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ABSTRACT 
Russia has been lagging behind most of the developed countries and 
some of the transition economies in terms of the corporate governance 
infrastructure (Woodruff, 2004). However, the challenge to develop 
strategic assets, particularly in the form of oil and gas reserves, produced 
the need to attract foreign capital and expertise. This in turn has led to a 
mounting pressure to improve fundamental characteristics of corporate 
governance such as the regulatory environment, enforcement 
mechanisms, corporate structure and transparency (Preobragenskaya, 
2004). Since strategic assets are at the very heart of the still undiversified 
Russian economy, it is easy to see how corporate governance has 
become one of the top priorities on the agenda of national reforms (EU-
Russia Roundtable on Corporate Governance, 2006). This study attempts 
to register the perceived change in the institutional context in Russia 
through analysing reported corporate disputes. Thematic template 
analysis is applied to the data on corporate conflicts taken from the 
English language Russian press. The results of the study suggest a 
positive change in perception about the role of formal institutions with 
reference to private entities and a negative change in terms of perception 
in relation to state entities. This conclusion is based on the comparison of 
corporate disputes and enforcement practices employed by the parties to 
corporate disputes reported in 1998 and 2006. On an academic level this 
study addresses a call in the literature to give more consideration to the 
particularities of the management environment and the fragility of its 
social systems in Russia (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2001) as well as 
complement understanding of Russian corporate governance by 
concentrating on the in-depth analysis of company behaviour (Iwasaki, 
2007). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Setting the Scene 
In academic terms the subject of corporate governance has been intensively 
researched, particularly in the last two decades. A lot of research has taken place 
in the Anglo-Saxon, European and South East Asian contexts because of the 
economic influence of these regions. However, since the beginning of the 
transition from command to market economy, scholars turned their attention to 
Russia. The magnitude of the undertaken change made the country a unique 
laboratory for testing the robustness of market institutions. Western academics 
(Andrei Shleifer1 and Bernard Black2) and finance providers (IMF, World Bank) 
conducted their experiments often not knowing what the result of proposed 
reforms would be. Since then, two opposing opinions were formed. The first 
opinion led by Shleifer (2005) defended the core of the transition and justified the 
reforms arguing that Russia became a ‗normal country‘. The second group of 
academics led by Black (2000) remained pessimistic about the very foundation of 
Russia‘s capitalism and directed their research efforts at explaining ‗what went 
wrong‘. Both camps produced highly insightful academic studies in support of their 
opposing opinions. Under such circumstances an academic truce can only be 
achieved by celebrating the complexity of the task at hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Andrei Shleifer (Harvard Business School) was one of the key privatisation advisers in the earlier stages of 
Russia’s transition. 
2
 Bernard Black (University of Texas) led the development of the Russian law on Joint Stock Companies, 
1996. 
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1.2 Brief Historical Background of Russia’s Transition  
 
The Russian socialist experiment ended because it produced a low standard of 
living for the majority of Soviet people; crisis of the single party system was 
profound; extreme militarization of the economy could not be sustained; difficult 
interethnic relations were exacerbating; and the central planning system was 
suffering from unprecedented levels of inefficiency. All of these factors led to a 
systemic economic and political crisis. The communist regime in Russia had no 
reserve capacity to outlive the crisis particularly exacerbated by the falling global 
oil prices (the last line of economic defence previously relied upon by the regime). 
The sentiment in favour of the radical regime change was felt strongly among 
Russian population which by the late 1980s began to realise and understand many 
of the deficiencies of the system. That sentiment was very much shared by ‗the 
West‘ which saw communism as a significant threat to the free market ideology 
and hence was prepared to allocate substantial resources to the task of changing 
the Soviet system irrevocably.  
 
No nation had ever attempted a transition from central planning to market 
economy on such a large scale3. Hence, those who happened to be in charge of 
determining the future of Russia‘s transition had little idea as to the impact of the 
contemplated reforms on the country and its economy. Nevertheless, the 
consultation process had to be quick because the reformers and their western 
advisors were fearful that the ‗window opportunity‘ (Aslund, 1995, p.1) will close 
and the communists will re-gain their power grip over the country. Decisive action 
was required without delay.  
 
Gorbachev was a proponent of a gradual change. The basic idea here was to 
retain the Soviet corporate infrastructure, but gradually reform sections of the 
economy aligning it more and more with the capitalist model. This is of course a 
reasonable approach to the task of steering the economy through the transition of 
an unprecedented scale. However, politically Gorbachev was in a very difficult 
position. The general mood of the public was biased against the communist party 
                                                          
3
 The radical nature of the changes undergone are analysed in Aslund (1995), a western advisor directly 
involved in the reform process. 
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member when he was talking about gradualism. The mood on the streets, in the 
parliament (Duma), on television, at schools, in universities and at work was to 
change things radically. The more radical the proposed reforms, the more short-
term support the reformers were bound to get from the population and the West 
who long wished the demise of the old regime.  
 
Based on the above set of circumstances it is not surprising that Russia, in 
contrast with Czech Republic and Poland, opted for a speedy privatisation without 
giving much thought to what might happen as a consequence of turning the whole 
country into shareholders almost overnight. Nevertheless, in the space of months 
(rather than years or even better decades) 6,477 joint stock companies were 
registered. Between 1992 and 1993 privatization vouchers were made available to 
150 million Russian citizens (Boycko & Shleifer, 1993).  
 
Some argued that the reformers must have known that the experiment with private 
property of this magnitude was destined to fail in the absence of even the most 
basic market institutions (Black et al., 2000) and culture. The country of 
shareholders did not have a single mechanism of addressing the massive agency 
problem that the reformers hastily created when vouchers (in essence shares) in 
Russian industrial assets were distributed among the general population.  
 
It has been argued that it was only logical that the country turned into a criminal 
haven. Then, it was not unusual for the most valuable assets to change hands at 
one thousandth of their real value (Boycko & Shleifer, 1993). Ordinary 
shareholders saw their wealth expropriated by means of schemes involving the 
crudest forms of transfer pricing and asset stripping in the best cases and physical 
violence in the worst examples. Under such conditions, the quality of the evolving 
ownership class left much to be desired. The compromise that the reformers 
ultimately accepted meant that the subsequent stages of Russia‘s transition had to 
continuously account for the corrupt nature of the post privatization environment 
and consequently (or as a cause of corrupt privatization) a highly deficient 
ownership class (see appendix 10 for a list of Russian Oligarchs). 
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1.3 Rationale for the Study 
The task of developing Russian corporate governance in line with ‗Western‘ 
approaches has been growing in relevance as more and more companies in 
Russia seek to raise finance on foreign capital markets. In relation to the UK, the 
issue has become pertinent with a considerable increase in the number of Initial 
Public Offerings of large Russian enterprises on the London Stock Exchange (EU-
Russia Roundtable, 2006). 
However, meaningful investigations of corporate governance practices in Russia 
have been hindered by difficulties associated with gaining sufficient access to 
enterprise data and a general lack of transparency (Fox & Heller, 2000). 
Consequently, most studies attempted to avoid company-specific investigations by 
examining corporate governance on the macro level. Studies of this nature tend to 
investigate the development of corporate governance mechanisms, concluding 
with the implications for the companies operating in the environment. In the 
Russian context researchers conducted numerous investigations that attempt to 
assess the impact of various types of ownership, remuneration practices, board 
structures and levels of disclosure on corporate performance (Iwasaki, 2007). 
These typically positivistic studies often arrive at contradictory conclusions and 
rarely demonstrate a strong correlation between a certain corporate governance 
characteristic and firm performance. This study however, attempts to contribute to 
the body of knowledge by adding to the understanding of how companies 
operating in Russia responded to the efforts directed at changing the institutional4 
environment and corporate governance in the country. This research places 
emphasis on the actual company practice as opposed to a reform-driven analysis 
of the institutional context. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 We use a standard definition of “institutions as rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that 
structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behaviour” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, pp. 
727). 
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1.4 Summary of Contribution to Literature 
With reference to studies of corporate governance in the Russian context, a great 
deal of emphasis has been placed on empirical research. A number of 
comprehensive surveys of the discipline in the Eastern European context 
(Djankov, 2002) and more specifically with reference to Russia (Iwasaki, 2007) call 
for more qualitative and multi-faceted approaches to studying the subject of 
corporate governance. The current study addresses this general gap in the 
literature by analysing reported corporate disputes and methods of their resolution 
as key determinants of the change taking place with reference to Russian 
corporate environment. In doing so, the study additionally contributes to the 
literature on the role of media in shaping corporate governance environment. 
More specifically, the trajectory of the development of Russian corporate 
governance institutions has been debated by a number of academics. There is no 
agreement in contemporary literature on whether formal institutions are becoming 
an effective mechanism of overseeing corporate environment. Some conclude that 
moderate improvements have been achieved (Roberts, 2004), while others 
emphasise great inefficiencies of the legal system and the lack of the rule of law 
(Kochetygova et al., 2004). This study directly contributes to this academic debate 
by studying the dynamics of the dispute resolution process in the country. 
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1.5 Objectives of the Study 
In order to address the research question, the following objectives have been 
formulated: 
- To review the literature on corporate governance in the Russian context, 
present definitions of corporate disputes and enforcement practices and 
discuss the role of media in the context of the clearly defined research 
question (Chapter 2); 
- To select and justify a method of data collection and analysis that would 
most effectively address the research question. (Chapter 3); 
- To examine the extent of media coverage of corporate disputes in 1998 and 
2006 (Chapter 4, section 1); 
- To analyse the nature of reported corporate disputes and methods of their 
resolution in the two years of the study (Chapters 4, sections 2, 3 and 4); 
- To triangulate the data by interviewing reporters (Chapter 4, section 5); 
- To examine forces that stimulate and prevent the development of corporate 
governance institutions in Russia (Chapter 5); 
- To reach conclusions about the institutional change in the country based on 
the analysis of corporate disputes and methods of their resolution as well 
as analyse limitations of the study and propose further research (Chapters 
5). 
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1.6 Research Question 
In relation to transition economies, the development of greater investor protection, 
increased market control, a shift towards the rule of adequate laws and a more 
sophisticated judiciary are all complex processes which individually and as a 
whole are not subject to a single reform. The complexity arises from a great variety 
of both dynamic and inert factors at work. Looking for a relationship between a 
narrowly defined development and the trend in institutional dynamics is unlikely to 
produce meaningful results for that very reason. 
In order to contribute to the understanding of the institutional development in 
Russia, the following two factors are proposed for consideration: 
1. Reported conflicts and methods of their resolution at the beginning of 
transition 
2. Reported conflicts and methods of their resolution in the modern 
environment 
The reason for choosing reported corporate conflicts as a unit of analysis is 
twofold: firstly, there is an underlying assumption that reported material relatively 
accurately mirrors the actual environment (Dyck et al., 2008) and secondly, any 
system of governance is best tested by its exposure to situations with opposing 
interests and claims (Fox & Heller, 2000). The key research question here is: 
- What is the change in foreign investor perception about the institutional 
dynamics in Russian corporate governance based on the comparison of 
corporate disputes pertaining to two different time periods of Russia‟s 
transition? 
In the context of the above question, the term corporate dispute is defined as a 
conflict of interests among identifiable stakeholders which is usually (but not 
necessarily) followed by a resolution process. 
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1.7 Methodology 
This study is conducted from the philosophical stance of pragmatism. It is a 
predominantly qualitative piece of research with a limited quantitative dimension. 
Current investigation is informed by case studies of corporate disputes taken from 
the archival material of the Moscow Times. The data on corporate disputes covers 
two years, 1998 and 2006 and is analysed using the method termed thematic 
template analysis (King, 1998). Additionally, semi-structured interviews are 
conducted with 5 reporters of the newspaper in order to complement and 
triangulate the data. Collected data is coded and categorized relative to the nature 
of corporate conflicts and enforcement strategies. 
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of 6 chapters namely, introduction, literature review, 
methodology, data analysis, findings and discussion and conclusion. All chapters 
begin with an introduction and are concluded with a brief summary of the main 
points.  
The literature review chapter consist of three sections. The first section outlines 
the subject of corporate governance in general and in Russia. Moreover, the 
institutional context in the country is also discussed. The second section deals with 
the definition of corporate disputes and enforcement practices while the last 
section explains the role of the media in the context of this study. Each section is 
concluded with further clarification of the research question. Finally, an outline of 
the gap in the literature is provided. 
The methodology chapter outlines the philosophical perspective, methodology 
and main method of data collection as well as analysis. Additionally, the chapter 
presents an outline of original contribution and methodological limitations of the 
study.  
The data analysis chapter is divided into five sections. It is the largest and most 
prominent chapter of the thesis. The first section provides a numerical overview of 
the data set; the second, third and fourth sections present an analysis of the 
content of reported corporate disputes while the final section contains an analysis 
of the interview material. 
The findings and discussion chapter presents the key drivers behind institutional 
change in Russia and original contribution of the study. 
The conclusion chapter revisits the research objectives, discusses limitations of 
the study and provides suggestions for further research in the area.  
 
Page 10 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview 
of the subject of corporate governance in general and, more specifically, with 
reference to Russia. Corporate governance is discussed in the context of agency 
theory. The section also includes a description of the institutional context in the 
country outlining major forces behind the change. Here, the relationship between 
formal and informal institutions is described. The second section defines corporate 
disputes, and presents the literature on enforcement practices in the country. This 
section introduces a priori themes that are used at the stage of data analysis. The 
last section of the literature review discusses the effects of media coverage on 
corporate governance. Here, the link to agency theory is maintained through 
considering reputational costs of disputes/violations.  
Each section is concluded with a refinement of the research question of this study. 
Finally, an outline of the key areas of literature to which this research contributes 
to will be presented. 
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Section 1: Corporate Governance and Russia 
This section outlines the subject of corporate governance, provides a theoretical underpinning of 
the study and discusses the institutional context in Russia. 
 
1.1 Subject of Corporate Governance 
In its all-encompassing sense, corporate governance is a discipline which is 
concerned with the way companies are managed. In the Anglo-Saxon context, 
there has been a particular focus on public companies where ownership and 
control are separate. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is the core 
theoretical underpinning that provides the context/framework within which 
relationships between those who delegate (principals) and those who manage 
(agents) need to be considered. 
In the context of a commercial public entity, managers are the agents and 
shareholders are the principals. The theory assumes self-centred actions of the 
agents and warns about the agency costs that inevitably arise when management 
are left unsupervised. In this context, the role of corporate governance is more 
narrowly defined and manifests itself through various control mechanisms that 
shareholders need to put in place in order to protect their interests and ensure that 
the profit-maximisation agenda is followed. Board composition, disclosure, 
remuneration policies, accountability, internal and external audits are all control 
mechanisms that seek to reduce the agency costs by both minimising the extent of 
insider dealing (managers acting in self-interest) and encouraging profit-
maximisation.  
The regulatory core of corporate governance is in the fiduciary duty of directors to 
act in the interests of shareholders. In the Anglo-Saxon context, this concept has 
been around for some time. However, fiduciary duty is not a straightforward 
regulatory concept. It requires a sophisticated institutional infrastructure, 
particularly when it comes to arbitration. The concept of fiduciary duty is difficult to 
enforce because of its complexity which arises from the deliberately loose or non-
prescriptive legal underpinning. 
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Below is the discussion of the role of corporate law and formal institutions in 
achieving the desired effect of shareholder-oriented corporate governance5. 
 
1.2 The Role of Legislation 
The design of corporate law as a concept will depend upon its role within the 
business context. Varying national factors determine the role and hence the nature 
of the legal provisions (Black et al., 1999). 
The primary role of corporate legislation in developed economies such as Great 
Britain is to facilitate the business process. Here, company law and its reform are 
designed in such a way as to assist the decision making process aimed at wealth 
maximization, which is indeed the principal goal of corporate legislation (Black & 
Kraakman, 1996). The law acts in unison with supporting institutions that oversee 
the management and typically reacts to the anomaly of expropriation and/or 
management malfunction (Black & Kraakman, 1996). This fact allows a greater 
level of flexibility in the way a public organisation is run. Ideally, good managers 
need a complete decision-making freedom in their pursuit of wealth maximization 
as some restrictions might prevent profitable deals from taking place. On the other 
hand, investors require a certain level of protection which will minimize the risk of 
misappropriation and bad practice (figure 2.1). In developed economies, this role 
of legislation is supported by the effects of competition, relatively efficient stock 
markets, and a developed accounting profession, together with enforceable and 
clear rules against expropriation (Avilov, et al., 1999). All of these result in a 
reasonably developed management culture which, coupled with informed investor 
expectations, lead to a relatively healthy business environment6. Therefore, most 
compulsory provisions are redundant, and those which are necessary tend to be in 
                                                          
5
 The stakeholder approach to corporate governance is not discussed, because it is argued, that in the 
Russian context of barbarian capitalism, as depicted by Freeland (2000), managers and oligarchs are not 
driven by anything other than self-interest. Moreover, Russia’s transition produced enough confusion in the 
minds of indigenous managers and newly established owners, that an additional complexity associated with 
balancing stakeholder needs is simply prohibitive. Indeed, most academic studies of Russia’s transition 
(Shleifer & Treisman, 2005; Mueller, 2006; Black, Kraakman, & Tarassova, 2000) consider corporate 
governance from the Anglo-Saxon perspective. 
6
 That is not to say that the system is 100% protected from corporate scandals which continue to affect 
even the most developed economies. 
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line with what is usual and most logical practice anyway. Furthermore, courts have 
a sufficient level of expertise and enforcement capabilities to apply the concept of 
fiduciary duty as a measure against blatant cases of managerial misconduct 
(Black et al., 1999). Whatever is in the grey area of managerial practice and does 
not fall into the ‗bright line‘ category of corporate misconduct, is left for the markets 
to interpret. The process is facilitated by a number of mechanisms that seek to 
protect the interests of shareholders (principals) against self-centred motives of 
the management (agents). In developed economies this structure, although not 
faultless, more often achieves the required balance of power to the mutual benefit 
of those who provide the finance and those who manage the business. 
Figure 2.1: Role of Legislation in Developed Economies 
     Role of Legislation 
 
 
 
Investor Protection       Managerial Freedom 
 
 
 
1.3 Corporate Governance in Russia 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has been struggling to create a 
sufficiently robust institutional infrastructure. The country‘s transition from 
command to free-market economy did not produce the results most reformers had 
hoped for. Endemic corruption that paralysed the efforts to reform the economy is 
the most commonly cited reason behind the failure (Black et al., 2000; Black et al., 
2002; Levin & Satarov, 2000; Roaf, 2000). There is no consensus among 
academics as to what caused such unprecedented levels of corruption.  
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Some blamed the ‗shock therapy‘7 strategy of privatising national assets (Black, 
2002; Ellerman, 2001) admitting that the input of Western advisors was 
counterproductive. Yet others defend the credibility of ‗shock therapy‘ explaining 
the rise in corruption as an inevitable side effect of such a dramatic transition 
(Shleifer & Treisman, 2005). 
Whatever the underlining reasons, the privatisation chapter of the Russian 
transition was closed (at least temporarily) by numerous reassurances coming 
from president Putin that there would not be any centralised efforts to 
review/reallocate existing property rights at a national level. The significant 
shareholding structures in Russia appear to be more stable with the exception of a 
number of politically motivated instances of de facto re-nationalisation. It could be 
argued that Russia has paid the price for changing its regime by surrendering key 
assets to certain individuals, whose empires were allowed to flourish in return for 
unconditioned political support. Paradoxically, those who gained control in the 
lawless environment of 1990s Russia have recently become the most active 
proponents of the reforms that call for the rule of law (Woodruff, 2004).  
 
1.4 The Role of Legislation in Russia 
The role of corporate legislation in developing economies such as Russia is 
fundamentally different from that in developed economies. Here, the primary role 
of legislation is the protection of investors‘ interests from the self-benefiting actions 
of insiders. The law on joint-stock companies in Russia provides reassurance of 
the status and position of the company in the eyes of investors (Black et al., 1999). 
This is a challenging task, particularly with the absence of the essential market 
institutions and the required social and management traditions and culture. The 
balance in favour of investor protection inevitably diminishes managerial freedom 
because it comes in the form of compulsory rules and prescribed practices. It 
diminishes managerial freedom because the business process is too complex and 
                                                          
7
 In the context of Russia’s transition from command to market economy, shock therapy refers to a process 
of rapid privatisation of previously state-owned assets. Although defended by some academics (Shleifer & 
Triesman, 2005) the practice was severely criticised because, at the time, the country’s institutional 
infrastructure was completely unprepared to deal with such a drastic change (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 
2000). 
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deals with too many uncertainties to be systematically consistent with ‗bright line‘ 
rules which need to be blindly adhered to. However, in the Russian context there 
is a lot of rationale in sacrificing managerial freedom to act in the interests of 
shareholder rights. The argument here is that it is that same managerial freedom 
which is likely to lead to misappropriation of shareholder funds if deliberately 
misused by insiders (figure 2.2). Furthermore, an ownership structure where 
majority control typically belongs to insiders and outside shareholders take up the 
role of the minority makes the governance structure in Russia even more 
vulnerable to expropriation practices. This ultimately leads to the negative political 
side-effect of growing public dissatisfaction with the concept of market economy 
and property rights. This political pressure further emphasises the protective role 
of prescribed legislation that inevitably curtails managerial freedom. 
Figure 2.2: Role of Legislation in Developing Economies 
     Role of Legislation 
 
 
 
          Investor Protection                 Managerial Freedom 
 
 
 
1.5 Institutional Infrastructure in Russia 
In terms of the institutional infrastructure in Russia, Black & Tarassova (2002) 
have discussed the complexity of the required reforms and their interrelatedness8. 
Ten broad categories that influence the core of the required institutional reform 
have been proposed in the order of importance: anti-corruption efforts, tax reform, 
macro-economic policy, small business development, commercial law reform, law 
enforcement institutions, competition and trade policy, privatisation and 
                                                          
8
 The academics produced a diagram that depicts elements of legal, institutional and microeconomic reform 
required in Russia. The extent of the complexity of the task of reforming formal institutions is truly 
incredible with e.g. cultural and religious components being an important addition to the more obvious 
elements related to anti-corruption and economic reform. 
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restructuring, banking and land reforms. It has been proposed that during the first 
three years of Putin‘s rule some improvement in Russia‘s business environment 
has been achieved9. More recently, Woodruff, (2004) proposed an account of the 
institutional context in Russia by examining Russian privatisation and subsequent 
conflicts over corporate property rights. He proposed that the clarification of the 
political trajectory will lead to stronger property rights in Russia. Roberts, (2004) 
discussed the relationship between corporate governance practices of Russian 
companies and the internationalisation of the financial markets. He identified a 
general trend towards the Anglo-Saxon model and a notable improvement in the 
conduct of specific companies when they become exposed to international capital 
markets. 
Generally, this stream of literature concludes that over the past decade, there has 
been a moderate improvement in the Russian institutional infrastructure and 
corporate governance in general. However, it is impossible to tell whether the 
business climate is changing from within or simply looks glossier because of the 
influx of petrol dollars.  
Furthermore, there is a consensus among both academics and practitioners that 
some important aspects of corporate governance in Russia still lag far behind 
international standards. It has been previously mentioned that the lack of the rule 
of law and dysfunctional enforcement mechanisms represent the most important 
deficiency in Russian corporate environment. Below is a review of the challenges 
to the rule of law and alternative enforcement strategies that exist in the country. 
 
1.6 The Rule of Law in Russia 
In general terms, the rule of law describes a fair and formal process by means of 
which all aspects of society function. Here, arbitration is based on clear rules, 
which ideally, everyone is aware of. Enforcement of these rules is carried out by 
means of formal institutions such as courts which have the power to sanction non-
compliers. Moreover, the severity of sanctioning must be strong enough to act as a 
deterrent for potential violators and non-compliers. In order for a country to have 
                                                          
9
 Albeit at the expense of one or two oligarchs who had alternative political ambitions.   
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the rule of law, existence of uncorrupt formal institutions is necessary (Charkham, 
p.5, 2005). 
‗The un-rule of law‘ is a term used in the work of Gel‘man (2004) and refers to the 
dominance of informal institutions and networks which act as a major obstacle to 
the development of formal institutions and hence the rule of law. In the Russian 
context, it has been argued, that the dominance of such institutions together with 
selective application of law and corrupt regulatory bodies present one of the major 
challenges to the development of corporate governance (Kochetigova et al., 
2004). 
More specifically, capital markets are directly contingent to the rule of law in that 
investors‘ confidence will be high in an environment of homogeneously enforced 
laws. Confidence in formal institutions translates into a significant reduction in the 
cost of capital (Mueller, 2006) and stimulates the flow of resources to companies. 
Moreover, a positive correlation between the rule of law and the size of capital 
markets has been suggested by a number of prominent studies in the area of 
corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1997; Modigliani & Perotti 1997; La Porta et 
al., 1998). In the west, capital markets are relatively developed, in part for the 
above reason.  
Although as far as Russia is concerned, there is no evidence that the size of the 
financial markets can be affected solely by the improvements of the legal 
infrastructure (Pistor & Xu, 2005), it is generally agreed that effective regulations 
are the ‗minimum requirement‘ for the developed capital markets and corporate 
governance (Roberts, 2004; Pistor & Xu 2002; Pistor & Xu, 2005).  
In Russia however, to a large extent, capital markets have been taken out of the 
equation. The line of causality that has brought about this effect appears unclear. 
It has been argued that the root cause of underdeveloped capital markets in 
Russia has been the rent-seeking motives of government officials and other 
influential stakeholders who prevent the required development of the legal 
framework (Modigliani & Perotti, 1997). Some suggested that the swift change 
from state rule to the market model created the legal vacuum that gave rise to 
massive self-dealing opportunities and discouraged potential investors (Black et 
al., 2000). Yet others explain this fact in terms of the genuine evolutional process 
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inherent to and typical of regime change (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005). Regardless 
of causality, the fact that there is the ‗unrule of law‘ and underdeveloped capital 
markets is difficult to challenge in modern day Russia. In broader terms, the 
phenomenon can be attributed to the lack of the capacity of the state and the 
legacy of the past (Gel'man, 2004). The latter is a constant feature although with 
time, its effect is likely to erode as ‗new history‘ and culture is created (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2004). The former however, is a more dynamic feature in that it is subject 
to political forces and the subsequent change in the design and effectiveness of 
formal institutions10.  
It has been suggested that the absence of the rule of law leads to the dominance 
of informal institutions, which in turn prevent the development of legal 
infrastructures. This is the case in Russia (Gel'man, 2004; Preobragenskaya & 
McGee, 2004). Informal institutions here are likely to create non-contractual 
enforcement mechanisms which will allow influential actors to collaborate within 
closed networks,  for example cross holdings and private clubs (Modigliani & 
Perotti, 1997). These social networks transmit informal rules that fill the gap 
created by inchoate laws and/or ineffective enforcement. In terms of the latter, 
informal institutions tend to be characterised by different mechanisms of 
enforcement in comparison to the formal ones exercised by the police and courts. 
‗Informal sanctioning mechanisms are often subtle, hidden and even illegal. They 
may range from hostile remarks, gossip, ostracism, and other displays of social 
disapproval to extrajudicial violence‘ (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 733). 
It is critically important to have a deep understanding of the informal rules and 
associated enforcement mechanisms prior to committing to a contractual 
relationship with a partner who is conditioned by such an environment. The 
investigation needs to produce substantial knowledge about the informal 
arrangements in the Russian business community and the power distribution 
within it.  
The Russian government headed by Putin‘s administration has achieved some 
success in regaining the capacity of the state (Gel'man, 2004). This, together with 
                                                          
10
 This dynamic is most visible when a new political clan comes to power. It took less than a year of Putin’s 
presidency for analyst to declare an improvement in the country’s business environment. 
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marginal improvements in the legal infrastructure should lead to a redressed 
balance in favour of the rule of law (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2003). This fact, 
assisted by the change in culture and the need to attract foreign capital should 
lead to the diminishing relevance of the informal institutions. It is expected that 
these trends will have a positive influence on the development of capital markets 
and reduce the importance of the informal networks. However, there are active 
forces opposed to this change. These forces are represented by the desire to 
retain power on the part of the informal institutions and by corrupted officials 
resisting institutional reform. A positive trend in the institutional context is likely to 
happen where the forces behind establishing the rule of law prevail. This would 
lead to opportunities for the development of the corporate governance system in 
Russia and bring it in line with western practice. Conversely, if the forces resisting 
this change prevail, the negative trend may lead to a threat of deterioration. 
Hence, it is proposed that opportunity for improvement will be substantiated if 
corporate governance reforms make formal institutions stronger and informal ones 
weaker. 
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Figure 2.3: Dynamics of the Institutional Change in Russia 
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1.7 Research Question Revisited 
Any corporate governance system is best tested by its exposure to situations with 
opposing interests and claims. Hence disputes are chosen as the unit of analysis 
for this study. The key research question here is whether there is a noticeable 
change in the composition and type/style of institutional involvement in the process 
of corporate dispute resolution. By analysing both disputes and methods of their 
resolution in the Russian environment, the researcher seeks to identify influential 
parties and assess the nature of their involvement in the process of resolution. 
Such analysis will facilitate the identification of both positive and negative forces 
within the environment that explain the changing nature of the institutional 
infrastructure and corporate governance. 
This method of analysing corporate governance is deemed more applicable to less 
developed countries and transition economies where courts are generally less 
capable of resolving corporate disputes adequately and stakeholders have to 
employ a variety of methods to protect their interests11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Conversely, in countries with a developed legal infrastructure, a dispute is normally identified by a legal 
action. In other words, in an instance of a conflict, affected parties trust legal arbitration and accept the 
authority of the courts. 
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Section 2: Corporate Disputes and Enforcement Practices 
This section provides a definition of corporate disputes and enforcement practices prevalent in 
Russia. 
 
2.1 Defining Corporate Disputes 
Altogether only two academic studies have been found that provide a 
comprehensive review of the nature of corporate disputes in Russia. Both studies 
seek to provide a holistic view of prevailing value-destroying practices which are 
unique to the Russian context. Moreover, agency theory is featured in both studies 
and serves as the theoretical prism through which corporate violations are 
categorised. 
The most recent attempt sub-divided corporate violations into disenfranchisement 
and dilution practices (Dyck et al., 2008). The former category refers to attempts 
by controlling shareholders to prevent other stakeholders from influencing 
corporate decisions. Here, the practice ranges from corporate bullying to 
preventing access to general meetings. The second type of violation refers to 
various forms of share dilution (closed share issues, unfair share swaps, self-
dealing transactions, creditors reallocating assets to themselves via bankruptcy 
proceedings, flawed appraisals of assets and other less obvious forms of share 
dilution).  
The second categorisation was proposed by Fox & Heller (2000) who developed a 
framework of Russian corporate governance pathologies. The framework and 
‗pathologies‘ set the context and explain the nature of corporate disputes in the 
country. Here corporate conflicts are also divided into two broad areas: non-
maximisation of residuals and non pro-rata distributions (appendix 2). The first 
broad type of corporate violations refers to a failure to manage corporate entities in 
a wealth-maximising fashion. Here, managerial incompetence, managerial 
inaction, lack of authority, and other factors12 that prevent creation of wealth are 
mentioned. The second category refers to inadequate compensation for 
shareholders in proportion to their ownership stake13. Failure to distribute claims 
                                                          
12
 Both internal and external to a firm. 
13
 Once wealth has been generated, it needs to be distributed fairly. 
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constitutes a corporate violation of the second type. This category is further 
subdivided into diversion of assets when corporate property is squandered and 
diversion of claims when existing shareholdings are diluted.  
Furthermore, the Russian law on Joint Stock Companies (1996) has been 
reviewed for additional information about potential categories of corporate 
disputes. Here, the foundation, re-organisation and liquidation of a company, 
register of shareholders, issue and redemption of shares and other securities, 
payment of dividends, board of directors, major transactions, self-dealing, control, 
disclosure and accountability have all been identified as key areas where potential 
corporate conflicts can occur.  
 
2.2 Enforcement Practices 
The low level of law enforcement in Russia has been identified as a central 
problem that renders the very existence of most governance institutions virtually 
ineffective (Kochetygova et al., 2004). The mass privatization strategy adopted by 
the Russian policy makers and encouraged by influential Western advisors has 
resulted in a questionably just and legitimate ownership transformation process of 
a large proportion of valuable national assets (Black, et al., 2000; Fox & Heller, 
2000; Woodruff, 2004). Miss-allocation of property rights destroyed previously 
established matters of de facto managerial ownership making it impossible to exert 
legal control over the process (Woodruff, 2004). Consequent enlargement of the 
ownership chains made law enforcement impossible in the country where 
available legal mechanisms did not have enough time to readjust to meet the 
challenges of the newly established market economy.  
As previously stated, those who gained control in the lawless environment of 
1990s Russia have recently become the most active proponents of the reforms 
that call for the rule of law. Initially, these reforms were allegedly blocked by the 
same individuals at the onset of the transition. The argument here is twofold. 
Russia is ruled by unscrupulous owners who became rich by misappropriation of 
the economy at the time when it was most vulnerable and defenceless. They are 
the individuals responsible for practically every known pathology of corporate 
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governance (Fox & Heller, 2000). On the other hand however, current owners, 
having achieved the desired status, developed their understanding of the market 
economy to the extent necessary to realise that absolute legitimacy is the only way 
forward if the great potential of capital markets is to be tapped into (Woodruff, 
2004). A fundamental shift towards greater legitimacy is an indication of the 
existence of the motivating factors dictating law-consistent actions. The nature of 
the latter is not connected with a conscious effort towards legal reforms, but is to a 
large extent driven by non-legal motives, such as the desire to retain overall 
existing control over property rights. The non-legal motives are the ones that fall 
outside the sphere of legal sanctions and therefore do not require external 
enforcement14. The positive trend here is that regardless of the underling motive 
that determines the means, the end will invariably be justified by a more effective 
legal system. The study of the role of law in enterprise transactions contains the 
proof of the latter, and demonstrates that litigation can be an important and 
workable enforcement strategy in Russia (Hendley et al., 1999). However, in an 
environment where formal rules are contradictory and unstable, litigation can also 
be used as a business filter and barrier working in the interests of a small group of 
influential actors (Radaev, 2003). The fact that a number of enforcement strategies 
exist, suggests therefore that litigation is not the absolute determinant of corporate 
conflict resolutions. These strategies and their importance in relation to enterprise 
behaviour in Russia are considered hereunder. 
 
2.2.1 Relationship-Based Enforcement 
This form of enforcement uses the refusal to cooperate in the future as a main 
deterrent from breaking an agreement. It is most effective when it is difficult to find 
an alternative trading partner, investor, resource, etc. on the same economic terms 
(Johnson et al., 2001). 
Small, probing contracts, deals and arrangements play an important role in 
establishing the initial business contact. Typically, if unfavourable contractual 
                                                          
14
 In other words there is no need to compel an owner to act as an owner, because it is in his/her self-
interest to do so anyway. If self-interest can be better served by adhering to basic rules, than most owners 
will ensure that this is the case without the necessary legal enforcement. 
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conditions prevail at this stage, they will serve as a test of trustworthiness and help 
to acquire the practical experience of working with the chosen partner (Radaev, 
2003). These unfavourable conditions will act as an incentive not to break the 
terms of the agreement once the required level of understanding and acceptance 
has been achieved. It is important that the latter condition is followed by the 
subsequent improvement of the arrangement to the mutual benefit of the partners. 
This benefit comes in the form of both financial gains from the reduced cost of 
transactions, and the simplification of operating procedures. 
Knowledge of the background and specific characteristics of a partner will provide 
a degree of influence when it comes to the actor‘s willingness to conform to the 
terms of the agreement (Johnson et al., 2001). This influence is likely to be in the 
form of informal sanctions detrimental to the partner‘s reputation or social standing 
(Dyer, 1997). Clearly, such sanctions will have a greater leverage in relation to 
long established partners whose main asset is their reputation. Interestingly, it has 
been suggested that under such circumstances, litigation is also an effective 
strategy which paradoxically complements the relationship-based contracting in 
Russia (Radaev, 2003). 
Additionally, and as an indirect function of the above, trust is considered as a 
mechanism of enforcement, as the existence of such reduces the cost of 
transactions (Madhok, 2005; Madhok, 2006). Trust will act as an effective leverage 
of enforcement if preserving ‗goodwill trust‘ translates into greater savings on 
transactions in comparison with the savings resulting from non-compliance (Dyer, 
1997). Russia is a comparatively low trust country, characterised by ineffective 
formal institutions and frequent infringement of business contracts. It is no surprise 
that honesty in relations here is hard to achieve, but is generally regarded to be of 
great value (Radaev, 2003). 
It is important to acknowledge at this stage, that in international joint ventures, a 
degree of asymmetry will inevitably be present in relation to interpretation of the 
concept of trust (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). In Russia relationship contracting is the 
most significant enforcement strategy (Hendley et al., 1999). This is an important 
feature which to a large extent determines the required level of cooperation 
founded on trust. It is likely that the Russian companies will want to see a greater 
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level of trust facilitating enforcement in international ventures in a conscious effort 
to preserve confidentiality. It is this same confidentiality that has up until now 
blocked comprehensive corporate governance studies on the enterprise level (Fox 
& Heller, 2000). 
Relationship-based contracting is characterised by high set-up costs of collecting 
business data, but mitigated by lower transaction cost over a longer term (Dyer, 
1997). The latter consideration suggests that this enforcement strategy is 
particularly relevant when the parties involved are seeking continual commitment 
in an environment characterised by a weak legal infrastructure and poor 
institutional support. 
 
2.2.2 Self-Enforcement 
Self-enforcement is a widely used strategy in Russia as it does not require any 
participation from a third party (Thornton & Mikheeva, 1996). This is an important 
consideration since in Russia there is little predictability when it comes to dispute 
resolution by impersonal legal and market institutions. Here, applied mechanisms 
of enforcement seek to create a mutually beneficial arrangement. It is achieved by 
voluntarily giving up control over interests in non-enforceable agreements in return 
for control over interests in agreements where enforcement is possible. If a foreign 
partner invests in Russian assets which are vulnerable to expropriation, in the 
absence of prior working experience between the partners, the Russian partner 
must compensate by having an equivalent financial exposure in the jurisdiction or 
control of the foreign partner. (Hendley et al., 1999). These sanctions determine 
the ‗self-enforcing range‘, which is an indication of how robust the contract 
between the partners needs to be under volatile external conditions (Gow et al., 
2000; Gow & Swinnen, 2001). This enforcement strategy is considered an 
effective strategy when there is little knowledge or influence over the partner‘s 
behaviour. Despite the fact of the initial limitation on net investment, this 
arrangement leads to the build up of trust and reputation once the message of 
mutual benefit has been understood by the parties involved. Careful investigation 
of the reputation and track record of a potential partner can be carried out during 
this initial stage of cooperation characterised by formal self-enforcing 
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arrangements. Once the required level of confidence has been achieved, formal 
control can be relaxed, facilitating further investment and reducing transaction 
costs. This confidence however, has to be supported by economic consideration 
whereby future opportunities of cooperation must  outweigh immediate benefits 
from non-compliance (Thornton & Mikheeva, 1996). 
 
2.2.3 Third-Party Enforcement 
Third-party enforcement is gaining momentum in contemporary Russia (Hendley 
et al., 1999). It can be considered as a strategy which is one step closer to formal 
and official enforcement. To a certain extent the arbitration and enforcement 
function here is delegated to a third party. This kind of enforcement prevails over 
litigation only if business actors have a greater trust in the conflict-resolution 
assistance coming from a reputable third-party enterprise. This seems to be the 
case in Russia as businesses tend to view themselves as ‗us‘ versus ‗them‘, the 
latter meaning authorities (Radaev, 2003). It is for this reason that non-competing 
companies chose to be more open with each other, rather than the state (Hendley 
et al., 2000). 
Although there have been cases where the intervening third party had no direct 
interest in such enforcement, what really makes this strategy work is the 
interdependency of the organisations involved in the dispute (Hendley et al., 2000; 
Radaev, 2003). Conflict resolution is straightforward under the circumstances 
where there is a dominating entity capable of exerting control over adjacent 
companies. The rise of the Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs) in Russia is clearly 
an indication of the presence of such dominant forces with substantial 
enforcement capabilities. These industrial groups are fighting for legitimacy and 
general acceptance by the business community through being the most active 
proponents of law and order, a difficult and controversial task given the not so 
distant history of Russian privatization (Woodruff, 2004). 
By way of contrast, it has been suggested that FIGs do not play an important role 
in contract enforcement in Russia (Hendley et al., 1999; Hendley et al., 2000). 
However, the explanation for this might be the fact that most commonly these 
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groups are viewed as an absolute authority with extensive governance functions 
(Brown et al., 2000). It is considered impossible to challenge the latter and hence 
most companies simply comply even though their interests might not have been 
fairly represented. This fact is particularly relevant to market entry and competition 
disputes. 
Financial Industrial Groups in Russia are typically closely associated with a 
friendly bank. This fact makes these groups very effective at enforcement, 
particularly in relation to independent companies using the services of such a 
bank. However, since the Financial Industrial Groups in Russia have substantial 
economic powers, they have a propensity to use those powers in their own 
interests, thereby benefiting affiliates and disadvantaging independent entities 
(Kochetygova et al., 2004). This fact constitutes a degree of asymmetry in the 
actual enforcement role of the industrial groups in Russia. 
In the absence of a dominant player, third-party enforcement is carried out through 
business networks and associations (Hendley et al., 2000). Breaking the rules of 
such institutions may result in a non-performing company being added to a 
blacklist. This form of enforcement is effective when there are tangible benefits to 
be gained from being a member of such organisations. Business associations are 
at the evolving stage and are likely to gain relevance in Russia as the advantages 
from membership become more evident. 
Finally, as the capital markets develop further, auditors, debt rating agencies, 
security analysts, and other parties involved in floatation procedures gain 
importance and act as facilitators of the culture of formal compliance and 
enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998). This fact arises from the potential of a greater 
financial benefit when seeking floatation as available capital resources are on the 
increase. 
 
2.2.4 Private Enforcement 
Weak legal infrastructure has been a characteristic of post-Soviet Russia 
(Thornton & Mikheeva, 1996; Hay & Shleifer, 1998; Kochetygova et al., 2004). The 
state legal system is not used because it provides an inefficient and overly 
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expensive service. Moreover, businesses are unwilling to expose themselves fully 
to the authorities because as a rule their legitimacy could be called into question. 
Unsure of the officials‘ reaction to the inherent discrepancies in business conduct, 
companies are cautious about using the legal system in case it should turn against 
them (Hay et al., 1996; Hay & Shleifer, 1998). 
Private enforcement is believed to have taken an active role in filling the legal 
vacuum (Hay et al., 1996; Hendley et al., 2000). It has done so in two forms: 
private arbitration tribunals (Treteiskie courts) which are recognized by the existing 
legal system and private security firms which are generally perceived as less 
legitimate (Hendley et al., 2000). 
When using private arbitration tribunals disputants need to acquaint themselves 
with the varying procedural rules. This consideration, to a certain degree, limits the 
number of such tribunals that can be used simultaneously. This is specifically the 
case in Russia where Treteiskie courts typically specialize in a very narrow area of 
dispute resolution. Normally, parties to a contract would choose a ‗friendly tribunal‘ 
which is not necessarily completely biased, but is expected to protect the interests 
of the nominating party. On the other hand, the reputation of such tribunals is their 
most valuable asset since they exist on the fees paid by the companies. Such 
exposure to the market forces will compel the tribunals to provide the services 
which are required by the market participants. They will supply fair arbitration if the 
demand dictates so. 
As far as international cooperation is concerned, the likelihood of a Russian 
arbitrator being nominated is very low. The Stockholm or London courts are the 
much preferred option of the foreign partners where local legislation permits (Hay 
& Shleifer, 1998). 
Private security firms are considered for use when there is no pre-existing 
relationship between parties to a contract (Hendley et al., 2000). Their main 
advantage is the speed of enforcement. Private security firms are not concerned 
with looking for a fair dispute resolution, but simply represent the interests of the 
party that offers more money. Hence, their enforcement is not characterised by a 
great deal of procedural consistency, but may be chosen for its responsiveness. 
Frustrated with endless bureaucratic hurdles intrinsic in the official process, 
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companies may opt for the methods which represent the alternative extreme of the 
enforcement continuum, falling outside the legal zone. Interestingly, but not 
surprisingly, a lot of organisations fall into the trap of choosing this method of 
enforcement. It is a trap, because a great many companies in Russia operate in an 
extra-legal environment (Hay et al., 1996). Once exposed to a private security firm, 
companies find it almost impossible to disassociate themselves from the former. 
Private enforcement firms may and do use their knowledge of the extra-legal 
activities of a firm as a form of coercion in order to guarantee continuing 
cooperation.  
Generally, there is consensus among academics that private security firms‘ 
enforcement is inefficient in the new Russia (Thornton & Mikheeva, 1996; Hay & 
Shleifer, 1998; Hendley et al., 1999; Hendley et al., 2000; Yakushin, 2003; 
Woodruff, 2004). This type of enforcement, although speedy and powerful, is also 
described as incompetent, unstable, uncertain, costly and lacking confidentiality. 
Further study has found evidence of very limited use and importance of this type of 
enforcement in Russia (Hendley et al., 1999). However, it has also been  
suggested that it is impossible to eliminate private security firms from today‘s 
Russia because they have too big a role in protecting property and money (Hay & 
Shleifer, 1998). Hence, every effort should be made and is being made to readjust 
their practices to ones which are socially acceptable, a move which will lead to a 
possibility of future legal acknowledgement. This can be done by clearly 
separating the arbitration and enforcement functions. Here, arbitration should be 
carried out by more competent private arbitration tribunals and then enforced by 
means of private security firms. Bright line rules are the essential facilitators of the 
arbitration stage (Hay et al., 1996), while the existing social norms would dictate 
acceptable enforcement practices. This arguably more balanced allocation of 
enforcement responsibilities is expected to lead to a greater convergence of the 
dispute resolution mechanisms applied in Russia. Unfortunately, as a result of 
mass exposure to state oppression, Russian society has developed a great deal of 
tolerance towards violent enforcement. It is this passive complacency, a legacy of 
brutal state control that lends itself to the acceptance of violent enforcement in the 
business community (Levin & Satarov, 2000). However, with the new regime, the 
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social norms should rapidly evolve until eventually, violent measures become 
prohibitive. 
 
2.2.5 Administrative Levers of the State 
Government officials have significant influence and effective enforcement 
mechanisms at their disposal in relation to their involvement in dispute resolution. 
These mechanisms come primarily in the form of the officials‘ ability to assist or 
impede a company‘s efforts to ensure compliance, specifically along the 
bureaucratic dimension (Roaf, 2000). Moreover, officials have substantial arbitrary 
and discretionary powers as the legal system lags behind the country‘s market 
reforms (Roaf, 2000; Kochetygova et al., 2004). Therefore, affiliation with local 
authorities is regarded as a practical measure which facilitates the enforcement 
capabilities of an enterprise (Levin & Satarov, 2000). At the federal level, all major 
companies are careful about not upsetting the state since the latter is capable of 
selective action. The fact that in the 1990s it was almost impossible to conduct 
business in Russia absolutely legally, gives the state necessary leverage and 
control over influential enterprises. The trade-off here is an informal agreement 
between the officials and businessmen where the former agrees not to press for 
tax and other allegations so long as the latter supports and accepts the authority of 
the state. At its worst, this interaction may fall into the category of high-level 
corruption where the terms are dictated by a political and business elite (Roaf, 
2000). This situation is difficult to rectify because the interests of very influential 
parties are at stake. However, current administration makes systematic efforts to 
redress the balance by means of administrative reforms which seek to reduce the 
role of government, simplify procedures, improve the rulemaking process, and 
increase transparency (Black & Tarassova, 2002). All the above mentioned 
measures seek to reduce the levels of corruption among Russian officials at both 
local and federal levels.  
Currently, available administrative levers are used for two purposes and with 
completely different objectives with regards to contemporary businesses.  
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The first broad application is connected to the ongoing power struggle between the 
current government, and influential business parties in relation to political issues 
and ownership of strategic assets. Here, the former does not hesitate to use all the 
available administrative levers at its disposal. Withdrawal of licences, privileges, 
and approvals, ownership and tax claims, denial of access to valuable resources, 
privatization allegations and endless bureaucratic measures are applied on an 
arbitrary basis and are used to coerce non-conforming organisations (Levin & 
Satarov, 2000). Under such circumstances the efforts of the state can be highly 
organised, systematic and extremely effective.  
The second broad application of administrative levers in Russia is a decentralized 
and extremely ad hoc phenomenon whereby underpaid officials seek to exploit 
their position of power for personal gain (Levin & Satarov, 2000). Rules and 
regulations that encourage bribery and corruption, lead in themselves to a demand 
for the creation of more official posts, further expanding a self-perpetuating 
administrative sector. The latter has then to come up with more rules and 
regulations so that more bribes can be collected. At one time, the whole of the 
Russian economy was infected by this characteristic (Black et al., 2000; Levin & 
Satarov, 2000; Roaf, 2000). The ongoing administrative reform is primarily 
directed at tackling this particular misuse of the administrative levers. 
 
2.2.6 Shadow of Enforcement 
Threats of enforcement act as an enforcement strategy in their own right. There 
are two directions a company can pursue within this category of enforcement in 
Russia. The first direction is also applicable to more developed countries and is 
frequently referred to as the shadow of the law (Hendley et al., 1999). Threats to 
pursue legal actions act as a robust enough deterrent from breaking the terms of a 
contract, particularly if the latter includes collateral or penalty clauses. It is different 
from self-enforcement in that here, although as a last resort, the parties still do rely 
on taking the case to court. Under these circumstances, the actors involved in the 
conflict accept the authority of the court and its enforcement capabilities. However, 
ultimately a non-conforming business partner might choose to comply and not use 
the services of the legal system because of the associated high legal costs and 
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the potential imposition of sanctions. The threat of legal action is an effective 
enforcement strategy in Russia where penalty clauses and official letters of 
complaint often provide room for further negotiation rather than initiate legal action 
(Hendley et al., 2000). 
The second direction involves the threat of private enforcement and is generally 
regarded as more specific to Russian circumstances. This strategy is applicable in 
situations when the characteristics of a partnership are such that legal action is 
impossible or ineffective. If the parties to a contract recognize that their 
interactions fall outside the legal enforcement range, they will turn to private 
security firms (Hay & Shleifer, 1998; Black & Tarassova, 2002). As discussed 
earlier, such firms are expensive to use and once employed, they are impossible 
to disassociate from. However, because private enforcement is responsive and 
powerful, it is feared by most market participants and therefore the potential use of 
such methods sends a strong signal to the non-complying party. Here, companies 
tend to disclose which private enforcement agency they have access to at the 
initial stage of cooperation and in most cases this will be sufficient to ensure 
compliance within the terms of the agreement. In practice there has been a fairly 
low instance of resorting to the actions taken by the actual agency (Hendley et al., 
1999). This is indicative of the fact that this strategy does not require aggressive 
actions, as parties will look for a mutually acceptable solution with the fear of 
private enforcement serving almost as a motivating factor. According to some 
academics, this enforcement capability creates a unique business environment in 
Russia which reinforces control over parties with potentially conflicting interests 
and helps to maintain the status quo.  
 
2.2.7 Litigation 
The most prominent safeguard against non-compliance employed in the West is 
the legal contract (Dyer, 1997). This type of enforcement requires a high level of 
formality in the interactions which are supported by the power of institutions in an 
environment of  maximum transparency (Roaf, 2000). In Russia however, the 
effectiveness of this enforcement strategy has been questioned. It has been 
argued that corrupt officials right across the institutional infrastructure render this 
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enforcement strategy unusable for legitimate organisations (Levin & Satarov, 
2000). Contradictory and incomplete laws coupled with incompetent and 
inexperienced judges result in an unacceptably low level of predictability within the 
legal system. Finally, this system has no effective means of enforcing its decisions 
once a ruling has been made (Hay & Shleifer, 1998). 
Conversely, it has been suggested that a marginal improvement has been 
achieved through the ongoing legal reform (Black & Tarassova, 2002). Some 
critical elements of the legal system are being addressed and in doing so 
important legal loopholes are being closed. This encourages the use of litigation 
as a plausible enforcement strategy in Russia (Hendley et al., 1999). By 
addressing critical issues associated with the tax system, commercial law, legal 
aspects of enforcement institutions, competition and trade policies, banking 
reform, market reform, and land reform the central government is making a 
systematic attempt to re-establish law and order in the country. Proposed laws are 
set to accommodate current business practices better and seek to work with rather 
than against already established organisations. Arbitrary dimension of the legal 
system is diminishing. Bright-line laws are being introduced and contradictory laws 
eradicated. As a result, the bureaucratic system is becoming less prone to 
corruption and more efficient at performing its functions. However, ‗cleaning up‘ 
the legal system is recognized to be a lengthy process and the current situation, 
although positively influenced by the emerging free market infrastructure, still 
requires a great deal of anti-corruption measures. 
Therefore, the logical question to ask is how litigation, as a dominant enforcement 
strategy in the West, changes and evolves in an environment where the 
relationship-based approach prevails. In order to gain a greater insight, the 
practical strategies of enforcement adopted by the cooperating parties need to be 
analysed. It is unlikely that there will be a single strategy chosen, but rather an 
amalgamation of the most effective ones under the circumstances. The emphasis 
attached to a particular approach will be an accurate indication of the 
prevailing/dominant system. 
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2.3 Research Question Revisited 
On a national scale, the development of greater investor protection, increased 
market control, shift towards the rule of adequate laws and more sophisticated 
judiciary are all complex processes which individually and as a whole are not 
subject to a single reform. The complexity arises from a great variety of both 
dynamic and inert factors at work. Looking for a relationship between a specific 
development and the trend in institutional dynamics will not produce meaningful 
results for that very reason. 
In order to identify the trend in institutional development the following tasks are 
proposed: 
1. Identify conflicts and methods of their resolution at the beginning of 
transition 
2. Identify key institutions involved in the process 
3. Identify conflicts and methods of their resolution in the modern environment 
4. Identify key institutions involved in the process 
5. Analyse the degree of influence of each institution. 
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Section 3: Media 
This section considers the role of media with reference to the study. It also provides a revision of 
the research question. 
 
3.1 The Role of the Media in the Study of Russian Corporate Governance 
Another literature stream that this study relies on seeks to formulate the role of the 
media in corporate dispute resolution. In discussing some of the key works in this 
area, the role of corporate governance in the context of agency theory will be 
highlighted. 
Despite the frequently acknowledged impact of media on the development of 
corporate governance, there have been few attempts at formulating this influence 
in terms of academic theories and frameworks. Arnold et al. (2007) call for more 
research into the connection between media coverage and corporate governance. 
Their research looked at the share price performance of companies further to their 
appearance on the front page of a popular business publication. This positivistic 
study concluded that extreme performance (good or bad) comes to an end when a 
company appears in a front page report. Earlier, Pollock & Rindova, (2003) refer to 
press as ‗expert monitor‘ which role is to facilitate the exchange between buyers 
and sellers, but also highlight the role of media in forming perceptions about 
appropriateness of firm actions. The former role of media has led academics to 
conclude that publishing unreliable information would result in readers making 
unprofitable investments, forcing them to turn to alternative sources of information 
(Johnson et al., 2005). Hence, there is incentive for newspapers to represent 
reality accurately if copies are to be sold in good numbers. The same academics 
concluded that vigilant press will act as a corporate governance mechanism and 
prevent managerial expropriation by investigating and reporting on corporate 
matters. In this context, financial press not only provides the mirror of corporate 
environment15, but also exerts influence over the decision making process within 
the system of governance. The latter function of media is further discussed by 
McCombs (1992) in relation to agenda setting power of media. Skeel (2000) 
                                                          
15
 Deephouse (2000) emphasises professional norms that would require journalists to produce a thorough 
record of important events. 
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considers the role of shaming in corporate law, reinforcing the connection between 
media and corporate governance through reputational costs. In general, there is a 
great deal of agreement that media coverage of corporate matters is crucial for the 
understanding of the development of the corporate governance discipline (Brickey, 
2008). 
All this said there has been little research into country specific circumstances that 
play a role in the aforementioned relationship. However, academic literature 
reveals a number of important factors that need to be considered in the context of 
studies that seek to investigate corporate governance through the prism of country 
specific media characteristics. 
Djankov et al. (2001) consider patterns of media ownership. Their conclusions 
suggest that government ownership is generally associated with, among other 
things, inferior governance. They also suggest that ‗the adverse effects of 
government ownership on political and economic freedom are stronger for 
newspapers than for television‘ (Djankov et al., 2001, p 2). Significant state 
ownership tends to be the case in countries like Ukraine, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Kazakhstan. In the instance of Russia, in the late 1990s, there was a close 
connection between those who owned the media and the government. This fact 
allowed the latter to be in full control over information dispersion in the country. 
With time, ownership of key media outlets in Russia was transferred from ‗friendly 
individuals‘ to the state. This fact, in principle, further curtailed the role of financial 
press as an independent governance watchdog. Clearly this development, not only 
prevents media from acting as a ‗mirror‘ of actual events, but also sets a particular 
agenda, and hence diverts attention from real governance issues to the ones 
which are politically ‗manufactured‘. However, Dyck et al. (2002) argue that in 
these circumstances, foreign media, if not banned, should fulfil the required role by 
not being subject to the same intensity of political pressure and influence as local 
press. Their later research concludes that Russian companies/stakeholders are 
more likely to reverse their damaging actions if the respective corporate 
governance violations are reported in western press as opposed to Russian 
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media16. The researchers did not consider the relationship in the context of other 
countries. There is an inclination however to suggest that former Soviet states 
would exhibit similar biases against indigenous sources of media and by virtue of 
that fact would tend to treat western sources of information as more credible. 
Nevertheless, the same researchers outlined the role of generally acceptable 
norms of behaviour in a society as a determinant of the impact media is likely to 
generate on a particular sphere of activity. Here, it is proposed to consider the 
Russian case as an example of the latter tentative conclusion. If western media 
reports a severe case of corporate violation, the full impact of media will be 
achieved only if the investment community interprets the violation as severe. In the 
Russian context there inevitably will be a degree of asymmetry in this respect. In 
the late 1990s, internal pricing seemed to be treated as a norm and press reports 
to that effect did not trouble the investment community (including foreign investors) 
which was very much used to the practice in question. However, in the context of a 
more developed country in terms of the corporate governance infrastructure, the 
same story about transfer pricing would have been interpreted as a severe 
violation. In the second scenario, the call for the redress of the violation would be 
much stronger whereas in the Russian example, the social norms would dampen 
the effect of the report on the subsequent action. The threshold of tolerance is 
different in different countries and for that reason it is difficult to make any cross 
country comparisons. However, social norms are regarded as a fairly inert 
characteristic unlikely to change drastically in a short to medium term. This makes 
comparison within a particular cultural setting more meaningful.  
 
3.1.1 Information Diffusion 
In general terms, the role of the media is to present information in a particular way. 
As far as economic agents are concerned, the immediate benefit here is the 
dramatic reduction of costs associated with being informed (Dyck at el., 2008). 
The financial press publishes a lot of information about specific companies and 
stock markets in general, which otherwise would have been difficult to accumulate. 
                                                          
16
 The gathered data suggests that in almost 60% of cases redress of violations occurs if disputes are 
reported in western media. 
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In many instances had it not been for the press, a lot of investors (and other 
stakeholders) would not have been informed about their investments/companies to 
the same extent as they are. This point is supported by the concept of rational 
ignorance described by Downs (1957) where the cost of not being informed is 
exceeded by the cost of acquiring information. 
Clearly, the press can package information in a particular way (Becker & Murphy, 
1993) which means that the information is inevitably presented with an element of 
bias. The bias can be determined by a variety of factors such as advertising 
pressures (Reuter & Zitzewitz, 2006), media ownership (Besley & Pratt, 2006), 
target audiences (Mullinaithan & Shleifer, 2005), and the trade-off between 
reporters and sources (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). However, in the Russian context 
political pressures have also been suspected as a source of potential bias (Dyck 
et.al, 2008), particularly in terms of serious concerns over freedom of press17 
(Osipovich, 2008). However, the same authors acknowledged the fact that in 
Russia, the English language press is unlikely to be subject to the same level of 
political bias as their Russian counterparts.  
Studies which rely on reported material as their source of data need to be mindful 
of the fact that published material can be strongly influenced by factors that 
prevent an accurate representation of events. Regardless of the accuracy of 
representation however, some authors in this stream of literature suggest that the 
economic impact of media pressure is large (Dyck et al., 2008). This is particularly 
true with regard to topical issues like corporate governance. Additionally, in 
perceived terms not only does reported material constitute a significant proportion 
of such pressure, it also plays an important role in forming opinion and informing 
actions.  
 
3.1.2 Agency Theory and Corporate Governance 
As previously stated, agency theory is the theoretical underpinning of this work. In 
terms of reported material, the connection becomes evident when reputational 
                                                          
17
 According to the U.S.-based democracy watchdog Freedom House Russia has the same level of press 
freedom as Sudan. 
Page 40 
 
costs of negative coverage are considered (Fama, 1980). In theory, managers 
(and other stakeholders) will be deterred from self-centred actions if the derived 
benefits are less than the negative impact of punishment and reputational costs 
(Dyck et al., 2008). The following equation proposes a condition under which self-
centred managers will be deterred from violating rights of 
shareholders/stakeholders:  
Private benefit < Reputational cost + Punishment 
In countries where formal institutions are weak, appropriate punishment becomes 
less likely. This is because courts can be bribed and punitive rulings can be simply 
ignored. The same applies to other formal institutions that in such environments 
typically lack enforcement powers. Conversely, in this context, reputation becomes 
an important asset (Radaev, 2003) and hence reputational damage begins to have 
a more direct and substantive impact on the decisions of agents whether to 
engage in value reducing practices or not.  
In Russia formal institutions are weak. Often, before committing to a major 
investment, foreign companies are keen to invite influential Russian counterparts 
that would assume the tasks normally performed by formal institutions18. Often 
because of the importance of such Russian insiders, foreign companies are 
prepared to remunerate these individuals very generously. This means that any 
negative piece of publicity would considerably reduce the chances of such an 
individual being selected. Hence, the reputational cost of negative publicity in 
certain instances would act as a strong deterrent from acting in self-interest. The 
government and state officials would also be subject to reputational costs, but 
more in connection with electorates‘ opinion, rather than commercial partners and 
major shareholders. However, with the increasing role of the state in the business 
affairs of the country (Gel‘man, 2004), investment communities will be on constant 
alert for any information that would reveal clues about the state‘s reputation as a 
key decision-maker in the environment. 
                                                          
18
 In the Russian context rating agencies like Standard and Poors often refer to the partner risk as opposed 
to the country risk. 
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3.1.3 Media Effectiveness 
The press, as a source of the media, is in an ideal position to inflict reputational 
costs on various agents. By publishing compromising materials, the value of an 
individual‘s reputation can be considerably reduced. At the same time, reputable 
newspapers base their reporting on reliable facts (or are perceived as doing so) 
(Dyck et al., 2008). Therefore, influential business people will have an incentive 
not to generate facts or rumours that would cause a detrimental impact on their 
reputation. In this respect, media coverage sends a very important message to the 
business community about the state of development of corporate governance in a 
particular country. If blatant violations are continuously reported then in perceived 
terms there is evidence that: 
1. Institutions continue to be weak (low risk of external punishment); 
2. Self-centred stakeholders derive a greater benefit from expropriation than 
from being a reputable partner (insignificant reputational costs). 
Conversely, if there is a noticeable improvement with reference to the way 
corporate disputes are reported, then, in the absence of media bias: 
1.  Institutions become more powerful (a greater risk of external punishment) 
2. Key stakeholders derive a greater benefit from good reputation than from 
immediate gain of expropriation (significant reputational costs). 
Hence, media coverage of corporate disputes is an important barometer of 
corporate governance both in terms of institutional infrastructure and in relation to 
the individual behaviour of key stakeholders. 
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3.2 Research Question Revisited 
This study relies on evidence of media impact (publications in English language 
press) on corporate governance in Russia (Dyck et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
boundaries of this research question cannot not be extended beyond the level of 
perceived change by foreign investors. However, such reliance on media material 
offers an opportunity to conduct a more holistic investigation into the institutional 
construct in the country. Here, it is necessary to compare reported material on 
corporate conflicts because such analysis reveals the sanctioning powers of 
institutions at work and suggest inferences about reputational costs with reference 
to key stakeholders. In this respect, the research question has to reflect the 
evolving nature of the reported material on corporate disputes in the country. 
 
Outlining the Gap in Literature 
The Study of Corporate Governance 
According to Iwasaki (2007) in order to understand the subject of corporate 
governance better, it is necessary to examine the discipline from a multi-faceted 
perspective. In the Russian context a great deal of empirical research has been 
conducted investigating the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate restructuring. However, dominance of this line of enquiry has led to a 
vacuum in understanding the complexity of factors that determine enterprise 
behaviour. This study seeks to provide a contribution to the body of literature by 
analysing corporate behaviour in the context of reported corporate disputes. 
 
Development of Formal Institutions in the Russian Context 
Second, there is no agreement in contemporary literature on whether formal 
institutions in Russia are beginning to perform the required role of policing market 
relations. Some believe that moderate improvements have occurred (Roberts, 
2004), while others emphasise the destructive impact of corrupt courts 
(Kochetygova et al., 2004). Therefore, any additional information about the role of 
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corporate governance institutions in the Russian context would contribute to the 
ongoing debate about the trajectory of the development. 
 
Corporate Disputes and Resolution Methods 
 
Previously, academic studies attempted to classify corporate disputes (Fox & 
Heller, 2000; Dyck et al., 2008) and methods of their resolution (Hendley et al., 
2000). However, those were separate and unrelated classifications. No previous 
study attempted to look at the evolving nature of both characteristics in conjunction 
as a tool for the evaluation of corporate governance. This method of analysing the 
discipline is of particular relevance to countries where a number of enforcement 
strategies exist (in addition to litigation). Hence, this study offers a greater scope 
for analysing more intricate details of the development of corporate governance 
particularly focusing on agency based conflicts when the system of governance is 
exposed to opposing interests and claims of various stakeholders. Moreover, 
because of the added dimension, this study is well positioned to complement and 
contextualise dispute and enforcement related frameworks in the setting of a 
holistic investigation of corporate governance.   
Additionally, looking at the dispute and enforcement frameworks together offers a 
wide range of applicability and relevance to other corporate governance related 
research. Here, positivistic studies of the discipline may benefit from an 
opportunity to identify new variables and further discuss existing ones in the 
context of a more encompassing set of parameters. Likewise, studies considering 
‗softer‘ aspects of corporate governance like culture and attitudes may adopt a 
similar approach of combining existing frameworks as way of capturing a higher 
level of complexity of the subject matter.  
 
The Role of Media in the Study of Corporate Governance 
Finally, this research highlights the role of the media in corporate governance 
studies. Literature on this topic has been extremely scarce and can be taken 
forward by the study that relies on the proposition that reported material on 
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corporate violations can serve as a foundation for inferences about the expected 
development of the discipline of corporate governance (Dyck et al., 2008). 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented three sections of literature that have informed and 
influenced the design of the study. Agency theory has been selected as a 
theoretical underpinning of this work with reference to the discipline of corporate 
governance, institutional infrastructure and the role of the media in the Russian 
setting. Concordantly, the research questions and gaps in relevant literature have 
been identified and explained. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter consists of three sections. Section 1 discusses the main philosophical 
underpinning of this work. The philosophy of pragmatism is introduced on the 
ontological level with reference to more specific methodological implications for the 
research design and quality issues. It is argued that pragmatism is an adequate 
philosophical perspective for contemporary investigations of Russian corporate 
governance because of the inherently high level of flexibility. The section is 
concluded with the discussion of the status of the findings in the context of the 
proposed investigation. Section 2 presents the method of data collection which is 
based on the archival material of the Moscow Times and a number of semi-
structured interviews. Here, the definition of corporate disputes is reiterated in the 
context of the chosen unit of analysis. The final section explains how the selected 
method of analysis is applied to the collected data in the context of the main 
research question. The innovative use of template analysis is explained through a 
detailed demonstration of the coding process in relation to the reported material 
selected for the study. Additionally, a clarification of how the interviewed data 
triangulates the coded material is provided. This chapter is concluded with an 
outline of the expected original contribution and methodological limitations of the 
study.  
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Section 1: Philosophical Underpinning 
This section discusses the main philosophical underpinning of the study. Pragmatism is considered 
in the context of the main research question with reference to methodological and research quality 
implications.  
 
1.1 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is an interpretative aid that enhances the meaningfulness of 
scientific findings. A clear benefit of discussing a researcher‘s view on ontology 
and epistemology is that it provides an overall context within which a piece of 
research has been carried out. This philosophical context, unlike subject-based 
context, is provided by researchers. It is for this reason that within a single 
discipline, one can find studies adopting a whole range of philosophical 
underpinnings. The latter point is of particular relevance to social sciences 
research where there has been a greater degree of tolerance toward ‗non-
mainstream‘ methodological solutions. The overall acceptance of these, at times, 
obscure methodologies probably comes from the non-scientific nature of some of 
the proposed enquiries. This however, does not necessarily detract from the 
importance of these enquiries which is a separate and more subject-specific 
argument. In a number of instances however, lack of such flexibility might lead to a 
restraint being imposed on a potentially useful investigation.  
This research is underpinned by the philosophical stance of pragmatism. Before 
discussing this philosophical paradigm, it is important to outline the top-down 
methodological hierarchy that most social sciences and business and 
management researchers are comfortable with. This outline will provide a point of 
reference and hence set the scene for a more meaningful discussion on 
pragmatism.    
 
1.2 Top-Down Approach 
Some researchers argue that ontology should be at the very top of the 
methodological hierarchy (Crotty, 2003). Considerations of an ontological nature 
reveal the much-debated relationship between the truth that researchers are 
seeking to uncover and reality. Once this relationship has been determined, the 
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choice of methodology is a matter of adherence to the overriding philosophical 
principles. These principles determine distinct paths that researchers subscribe to 
at the very onset of their investigations. A researcher who believes in truth being a 
single objective reality naturally falls into the theoretical perspective of positivism. 
Positivism prescribes a quantitative methodology that in turn determines the 
choice of statistically coherent methods. Conversely, a researcher who is of an 
ontological view that multiple realities exist sets out on a research journey having a 
licence to determine his/her own unique truth. Interpretivism is a research 
philosophy that sits comfortably within such a subjective view of the world. It 
prescribes qualitative methodology and advocates non-statistical methods which 
do not seek to correlate or extrapolate, but strive to capture and explain individual 
scenarios from the perspective of a researcher.  
Traditionally, positivism was seen as the dominant view of the world in relation to 
scientific enquiries. More recently however, interpretivism has found its way and 
established itself as a valid theoretical underpinning in social sciences research. 
However, a major criticism of the top-down approach has been the fact that 
researchers are inevitably faced with substantial constraints and limitations if they 
choose to subscribe to the subjective/objective epistemological divide described 
above. Pragmatism addresses this limitation by proposing a new dimension to the 
philosophical debate about the relationship between truth and reality.  
 
1.3 Philosophy of Pragmatism 
Pragmatism has been dubbed an anti-philosophy because it rejects the notion that 
we should be concerned about what reality is. It does not necessarily reject the 
philosophical argument altogether, but rather categorically refuses to engage in 
the debate about the relationship between reality and truth. The justification for 
such a dismissal is our inability to know what reality is (Rorty, 1982) and hence the 
efforts of simply representing it accurately are meaningless. Instead, we must 
strive to construct useful interpretations of surrounding phenomena.  
As far as pragmatists are concerned there are two opposing scenarios that we 
need to consider. The first scenario is a hypothetical one in which a reasonably 
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accurate representation of reality is proposed as the ultimate aim of the scientific 
enquiry. However, from the viewpoint of any pragmatist, this scenario is certain to 
fail at the very onset since, without knowledge of what reality actually entails, 
accuracy of representation cannot be adequately determined. Nevertheless, this 
scenario serves the purpose of demonstrating precisely what pragmatists reject.  
The second scenario emphasises the inevitable discrepancy between reality and 
its representation. It proposes that in the context of a scientific enquiry, the 
accuracy of representation is subordinate to the usefulness of representation 
(Gibson, 1979). Hence, pragmatism accepts the idea of an inaccurate, but useful 
representation of reality. Taking this school of thought further, Rorty (1982) 
excludes accuracy of representation from the philosophical equation with the non-
representationalist view where he invites scientists to cope with the world and not 
seek to represent it. James (1907), in a strongly worded statement, suggests that 
a large number of philosophical arguments simply fail when they become exposed 
to the test of reaching a practical consequence. In this regard, pragmatists 
propose to focus on the creation of knowledge with practicality being the essential 
criterion for judging meaningfulness (Goldkuhl, 2004).  
It is clear from the above that when it comes to the development of research 
questions, pragmatists need to fulfil the usefulness requirement. This is where an 
overlap with other research philosophies may occur. It is entirely possible that 
taking for example a positivistic path may lead to findings with the most practical 
significance. In this context, pragmatists do not hesitate to imitate positivists or any 
other research philosophy for that matter. The fundamental difference is that the 
parameters of research design are not determined on an ontological level, but are 
the result of considerations of a practical nature. The following quotation from 
Morgan (1998, p.19) perfectly illustrates the above point: 
“Just as we select a tennis racquet rather than a golf club to play 
tennis because we have a prior conception as to what the game of 
tennis involves, so too in relation to the process of social research; 
we select or favour particular kinds of methodology because we have 
implicit or explicit conceptions as to what we are trying to do in our 
research.” 
In the context of the above quotation, the question of ‗what we are trying to do‘ is 
unequivocally addressed by pragmatists. They believe that it is the task of 
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changing our environment in favourable ways (Goldkuhl, 2004) that provides the 
rationale for scientific investigations. An impact of practical knowledge is 
considered to be the driving force of the research process.  
Following on from the above, a pragmatic piece of research has to identify a 
concrete action that it seeks to improve. This action is subjected to an 
investigation which examines/evaluates input from various stakeholders and 
proposes modifications. The ‗new action‘ is expected to be an improvement on the 
‗old action‘ from the perspective of an identified group of stakeholders. 
Consequently, the level of improvement serves as the criterion for judging the 
legitimacy of the enquiry. Figure 3.1 is the graphical representation of the latter 
point. Clearly, at the time of the enquiry itself it is difficult to know whether it would 
lead to an improved action or not. Pragmatism does not necessarily suggest that 
enquires that fail to produce an improved action lack legitimacy. But it clearly 
states that the requirement of usefulness must be fulfilled. This resonates with 
Goldkuhl (2004) who claims that pragmatism gets its legitimacy from being a 
servant
 
to practice. 
 
Figure 3.1: Legitimacy of Pragmatic Research 
 
Action      Enquiry                           Improved Action/ 
       Useful Findings 
 
     Legitimacy of 
            research design 
 
In this regard, pragmatism has a lot to offer social sciences and particularly 
business and management research where more emphasis should be put on the 
practical consequences of knowledge (Goldkuhl, 2004).  
 
1.4 Methodological Implications of Pragmatism 
Pragmatism does not reject either objective or subjective methodologies. In fact, it 
refuses to favour one or the other. It suggests that if there is a practical rationale, 
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the unrestricted choice of methodology is the essential freedom that researchers 
must have. Pragmatism does not view objectivism and subjectivism as unrelated 
dimensions, but rather regards them as the opposite ends of the methodological 
continuum (figure 3.2). The position on the methodological continuum is not so 
much determined by the researcher‘s view of the world (ontological level), but is 
driven by the nature of the research question and practicalities of the research 
design. As a direct consequence of this, pragmatists have the option to change the 
degree of objectivism/subjectivism as deemed appropriate in the context of the 
research question.  
 
Figure 3.2: Methodological Continuum 
 
 Objectivism         Subjectivism 
 
 
This position has been criticised profusely by both extreme positivists and social 
constructionists. They are uncomfortable with pragmatism and see it as ‗sitting on 
the fence‘. The refusal of pragmatists to identify themselves in objective/subjective 
terms simply renders their arguments illegitimate. Indeed, one can see the source 
of confusion and even irritation when pragmatists start changing their world view 
like gloves, while others are stuck with a single methodology. To ‗others‘ 
pragmatists are unidentifiable and therefore their findings cannot be viewed within 
a meaningful/rigorous philosophical and methodological context.  
Pragmatists do not reject this criticism outright for they recognise rigour as an 
important aspect of research. Indeed, if a research design leans towards the 
subjective end of the continuum, due consideration must be given to the origins 
and impact of the researcher‘s bias. Moreover, findings need to be discussed and 
applied within the boundaries of limited validity and generalisability. It appears that 
interpretivists would go about the task in much the same way. In this case, the 
‗sitting on the fence‘ criticism does not amount to the quality of the findings, but 
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simply manifests itself in the general unwillingness of pragmatists to commit to a 
particular methodology. It is understood how this could lead to a certain degree of 
confusion if not addressed adequately. However, in a true pragmatic fashion, it is 
believed that if the much criticised flexibility produces tangible benefits where 
positivists and interpretivists stand a higher chance of failure, the argument of the 
latter simply does not hold.  
 
1.5 Pragmatism in the Study of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance as a whole is a fairly fragmented discipline (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003). Although there are a number of highly positivistic studies that 
investigate narrowly defined aspects like board composition and ownership 
structures, their findings are often inconclusive and lack generalisability (Iwasaki, 
2007). In fact, it is difficult to identify a major study within the field that has not 
been challenged or contradicted. This is explained by the high level of complexity 
of the corporate governance phenomenon, particularly in an international context 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Some suggest that it is impossible to depict the 
discipline adequately by using a limited number of variables. It is not surprising 
since such broad areas as culture and individual circumstances play a significant 
role in determining corporate governance arrangements (Mintz, 2005). Under such 
conditions researchers often turn to in-depth qualitative investigations of prominent 
corporate cases and look for theory building opportunities (Fox & Heller, 2000).  
Whichever approach is adopted, the test of these studies is their relevance to 
practice. As suggested by Shleifer & Vishny (1997), research in the area of 
corporate governance is of enormous practical importance. This practicality of the 
subject comes from its proximity to core business processes. These processes are 
to do with the mechanics of decision making (Cuervo, 2002), distribution of 
residuals (Fox & Heller, 2000), accountability to shareholders (Osugi, 2000), 
stakeholder management (Moore, 1999), ownership and control (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1998), etc. Corporate governance as a subject area is 
charged with the task of evaluating existing practice and proposing reform 
solutions (Black, 2001). In this respect, corporate governance runs parallel with 
the primary objectives of pragmatic research.  
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1.5.1 Russian Context 
As far as Russian companies are concerned, corporate governance is a fairly new 
concept. The Russian economy has gone through a period of rapid change 
affecting the most fundamental aspects of prevailing business infrastructures 
(Preobragenskaya & McGee, 2004). The country‘s transition from command to 
market economy created an unstable environment in which many companies 
struggled to survive. It is not a secret that the overwhelming majority of officials 
engaged in all types of unlawful conduct. Here, the practices ranged from minor 
administrative violations to criminal offences. This has led to a negative impact on 
the levels of transparency of Russian corporations. An extremely secretive culture 
has become a permanent characteristic of Russian enterprises (Fox & Heller, 
2000). It is this very fact that has been identified as a stumbling block in most 
studies of the country‘s corporate governance. 
On a practical level, Russian and foreign companies are becoming more 
aggressive in seeking out joint-venture opportunities in Russia. This has 
manifested itself in the rapidly growing number of Initial Public Offerings of 
Russian companies on the London Stock Exchange and a substantial increase in 
Foreign Direct Investment over recent years. Hence, the answer to the question of 
what works and what does not work is constantly gaining practical relevance since 
the levels of foreign engagement in the country are reaching unprecedented levels 
(EU-Russia Roundtable on Corporate Governance, 2006). 
To summarise, this study is conducted from the philosophical stance of 
pragmatism. Here, the justification for avoiding a clear-cut commitment to a 
particular methodology takes its grounding in the following:  
- The fragmented nature of the discipline 
- The difficulties associated with accessing information 
- The usefulness of findings as the overriding objective 
The core philosophical underpinning of this work constitutes a call to concentrate 
more on coping with the world rather than representing it. 
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1.6 Mixed-Methods Research 
Mixed-methods research is consistent with the pragmatic view of the world in that 
it supports paradigm integration along the methodological continuum (Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). Typically, mixed-methods research seeks to 
combine quantitative and qualitative methods in the pursuit of either triangulation 
or complementarity. Traditionally, mixed-methods research has been viewed as an 
equal split between qualitative and quantitative inputs. Here, a positivistic 
questionnaire followed by a series of unstructured in-depth interviews is a 
commonly used combination.  
However, this research has a dominant qualitative component primarily 
determined by the chosen method of analysis19. In fact, quantitative input is limited 
to descriptive statistics of qualitative data. Mixed methods as a research paradigm 
does not disallow leaning towards one of the extremes of the methodological 
continuum. Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, (2007, p. 124) propose a qualitative 
dominant sub-type of mixed-methods research where ‗one relies on a qualitative, 
constructivist-post-structuralist-critical view of the research process, while 
concurrently recognizing that the addition of quantitative data and approaches are 
likely to benefit most research projects‘. This definition of mixed-methods is 
applied to this study. However, it is necessary to emphasise that the quantitative 
input is built on and serves the purpose of assisting what is primarily a qualitative 
analysis.  
 
1.7 Research Quality 
With regard to the study of corporate governance, it has been suggested that the 
quantitative approach restricted by the traditional parameters of quality (validity, 
reliability, replicability) failed to produce conclusive findings in transition economies 
(Djankov, 2002). This sobering revelation is particularly true in the Russian context 
(Iwasaki, 2007). The two major surveys of academic studies in the discipline call 
for a shift in priority to focus more on investigations of less quantifiable aspects of 
                                                          
19
 The method is termed template analysis (King, 1998); see section 3 of this chapter for further 
explanation. 
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the discipline such as the state of institutional construct. In order to address this 
vital call, it is proposed to re-define quality of research findings in alternative terms. 
This is a critical point, because the parameters of research quality must run 
parallel with the underlying philosophical underpinning whilst consistency with the 
chosen method of data collection and analysis must not be compromised.  
The predominantly qualitative nature of this study dictates less statistically bound 
measures of quality. Mixed methods, along with template analysis, recognize 
trustworthiness and credibility as acceptable parameters for measuring research 
quality (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007; King, 1998).  
 
1.7.1 Trustworthiness 
Generally, in qualitative research the burden of inference lies on the researcher 
(as opposed to statistical tools used in quantitative research) (O‘Dwyer, 2004, p. 
391). For a long time, this very fact blocked the recognition of this type of enquiry 
from being regarded as scientifically robust. Nevertheless, qualitative researchers 
developed an approach that helped them overcome this challenge. This approach 
manifests itself through the total openness of the research process. Hence, 
trustworthiness refers to transparency that spans data collection, and more 
importantly data analysis. Sandelowski (1986) talks about the process of 
auditability or ‗a decision trail‘ that allows the reader to track and verify the 
research process. The decision trail serves as a measure of trustworthiness of the 
findings. Clearly, transparency does not eliminate subjectivity, nor is it its purpose 
to do so. However, it does reveal the logic applied to every stage of a research 
project, exposing the mechanics of data collection and analysis (Johnson et al., 
2006). It is for this reason that the process of constructing and analysing a 
template should be presented with a great deal of detail. In the section on template 
analysis, the process of identifying and analysing templates depicting corporate 
disputes is not only explained, but also demonstrated using the working papers of 
the research. Such a detailed disclosure of the study is necessary in order to 
persuade the reader that the research process is traceable and verifiable. 
However, this research does not claim to be replicable. Pragmatism does not 
confine researchers to a search of a single reality, and consequently repeatability 
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ceases to be ‗an essential property‘ of a trustworthy research (Sandelowski, 1986, 
p. 3). Nevertheless, it is important to reinforce that ‗a study is trustworthy only if the 
reader of the research report judges it to be so‘ (Rolfe, 2006, p. 305). 
 
1.7.2 Credibility 
Credibility corresponds roughly to the positivistic notion of internal validity (Rolfe, 
2006). This measure refers to the accuracy of analysis. In qualitative research, 
member checks (retuning to participants after data analysis) and peer checks 
(using a panel of experts or an experienced colleague to re-analyse some of the 
data) have been regarded as important techniques for increasing accuracy and 
hence credibility of research (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Since newspaper articles are 
the main source of data, this research is complemented by interviews with the 
Moscow Times reporters. It is important to acknowledge however that the 
interviews were conducted during the stage of data analysis and therefore cannot 
serve as a check of accuracy of interpretation outside the concept of triangulation. 
In this respect, this study strives to achieve credibility through comparing and 
complementing inferences made from the analysis of articles and interview data. 
Moreover, since a degree of subjective judgement is an intrinsic part of qualitative 
analysis, credibility checks must be viewed as study specific rather than something 
predetermined and universally applicable (Sandelowski, 1993; Rolfe, 2006). 
 
1.8 Status of the Findings 
Status of the findings usually refers to the level of generalisability. The proclaimed 
goal of quantitative research is to achieve total generalisability and reveal the 
single reality as underpinned by the philosophical concept of positivism. The goal 
is achieved by ensuring that the sample used is big enough and representative, as 
well as the method of analysis being chosen and applied correctly. Conversely, 
qualitative research focuses on individual interpretations as a means of increasing 
our understanding of more complex social phenomena. The findings are not 
generalisable, but reveal intricate details of the phenomena under investigation. 
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The varying degree of generalisability and associated quality checks of the 
alternative research paradigms are shown on figure 3.3 a.  
As a rule, most corporate governance studies in the Russian context lean towards 
the generalisable end of the continuum (Iwasaki, 2007), but have been criticised 
for their lack of usefulness stemming from the contradictory nature of the findings. 
The philosophical underpinning of this work helps to solve this dilemma by 
replacing the ‗generalisability continuum‘ with the ‗usefulness continuum‘ which is 
considered to be the overall indication of the status of the findings (see figure 3.3 
b.).  
This study seeks to explore the factors at work and to present the findings as 
examples of agency-based conflicts, and how these have changed with inferences 
about the balance of power and the rule of law20. It has been suggested that lack 
of the rule of law and unpredictable power structures represent the biggest 
challenge to Western investors in the Russian context (Black & Kraakman, 1996; 
Sucher & Bychkova, 2001; Kochetygova et al., 2004). Learning more about the 
phenomenon is therefore bound to have useful implications which, in the context 
of this research, serve as a manifestation of the status of findings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 The author would like to thank Prof. Laura Spira and John Forker for their extremely useful comments on 
the methodology of this work presented at the Financial Reporting and Business Communication 
Conference in Cardiff, 2007. 
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Figure 3.3: General Status of Findings 
a. 
       Qualitative   Quantitative 
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        Repeatability   Replicability 
        Credibility   Validity 
 
b.        Not useful21     Useful 
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   Research Question 
 
1.9 Source of Subjectivity 
Holloway & Wheeler (1996, p. 10), describe qualitative research as ―holistic, emic, 
contextualized, interpretive, and immersed‖. Within the discipline of corporate 
governance, this framework is very well positioned to contribute to the practical 
dimension of research outcomes. It is clear that the subjective element is an 
integral part of the aforementioned characteristics of qualitative research and 
therefore needs to be revealed.  
The first source of subjectivity within this research relates to the primary method of 
data collection. In general, newspaper sources have been frequently used in event 
analysis. The reason for this is the fact that other sources of data are likely to 
                                                          
21
 There is no suggestion that quantitative research has no place in the study of corporate governance. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the dominance of this line of enquiry in the Russian context 
produced contradictory findings with limited applicability (Iwasaki, 2007). Furthermore, the diagram does 
not propose that reliability, replicability and validity are undesirable characteristics of the research quality. 
On the contrary, they are desirable. However, very often strict adherence to these quality checks can force 
researchers to re-formulate the research question, or drop otherwise legitimate enquiries all together. 
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contain a larger bias or (as the case is in this particular study) are simply 
unavailable to most researchers. Nevertheless, newspaper sources pose 
fundamental problems of a methodological nature. With regard to longitudinal 
studies, or when two time periods are compared, it is important to know whether 
press data accurately represents events under consideration, or is skewed by 
journalists‘ selection process and a change in reporting practice. Although 
contamination of newspaper data has been categorically acknowledged (Danzger, 
1975), others rather convincingly argue that no alternative source provides ‗as 
complete an account of events as newspapers for the widest sample of 
geographical and temporal units‘ (Olzak, 1989, p. 128). Moreover, even in the 
purely quantitative sense, the bias of newspaper sources has been described as 
stable and therefore acceptable for formal analysis. The metaphor used by 
Barranco & Wisler (1999) is that of a thermometer that shows temperature 
incorrectly. Here, the point is that if inaccuracy is consistent, then we can still learn 
about the changing nature of the unit of analysis through a systematic comparison. 
Their study of public demonstrations in Swiss cities confirms the latter proposition 
which serves as the fundamental justification for the choice of the source of data 
for this study.  
Articles from the Moscow Times, although factual in nature, are primarily informed 
by Western business people and written by Anglo-Saxon reporters. It is not 
surprising that a lot of published material on corporate disputes has a certain 
degree of bias in favour of foreign investors (particularly European and Anglo-
Saxon). As a source from the Moscow Times put it: 
“I think the only potential bias you could find in a Moscow Times 
story is the inevitable pro-foreigner bias that you would find in any 
foreign newspaper working in Russia. There is always going to be 
some subtle bias in favour of foreign investors just by the simple fact 
that they speak our language natively and we understand them 
better than we do the Russians. But that was never overt and I think 
we tried very hard to avoid that but I think that‟s probably a bias you 
will see in some Moscow Times stories” (see interview guide, 
appendix 4, question 4). 
It is important to acknowledge that this bias is not accidental, as one of the 
aspects of this research is to investigate the phenomenon of Russian corporate 
governance from the perspective of Western investors. This bias very much 
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contributes to foreigners‘ perception of the environment and, by virtue of that fact, 
influences the actual corporate governance practice. Moreover, the bias can be 
considered inert since it has been confirmed separately and independently by 
journalists who worked for the newspaper in 1998 and 2006. 
An additional consideration here is that relying on a Russian newspaper would 
have produced a much greater anti-foreign bias. It is a general consensus (among 
both Russian and Western reporters) that Russian newspapers are subject to a 
greater degree of political pressure and hence are less free to portray the 
environment in factual terms and with the same degree of accuracy (Osipovich, 
2008). 
The second source of subjectivity comes from the interviewees themselves. 
Clearly, answers to the questions must have been very much determined by the 
participants‘ individual experience. In general, reporters are largely free from that 
bias because they work for the same organisation and are equally well informed 
about the environment. However, they are still expected to have a varying degree 
of specialised knowledge and, more importantly, unique experience and 
circumstances. These circumstances cannot be fully disclosed for confidentiality 
and anonymity reasons, but are considered while analysing interview data and 
constructing analytical and concluding inferences. 
Moreover, the researcher‘s bias needs to be acknowledged. This bias spans the 
whole of the research affecting data collection and analysis. The process of 
identification of corporate disputes covered in newspaper articles is full of 
subjective elements. This source of subjectivism revealed in the subsequent 
sections as the ‗decision trail‘ is exposed. For the purpose of clarity, it is critical to 
reiterate that the aim of presenting the ‗decision trail‘ is not to ensure repeatability 
of the study, but to reveal and explain the logic behind each decision made.  
Page 60 
 
Section 2: Data Collection 
This section explains how the data was collected. It covers both archival material and semi-
structured interviews.  
 
2.1 The Moscow Times Archival Data 
There has been a considerable level of research using newspaper archives 
because they ‗incorporate a number of facets concerning a country‘s social, 
political and economic history‘ (Gatos et al., 2000, p. 77). Archival data is usually 
fairly bulky and therefore is typically analysed by means of computer aided 
techniques. With regard to newspaper archives, quantitative content analysis is 
widely used to determine the dynamics of narrowly defined social events 
(Barranco & Wisler, 1999). Text recognition programmes are of key importance in 
these scientific endeavours.  
This research uses The Moscow Times archives as the main source of data. 
Appendix 1a presents background information about this source of data while 
appendix 1b contains reporters‘ accounts of the paper‘s independence and 
influence. 
The website of the newspaper contains a comprehensive search engine which 
helps to track articles matching a specific description. However, in order to collect 
all articles about corporate disputes it was necessary to study the content, 
manually analysing all published material pertaining to 1998 and 2006. Such 
necessity comes from the fact that it is impossible to describe all disputes by 
means of a limited number of key words. However, once this time-consuming 
exercise was complete, the search engine was used to double-check that no 
article had been omitted.   
 
2.1.1 Definition of Corporate Disputes 
The key difficulty in extracting the right articles is determined by a fairly general 
unit of analysis, i.e. corporate disputes. What constitutes a corporate dispute and 
what does not may be interpreted differently. The following is the adopted 
definition of a corporate dispute in the context of this study: 
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- A conflict of interests between identifiable/affected stakeholders22, 
typically followed by a resolution. 
Altogether 290 articles23 depicting corporate disputes matching the above 
definition have been selected from the newspaper‘s business section. Clearly, 
bigger corporate disputes like Shell vs. Gazprom over Sakhalin 2 received a great 
deal of coverage spanning 25 articles24. However, for a dispute to qualify, one 
dedicated article was considered sufficient. A large proportion of corporate 
disputes included in the analysis originate from a single article25.  
Appendix 3 contains an example of a typical article covering a corporate dispute. 
Having studied the appended article, it is easy to see what is meant by a corporate 
dispute and how it can be reliably identified even though an all-encompassing 
criterion for the selection process probably does not exist. 
In addition, a number of issues have been identified while collecting articles on 
corporate disputes: 
- Some disputes were covered across a number of articles, whereas others 
were mentioned in a single issue. Although weightings based on a number 
of articles covering a dispute are used, articles that repeat previously 
reported facts have been disregarded. 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 The most prominent stakeholders in the Russian context are shareholders, the state, workers’ unions, tax 
authorities and local administration. 
23
 175 articles representing 1998 data and 115 articles pertaining to 2006. 
24
 This dispute was very extensively covered by the Moscow Times because of its magnitude. Sakhalin 2 was 
a $22 b. investment project. 
25
 Analysis of data (chapter 4) provides additional information about the amount of coverage each coded 
dispute received. 
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- A dispute covered in the newspaper might have a continuation which was 
not necessarily covered in the subsequent issues within the two years of the 
study. Moreover, a dispute may be an ongoing one, i.e. pending resolution. 
These were recorded and coded according to the data published within the 
two years under analysis. 
- An actual dispute might have taken place prior to the two years under 
consideration, but for whatever reason was reported later. Articles with such 
disputes were included in the data because their coverage has an impact 
on the readers, and hence investor perception of the environment. 
- The focus of an article may be other than the dispute itself which is 
mentioned in passing as a point of reference or a comparison. In these 
circumstances such disputes were disregarded.  
 
2.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The second stage of data collection is conducted by means of semi-structured 
interviews. The goal of such interviews is to reveal the research topic from the 
perspective of the interviewees (Kvale, 1983). 
In broader terms, qualitative interviews can be divided into two opposing types. In 
the first type, the interview situation determines participants‘ responses (Madill et 
al., 2000). The content of this type of interview is detached from the participant‘s 
personal experience, and for that reason cannot be used as a source of 
triangulation in events analysis. Conversely, the second type of qualitative 
interviews enables researchers to learn about participants‘ experience outside the 
interview setting and is therefore very much concerned with the accuracy of 
accounts produced. This type of interview is generally more structured as 
comparability of accounts must be ensured. This type of data collection has been 
termed ‗realist interviews‘ (Madill et al., 2000) and is used in this research. The 
critical point here is that researchers may compare realist ‗interview findings with 
those obtained through other methods, such as documentary analysis‘ with the 
purpose of triangulation (King, 2004, p. 12). 
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Realist interview guides tend to be fairly structured with a more narrowly defined 
topic for discussion (King, 2004). The interview guide used in this research is 
presented in appendix 4. The process of developing the questions was very much 
influenced by the analysis of the newspaper articles and two pilot interviews with 
industry experts. The latter revealed the need to simplify the questions26 and focus 
the interviews solely on the participants‘ experience/knowledge of corporate 
disputes in the country. The pilot interviews also uncovered a challenge inherent to 
the research design, i.e. asking participants to recall a corporate dispute from as 
far back as 1998. This flaw was overcome by making sure that the interviewees 
received a copy of the questions well in advance of the interview27. Furthermore, in 
order to provide participants with more flexibility it was decided to refer to the late 
1990s rather than specifically 1998. Nevertheless, despite this change in the 
research design, all of the disputes referred to in the interviews took place in 
199828 and were covered by the Moscow Times reports. 
 
2.2.1 Interviews with the Moscow Times Reporters 
Altogether five interviews with the Moscow Times reporters were conducted. Three 
interviews were with the reporters who worked for the newspaper in 1998 and two 
interviews were with the reporters who wrote in 200629. The interviewees were 
chosen on the basis of their contributions to the selected articles in the respective 
time periods. 
With regard to this study, the purpose of the interviews is to triangulate and 
complement analysis of archival data as well as seek the opinion of the reporters 
on the newspaper‘s independence and influence. Even though the number of 
                                                          
26
 Initially, academic terms like ‘institutional construct’ and ‘extra judiciary enforcement’ were used in the 
interview guide. 
27
 Most of the reporters found it useful for interviews to begin with a brief recap of most commonly 
reported disputes at the time. 
28
 The explanation for that could be the 1998 financial crisis that increased the number of corporate 
disputes and generally made that year particularly memorable. 
29
 The reason for including an extra interview for 1998 lies in the fact that participants had difficulty 
remembering facts from almost a decade ago. By including an extra interview, the impact of this asymmetry 
with 2006 data was reduced. 
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interviews is fairly limited, in terms of the combined coverage, interviewed 
reporters contributed to just under 50% of the articles that had been selected for 
analysis in the first stage of data collection. 
 
2.2.2 Telephone Interviews 
Telephone interviews are by no means inferior to face-to-face interviews 
(Wiseman, 1972). According to Rogers (1976) telephone interviews have a 
number of compelling advantages. They are: 
- less biased towards socially acceptable responses; 
- no different in accuracy and completeness in comparison with face-to-face 
interviews; 
- cheaper and easier to arrange. 
However, the most commonly cited criticism of telephone interviews is that they 
deprive the interviewer of an opportunity to interact with the interviewee at the 
level of engagement offered by face-to-face communication (Rogers, 1976). 
Furthermore, absence of the visual aspect of communication not only poses 
challenges to the actual conduct of interviews, but can also lead to a possible loss 
of data. A lot of signals that facilitate interaction between the researcher and 
participant in a face-to-face interview are unavailable in a telephone interview 
situation. Absence of these clues may make it more difficult for researchers to 
establish the right rapport with their interviewees.  
Interviews with all Moscow Times reporters were conducted by telephone. In 
general, journalists depend on other people‘s willingness to talk, and therefore 
tend to be very approachable themselves. Moreover, reporters are very skilled at 
conducting interviews by phone themselves. This fact made it easier for the 
researcher to establish a positive rapport with the respondents.  
Additionally, all interviews with the reporters were recorded by means of special 
teleconferencing equipment making it easier to concentrate on the systematic 
questioning and participants‘ responses. 
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2.2.3 Transcribing 
All recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed with the help of a 
professional typist. In total, approximately 20,000 words of transcribed material 
was produced. Subsequently, the text was checked for mistakes by the 
researcher. This made it possible to eliminate content inaccuracies and typing 
errors, as well as provide the researcher with an opportunity to become more 
familiar with the data. Amended transcripts were sent back to the research 
participants for their comments. Once feedback30 from the research participants 
had been received, the final text was subject to proofreading, after which it was 
deemed ready for initial analysis. 
                                                          
30
 Feedback primarily constituted additional facts and never serious amendments to the actual content. No 
comment was withdrawn by any of the interviewed reporters. 
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Section 3: Data Analysis 
This section explains the main principles of the chosen method of analysis as it is used in this 
study. A demonstration of how the coding was conducted is also provided. Additionally, expected 
original contribution and methodological limitations are presented 
 
3.1 Method of Analysis 
This study is concerned with analysis of textual data which may be carried out by 
means of either content analysis or template analysis. Here, the most significant 
distinction is not necessarily determined by opposing philosophical underpinnings 
of the two methods, but manifests itself through the varying degree of procedural 
restrictions (King, 2004).  
The investigation of corporate governance in Russia is dependent upon the 
researcher‘s success in gaining access to the relevant data. The external 
environment makes it extremely difficult to penetrate generally high levels of 
suspicion and where there is a strong reluctance to sharing information when it 
comes to the subject matter. Under such conditions, it is very risky to accept 
restrictive methods of data collection and analysis. 
Template analysis has been chosen for the purpose of this study because it allows 
a great deal of freedom in the application and development of codes while 
engaging with textual data. It is not prescriptive in terms of epistemological 
positions (King, 2004) and has been used in pragmatic research. The method 
offers sufficient scope for the development of useful codes, as it accepts both 
objective (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and subjective (Madill et al, 2000) 
methodologies claiming these to be subordinate to the interplay between the 
researcher and data31. 
Due to such an inherent flexibility, template analysis encompasses a wide range of 
techniques (King, 2004). Very often these techniques amount to assigning a list of 
codes to corresponding themes identified in textual data. Related themes are then 
organised in a template that usually has a hierarchical structure (King, 2004). It 
                                                          
31
 If applicability of codes is the ultimate aim of such interplay, then the pragmatist criteria is fulfilled. 
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has to be mentioned that rules with regard to identifying themes32, defining 
codes33, and assigning codes to themes are often interpreted differently in the 
context of various studies because of their general nature. Consequently, 
descriptions of this method in research methodology literature are fairly brief while 
a lot of emphasis is placed on the demonstration of how the method was used in a 
particular study (Symon & Cassell, 2004). The explanation for this lies in the fact 
that, with regard to template analysis, most researchers have to alter certain 
aspects of the method based on the nature of the research question and unique 
characteristics of accumulated data.  
This research seeks to capture institutional change through analysis of corporate 
disputes, and draws on newspaper articles as a major source of data. Therefore, 
modification of the chosen method of analysis is required in order to fulfil the 
purpose of this research and accommodate unique characteristics of the data set. 
This chapter proceeds with the demonstration of how newspaper articles have 
been transformed into templates that were subsequently used in the analysis 
chapter of this thesis.  
 
3.2 Template Analysis 
Template analysis can be applied to any textual data, including newspaper 
articles, for its capacity to deal with large data sets (King, 2006). However, most 
frequently this method of data analysis deals with interview transcripts which as a 
rule address research questions directly. This is not the case with newspaper 
articles which are originally written for a different purpose. The above section on 
archival data collection demonstrates how the Moscow Times articles have been 
selected in order to ensure their relevance. As previously stated, 290 articles 
(approximately 200,000 words) in total have been subjected to template analysis. 
 
                                                          
32
 Themes are features of participants’ accounts which characterise particular perceptions and/or 
experiences which the researcher sees as relevant to the research question (King, 2004). 
33
 Coding is the process of identifying themes in accounts and attaching labels (codes) to index them (King, 
2004). 
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3.2.1 A Priori Themes 
A priori themes relating to the nature of corporate disputes (Fox & Heller, 2000) 
and enforcement strategies (Hendley et al., 1999) have been borrowed from the 
literature. Dispute-related themes were also complemented by additional themes 
that were developed further to a comprehensive review of the Russian law on joint 
stock companies that rather specifically defines potential areas of conflict. 
Furthermore, the ‗other‘ category in relation to corporate disputes and enforcement 
strategies have been added to ensure that preliminary coding erred on the side of 
inclusivity. All a priori themes are presented in appendix 6 a. 
 
3.2.2 Developing Themes 
A priori themes proved to be relevant to the content of the Moscow Times articles 
on corporate disputes. However, further development of the themes was required 
in order to capture the richness of the newspaper accounts while ensuring that a 
meaningful grouping of the themes was still possible. Changes to a priori themes 
are presented in appendix 6b.  
It has to be acknowledged that the process of developing the themes was fused 
with subjectivity. Without seeking to eliminate the latter, understandable concerns 
over research rigour can be addressed by a demonstration of how disputes were 
recorded and themes identified prior to the coding process (see figure 3.1 which 
presents a four-step34 example based on the corporate dispute described in 
appendix 3).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 The four steps have been determined by the adopted definition of corporate disputes. For a dispute to 
qualify for the study the content of selected articles would normally outline key stakeholders, nature of the 
dispute, arbitration and enforcement.  
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Figure 3.4: Example of how disputes were recorded 
Stage 1  
 
 
 
The example is based on the corporate dispute 
presented in appendix 3. 
Stakeholders 
are identified 
 
Bank Rossiisky Kredit (spokeswoman Tatyana 
Izmailova), Moscow's Golovinsky District Court, 
Moscow City Arbitration Court, Trekhmernaya Pamyat 
(the firm's lawyer Sergei Yerokhov), Bailiffs, Moscow's 
traffic Police, Tax Authorities. 
 
Stage 235  
 
 
 
The bank refused to transfer money from the account 
of its client referring to tax authorities who froze the 
account of the client for non-payment. Nature of the 
dispute is 
described 
 
Stage 3  
 
 
The court ruled in favour of the client and accused the 
bank of illegal refusal to transfer the money meant for 
wages and taxes. Arbitration is 
considered 
 
Stage 4  
 
 
 
 
The court‟s decision was enforced by bailiffs who 
seized the bank‟s armoured vehicles with the help of 
traffic police. The bank expressed its intention to 
appeal the decision since it argued that the client‟s 
account had been frozen by tax authorities. 
Enforcement 
strategy is 
analysed 
 
  
Once every dispute had been recorded in this way, it was possible to see which a 
priori themes best captured the data and which themes needed to be expanded, 
altered or excluded. With regard to the above example, the following themes were 
identified: 
 
                                                          
35
 Although every effort was made to ensure that steps 2, 3 and 4 reflect the content of the articles, they 
are descriptions produced by the researcher and in this respect are not bias-free.  
 
Page 70 
 
- Diversion of claims: refusal to transfer money to customer 
- Litigation: a court ruling in favour of the customer enforced by bailiffs who 
seized property of the bank. 
- Unclear rules: the bank appealed the decision of the court claiming that the 
client‘s account had been frozen by tax authorities.  
Following Fox & Heller (2000) (see appendix 2), it was necessary to expand the 
definition of the ‗diversion of claims‘ pathology to include disputed instances of 
non-payment. Moreover, emerging themes such as unclear/contradictory/ 
inadequate rules had to be added to the list of themes in order to capture more 
specific aspects of corporate disputes. 
In developing the themes it was necessary to retain the balance between a 
comprehensive structure and applicability to the data set. In other words, it was 
important to ensure that the content of the selected articles was covered fully by 
the final themes with an appropriate level of detail36. This reflects on the task of 
data collection and explains the strategy adopted for the development of the a 
priori themes.  
 
3.2.3 Coding 
Once definitions had been attached to each theme, it was necessary to arrange 
the data in a way which would be conducive of a detailed analysis. King (2004) 
advocates a hierarchical structure of arranging data. This hierarchical structure is 
created by allocating ‗higher order codes‘ to the most general themes while more 
narrowly defined sub-themes are attached to ‗lower order codes‘. While reviewing 
definitions of each theme, a 3-order hierarchy depicted in table 3.1 emerged.   
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Once this condition was met, the two ‘other’ categories became redundant. 
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Table 3.1: Coding Corporate Disputes 
First Order 
Management   1.1 Diversion    1.2 
Second Order 
1. Bankruptcy   1.1.1 
2. Ownership   1.1.2 
3. Misinvestment   1.1.3 
4. Misimplementation  1.1.4 
5. Taxes    1.1.5 
6. Control    1.1.6 
1. Diversion of Assets  1.2.1 
2. Diversion of Claims  1.2.2 
 
Third Order 
Disputes 
D 
Resolution 
ES 
1. State Interference  
2. Inadequate Information 
3. General Meetings 
4. Unclear Rules 
5. Transactions with Self-Interest 
6. Relationship-Based 
7. Self-Enforcement 
8. Third-Party Enforcement 
9. Private Enforcement 
10. Administrative Levers of the State 
11. Shadow of Enforcement 
12. Litigation 
 
 First Order Codes 
All recorded disputes could be divided into two very broad categories: disputes to 
do with the way companies are managed and disputes that arise as a result of 
misappropriation (or diversion of funds and assets). This distinction resembles Fox 
& Heller‘s grouping of ‗non-maximisation of residuals‘ and ‗non pro-rata 
distributions‘ pathologies. However, in this research the codes correspond to the 
themes that are defined by the content of the articles, and therefore a priori 
themes used at the initial stage of the analysis became redundant once they 
fulfilled the purpose of assisting the initial stage of coding. 
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 Second Order Codes 
The second order codes reveal the asymmetric structure of the hierarchy. 
Managerial disputes are subdivided into 6 codes while diversion disputes consist 
of only two. As far as template analysis is concerned this asymmetry does not 
pose a problem because the coding is not supposed to be predetermined, but is 
created by the researcher himself while engaging with the data. At this stage it is 
important to state that parallel coding was employed in the analysis of the data 
(King, 2004). The same dispute could be coded as both e.g. diversion of claims 
and misinvestment. This fact detracts from the meaningfulness of citing the 
frequency37 of a particular type of dispute, but contributes positively to the level of 
detail with which templates capture reported data.  
 Third Order Codes 
The purpose of the third order codes is to capture intricate details of the data set. 
Altogether, there are 12 sub-categories corresponding to each second order code. 
The first five codes (1-5) further define the nature of the corporate disputes, while 
the latter seven (6-12) cover the resolution process. Nevertheless it was 
necessary to limit the hierarchy of data to three levels38 in order to avoid 
unnecessary complexity of final templates and ensure that every code is 
represented by a prominent and easily identifiable theme. 
Referring back to the corporate dispute presented in appendix 3, table 3.2 
provides an example of a final template of the dispute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Template analysis cannot relate frequency to salience (King, 2004). 
38
 Level of detail recommended by King (2004). 
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Table 3.2: Final Template 
Coding 
Profile 
Theme Brief Notes 
1.2 
Fist Order 
Diversion   Disputed transaction 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Refusal to transfer money to a customer 
1.2.2.4 
Third Order 
O 
Unclear Rules 
   
The bank appealed the decision of the 
court claiming that the client‘s account had 
been frozen by tax authorities 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation  
 
Court ruling was enforced by bailiffs who 
seized property of the bank  
 
Such a template has been compiled for all disputes extracted from the Moscow 
Times articles pertaining to 1998 (79 templates) and 2006 (41 templates). All the 
codes have been entered into a spreadsheet and represent the data for 
descriptive statistics.  
The reason behind not looking beyond the years in question stems from the fact 
that the study focuses on the investigation of the change in perception. Two clearly 
defined ‗snap shots‘ of the environment at different points in time will act as an 
accurate measure of the change in perception provided the ‗snap shots‘ are 
representative vis-à-vis reported material published in the respective periods 
under consideration. A year‘s worth of reported material on corporate disputes is 
considered representative of the newspaper‘s coverage for a particular period 
because of the large number of articles meeting the selection criteria (175 articles 
representing 1998 data and 115 articles pertaining to 2006). In this respect, 
expanding the data set is considered unnecessary because an accurate enough 
representation of the environment can be constructed on the bases of the 
available data. Additionally, it is important to note that some larger disputes in the 
study took longer than a year to resolve. However, these disputes were not 
followed through for two reasons: 
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1. Larger disputes tend to be resolved in distinct stages which, if match the 
respective period of reporting, are included in the study. The net impact of 
these disputes on perception is less than reported material on smaller 
disputes because the latter are a more significant characteristic of collected 
data.  
2. Some particularly large disputes span over a considerably longer period of 
time than a year (e.g. Yukos dispute began in 2003 and was not resolved 
until 2007). In this case, the systematic characteristic of the data needs to 
be maintained through a clear cut-off point even though some data is 
inevitably lost as a result. The justification for this lies in the comparative 
dimension of the final data set that forms the foundation for conclusions 
about the change in perception with reference to concrete stages of the 
development of corporate governance in Russia.  
 
3.2.4 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The purpose of having two sources of data is not so much to increase 
generalisability of the findings, but to improve credibility of the study. According to 
Goldkuhl (2004), ―For a pragmatist … triangulation of sources and methods, are 
ways to escape a too large dependence on informants‟ conceptions‖ and thus the 
issue about the nature/quality of inferences is addressed.  
Unlike newspaper articles, interviews address the research questions directly. The 
purpose of semi-structured interviews in the context of this research is to 
triangulate the coded data39 as well as to investigate the status of the Moscow 
Times articles with regard to the accuracy and influence of published material. 
Dispute-related questions (see appendix 4, questions 1-3) have been covered by 
interviews with the newspaper reporters. The coding profiles described above 
have been created for all disputes covered in such interviews. Constructed 
templates were then compared for consistency with the templates informed by 
                                                          
39
 It is important to be sure that no major corporate dispute has been omitted from the coded data and 
indeed the reported material in general. 
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newspaper articles. Such a comparison is regarded as central to the task of 
improving the quality of data, inferences and credibility of the findings.  
In order to capitalise on the richness of interview data, all interviews with the 
Moscow Times reporters have been screened repeatedly for additional 
information, particularly with regard to more general comments on the changing 
nature of the rule of law. Although, these comments are excluded from the formal 
analysis, they played an important role in setting the scene for a comprehensive 
discussion of the findings. 
Questions about the Moscow Times reports (see appendix 4, questions 4a and 4b) 
were analysed separately. The key themes here had been predetermined at the 
questioning stage and refer to the levels of accuracy, independence and influence 
of the newspaper‘s coverage of corporate disputes in the country. Due to the fairly 
specific nature of the questions and a limited number of interviews, it was possible 
to attribute all relevant transcript extracts to the specified themes (see chapter 4 
section 5). The purpose of this is to strengthen credibility of the archival data by 
analysing comments about the articles‘ accuracy and influence.  
 
Original Contribution 
This study strives to analyse the changing nature of the corporate governance 
environment in Russia. The unique element here is the focus on corporate 
disputes as a determinant of the institutional infrastructure in the country. 
Inferences about the change in the environment are informed by a detailed 
comparison of agency based conflicts and methods of their resolution pertaining to 
1998 and 2006. Such a comparison of corporate disputes has not been carried out 
before. 
 
Methodologically, this study relies on the Moscow Times archives as a main 
source of data. This source has been used in the study of corporate governance in 
Russia (Fox & Heller, 2000). However, this investigation not only adds a 
comparative dimension but also attempts to improve the quality of inferences by 
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employing template analysis as a technique for a structured, yet holistic, 
examination of the large data set. Thus, useful amendments to existing 
frameworks are suggested while the vital call to investigate the role of the 
institutional construct in the discipline of corporate governance (Iwasaki, 2007) is 
addressed.  
In summary, this study offers original contribution to knowledge because it: 
 uses corporate disputes as a unit of analysis  
 provides a comparative dimension to the study of institutional environment 
 relies on uniquely constructed archival data 
 proposes useful amendments to the existing theoretical frameworks 
 investigates the way template analysis can be employed in the study of 
corporate governance. 
The practical, theoretical and methodological innovations used in this study 
contribute to the understanding of the system of corporate governance in Russia 
leading to greater awareness of the environment while establishing strategically 
important partnerships. Original contribution of this study is further discussed in 
chapter 5 (5.4). 
 
Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations that need to be acknowledged and 
addressed through a vigilant analysis and cautious conclusions. This chapter 
concludes with a summary of these limitations and steps taken to overcome some 
of them.  
The Moscow Times Articles: 
 Between 1998 and 2006 the Moscow Times employed several editors 
 The physical layout of the newspaper and its website changed 
 The situation with regard to the freedom of media in Russia changed 
 Newspaper articles can be rather subjective 
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 A dispute covered in the newspaper might have a continuation which is not 
necessarily covered in the subsequent issues within the two years of the 
study 
 Some disputes are covered repeatedly (across a number of articles), 
whereas others are mentioned only in a single issue 
 There is a difference between the number of disputes that actually occurred 
and those that were reported in the newspaper.  
In order to overcome these limitations a number of steps have been taken: 
1. Some of the limitations above were addressed though interviews with the 
reporters of the Moscow Times. The interviews revealed that changes of the 
editors and format of the newspaper did not have a noticeable impact on the 
reporters‘ work, particularly in the business section. Additionally, as discussed 
later in chapter 4 section 5, the growing concern about the freedom of speech 
in Russia did not apply to the newspaper because of its relatively limited 
readership. 
2. Opinionated articles are included in the data set, because they also determine 
perceptions about the environment. However, conclusions drawn from the data 
accept the bias in favour of foreign investors. This point is discussed further in 
chapter 4, section 5. 
3. It is understood that the selected corporate disputes might receive more 
coverage outside the time scale of this study. Nevertheless, it is still reasonable 
to disregard this coverage in order to maintain a clear comparative dimension.  
4. The intensity of coverage (number of articles per dispute in a given year) has 
been included in the formal analysis in order to address the associated 
limitation.  
5. The limitation connected with how fully the newspaper represents the 
environment has been partially addressed through confining the major 
conclusions to the change in perception.  
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Interviews: 
 The interview guide was still at the stage of development when the initial 
interviews took place 
 Some reporters had difficulty recalling corporate disputes from 1998 and 
consequently, more general questions about the rule of law dominated such 
discussions. 
In addressing limitations connected with the quality of interview data, the following 
steps were taken: 
1. The brief did not refer to any particular disputes and the reporters were asked 
to recall the most representative disputes. 
2. The reporters were asked only about the disputes that took place at the time 
they were working for the newspaper. 
3. The list of questions (appendix 4, excluding the probes), where possible, was 
sent well in advance of the actual interviews.  
Analysis: 
 Content of constructed codes is descriptive in that it is the researcher‘s own 
account of the reported data.  
In addressing this limitation, the content of the final templates (appendices 9a and 
9b) is presented with the maximum degree of detail. Moreover, the process of 
constructing the templates described in the chapter was strictly adhered to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 79 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented information about the philosophical stance of the 
researcher and explained the way in which data was collected and analysed. Here 
the concept of pragmatism was discussed in conjunction with key aspects of the 
data and template analysis. Additionally, original contribution was discussed in 
methodological terms. Finally, an outline of limitations and possible solutions was 
considered.  
This chapter provided the framework (in the broadest sense of the word) within 
which the subsequent analysis and findings need to be considered. It is important 
to reiterate however, that this is a predominantly qualitative piece of research. 
Hence, the numerous graphs presented in the next chapter are the constructed 
representations of the data set the primary purpose of which is to lay out the 
analysed material in a transparent and structured manner.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the data pertaining to the two 
periods under investigation (1998 and 2006). First, the reported data is analysed 
followed by a structured overview of interview material. The key characteristic of 
this chapter is the comparative dimension which is informed by the constructed 
templates. Altogether there are five sections. Section 1 comprises a brief outline of 
the codes and themes based on numerical representations. Section 2 contains a 
detailed comparison of the second order codes (bankruptcy, ownership, 
misinvestment, misimplementation, taxes, control, diversion of assets and 
diversion of claims). Sections 3 and 4 present the information about the third-order 
codes which further define corporate disputes (state interference, inadequate 
information, general meeting, unclear rules, and transactions with self-interest) 
and resolution practices (relationship-based, self, third-party and private 
enforcements as well as administrative levers of the state, shadow of enforcement 
and litigation). The ongoing commentary is about how the nature of reported 
disputes and methods of their resolution evolved over the period under 
consideration. Section 5 deals with the interview material and presents the results 
of the triangulation of the data set. 
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Section 1: Numerical Overview of Coded Data 
This section provides a numerical overview of coded data representing reported corporate 
disputes. 
 
1.1 Outline of Codes 
Each reported dispute has been allocated to a corresponding code40. Additional 
features of disputes have also been captured by lower order codes. This coding 
process is central to the way data has been recorded and analysed in this study. 
The diagram below presents the full hierarchy of codes that has been developed 
during this research.  
Figure 4.1: Hierarchy of Codes 
 
         Corporate Disputes 
 
  Management       Diversion 
 
 
B O M (1)      M (2) T C     A   C 
 
 
 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 ES6 ES7 ES8 ES9 ES10 ES11 ES12  
  
Further characteristics of disputes      Dispute resolution practices 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Initially, the codes were informed by themes taken from the literature. 
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Management 
B – Disputes featuring bankruptcy 
O – Ownership-related disputes 
M (1) – Misinvestment  
M (2) – Misimplementation  
T – Disputes featuring taxes 
C – Control-related disputes 
Diversion 
A – Diversion of Assets 
C – Diversion of Claims 
 
Lower Order Codes 
D1 – State Interference 
D2 – Inadequate Information 
D3 – General Meetings 
D4 – Unclear Rules 
D5 – Transactions with Self-Interest 
Resolution 
ES6 – Relationship-Based 
ES7 – Self-Enforcement 
ES8 – Third-Party Enforcement 
ES9 – Private Enforcement 
ES10 – Administrative Levers of the State 
ES11 – Shadow of Enforcement 
ES12 – Litigation  
 
It is critical to reiterate that the above codes are defined by their content rather 
than a predetermined criterion. In this regard, meaningful analysis needs to follow 
a certain structure, yet account for the highest possible level of detail. To address 
this consideration, the analysis chapter begins with a comparative overview of 
numbers representing types of corporate disputes from 1998 and 2006 and 
proceeds with a detailed analysis of the content of constructed templates.  
The figures behind graphs presented hereunder must be interpreted with a 
number of limitations in mind. Firstly, this study relies on reported data, and 
therefore it is impossible to extend applicability of the identified trends to anything 
other than the change in perception. Secondly, use of parallel coding reduces the 
relationship between frequency and salience considerably. Thirdly, the figures 
reflect coverage of corporate disputes produced by a single newspaper, albeit the 
only one available for the purposes of this study. Evidently, generalisability of such 
findings is limited. Nevertheless, a numerical overview of reported disputes is 
possible because it reflects entire coverage of the newspaper and serves as a 
helpful demonstration of key trends within the sprawling data set. 
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1.2 Corporate Disputes 
In 1998, 45 companies spanning 17 industries were reported41 by the Moscow 
Times as being party to a corporate conflict. This is in comparison with only 20 
companies representing 7 industries in 2006 (see appendices 7a and 7b).  The 
number of articles covering corporate disputes also decreased from 175 in 1998 to 
115 in 2006. This reduction is not as drastic as the reduction in the number of 
companies which suggests that in 2006 a number of larger (in terms of coverage) 
disputes were reported by the newspaper. 
 
1.3 Graphs and Tables 
In 2006 the Moscow Times reported fewer corporate disputes than in 1998 (see 
graph 4.1). In total, 98 separate disputes were featured during the first year of the 
investigation in comparison with 58 disputes in 2006. Clearly these numbers need 
to be interpreted in the context of a fairly subjective method of coding. 
Nevertheless, such a significant difference in numbers reveals a very important 
trend42. 
Based on this data it is impossible to conclude whether the corporate environment 
in Russia has become more or less favourable for foreign investors. To draw a 
trustworthy conclusion on this point it is necessary to consider the nature of 
reported corporate disputes which will be done later. However, this data can serve 
as an indication of an improvement in terms of the way the environment is 
perceived. This conclusion is based on an underlying assumption that each time a 
new corporate dispute is reported it has a negative impact on the way investors 
perceive the environment. At the same time it has to be noted that perception is 
                                                          
41
 In order for a dispute to be included in the analysis, it had to be a prominent part of at least one full 
article. 
42
 Validity of the numbers is justified by the fact that all reported material published in the newspaper 
during the two years under investigation has been screened for corporate disputes. In addition, replicability 
of these findings is a function of the logic employed at the coding stage. 
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more closely related to the intensity of coverage rather than the variety of disputes 
and companies43.   
 
Graph 4.1: Total number of reported corporate disputes 
 
 
1.3.1 First Order Codes 
First order coding divides corporate disputes into two broad categories: 
1. Disputes to do with the way companies are managed. 
2. Disputes arising as a result of questionable distribution of property and claims. 
It has to be recognised that both types of corporate disputes can produce the 
same outcome, in that a legitimate party‘s interests are misrepresented. However, 
if a dispute is coded as a diversion, it implies an outright intention to 
misappropriate (or steal) by one of the parties to the conflict. Managerial disputes 
are more of a function of the situation that a company finds itself in. If a corporate 
dispute contains a feature of more than one theme, parallel coding is employed.  
 
 
                                                          
43
 For that reason it is important to repeat the fact that overall considerably fewer articles covering 
corporate disputes were published in 2006 than in 1998. 
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Figure 4.2: Management – Diversion Disputes 
 
 
The number of both managerial and diversion disputes reported in 1998 exceeded 
that of 2006 (36 versus 26 instances of diversion and 62 versus 32 conflicts of 
managerial nature). As depicted in figure 4.2, proportionately, the composition of 
corporate disputes changed in favour of diversion disputes in the most recent year 
(45%). Nevertheless, disputes of a managerial nature represent a majority with 
reference to both years under investigation. The latter point subtly suggests that 
according to reported data companies find themselves in situations of (potential) 
danger and that, to a noticeable extent, it is more of a fault of the environment 
rather than solely caused by actions of self-centred stakeholders that constitute an 
action of diversion.  
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1.3.2 Second Order Codes 
Second order codes further divide managerial and diversion disputes into 6 and 2 
subcategories respectively44. Disputes of a managerial nature include the 
following: 
 Disputes arising in connection with bankruptcy proceedings 
 Disputes related to property rights and ownership 
 Disputes arising as a result of investment in an apparently non-viable 
project (misinvestment) 
 Disputes connected with misimplementation of a viable project 
 Disputes related to tax arrears 
 Disputes over who controls a corporate entity 
Diversion disputes are subdivided into: 
 Diversion of assets, i.e. a situation when assets are misappropriated 
 Diversion of claims, i.e. a situation when financial resources are channelled 
away from a legitimate stakeholder 
It is difficult to rate these subcategories into more or less detrimental ones as far 
as the corporate climate is concerned. Hence prevalence of a particular type of a 
dispute is simply a characteristic of the environment45 rather than an indication of 
the overall level of hostility. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 This remains reminiscent of Fox & Heller (1999) categorisation albeit with alterations determined by the 
coding process. 
45
 Such prevalence is expected to be indicative of a gap in the institutional construct.  
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Figure 4.3: Composition of Diversion Disputes 
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that despite the significant drop in the total number of corporate 
disputes, 2006 saw more reported instances of diversion of assets than 1998. This 
is not surprising in the context of the frequently discussed re-nationalisation of 
assets within strategic sectors in Russia. Clearly, this figure demonstrates that the 
re-nationalisation process failed to account for interests of all stakeholders 
involved leading to a rising number in reported corporate disputes within this 
subcategory. Nevertheless, an almost twofold reduction in the number of reported 
disputes coded as diversion of claims suggests a positive change in the form of 
either more adequate leverage that corporate stakeholders have, or a change in 
culture that has started to act as a stronger deterrent of outright misappropriation 
of financial resources. A third explanation behind this perceived trend could be the 
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fact that individuals in a position of power have accumulated enough wealth and 
hence have become less aggressive in pursuing financial gains46. 
Figure 4.4: Composition of Managerial Disputes 
 
 
 
With regard to disputes of a managerial nature, all the subcategories have 
witnessed a reduction in the number of reported instances, apart from the 
ownership subcategory which gave rise to 16 reported disputes in both years 
                                                          
46
 This is a particularly strong deterrent if pursuing more financial gain results in additional risk to legitimacy 
since it could be safely assumed that in the more recent years such individuals have a great deal more to 
lose. 
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under investigation. However, proportionately, this subcategory should be 
perceived as more dominant in 2006 since the total number of reported 
managerial disputes fell by 31 instances. Again, this trend is in line with the 
previous comment regarding the current administration‘s drive to re-nationalise 
key strategic assets. However, these figures are not meant to confirm the already 
known fact of re-nationalisation, but rather clearly suggest that such re-
nationalisation took place at the expense of certain stakeholders. 
Moreover, disputes over control issues, despite being the most dominant category 
in 1998, became a less prominent feature of the environment in 2006, both in 
terms of the total number of reported instances and with regard to proportional 
representation. This suggests that there has been a positive change in the 
perceived stability of power structures in the country. This conclusion is drawn on 
the basis of an assumption that stability of power structures is negatively 
correlated to the number of reported instances of corporate disputes arising as a 
result of a struggle for control.  
Disputes involving non-payment of taxes and bankruptcy proceedings have again 
subsided in dominance with the more significant drop in the latter category. This 
should be the case in an economy where the highly volatile effects of early 
transition have been largely brought under control. Furthermore, if the overall 
economic condition of the country has improved, and the existing power structures 
have strengthened their grip over the majority of assets, then the likelihood of an 
entity going bankrupt would lessen accordingly. Under such conditions the number 
of reported instances of bankruptcy disputes is likely to fall. Data extracted from 
the Moscow Times articles renders support for such a proposition. 
According to figure 4.4, misinvestment and misimplementation are the least 
common forms of corporate disputes as per the Moscow Times coverage. 
Nevertheless, there were more reported instances when companies failed to 
implement projects than cases of non-viable investments for the two years 
covered by the study. Consistent with the overall trend, the number of disputes 
classified as either misinvestment or misimplementation fell in 2006. It could be 
argued that this reduction suggests a more shareholder-oriented approach to 
corporate conduct in Russia since the reduction in the number of reported 
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instances of these types of disputes can be explained by a greater level of 
accountability of management to finance providers.  
 
1.3.3 Third Order Codes 
As mentioned before, third order codes serve a dual purpose. Firstly, the codes 
seek to capture further details of reported disputes. Secondly, these codes 
encapsulate themes related to the style of resolution of captured conflicts.  
Graphs 5 and 6 depict dispute-related codes for both years of the study, where 
there is occurrence of the following: 
D1 – State Interference 
D2 – Inadequate Information 
D3 – General Meeting 
D4 – Unclear Rules 
D5 – Transactions with Self-Interest 
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Graph 4.2: Sub-types of Corporate Disputes, 1998 
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Graph 4.3: Sub-types of Corporate Disputes, 2006 
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The two graphs, apart from summarising all previously discussed trends, also 
provide an additional dimension represented by the 5 codes.  
With regard to state interference (category D1) it can be seen that overall it 
remains a visible feature of reported corporate disputes. Again with this data, we 
Page 92 
 
are not confirming an already known fact of active state interference in corporate 
affairs in Russia, but suggesting that such an interference fuels conflicts among 
affected stakeholders. Additionally, presented figures suggest that corporate 
conflicts are continuing to be caused by the lack of transparency and poor quality 
of disclosed information (category D2). However, a subtly positive change occured 
with regard to the number of reported disputes featuring general meetings 
(category D3) and unclear rules (category D4). This could be interpreted as a 
perceived sign of a more developed framework within which stakeholders 
negotiate their claims. Finally, with regard to self-centred activities (category D5), 
although the number of corporate disputes decreased, such a characteristic 
remains a dominant feature of the reported material covering corporate disputes in 
2006.  
The second purpose of the third order codes is to capture the changing nature of 
the resolution process with reference to reported corporate disputes pertaining to 
the two years of the study, where there is evidence of the following: 
ES6 – Relationship-Based Resolution 
ES7 – Self-Enforcement 
ES8 – Third-Party Enforcement 
ES9 – Private Enforcement 
ES10 – Administrative Levers of the State 
ES11 – Shadow of Enforcement 
ES12 – Litigation  
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Graph 4.4: Enforcement-related Codes, 1998 
 
Graph 4.5: Enforcement-related Codes, 2006 
 
The two graphs show an apparent dominance of administrative levers of the state 
and litigation categories. The latter was slightly more prominent in the 1998 
coverage whereas the former was more visible in 2006. Considering the overall 
reduction in the total number of reported disputes, proportionately, these two 
categories prevail with regard to the 2006 data. In contrast, relationship, self-and 
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third-party enforcements also featured strongly within the reported material in 
1998. A relatively weaker presence of these categories in 2006 indicates a 
noticeable shift towards a greater involvement of formal institutions in the process 
of dispute resolution. Again, it is impossible to tell whether or not this shift 
translated into a fairer resolution process. In order to address this question it is 
necessary to consider the nature of involvement of such institutions in some detail 
(this will be done in the subsequent section of the analysis chapter). However, 
fewer reported instances of relationship, self and third-party enforcement practices 
should contribute to a change in perception in favour of a gradual development of 
a more formalised resolution process in the country. Finally, and in contrast with 
the previous observation, the private enforcement category remained a visible 
feature of the environment in 2006 according to the Moscow Times data. This 
category is indicative of the extent of the extra judiciary activity in the country and 
therefore its largely unchanged presence precludes us from suggesting a positive 
change in perception with regard to the rule of law in the country at the stage of a 
general numerical overview of the reported data.  
In the following three sections of the chapter the content of constructed templates 
is presented and analysed in comparative terms. First, the content of second order 
codes is compared followed by a further scrutiny of more narrowly defined third 
order codes. Within each subsection specific features of the reported disputes are 
considered with regard to each theme followed by concluding comments about the 
perceived change of the rule of law in the country.  
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Section 2: Analysis of the Content of the Second Order Codes 
In this section the content of the second order codes is analysed in detail. A graphical 
representation of each code and relevent themes extracted from the reported disputes are  
provided for 1998 and 2006. 
 
2.1 Second Order Codes (Management) 
The discussion of the second order codes contains brief accounts of all relevant 
disputes. If a further clarification is required, readers can refer to a relevant 
template of the corresponding dispute contained in appendix 9a for 1998 and 
appendix 9b for 2006. In this section all accounts of the coded corporate disputes 
are presented in bullet points except for the last category, which due to its large 
size had to be summarised in a table. 
2.1.1 Bankruptcy 
With regard to the newspaper coverage featuring bankruptcy proceedings, 7 
disputes (6 different organisations) were identified in articles published in 1998 
and only one dispute (1 organisation) in 2006. A total of 13 articles captured the 7 
bankruptcy disputes in 1998, whereas the single case pertaining to 2006 was 
reported in 8 different articles (see graph 4.6). This suggests that the single 
bankruptcy dispute reported in 2006 had a disproportionately large impact on 
perception in comparison with individual cases reported in 1998.  
Graph 4.6: Bankruptcy Disputes 
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Bankruptcy disputes reported in 1998 were almost exclusively connected with the 
unfulfilled financial obligations of affected organisations. They were as follows: 
 Failure to meet outstanding debt obligations (Tatneft)47. 
 Creditors were pushing for bankruptcy because the parent re-diverted cash 
flows away from its subsidiary (Sidanko). 
 Unprofitable plant protected from bankruptcy because of the far-reaching 
social implication (Achinsk Alumina Combine). 
 Bankruptcy of a bank that failed to pay its depositors after the financial crisis 
(ABS Agro). 
 Two banks lost their operating licenses and were bankrupted after the 
financial crisis. The put option designed under the British law was not 
recognised by the Russian law (equal treatment of all shareholders) meaning 
that investors could not recover their money (EBRD). 
 A company failed on debt repayment when a court sent marshals to seize its 
property on behalf of creditors. The government issued a presidential decree 
extending the credit (ORT). 
There was one bankruptcy dispute apparently not directly connected to a 
commercial entity‘s inability to meet financial obligations: 
 Bankruptcy proceedings were used in order to gain control of a subsidiary 
(Sidanko). 
Three main themes emerge from the above. First, in 1998 bankruptcies affected 
unprofitable entities. These entities were unprofitable because they were 
mismanaged (Tatneft, Sidanko, Achinsk, ORT). Secondly, in addition to poor 
management, tough external conditions, at large caused by the uncertainty 
following the financial crisis, forced some companies into liquidation. The latter 
observation was particularly relevant to companies within the banking sector such 
as ASB Agro and EBRD (who had to write-off its investments into two smaller 
Russian banks). Finally, certain entities were protected from bankruptcy due to the 
far-reaching social implications that such proceedings would have caused. In the 
instance of Achinsk Alumina Combine, the government had no choice but to 
                                                          
47
 The subsequent analysis of the third-order codes provides references to the corresponding second-order 
codes as well as relevant templates contained in appendices 9a and 9b.  
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protect the entity because it was the main employer in the region, despite it being 
systematically misappropriated by the management. Moreover, bankrupting such 
an entity as ORT (main television channel) would have reduced the government‘s 
grip on the crucial opinion polls. An entity, that by all accounts should have been 
comfortably profitable, suffered from a constant drain on its resources caused by 
the self-centred actions of influential stakeholders. 
Bankruptcy proceedings can be an adequate response in the context of the above 
identified themes. In a capitalist setting, unprofitable entities should be liquidated 
and their assets sold to the highest bidder (Fox & Heller, 2000). Unfortunately, that 
was rarely the case in the 1998 environment in Russia. Much too often self-
centred stakeholders (unusually management) prevented bankruptcies by 
manipulating the system. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the 
system, despite being perceived as weak and incompetent, often called for the 
right actions. In other words, those bankruptcies should have happened but in 
some instances did not because of the self-centred individuals (including the 
government officials) who had an immense capacity to manipulate the system of 
governance to their advantage. 
In 2006 only one case of a bankruptcy was featured in the Moscow Times articles. 
As stated before, it was a much more influential (in terms of the impact it created 
on investor perception) case than any of the bankruptcies discussed with 
reference to the 1998 reporting because of the amount of coverage that this highly 
politicised case received. 
In contrast to the previously discussed cases, the bankruptcy of Yukos was not 
brought about by the company‘s inability to settle its financial obligations, but by 
the government who systematically sought to destroy an economically viable 
entity. The government brought massive back-taxes claims against the company 
because, allegedly, its owner refused to reaffirm his loyalty to the Kremlin. It is 
entirely possible that the company and its owners were in fact guilty of ubiquitous 
tax evasion. However, it can be suggested with a reasonable degree of confidence 
that this is an example of a selective application of law because other Kremlin- 
friendly entities (allegedly just as guilty of similar violations) did not experience the 
same pressure from the authorities. In this regard, it is evident that contrary to the 
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1998 environment, the sole case of 2006 demonstrates a severe lack of integrity in 
the system, which nevertheless has accumulated an unchallenged capacity to 
regulate the environment. 
 
2.1.1.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Bankruptcy Disputes 
With regard to the perceived change in the rule of law, 1998 compares favourably 
with 2006 only on a single account. With regard to bankruptcy disputes reported in 
1998, formal institutions (mostly courts) in the majority of reported cases proposed 
adequate rulings to bankrupt failing entities. In contrast to this, 2006 saw a 
corporate dispute where formal institutions (courts and tax authorities) were 
pressurised to produce rulings consistent with the government‘s agenda. The 
newspaper analysts suggested that this agenda was driven by self-centred actions 
of the Russian administrative elite. 
However, in terms of perception, it is possible to conclude with a number of 
improvements with reference to the rule of law in 2006. Firstly, there were fewer 
reported instances of bankruptcies, despite the 2006 case being much larger in 
terms of coverage. Secondly, formal institutions appear to have much greater 
enforcement powers and the state has accumulated a greater capacity to exert 
influence over previously extremely powerful financial structures within the 
country. 
Moreover, there were no reported instances when the government blocked 
bankruptcies of unviable entities. Finally, there were no reported instances when a 
bankruptcy was initiated by an interested private party in order to seize control. 
 
2.1.2 Ownership 
With reference to the Moscow Times coverage featuring ownership, 16 disputes 
(14 organisations) were identified from articles published in 1998 and 16 disputes 
(13 organisations) in 2006. A total of 40 articles captured the 16 ownership 
disputes published in 1998, whereas the 16 disputes in 2006 were reported in 89 
different articles. In contrast to the previously discussed category, ownership 
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disputes in total received more coverage and therefore created a greater impact 
on perception in the more recent year. However, the nature of ownership disputes 
has evolved over the period under consideration. 
Graph 4.7: Ownership Disputes 
 
With regard to ownership disputes reported in 1998, three distinct themes 
emerged from the content of the analysed articles. These themes are ownership 
restrictions, contested ownership, and politically motivated re-allocation of 
property. The latter category is also applicable to ownership disputes pertaining to 
2006. However a different theme termed ownership disclosure has been identified 
after a review of the content of 2006 ownership disputes. The themes and brief 
outline of relevant ownership disputes are presented hereunder.  
 
2.1.2.1 Politically Motivated Re-allocation of Property and Ownership Restrictions 
(1998) 
 Gazprom‘s managers set up a gauntlet of limitations to discourage outside 
shareholdings. Foreigners were barred from buying domestic stock and the 
company‘s registrar refused to accept trades unless the shares had first been 
offered to Gazprom (Gazprom). 
 $1.5 billion loan from the World Bank was on condition that the government 
would reform Gazprom and the gas industry making it more open to new 
entrants (Gazprom).  
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 Cancellation of trust agreement under which the head of Gazprom also 
managed a 35% stake. The Federal Audit Chamber made this 
announcement as Vyakhirev (Gazprom CEO) fell out of favour with the 
government (Gazprom). 
 The State Duma, parliament's lower house, passed a bill restricting foreign 
ownership in UES to 25% despite Yeltsin‘s apparent opposition. The issue 
was complicated by the fact that at the time foreigners had already bought 
around 30% of the company. The mechanism for buying back the 5% was 
unclear48. The bill was the result of political infighting between Yeltsin and 
communist dominated Duma, and was challenged in the courts (UES). 
 A prominent foreign investor (Kenneth Dart) was investigated by the state 
Antitrust Committee which sought to establish whether he colluded with other 
shareholders to control more than 20% of Sibneft‘s subsidiary without the 
required permission from the committee. Dart had fallen out of favour with the 
government for his vocal criticism of the country‘s corporate governance 
environment (Sibneft). 
 The results of high profile privatization deals (particularly with reference to 
Norilsk Nickel) were threatened with being reversed. The fact that Duma 
voted unanimously in favour of the reversal through the courts indicated a 
great deal of public dissatisfaction with the ‗loans-for-shares‘ deals (Norilsk 
Nickel). 
 The government decided to re-nationalise Vyborg Paper Mill and supported 
employees in their efforts to oust its new untrustworthy owners (Vyborg 
Paper Mill). 
 
2.1.2.2 Contested Ownership (1998) 
 Yuksi made a surprise announcement that it had no business relationship 
with Amoco which invested more than $100m in the joint development of an 
oil field (Yukos). 
 
                                                          
48
 The Russian Constitution explicitly forbids expropriation of property, and the state could not afford the 
$600 million it would cost to buy back the 5 percent of foreign-owned stock.  
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 The company that was appointed to manage shares of Magnitogorsk resisted 
the handover of shares as collateral for the loan because the stake 
represented its main asset. Sharipov encouraged a number of transactions 
involving foreign partners and the local share registrar to hide the shares 
(Magnitogorsk). 
 Those who attempted to hide the stakes in Lebedinsk Ore Mining Plant did 
so by selling it to a foreign company which no doubt was closely affiliated to 
Russian partners. The whole pursuit of shares by the government might have 
been caused by the pressure from the IMF that was calling for a greater effort 
to collect money on the part of the Russian government (Lebedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant). 
 Sergiyenko, former CEO of Kubanksy Gips-Knauf, was suspended from 
office on allegations of theft, mismanagement and tax manipulation. His 
response was to hold his own meetings, remove Knauf from the company‘s 
name, and issue 64 percent of new shares to dilute the rightful owners‘ stake. 
30 court decisions were ignored and the local authorities supported the coup 
arguing that the plant should be re-nationalised (Knauf). 
 The State Anti Trust Committee‘s decision to allow the transfer of a stake to 
AssiDoman was declared illegal by the Moscow Arbitration Court. It was 
unclear why the legitimacy of AssiDoman‘s stake in Segezhabumprom Paper 
Mill was questioned. The only reasonable explanation would be an effort from 
either a minority shareholder or a third party to take control and ownership of 
the paper mill (AssiDoman). 
 The Russian joint venture partner illegally ousted American partners (fast 
food chain Subway), renamed the entity to Minutka, and assumed control 
and ownership of the company (Subway). 
 Managers of Lomonosov Porcelain Factory denied foreign investors access 
to the factory and its books on the grounds that the brokerages that sold the 
stakes had originally purchased them illegally (Lomonosov Porcelain 
Factory). 
 Local authorities attempted to seize ownership (re-nationalise) of Kuznetsky 
Mine allegedly because the mine stood a good chance of returning to 
profitability following a major revamp by foreign investors (Kuznetsky Mine). 
 A state owned company used its influence to negotiate a lease agreement in 
its favour depriving the foreign investor of any guarantees thus driving the 
foreign investor out of the project (MCCI). 
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Graph 4.8: Composition of ownership disputes and the corresponding amount of 
coverage in 1998 
 
 
2.1.2.3 Politically Observed Re-allocation of Property and Ownership 
Restrictions (2006) 
 The government broke its promise to sell a 75% stake in Svyazinvest to 
strategic investors because it was looking for a politically acceptable partner 
(Svyazinvest). 
 An agreement that a significant ownership stake in a joint venture with 
Gazprom would go to Moncrief was broken in favour of BASF who received 
much stronger political support (Gazprom). 
 The government and Gazprom put pressure on foreign led projects using 
environmental non-compliance as a negotiating tool in order to secure 
favourable terms for Gazprom‘s (or Rosneft) entry (Gazprom).  
 The government, possibly arbitrarily, imposed back-tax bills on Yukos in an 
effort to seize ownership of its main assets. The decision was linked to 
Khodorkovsky‘s support of political opposition. The case was disputed in 
local and international courts including the US court case when high profile 
government officials were ‗legally served‘. The government‘s onslaught was 
eventually legitimised by the international community when a British judge 
cleared the way for Rosneft‘s listing on the LSE. Rosneft ended up scooping 
up most of Yukos‘ assets in a number of highly non-transparent auctions 
(Yukos).  
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 The government used the Natural Resources Ministry and a number of mid- 
ranking officials in order to force Royal Dutch Shell to accept Gazprom‘s 
entry into Sakhalin Energy on favourable terms. Previously, the Russian 
government was angered by Shell when the company increased its cost 
estimate for the project. Under the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) 49, 
that meant that the government would have had to wait longer before it 
received any money from the project. Because of the new cost estimate and 
high price of oil and gas, the government decided to renegotiate the terms of 
the contract which admittedly were not in Russia‘s best interests (Royal 
Dutch Shell). 
 The Russian government felt it was not in the interests of the country to allow 
foreign led projects (such as Total‘s Arctic Khoryaga oil field) to continue to 
operate under the original PSA terms. The decision was based on the fact 
that macro economic conditions i.e. sharp increases in oil prices rendered the 
PSA agreements highly unprofitable for the Russian side. The decision to re-
establish the ownership structure came from the government and was 
contrary to the agreements and promises made in the past (Total). 
 The Russian government used its usual tactics of bullying companies into 
compliance (surrender some licenses and stop competitive bidding) by 
bringing allegations against oil majors. In the instance of LUKoil it was the 
Natural Resources Ministry's environmental regulator that blamed LUKoil for 
environmental violations and development delays (LUKoil). 
 The government used environmental violations and non-compliance with the 
license agreement to force TNK-BP to accept ‗Gazprom tailored‘ terms of 
restructuring (TNK-BP). 
 Derepaska and Vekselberg were planning to merge their aluminium assets 
together after years of bitter rivalry. The chances of the merger going ahead 
were predicted to be higher if the oligarchs offered a stake to the state 
(RusAl). 
 
 
                                                          
49
 Production Sharing Agreements were designed in the 1990s with the aim of attracting and protecting 
foreign investors by offering tax breaks and nominating a foreign court to settle disputes.  
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2.1.2.4 Disputes Related to Disclosure and Transparency of Ownership (2006) 
 The Zurich arbitration tribunal ruled that the IT and Communications Minister, 
Leonid Reiman, was the ultimate beneficiary of the IPOC fund. The minister 
(who denied his connection with the fund) diluted the state‘s interest in 
MegaFon using his powers as the IT and Communications Minister 
(MegaFon). 
 Trading in preferred shares was cancelled because of an ongoing 
investigation into alleged abuses by former managers. The prosecutor 
general‘s office asked a number of brokerages to disclose the beneficiaries of 
Transneft. The most interesting point however was the fact that disclosing 
beneficiaries was predicted to worsen the sentiment on the stock market 
because of the constantly questioned legitimacy of privatisation (Transneft). 
 The US authorities wished to scrutinize links between Abramovich and the 
Russian Government50 in relation to Evraz‘s bid for Oregon Steel (Evraz). 
 Gazprom cut gas supplies to Ukraine breaking existing contracts and 
agreements. The company used its monopoly power to renegotiate better 
terms. In the instance of the agreement with Ukraine, a company with an 
undisclosed ownership structure (Rosukrenergo) was nominated as a trader. 
As a result of that, billions of dollars went unaccounted for (Gazprom).  
 RusAl disclosed its ultimate beneficiary51 because of a condition for a loan 
received from the EBRD (the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development). This in turn triggered a suit from a former business partner 
which had an impact on investor confidence (RusAl). 
 The chairman of Novolipetsk sold the company supplying raw materials that 
he owned to the group in order to address concerns over transfer pricing 
from the shareholders (Novolipetsk).  
 
 
                                                          
50
 Because the relationship between business and politics is so intertwined in Russia, the American 
authorities could use the investigation of that relationship as a tool to block the bid on political grounds. 
Equally so, the American authorities need to know what motivated the actions of the investor. 
51
 EBRC and felt it was necessary for RusAl to disclose its ownership structure. It turned out that Derepaska 
was the sole shareholder of the group. This disclosure led to a former partner’s legal complaint because he 
felt his debt had not been settled. He sued the company for $3b in compensation. With regard to other 
former partners, out of court settlements had been struck. 
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 Mordoshov (CEO of Severstal Group) sold the company (that he owned) 
supplying raw materials to the group in order to address concerns about the 
group‘s transparency. Previously, these types of assets were acquired by 
Kremlin insiders involving a series of transfer pricing schemes (Severstal). 
Graph 4.9: Composition of ownership disputes and corresponding amount of 
coverage in 2006 
 
 
The above comparison shows that politically motivated re-allocation of property 
and ownership restrictions category became a much more prominent feature of the 
perceived environment in 2006. With regard to this subtheme of ownership 
disputes, not only did the number of reported instances rise from 7 to 9, but more 
significantly, the number of articles covering this type of ownership disputes 
increased from 16 in 1998 to 74 in 2006. In 1998 there were only two disputes of 
this nature reported in more than two separate articles: a dispute involving re-
nationalisation of the Vyborg Paper Mill (3 articles) and an imposition of foreign 
ownership restriction below existing level in UES (8 articles). However, in terms of 
the impact on investor perception and with reference to 2006 these disputes are 
no match for a highly contentious re-nationalisation of Yukos (23 article), Shell‘s 
fight over Sakhalin 2 project (25 articles), and TNK – BP‘s troubles over Kovykta 
gas field (15 articles). In 2006 these disputes contributed a great deal to forming a 
perception of how the Russian government handles high profile corporate affairs 
involving conflicts of interests. The key issue here is arbitrary application of law. 
Very importantly, the example of this practice set by the Russian government is 
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replicated on a smaller scale in the form of ubiquitous corporate raids. These 
corporate raids are possible because of the involvement of corrupt governmental 
agencies such as tax authorities and health and safety inspectorates. 
The category of contested ownership ceased to be a relevant feature of reported 
material in 2006. This subtheme was visibly present in 1998 reporting (9 disputes 
covered across 24 articles) with a number of prominent disputes such as 
contested ownership of Subway – Minutka (7 articles), challenged legitimacy of 
AssiDoman‘s ownership stake in Segezhabumprom Paper Mill (6 articles) and 
Magnitogorsk management‘s illegal refusal to hand over an ownership stake they 
had been entrusted to manage (3 articles). Disputes of this nature are typical of an 
early stage transition which is normally associated with weak property rights. In 
contrast, 2006 reports illuminated no instances of such conflicts52. Instead a new 
subtheme related to disclosure and transparency of ownership (7 disputes covered 
across 15 articles) emerged. A number of companies were pressed to disclose 
their ultimate beneficiaries causing concern among certain stakeholders when 
ownership was disclosed voluntarily (Evraz, RusAl, Novolipetsk, Severstal) and 
when it was not (Megafon, Gazprom, Transneft).  
 
2.1.2.5 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Ownership Disputes 
With regard to ownership disputes, there is no evident change in perception 
towards a greater rule of law in the country. If anything, extensive coverage of 
politically motivated corporate disputes has caused a deterioration in the perceived 
environment by firmly setting the image of legal nihilism (i.e. the belief that all 
established authority is corrupt) in the eyes of foreign investors. This perception is 
more detrimental to Russia‘s corporate image now than it was in the 1990s 
because earlier it was attributed to an inevitable side effect of transition, whereas 
now it is seen as a more permanent, deeply rooted feature of the environment. 
Prevalence of this aspect, coupled with a much greater capacity of the state, 
                                                          
52
 A conclusion that such disputes do not happen anymore cannot be drawn from this data. However, it can 
be stated that disputes of this nature have became less of a characteristic of foreign investor perception of 
the environment. 
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represents a bigger threat to previously powerful foreign investors and hence 
produced more negative coverage in the pro-western press.  
On the positive side, in 2006 a change in perception towards stronger property 
rights (outside previously discussed situations when there is direct involvement by 
the government) manifested itself through the absence of coverage of contested 
ownership disputes. In the late 1990s businesses were frequently forced to give up 
their property when a stakeholder with stronger ‗physical presence‘ could 
affectively deny access to rightful owners for no apparent reason (Knauf, Subway). 
In 2006 disputes falling into this subtheme were not reported. Such a crude 
redistribution of property ceased to be a prominent feature of the perceived 
environment. Similar to previous conclusions however, a degree of caution must 
be expressed with regard to the latter proposition. The data gathered by the author 
does not suggest that crude redistribution of property does not take place in 
contemporary Russia. Conversely, anecdotal evidence suggests that it does take 
place in the form of outrageous corporate raids. However, such raids require the 
involvement of governmental agencies and therefore serve as an explanation for 
increased reported activity with regard to the subtheme which is called the 
politically observed redistribution of property. Nevertheless, from the western 
perspective an absence of coverage directly related to the contested ownership 
subtheme must have had a positive impact on investor perception of the business 
climate in the country.  
Secondly, with regard to the increased presence of the disclosure subtheme, the 
fact that major owners started (were forced) to disclose their shareholdings serves 
as a sign of an increased confidence in public acceptance of the de facto 
ownership structures in the country. Although such disclosures proved to be a 
painful process filled with subsequent litigation (e.g. the case involving aluminium 
producer RusAl), it is nevertheless a step in the direction of a greater legitimacy of 
existing ownership structures. Such formal disclosures were impossible in the 
1990s due to an unpredictable public reaction to the newly established owners 
after the extremely unpopular loans-for-shares deals53.  
                                                          
53
 Loans-for-shares was a privatisation scheme whereby the government sought to raise much needed 
finance by offering highly discounted shares in most valuable Russian companies as collateral for loans. 
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2.1.3 Misinvestment 
With regard to disputes arising as a result of misinvestment, 3 instances affecting 
3 organisations were reported in 3 articles in 1998. In 2006 a single instance was 
reported and only in one article. This is the smallest category but is nevertheless 
included in the analysis because it reveals non financial motives behind high-
profile business decisions. Even though the data is extremely scarce in relation to 
reported instances of misinvestment, a conclusion in favour of 2006 can still be 
drawn from the numbers presented in graph 4.10. 
 
Graph 4.10: Misinvestment Disputes 
 
In 1998, all reported instances of misinvestment were externally imposed. Here, 
the role of government in explaining the non-financial motives of business 
decisions is rather explicit. A brief outline of the three cases of disputes reported in 
1998 is presented hereafter: 
 Gazprom‘s decisions to purchase Inkombank and a media outlet were 
motivated out of pre-election oligarchic manoeuvring rather than prudent 
business acumen (Gazprom).  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Kremlin insiders provided the money knowing that the government would default on repayments giving 
them rights over much sought after collateral. 
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 Achinsk Alumina Combine was protected from bankruptcy because the local 
administration was trying to prevent the plant‘s collapse due to far-reaching 
social implications (Achinsk Alumina Combine). 
 Political connections led to bailing out of some banks such as SBS Agro and 
not others. The decisions were not linked to operational efficiency of banks in 
question (SBS Agro). 
In 2006 there was only one reported instance when an investment was not in the 
financial interests of one of the major shareholders involved: 
 Both shareholders of VimpelCom had a blocking stake. One of them was 
interested in VimpelCom purchasing a competitor of the other shareholder. 
The Russian shareholder provided misleading information at the disputed 
extra-ordinary shareholders meeting and got the vote its way (i.e. in favour of 
the purchase). Telenor disputed the decision in the Russian courts and 
threatened to take the case to an American court (VimpelCom). 
 
2.1.3.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Misinvestment Disputes 
It is evident from the purely inductive comparison presented above that the biggest 
difference between the two time periods is a perceived move away from situations 
when businesses were forced to misinvest by the external environment to a 
healthier situation when some of the key investment decisions are internally 
challenged by affected shareholders and stakeholders. In 1998 the chaotic post-
privatisation environment dictated the terms. Often firms (particularly larger ones) 
had to engage in projects that did not make economic sense to profit-oriented 
shareholders. Gazprom‘s involvement in a media outlet and opposition to a 
socially damaging bankruptcy of Achinsk are examples of misinvestment reported 
in 1998. Conversely, the single case reported in 2006 can be seen as a purely 
internal affair where shareholders encountered a conflict of interests arising as a 
result of a possibly viable investment project54.  
 
 
                                                          
54
 The way a major shareholder dealt with the situation was by no means a demonstration of good 
corporate governance practice and will be analysed in more detail in the dispute resolution section.  
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2.1.4 Misimplementation 
Similar to misinvestment, misimplementation is a small category in terms of the 
number of separate disputes covered by the newspaper. There were 4 instances 
of this dispute affecting 4 organisations in 1998 versus 3 cases (3 organisations) 
reported in 2006. However, these disputes had a much larger impact than 
misinvestment disputes because of the amount of coverage received (see graph 
4.11). Clearly, 2006 stands out in this regard suggesting that failure to implement 
viable investment projects was a prominent feature in forming investment 
perception in the latter year of the investigation.  
Graph 4.11: Misimplementation Disputes 
 
In 1998 there were a variety of reasons behind the failure to implement viable 
investment projects. Among such reasons were political differences between key 
individuals seeking to form a joint venture, failure to negotiate mutually acceptable 
terms of partnership and value destroying actions by a partner. Examples of such 
corporate conflicts reported in 1998 are further detailed below: 
 
 A joint venture between Sibneft and Yukos (Yuksi) was postponed and 
eventually terminated because of political differences among top 
management (namely Berezovsky who was politically active and 
Khodorkovsky who preferred to keep a low political profile) (Yukos). 
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 Tax and wage arrears, fight for control and ownership at Vyborg Paper 
resulted in a failure to implement what otherwise would have been a viable 
project. The property was eventually re-nationalized (Vyborg Paper Mill).  
 Most-Bank alleged serious abuses on the part of Uneximbank calling for 
government regulators to investigate the matter. Uneximbank, however, 
argued that the operations of United Card Service (joint venture) had been 
audited by Price Waterhouse who did not uncover anything suspicious. Most-
Bank pulled out of the venture citing unwillingness to accept responsibility for 
the gross misconduct on the part of the joint venture partner (Most Bank). 
 Many questioned legitimacy of Prosystem GmbH‘s stake in Kuznetsky Mine 
even though the actual sale had taken place. There were efforts to reverse 
privatisation. Those were probably linked to the fact that the mine stood a 
good chance of returning to profitability after a major revamp by the foreign 
investor. It is possible that the local administration and other parties were 
interested in gaining control over the mine and used the political context as a 
pretext for their self-centred actions. The foreign investor failed to find a 
compromise with the local stakeholders (Kuznetsky Mine).  
In 2006 two cases of corporate disputes were arguably caused by a failure to 
reach a compromise with powerful stakeholders who eventually intervened with 
the goal of redistributing the property. The third case of a failed merger bid was 
evidently caused by a lack of managerial competence. Key aspects of these 
disputes pertaining to 2006 are presented below: 
 In a conflict with Shell, the Russian government made full use of the Natural 
Resources Ministry and its powers to revoke licenses. In general it is 
extremely difficult not to violate environmental rules in the process of oil and 
gas extraction, particularly if you are forced to use local subcontractors which 
one has little control over. Clearly, based on a technicality in the point of law, 
the Russian government had the right to revoke licenses and some violations 
probably did take place (this made it possible for the government to attack 
the Production Sharing Agreement55 which offered a great deal of protection 
to foreign partners). Additionally, Shell annoyed the government by 
increasing the costs of the project. This meant a longer wait for the 
government before it was to get any returns from the agreement (Shell). 
                                                          
55
 Production Sharing Agreements were designed in the 1990s to protect major investors from the unstable 
legislative environment in Russia. As a rule, such agreements nominated a foreign court (usually Stockholm 
Arbitration Court) as an arbitrator.  
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 The European shareholders did not welcome Mordoshov‘s (Severstal) bid 
because they suspected foul play on the part of the unknown Russian 
businessman. Also, it was very easy for the competitors for Arcelor‘s assets 
(Mittal) to play the corruption card, i.e. a rich Russian who was not doing a 
great deal to introduce himself to shareholders, was a bit of a dark horse, and 
therefore was very likely to be/have been connected to the criminal 
underworld (Severstal). 
 A well-connected local business group used fire violation (this aspect of 
Russian legislation is very vague) to put IKEA at a disadvantage ahead of a 
busy trading period. It was also very possible that the business group had 
more fundamental plans to do with the permanent closure of the mall. In 
these circumstances, based on the previous experience where the company 
invested in the infrastructure, IKEA had no choice but to negotiate a common 
solution with the stakeholders involved. The courts here were clearly used as 
an instrument at the disposal of the influential local parties. Had IKEA 
maintained good relationships with the power structures in the region, the 
assault would probably not have taken place (IKEA).  
 
2.1.4.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Misimplementation 
Disputes 
Despite the fact that the number of corporate disputes within this category fell by 
one instance, increased coverage in 2006 has had a negative impact on the 
perception of how easy it is to implement viable investment projects in Russia56. A 
more advanced stage of Russia‘s transition has not led to a more balanced 
relationship with key stakeholders. This situation was probably caused by a 
conflict of interests arising as a consequence of highly discounted sales of the 
past57. Under new economic conditions these discounted sales became politically 
prohibitive and a failure to renegotiate claims has led to the government-assisted 
redistribution of property. From an optimistic view point this could be interpreted as 
a fix in the very foundation of the Russian corporate environment, nevertheless, on 
the surface investor perception has suffered a great deal from the well-published 
examples of crude interference in the business processes. 
                                                          
56
 Actions of influential stakeholders will be considered in more detail in the subsequent sections dedicated 
to the analysis of enforcement strategies. 
57
 The period in question started when Russia began its transition from command to market economy. 
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2.1.5 Taxes 
Corporate disputes involving non-payment of taxes occur frequently in the Russian 
business environment. The number of such disputes reported in 1998 was 
substantially higher than in 2006. However, similar to ownership and 
misimplementation disputes, the amount of newspaper coverage of these disputes 
increased noticeably in the more recent year of the investigation (see graph 4.12).  
Graph 4.12: Tax Disputes 
 
In 1998 instances of corporate disputes connected with non-payment of taxes 
were determined by two factors. The first factor related to a massive budget deficit 
that the government had to close by means of a very aggressive tax-collection 
policy (which did not spare even strategically important joint ventures and 
partnerships). Reported conflicts arising as a result of such practice suggest that 
the government was keen to impose additional tax liability on cash rich firms. The 
second factor was a product of a malfunctioning system where tax authorities were 
used as an instrument for diverting claims, assets and competitiveness from less 
protected (connected) corporate entities. Further details of such disputes 
pertaining to 1998 are presented hereunder: 
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 Russia‘s dependence on International Monetary Fund forced authorities to 
scale back on the tax breaks promised by the presidential decree to the Gaz 
– Fiat joint venture (Gaz). 
 The Russian tax police specifically targeted the KIA venture in Kaliningrad. 
The seizure of assets was not authorised by the courts and it was suggested 
that the tax authorities were in cahoots with the local used-cars importers 
who tried to disadvantage their direct competition (KIA). 
 The Russian tax police seized assets of two Gazprom subsidiaries. This was 
an order by the new taxation chief, Boris Fyodorov who was charged with the 
task of improving tax collection rates. The bank accounts and property of 
Orenburggazprom and Uraltransgaz were ordered to be seized58 (Gazprom).  
 The local authorities enlisted the services of the unions to enhance their 
negotiating power with Yukos officials over disputed taxes. It was unclear 
whether the claimed tax arrears actually existed. The local administration 
together with union representatives tried to get more money out of Yukos; it 
is possible that the motive was to represent the interests of the population 
and ordinary workers of the company, but in the environment of 1998 a more 
pragmatic interpretation would suggest indirect expropriation of shareholder 
wealth (Yukos). 
 Tomskneft, a subsidiary of Yukos, was facing bankruptcy because it owed 
400 million rubles ($21 million) in taxes to the federal budget and another 200 
million rubles to the local budget and the pension fund. It also owed 300 
million rubles to its staff in back wages. A Yukos spokesman said that the 
court that ruled in favour of bankruptcy had ignored a proposal from Yukos to 
cover its subsidiary's debt without giving reasons (Yukos).  
 The city of Omsk saw its regionally gathered tax revenues fall from 65 
percent of its budget to only 38 percent. Omsk Mayor Valery Roshchupkin 
responded by raising local taxes - adopting a 2 percent city tax on turnover 
(not profits) that prompted 30 of the Omsk's largest businesses, including 
many with ties to the governor, to reregister "offshore," just outside the city 
limits. When Sibneft was re-registered outside the city, the Omsk mayor's 
office introduced a 35-ruble-per-ton tax on crude oil processed by the 
refinery, a tax Sibneft contested in court (Sibneft).  
 
                                                          
58
 The State Duma protested loudly claiming that the action would cause a threat to national security. 
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 With reference to Sidanko, the government came up with a resolution 
whereby oil companies were denied export quotas if they fell behind on tax 
repayment terms (Sidanko). 
 Irkutsk‘s regional administration sought to take control over a refinery 
(Sidanko‘s subsidiary) on the back of tax allegations by installing external 
managers further to a ruling made by the regional arbitration court. Sidanko 
responded by stopping deliveries of crude oil to the refinery. It had been 
suggested that the motive behind the proceedings was of a political nature, 
i.e. preserving jobs and enterprise in the region. The task was not of a 
commercial character because otherwise the entity would have been 
declared bankrupt as it was seen as unprofitable without the Production 
Sharing Agreement which the government was unwilling to grant (Sidanko). 
 The government had to boost tax collection in order to close a substantial 
budget deficit. In this particular case the decision was made to recover some 
of the tax debt through a bankruptcy of Norilsk Nickel‘s subsidiary. The 
company appealed the decision in an arbitration court arguing that the tax 
debt of $40m was calculated incorrectly (Norilsk Nickel). 
 An unidentified party was using tax authorities to exert pressure on Knauf to 
either surrender control, or simply share profits. The arbitration court ruled in 
favour of the decision made by the tax authorities59 (Knauf).  
 AssiDoman was charged with back taxes pertaining to the paper mill they 
had purchased. The fact that a solution to the tax and bankruptcy issues 
depended on the heads of the respective agencies60, and not an objective 
criteria suggests a very arbitrary approach. Also, pledges made by the 
president were not an indication of what was right or wrong, but simply 
populist exclamations during foreign visits. Meanwhile the state bankruptcy 
and tax authorities froze the accounts preventing the company from investing 
in capital improvements (AssiDoman). 
 
In 2006 reported tax disputes were almost exclusively connected with the 
government‘s drive to re-establish control over strategically important assets. 
These disputes (although fewer in number in comparison with 1998 data) 
                                                          
59
 Although the tax police were formally right as Knauf made an accounting mistake, the former refused to 
consider the evidence (receipts) supplied by Knauf. 
60
 The company sought to establish personal relationships with key individuals in the position of power such 
as Chubais and Mostovoi. Their efforts were cancelled out by the reshuffle. 
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generated a large amount of press coverage and in that sense had a significant 
impact on investor perception of the deterioration of the rule of law in the country. 
In 2006 manifestation of the latter point took the form of arbitrarily imposed tax 
charges. Further details of reported tax disputes pertaining to 2006 are presented 
hereunder: 
 The Russian Court system bounced criminal charges against AvtoVaz from 
court to court, but eventually returned all of the cases to the prosecutor‘s 
office which decided to cancel the investigation into the alleged non-payment 
of $8m in back taxes. No explanation was given as to why the investigation 
had been closed. However, analysts suggested that the government was 
seeking to re-establish control over the car manufacturer by opening and 
closing criminal investigations and bringing in a symbolic suit against the 
joint-venture partner (General Motors) (AvtoVaz). 
 The government detained Barinov (Nenets Governor) on suspicion of fraud 
and embezzlement allegedly after/because he complained against Rosneft‘s 
subsidiary which failed to pay taxes to the local budget and broke ecological 
standards. Rosneft claimed that the company was acting in accordance with 
all signed agreements and had nothing to do with the detention of the 
governor (Rosneft). 
 The Russian government charged Yukos with a massive back-taxes bill in an 
effort to seize control over the viable company‘s assets. The decision was 
also linked to Khodorkovsky‘s support of political opposition and had very 
little to do with the way the company was managed (Yukos). 
 TNK-BP learnt from the Yukos experience and did not challenge an imposed 
back taxes claim too aggressively in the Russian courts. The fact that the 
company did pay the questionable back-tax has been viewed as a 
relationship building opportunity with the Russian government and key 
stakeholders of the company (TNK-BP). 
 The Audit Chamber felt it was wrong for Evraz to use off shore traders in 
order to minimize taxes. The Chamber ruled against the company (Evraz). 
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2.1.5.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Tax Disputes 
From analysing cases of tax disputes reported in the two years of the study, both 
positive and negative trends with regard to the perceived change in the rule of law 
can be revealed.  
On the positive side, the Russian government does not need to resort to ‗fire-
fighting‘ measures of tax collection in order to close a loophole in its budget. In 
2006 there were no reported instances when a cash-rich firm was compelled by 
the tax authorities to ‗donate‘ its resources to the federal tax fund. Conversely, in 
1998 there were 6 examples of such practice (Gazprom, Fiat-Gaz, Yukos, Sibneft, 
Sidanko, Norilsk Nickel). Secondly, instances when tax authorities acted on behalf 
of a private group of individuals in order to target a specific venture were not 
reported in 2006. Therefore, as far as investor perception is concerned there has 
been a positive change within the environment which is seen as more protected 
from the crude abuses of the tax system. In 2006 there were no equivalent 
disputes to what happened to Knauf, KIA and AssiDoman in 1998 when tax 
authorities acted as a tool for self-centred private stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, 2006 was dominated by situations when the government used the 
tax system to achieve its political and economic goals. Examples involving 
AvtoVaz, Yukos and TNK-BP expose the arbitrary nature of this interaction. The 
tax dispute involving Rosneft also shows that the government is prepared to resort 
to the use of other formal institutions such as the courts in order to punish those 
who do not act in accordance with its de facto agenda. In 2006 it was these 
disputes that received a great deal of the newspaper coverage and hence 
considerably influenced investor perception of the rule of law in the country. 
 
2.1.6 Control 
With reference to control disputes, 1998 was a particularly eventful year with 21 
disputes involving 17 organisations featured in 66 articles. This compares with 
only 6 disputes involving 5 organisations in 2006. Although similar to previous 
categories there was a lot more coverage per dispute in 2006, in total more was 
written about 1998 conflicts (see graph 4.13). 
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Graph 4.13: Control Disputes 
 
 
The year 1998 was characterised by weak property rights and a poor corporate 
culture. In terms of disputes falling into this category, this means that there was a 
visible disparity between the level of ownership and a corresponding level of real 
control. According to the analysed disputes, such disparity occurred when: 
- There were instances of corporate insubordination (Tyumen, Knauf, Kosmos 
TV, Subway). 
- Outside groups exerted pressure on decision makers within their respective 
organisations (VimpelCom, Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant, Knauf, MCCI). 
-  The board of directors accumulated a disproportionately large amount of 
control (Rosneft). 
- Shareholders/creditors failed to get a fair board representation (Sidanko, 
Novolipetsk, Achinsk Alumina Combine, Inkombank). 
- The nomination/dismissal process failed (UES, Electrosila, MFK 
Renaissance, Kosmos TV). 
- Ownership was diluted ahead of voting on key issues (Yukos, Krasnoyarsk 
Hydro Plant, Subway). 
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- Aggressive takeover and bankruptcy proceedings were instigated against 
targeted organisations (Sibneft). 
Further details of such conflicts are presented hereunder: 
 Alongside booming growth came death threats and physical assaults on 
VimpelCom‘s employees. It was thought that the local criminal community 
had been trying to take control of the company (VimpelCom). 
 Rosneft pushed through an amendment to the company's charter whereby 
the board of directors of Purneftegaz was given the authority to conduct 
transactions with up to 50 percent of the company's assets. As a result, the 
directors could effectively sell off the company‘s equipment, oil wells, 
transportation machinery, and so on (Rosneft).  
 Menatep defaulted on a loan repayment. According to a previously signed 
agreement, 30% of Yukos‘ shares went to the bank as collateral, but 
Menatep‘s (Yukos) management decided to dilute the transferred stake 
through a share issue and by doing so reduced the leverage of the 
disgruntled bank (Yukos). 
 The Omsk Oil Refinery was a profitable business. It became a takeover 
target when Sibneft was being formed. The refinery was merged with 
Noyabrneftegaz. The move was opposed by the General Director of the 
refinery Ivan Litskevich but he died as the battle was heating up. The merged 
company was privatised for a song under the loans for shares programme. 
Berezovsky benefited from the deal (Sibneft). 
 The Irkutsk regional administration sought to take control over a refinery 
(Sidanko‘s subsidiary) on the back of tax allegations by installing external 
managers after a ruling made by the regional arbitration court. Sidanko 
responded by stopping deliveries of crude oil to the subsidiary (Sidanko).  
 Bankruptcy proceedings were used in order to gain control of Chernogorneft 
(Sidanko‘s subsidiary). It was unclear why two creditors were left out of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. It is entirely possible that a behind the scenes 
agreement had been formed as the two creditors did not react to the news 
(Sidnako). 
 
 
Page 120 
 
 The renegade director used support of the workers‘ collective of Tyumen‘s 
subsidiary in order to maintain his control. Paly gained support among fellow 
employees because he suggested that privatisation of Nizhnevartovsk was 
rigged in Alfa‘s favour (possibly not without considerable support from high-
ranking officials like Chubais). Eventually, he (Paly) gave up or was bought 
out by the Financial Industrial Groups i.e. Alfa and Renova, because the 
parent (Tyumen) and the subsidiary (Nizhnevartovskneftegaz) were losing 
money (Tyumen). 
 The Tanako FIG exerted pressure on the management of 
Krasnoyarskenergo to sell the stake in Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant cheaply. 
Boris Nemtsov (Deputy Prime Minister) denounced the deal giving a clear 
indication as to the government‘s stance on the issue. The director of 
Krasnoyarskenergo was sacked. UES (the parent of Krasnoyarskenergo) 
proceeded with a legal challenge that failed to produce any results. 
Meanwhile Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant issued shares to dilute the holding of 
the parent making it more difficult for UES to regain control. Krasnoyarsk 
Hydro approved the total of 30 percent dilution, but attracted attention from 
the Federal Securities Commission (Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant). 
 Two political clans, one headed by Deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov, the other 
by Prime Minister Chernomirdin were fighting for control of UES. Each 
wanted to appoint their men in the position of power (Brevnov and Dykov 
respectively). The fight was accompanied by accusations of corruption and 
bad management practice. The conflict however erupted when Dyakov called 
a meeting of the board of directors that voted to fire Brevnov, a 29-year-old 
former banker from Nizhny Novgorod brought in by First Deputy Prime 
Minister Boris Nemtsov to clean up the company's finances (UES). 
 Chubais received the top job at UES as a trade off for leaving the 
government. The name of the famous reformer was tarnished by accusations 
of corruption. Nevertheless he was still the preferred candidate from the 
perspective of foreign investors for his reputation as a liberal reformer (UES). 
 The majority shareholder of Electrosila decided that the existing director at 
the time was no longer suitable for them. It was speculated that the director 
needed to be replaced with someone who would be more active at 
recovering a lost stake on behalf of the shareholder. Siemens (the minority, 
but significant shareholder) protested saying that they were happy with the 
existing director who returned Elektrosila to profitability (Electrosila). 
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 Despite holding 40 percent of Novolipetsk‘s ordinary shares, a group of 
investors was blocked from getting board representation. The old 
management clearly did not want to share power with new shareholders, 
some of whom appeared as a result of the controversial loans-for-shares 
deals (Novolipetsk). 
 The financial groups behind the new shareholders of Novolipetsk squeezed 
Trans-World out by means of blocking its vote. Such interest in Novolipetsk 
arose as a result of rosy forecasts for the industry. Also the investigation by 
the State Duma securities commission of the Trans-World Director must have 
been a coordinated effort (rather than a coincidence) in driving the British 
company away from the dominant position in the industry (Novolipetsk). 
 A creditor (Alfa Group) of Achinsk Alumina Combine was pressing for the 
appointment of their own external manager and eventually bankruptcy of the 
combine. KRAZ, a FIG behind management existing at the time resisted the 
move. A local court ruled in favour of KRAZ (which was backed by local 
administration) extending its managerial capacity for a year (Achinsk Alumina 
Combine). 
 Sergiyenko, director of Kubanksy Gips-Knauf, was suspended from office on 
allegations of theft, mismanagement and tax manipulation. His response was 
to hold his own meetings, remove Knauf from the company‘s name, and 
issue 64 percent new shares to dilute the Germans' (rightful owners) stake 
(Knauf). 
 An unidentified party was using tax authorities to exert pressure on Knauf to 
either surrender control and/or simply share profits. The arbitration courts 
ruled in favour of the decision made by the tax authorities (Knauf).  
 A candidate (Boris Jordan) was refused the position of CEO at MFK 
Renaissance on the technicality in the law, did not qualify in the context of 
that particular circumstance. Allowing a foreigner to be in charge of an 
investment vehicle could have made the Russian government vulnerable 
(MFK Renaissance). 
 Uneximbank-MFK prevented representatives from Inkombank from voting on 
dismantling the board due to an alleged error on the part of the board. 
Inkombank‘s representatives did not receive ballots for the vote. Inkombank 
successfully petitioned the St. Petersburg Arbitration Court for an injunction 
on the meeting (Inkombank). 
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 A renegade director (Lapshin) at Kosmos TV took its shareholders to court 
over his dismissal. The court ruled in favour of the renegade director because 
it relied on the Labour code, rather than the Joint Stock Company Law, which 
is a higher order law that would have protected the shareholders more 
adequately (Kosmos TV). 
 The Russian joint-venture partner illegally ousted American partners 
(Subway), renamed the entity to Minutka, and assumed control and 
ownership of the company. The case was taken to the Stockholm 
International Arbitration Court which ruled in favour of the American partners 
(Subway). 
 A state-owned company, GlavUpDK, used its powers to negotiate the lease 
agreement in its favour depriving the foreign investor (MCCI) of any 
guarantees thus driving the foreign investor out of the project. The foreign 
partner turned to international courts that ruled in its favour (MCCI). 
 
In 2006 all reported disputes pertaining to the control category directly involved the 
Russian government. In order to maximise its influence over major commercial 
and strategic assets, the government used the legal system, tax authorities and 
environmental agencies to put pressure on private shareholders to surrender 
control. The government also promoted its own people to the positions of power in 
state owned enterprises allegedly based on the individuals‘ loyalty and not their 
ability to improve operational efficiency. Key details of reported control disputes 
are presented below: 
 The government was seeking to re-establish control over AvtoVaz by 
opening and closing criminal investigations and bringing in a symbolic suit 
against the joint-venture partner General Motors (AvtoVaz). 
 It was suggested that Ryazanov (Gazprom Deputy CEO) became so 
powerful that he started to represent a threat to some other high-ranking 
officials within Gazprom and the government. Ryazanov was replaced with 
an ex-KGB agent from St. Petersburg who worked at the mayor‘s office at the 
same time as Putin (Gazprom). 
 The government arbitrarily imposed back tax-bills on Yukos in an effort to 
seize control over its main assets. The decision was linked to 
Khodorkovsky‘s support of political opposition. The case was disputed in 
local and international courts (Yukos). 
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 A subordinate refused to follow the orders of his superior who represented 
the interests of the sole shareholder of an international unit of Yukos. Instead 
of the proposed appointment, the person who was fired received promotion. 
Analysts suggested that such an act of insubordination would have been 
impossible without the support of the government and/or high-ranking 
officials from Rosneft (Yukos). 
 The government was seeking to re-establish control over the country‘s oil 
and gas industry. The government used the Federal Service for Ecological, 
Technological and Atomic Inspection to force ExxonMobil to renegotiate 
terms of the Production Sharing Agreement (ExxonMobil). 
 The government used environmental violations and non-compliance with the 
license agreement to force TNK-BP to accept ‗Gazprom tailored‘ terms of 
restructuring (TNK-BP). 
 
2.1.6.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Control Disputes 
Analysis of this type of corporate dispute suggests that previously weak property 
rights have become noticeably stronger. In 2006 there were no reported instances 
of privately initiated seizures of control of corporate entities that are only possible 
in the environment where formal institutions completely lack enforcement powers 
and the central authority is weak. Situations similar to what happened to 
VimpelCom, Subway, Knauf AssiDoman, Trans World, and Kosmos TV in 1998 
were not reported in 2006 and hence there are grounds to suggest that such 
disputes are regarded as the legacy of the past and are unlikely to be repeatable 
in the current context. Moreover, instances when control was transferred by 
means of an unfounded reduction of ownership stakes have also disappeared 
from the reports of the newspaper. Additionally, corporate culture has seemingly 
developed to such an extent that even powerful stakeholders have begun to 
respect the integrity of shareholder nominated agents. Previously there was a real 
danger that after a mutually agreed transfer of ownership rights such agents would 
not be accepted by their new stakeholders. Subsequently, control was challenged 
by virtue of that fact. By 2006 potential buyers had accumulated enough credibility 
(partially due to a more established status of prospective owners and less 
discounted sales) that instances of outright non-subordination subsided in 
prominence. 
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However, in 2006 the government reinforced its efforts to re-establish ownership 
and control over major assets. The government‘s tactics in achieving its goal 
particularly with regard to situations when there was an element of unwillingness 
to cooperate, was surprisingly reminiscent of the crudest forms of corporate 
misconduct reported in 1998. This grim conclusion suggests that those who 
violated norms of corporate behaviour in 1998 for the benefit of private parties, in 
2006 were recruited by the Russian government to deal with the task of 
rearranging the balance of power and control in favour of the state. 
 
2.2 Second Order Codes (Diversion) 
2.2.1 Diversion of Assets 
This category refers to situations when value of corporate assets is artificially 
depressed or de facto ownership of these assets is challenged. According to the 
reported data 5 disputes affecting 5 organisations occurred in 1998. Those were 
referred to in 22 articles published by the newspaper. In 2006, 8 disputes of this 
nature were identified. Further numerical information about this category is 
presented in graph 4.14.  
Graph 4.14: Diversion of Assets Disputes 
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With reference to 1998 data, it can be observed that highly discounted sales took 
place at that time. As the example of Purneftegaz (Rosneft‘s subsidiary) 
demonstrates some assets were sold for less than one fortieth of the value 
established by alternative appraisers. Further details of disputes falling into this 
category are presented below: 
 A 38 percent stake in Rosneft‘s subsidiary Purneftegaz was seized by 
creditors and sold for just $10 million.  However, according to analysts the 
value of the sold stake was between $400 million and $500 million (Rosneft).  
 A large equity stake in a strategic natural-gas refining company was sold off 
to an unknown European company for roughly $20 million, a price 
significantly below the company's value. Allegedly, the buyer was connected 
to Gazprom (Gazprom). 
 Sibneft depressed the market price of its subsidiaries by means of transfer 
pricing and assets stripping before consolidation (Sibneft). 
 A Russian joint-venture partner denied Subway access to some of its 
acquired assets (Subway). 
 The state owned company used its powers to negotiate the lease agreement 
in its favour depriving the foreign investor of any guarantees thus driving the 
foreign investor out of the project (MCCI).  
 
In 2006 disputes arising as a result of inadequate valuations of assets continued to 
be perceived as a prominent feature of corporate environment in the country. The 
difference here is that in the late 1990s assets were transferred always from state- 
owned corporations, whereas in 2006 the trend reversed primarily in the direction 
of Gazprom and Rosneft who continued to buy assets at below market value. 
Although these companies are under greater scrutiny by international observers, 
that does not preclude them from diverting assets away from their potential rivals.  
 
 Alleged asset stripping and transfer pricing took place at Rosneft‘s 
subsidiaries. The subsidiaries complained to the government. Rosneft 
acknowledged transfer pricing and asset stripping saying that the former was 
common practice within the oil industry and the latter was the result of 
Rosneft‘s major investment in the subsidiary (Rosneft).  
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 The Russian government and Rosneft‘s officials used IPO in London as an 
instrument for legitimising the status of controversially acquired assets 
previously belonging to Yukos (Rosneft).  
 There was a diversion of assets and claims from Gazprom to Itera (the 
biggest independent gas producer in Russia) through crony deals valued at 
as much as $4 billion a year and then back to Gazprom through a politically 
backed consolidation (Gazprom). 
 The government decided to consolidate control over the oil and gas sector in 
the hands of Gazprom, yet delayed the law on strategic assets (Gazprom). 
 The decision to get rid of two foreign Yukos managers was made by the court 
appointed Yukos receiver and enforced by means of an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting that was ruled to be legitimate by a Dutch court. The 
two managers were accused of trying to hide the company‘s assets 
(essentially from Rosneft) (Yukos). 
 Valuations of Yukos assets were carried out in such a way as to suit Rosneft. 
A number of alternative (more independent), valuations including that by 
UBS, produced substantially higher figures (Yukos). 
 Shell and its Japanese partners were forced to accept Gazprom‘s entry into 
its Sakhalin 2 project as a majority shareholder because otherwise the 
government would have withdrawn several of its operating licences (Royal 
Dutch Shell). 
 The Russian government used the Prosecutor General‘s Office and the 
Ministry for Natural Resources to come up with allegations against TNK-BP 
in order to pressurise the company into acceptance of a restructuring plan 
which involved Gazprom‘s participation (TNK-BP). 
 
2.2.1.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Diversion of Assets 
Disputes 
In connection with disputes arising as a result of diversion of assets, collected data 
demonstrates deterioration in both substance and amount of reported material. 
The culture of interfering with market regulated pricing of assets continues to be a 
prominent feature of the environment. In 2006 state-owned companies benefited a 
great deal from highly discounted purchases that private shareholders were forced 
to accept. Even though a blatant undervaluation has become more difficult 
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because of the participation of international stock exchanges in the process of 
financing large Russian enterprises, in terms of perception, this has had a minimal 
impact on how Russian companies go about acquisition of assets in the country. 
 
2.2.2 Diversion of Claims 
This category refers to situations when shareholders (and other stakeholders) are 
prevented from receiving a fair/proportionate financial remuneration for their 
exposure to a business entity. These situations occur when there are abnormal 
interferences that either diminish financial claims of shareholders directly through 
practices such as share dilution, or indirectly, by reducing a company‘s 
efficiency/profitability.  
With regard to diversion of claims disputes there has been a reduction in the 
number of reported cases. This trend is in line with the overall reduction of the 
number of reported corporate disputes in 2006. Further numerical details of this 
category are presented in graph 4.15.  
 
Graph 4.15: Diversion of Claims Disputes 
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Based on the 1998 data, diversion of claims was carried out primarily through 
share dilution. Companies in difficult financial circumstances need to raise 
additional capital and in the 1998 context this happened at the expense of less 
protected minority shareholders. There were instances when the minority 
appeared to have agreed to accept smaller stakes in healthier companies (e.g. 
KamAZ and Mosenergo), but in the majority of disputes new share emissions were 
used as a way of consolidating control on the cheap without any regard for the 
rights of practically unprotected minority shareholders (e.g. MGTS, Yukos, Sibneft, 
Sidanko, Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant, etc). Secondly, insider dealings when 
resources were diverted by means of intermediary or management controlled 
companies (that benefited from questionable internal pricing arrangements) 
constituted a noticeable trend within the reported environment (e.g. Aeroflot, 
Gazprom, Yukos, Surgutneft, Channel 5, etc.).  Further details of the diversion of 
claims disputes reported in the Moscow Times are presented in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Diversion of Claims Disputes, 1998 
Company Method of  
Diversion 
Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Extent of 
coverage 
Aeroflot          
(1 article)         
Insider dealing Majority 
shareholder of 
Aeroflot Boris 
Berezovsky 
Travel agents and 
customers 
MGTS            
(4 articles)      
Share dilution The Moscow city 
government 
Minority 
shareholders 
AvtoVaz         
(1 article)          
Unjustified selling 
price 
Dealerships Shareholders of 
AvtoVaz and 
customers 
KamAZ           
(2 articles)       
Share dilution 
through issue of 
convertible bonds 
Majority 
shareholders and 
the company in 
general  
Minority 
shareholders and 
creditors 
KIA                  
(1 article)         
Questionable tax 
allegations 
Competitors KIA shareholders 
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Company Method of  
Diversion 
Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Extent of 
coverage 
Rosneft          
(2 articles)  
Transfer pricing 
and questionable 
write-offs of bad 
debts 
Subsidiaries‘ top 
management 
Shareholders of 
subsidiaries 
Gazprom        
(1 article)    
Barter schemes Gazprom 
managers, 
connected 
stakeholders 
Gazprom‘s 
minority 
shareholders 
Yukos           
(10 articles)  
Transfer pricing Majority 
shareholders of 
Yukos (parent) 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Yukos‘ subsidiary 
(inc. federal gov.) 
Yukos             
(1 article)     
Share issue Directors 
(majority 
shareholders) 
Minority 
shareholders 
Yukos             
(1 article)     
Interested party 
transaction (loan 
approval) 
Shareholders of 
Yukos 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Yukos‘ subsidiary 
Yukos             
(1 article)  
Questionable debt 
swap 
Shareholders of 
Yukos 
Shareholders of 
Yukos‘s subsidiary 
Yukos             
(1 article)    
Share dilution Shareholders of 
Yukos 
Creditor who 
received a stake 
as collateral 
Transneft       
(7 articles)    
Managers forced 
employees to sell 
their stakes at a 
discount 
Top management 
of Transneft 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Transneft 
(employees) 
Surgutneft.     
(2 articles)      
Share dilution and 
transfer pricing 
A group of local 
‗investors‘ and St. 
Petersburg 
administration 
Shareholders of 
parent 
(Surgutneft.) 
Sibneft           
(5 articles)  
Closed share issue Majority 
shareholders of 
Sibneft 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Sibneft‘s 
subsidiary 
Sidanko          
(6 articles)  
Share dilution 
through a closed 
bond issue 
Majority 
shareholders 
Minority 
shareholders 
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Company Method of  
Diversion 
Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Extent of 
coverage 
Krasnoyarsk 
Hydro Plant    
(4 articles)    
Share dilution Minority 
shareholder 
(Tanako FIG) 
Shareholders of 
parent company 
(UES) 
UES61               
(1 article)    
Non payment of 
promised 
dividends 
Management of 
UES 
Shareholders of 
UES 
Mosenergo     
(1 article)       
Share dilution Mosenergo Minority 
shareholders 
(foreign investors) 
Norilsk Nickel         
(1 article)    
Share dilution 
through closed 
share issue 
Ordinary 
shareholders 
Preferred 
shareholders 
(institutional 
investors) 
Novolipetsk    
(3 articles)  
Transfer pricing Minority 
shareholder 
(Trans World) 
Remaining 
Novolipetsk 
shareholders 
Lebedinsky 
Ore Mining 
Plant             
(1 article)    
Share dilution 
through charter 
capital increase 
Management of 
the plant and 
regional 
administration of 
Begorod 
Minority 
shareholder 
(Rossiisky Kredit 
Bank) 
SBS Agro       
(4 articles)  
Default on credit 
repayment 
SBS Agro Foreign creditors 
(Lehman Brothers) 
MOST Bank   
(1 article)       
Unauthorised 
transactions 
Uneximbank MOST Bank 
Pioneer 
Group           
(1 article)       
Unauthorised 
transactions 
Small Russian 
bank 60% owned 
by Pioneer Group 
Pioneer Group 
Tokobank       
(1 article)       
Refusal to honour 
futures contracts  
 
Tokobank A large group of 
Russian and 
foreign investors 
                                                          
61
 United Energy Systems 
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Company Method of  
Diversion 
Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Extent of 
coverage 
Rossiisky 
Kredit             
(1 article)       
Refusal to transfer 
money to 
customer‘s 
account 
Rossiisky Kredit Computer firm 
Trekhmernaya 
Pamyat 
Channel 5      
(1 article)       
Transfer pricing 
through 
unprofitable 
advertising 
contracts 
Premier SV and 
LISS – 
advertising 
agencies owned 
by a well 
connected 
businessman 
(Lisovsky) 
Channel 5 
shareholders 
ORT               
(1 article)       
Share transfer as a 
political gesture 
allegedly to bribe 
Yeltsin 
Yeltsin and 
Berezovsky 
Shareholders of 
ORT 
Standart NMT           
(1 article)        
Unjustified 
increase of price of 
security services 
A St. Petersburg 
police department 
SME Standart 
NMT 
Post Office     
(1 article)       
Pocketed 
revenues leading 
to a growing debt 
Management of 
Post Office 
The Railways 
Ministry 
 
In contrast to 1998, in 2006 there was only one case of share dilution reported in 
the newspaper. This corporate dispute involved the IT and Communications 
minister Leonid Reiman who was accused of diluting the government and 
minority‘s stakes in a telecommunications company, Megafon. The minister denied 
the allegation, but an arbitration tribunal in Zurich attributed this misappropriation 
to the government official. Other prominent examples of disputes falling into the 
diversion of claims category refer to the highly non-transparent re-nationalisation 
of key Yukos assets and re-negotiation of Production Sharing Agreements where 
the state-controlled companies like Rosneft and Gazprom emerged as clear 
winners at the expense of foreign and private entities like Total and LUKoil. 
Table 4.2: Diversion of Claims Disputes, 2006 
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Company Method of 
Diversion 
Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Extent of 
coverage 
Aeroflot          
(1 article)         
Purchasing strategy 
aimed at creating 
political allies and 
not shareholder 
wealth maximisation 
Federal 
government 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Aerofolt 
MagaFon         
(2 articles)       
Share dilution  IT and 
Communications 
Minister Leonid 
Reiman 
The state and 
remaining  
shareholders of 
Megafon 
Rosneft          
(2 articles)  
Share transfer 
though a non-
transparent middle 
company 
Rosneft 
shareholders, the 
Russian state, 
political elite 
Shareholders of 
Yukos 
Rosneft          
(3 articles)  
Under-valuation of 
subsidiaries in the 
wake of 
consolidation 
Rosneft 
shareholders i.e. 
the Russian 
government 
Shareholders of 
Rosneft‘s 
subsidiaries 
Rosneft          
(2 articles)  
Transfer pricing and 
assets stripping 
Rosneft and the 
Russian 
government 
Shareholders of 
Rosneft‘s 
subsidiaries 
Rosneft          
(6 articles)  
Acquisition of 
discounted Yukos 
assets 
Rosneft and the 
Russian 
government 
Shareholders of 
Yukos 
Gazprom        
(1 article)    
Transfer of assets 
from Gazprom to 
Itera and vice versa. 
Management of 
Gazprom and Itera 
Shareholders of 
Gazprom 
Gazprom        
(4 articles)  
Refusal to honour 
supply contracts 
Gazprom and the 
Russian 
government 
Customers 
(Ukraine, 
Belarus) 
Yukos           
(23 articles)  
Share transfers Old Yukos 
shareholders 
New 
shareholders of 
Yukos, i.e. 
Rosneft 
Yukos             
(1 article)    
Insider dealing Gazprombank Old shareholders 
of Yukos 
Total               
(2 articles)     
Re-negotiation of 
PSA agreements 
Government-
controlled oil 
Shareholders of 
Total 
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Company Method of 
Diversion 
Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Extent of 
coverage 
companies 
LUKoil            
(2 articles)     
Valuation of 
subsidiaries 
Shareholders of 
LUKoil 
Shareholders of 
LUKoil 
subsidiaries 
Novolipetsk    
(1 article)       
Internal pricing Majority 
shareholder of 
Novolipetsk 
 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Novolipetsk 
Severstal        
(2 articles)  
Internal pricing Majority 
shareholder of 
Severstal 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Severstal 
RusAl             
(1 article)    
Valuation of 
subsidiaries 
Majority 
shareholders of 
RusAl 
Minority 
shareholders of 
RusAl 
RusAl 
(1article)     
Corrupt bidding for 
assets 
RusAl and 
Nigerian president 
BFI Group 
Devino and 
Alscon 
shareholders 
Eurocement   
(1 article)       
Internal pricing Majority 
shareholders of 
Eurocement 
Minority 
shareholders of 
Eurocement 
(Russia Partners) 
IKEA              
(4 articles)    
Closure of a mall by 
health and safety 
inspectors 
IKEA‘s competitors IKEA 
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2.2.2.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Diversion of Claims 
Disputes 
Similar to previous categories, collected data suggests both positive and negative 
changes within the perceived environment as constructed by reported material. 
In 2006, it was the government that instigated the practice of diverting claims by 
means of state controlled entities (except for the two privately initiated conflicts 
involving Eurocement and IKEA). In terms of the methods employed by the 
government nominated managers, this practice took the form of the most daring 
expropriation. With reference to Yukos, the most valuable assets of the company 
were transferred to Rosneft through an intermediary entity that was registered in 
the same building as a grocery shop. The intermediary company called the Baikal 
Finance Group received the assets previously belonging to Yukos, and later 
transferred those to the balance sheet of Rosneft. The scheme was devised to re-
divert legal risks away from Rosneft and was criticised for a complete lack of 
transparency and accountability. Analysts alleged that a substantial amount of 
money changed hands during this transaction. The scheme involving transfer of 
assets from Gazprom to Itera and vice versa was very similar in style and extent of 
expropriation which was measured in billions of dollars. In 1998 similar 
expropriating practices took place. Barter schemes, illegal debt swaps, 
unprofitable contracting, ubiquitous share dilution and transfer pricing were 
constantly featured in the Moscow Times reports with reference to the most 
reputable companies. In both years of the investigation, minority shareholders 
appear to be the biggest losers in these conflicts, unable to defend their interests 
though the courts and other formal institutions. However, with regard to the main 
beneficiaries of these actions, there has been a shift away from private individuals 
who dictated the terms in 1998 in favour of the establishment that proved to be 
very much in control in the more recent year of the study. 
However, with reference to conflicts involving solely private shareholders, there 
has been a noticeable positive change in the culture and extent of 
misappropriation. In 1998 collusion among a group of local investors (usually 
unidentified) and local administration was a force capable of attacking subsidiaries 
of even large corporate entities. Disputes involving Surgutneftegaz and 
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Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant serve as an example of the type of corporate 
conflicts that in 2006 ceased to be directly associated with the perceived 
environment. Moreover, with reference to a number of 2006 disputes featuring 
transfer pricing as a method of diverting claims, constructive solutions have been 
proposed by key shareholders (Novolipetsk and Severstal) after the concerns 
raised by minority stakeholders. Encouraging examples of such preventive 
measures have not been found among the material reported in 1998. Finally, in 
1998 and 2006, there were a number of disputes around valuation practices. In 
these instances dialogues between parent companies and shareholders of 
subsidiaries was on a more equal footing in the more recent year of the 
investigation. Blatant undervaluation exemplified by the management-controlled 
consolidation of Transneft in 1998 has been replaced by a more balanced 
negotiating process that took place during LUKoil‘s consolidation in 2006. 
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Section 3: Analysis of the Content of the Third Order Codes 
In this section, the content of the third order codes is analysed. A graphical representation of    
each code and relevent themes are provided. The data is presented in tables followed by a 
comparison of key elements of the two years.  
 
3.1 Third Order Codes (Disputes) 
Third order codes62 further define corporate disputes making it possible to 
capitalise on the richness of the gathered data. In addition to the overall patterns 
revealed by the analysis of the second order codes, this section offers intricate 
details and complementary characteristics of the identified corporate disputes. 
Moreover, the hierarchical nature of the data is revealed in this section by 
providing a link between second and third order codes with reference to the 
categories (bar charts) and separate disputes (tables).  
 
3.1.1 State Interference  
State interference occurs when federal and local governments become a party to 
corporate disputes. Clearly the state can have a variety of motives for being 
actively involved in corporate affairs other than financial gain. Comparison of this 
category therefore should reveal the perceived change in such motives as well as 
outline the evolving nature of state participation in corporate life in Russia.  
In total 25 disputes63 were coded as state interference in 1998. All second order 
codes are represented within this category apart from bankruptcy disputes. 
Disputes coded as ownership, taxes and control produced the most active 
participation of the state (see graph 4.16) whereas disputes coded as diversion of 
claims featured only one instance of state interference. Further details of this 
category are summarised in table 4.3 specifying reasons for state interference, 
prevailing stakeholders and relevant comments. 
 
                                                          
62
 In total there are five third order codes: State Interference, Inadequate Information, General Meetings, 
Unclear Rules and Transactions with Self-Interest. 
63
 Altogether, there were 19 individual disputes of which 6 were parallel coded. 
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Graph 4.16: State Interference 1998 
 
Table 4.3: State Interference, 1998 
Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Gaz 
1 Article,  
ref. 7 
Coding64: Taxes 
Encourage 
investment by 
offering tax 
breaks 
IMF Tax breaks were 
withdrawn because 
they fell foul of IMF 
requirements 
Rosneft  
8 Articles,            
ref. 10.1       
Coding: Diversion 
of Assets 
Return of a 
valuable stake 
in a Rosneft‘s 
subsidiary that 
had been sold 
on by creditors 
The 
government 
Technically the 
creditors had a right to 
sell the asset because 
Rosneft fell behind on 
debt repayments 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.1  
Coding: Ownership 
Ownership 
restriction 
Management-
controlled 
intermediary 
companies 
and foreign 
investors 
The government failed 
to enforce a ban on 
ownership of Gazprom 
shares by foreign 
investors 
                                                          
64
 The referenced 2
nd
 order codes reveal the coding history of each dispute.  
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Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Gazprom 
3 Articles,  
ref. 11.2                    
Coding: Taxes 
Tax claims 
against the 
company 
Tax authorities 
who froze 
accounts of 
two Gazprom 
subsidiaries 
The Duma protested 
by declaring the action 
a threat to national 
security 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.3 
Coding: Ownership 
Making the gas 
industry more 
accessible to 
foreign investors 
The World 
Bank 
The Russian 
government was under 
pressure from the 
World Bank to strip 
Gazprom of its 
monopoly status. The 
World Bank used the 
possibility of a loan as 
a bargaining tool 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.4  
Coding: Ownership 
Elections Oligarchs and 
the 
government 
Gazprom grew its 
media portfolio in 
order to ensure pro-
Kremlin coverage 
Gazprom  
1 Article,  
ref. 11.5 
Coding: 
Misinvestment 
Balance of 
power 
The 
government 
Head of Gazprom 
(Vyakhirev) fell out of 
favour with the 
government which 
used the Audit 
Chamber to cancel the 
original trust 
agreement. 
Yukos 
10 Articles,  
ref. 12.1 
Parallel Coding: 
Control/Diversion of 
Claims 
Transfer pricing 
organised by 
Yukos 
management 
that negatively 
affected the 
government‘s 
stake 
The 
government 
The FSC cancelled the 
decision of a 
shareholders meeting 
that gave Yukos 
executives too much 
power. 
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Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Yukos 
2 Articles,  
ref. 12.6 
Coding: 
Misimplementation 
Political context 
of the joint 
venture 
between Yukos 
and Sibneft 
N/A CEO of Yukos 
(Khodorkovsky) kept a 
low political profile. He 
pulled out of the 
planned merger after 
Berezovsky (alleged 
owner of Sibneft) 
made a number of 
controversial political 
statements. 
Sibneft 
1 Article,  
ref. 21.1  
Parallel Coding: 
Control/Taxes 
Additional taxes Local 
administration 
Administration of the 
city of Omsk imposed 
an additional tax on 
the crude oil 
processed by a Sibneft 
refinery in order to 
increase its dwindling 
tax revenues. 
Sidanko 
4 Articles,  
ref. 22.2                 
Coding: Taxes 
Tax arrears Tax authorities The company was 
forced to settle its tax 
arrears because the 
government denied 
access to the export 
pipeline. 
Sidanko 
2 Articles,  
ref. 22.3                
Parallel Coding: 
Taxes/Control 
Tax arrears Sidanko Local administration 
seized control of a 
Sidanko refinery for 
non- payment of taxes. 
The company 
responded by stopping 
supply of crude oil. 
UES 
11 Articles,  
ref. 25.1       
Coding: Control 
Battle for 
leadership of 
the company 
First deputy 
Prime Minister 
Nemtsov 
Infighting between 
reform- oriented and 
more conservative 
political clans affected 
the company‘s 
leadership.  
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Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
UES 
8 Articles,  
ref. 25.4                 
Coding: Ownership 
Ownership 
restriction 
The Russian 
parliament65 
The Russian 
parliament passed a 
controversial piece of 
legislation that limited 
ownership of foreign 
investors in UES to 
25% despite a de facto 
ownership of 29%. 
The bill was a gesture 
of the communist 
dominated parliament 
aimed at spoiling 
Yeltsin‘s privatisation 
plans. 
Norilsk Nickel 
1 Article,  
ref. 28.3                
Coding: Taxes 
Tax arrears Norilsk Nickel The company 
successfully contested 
a back-tax claim that 
represented the 
government‘s efforts to 
reduce the budget 
deficit. 
Lebedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant 
2 Articles,  
ref. 34.1                
Coding: Ownership 
Contested 
ownership 
Majority 
shareholder 
Nacosta 
The government‘s 
stake in the plant was 
questioned in the 
courts. This fact upset 
the plans to raise the 
much-needed capital 
from the sale. 
SBS Agro 
1 Article,  
ref. 40.3               
Coding: 
Misinvestment 
Support for 
banks affected 
by the financial 
crisis 
SBS Agro The decision to 
support some banks 
and not others was 
based on political 
affiliations and not 
performance related 
measures. 
                                                          
65
 At the time the Russian parliament was dominated by the opposition and therefore very often acted 
contrary to what the government proposed. 
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Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Kuznetsky Mine 
1 Article,  
ref. 54 
Parallel Coding: 
Ownership/ 
Misimplementation 
Contested 
ownership 
Kemerovo 
authorities 
Local authorities 
sought to get control 
over the newly 
renovated mine.  
MCCI 
1 Article,  
ref. 55 
Parallel Coding: 
Control/Ownership/ 
Diversion of Assets 
Lease 
agreement 
State 
company 
GlvUpDK 
A state company 
GlavUpDK had 
reneged on its part of 
the contract with MCCI 
by not turning over a 
lease on the property 
to the joint venture. 
 
From the analysis of the summary table above, three main themes become 
apparent. First, in 1998 the government (being a hostage to the significant budget 
deficit) strongly depended on financial support from organisations like the IMF and 
the World Bank. However, this support came with certain conditions that the 
government had to meet. Improved tax collection was one of such conditions. It is 
for this reason that the government retracted its promise of tax breaks to the GAZ-
Fiat venture and imposed additional tax liability on companies like Gazprom, 
Sibneft and Sidanko. Another condition imposed by the Word Bank was the 
opening up of key strategic sectors such as gas and electricity. In other words, if 
the government did not reform those sectors to the liking of international finance 
providers, financial support would not have materialised. From the view point of 
foreign investors it was a reassuring fact because in an instance of a large 
corporate scandal considerable pressure could have been applied to the 
government.  
Second, in 1998 there were instances when the government acted as a minority 
shareholder fighting practices such as asset stripping and share dilution. These 
practices were initiated by parent companies which were controlled by a handful of 
oligarchs. A new share issue at Yukos, the sale of a stake in Purneftegaz 
(Rosneft‘s subsidiary) and Krasnoyarsk Hydro are examples of such daring 
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actions initiated by the financial industrial groups. Even though the government 
sometimes challenged these actions, a lot of newspaper ‗noise‘ was generated by 
these disputes, frequently exposing the government‘s inability to protect its own 
interests (Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant). 
Lastly, disputes reported in 1998 demonstrate that the government was incapable 
of acting in unison because of the heated internal battles for control of large state 
companies such as UES (on the federal level) and Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant (on 
the local level). 
In 2006 26 reported disputes66 featured state interference. Similar to 1998, all 
categories (apart from misinvestment) could be found within the hierarchy. 
Ownership, however, appeared as the most prominent second order code with ten 
separate disputes involving state participation67. In terms of the overall perception, 
this is a considerable number particularly in the context of the overall reduction of 
reported material covering corporate disputes. Furthermore, disputes involving 
Yukos (ownership, control and taxes) and Shell (ownership, diversion of assets 
and misimplementation) need to be highlighted as the most significant in terms of 
shaping investor perception because of the considerable amount of coverage 
received (23 and 25 articles respectively). Further details of this category are 
presented in graph 4.17 and table 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66
 In total there were 16 individual disputes of which 10 were parallel coded. 
67
 This has already been discussed with reference to ownership disputes.   
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Graph 4.17: State Interference, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.4: State Interference, 2006 
Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9b 
Aeroflot 
1 Article,  
ref. 1 
 Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Recreation of 
the airline 
industry 
The 
Russian 
government 
The government looked for a 
politically acceptable partnership 
at the expense of the 
operational and financial 
efficiency. 
AvtoVaz 
2 Articles,  
ref. 6 
 Parallel 
Coding: 
Control/ 
Taxes 
Appointment of 
state-friendly 
management  
The 
Russian 
government 
The government shifted the 
balance of power in the joint 
venture in its favour. 
Rosneft 
1 Article,  
ref. 10.4 
Coding: 
Taxes 
Tax arrears 
and 
environmental 
violations 
The 
Russian 
government 
Nenets governor accused 
Rosneft of a $33m. tax debt and 
breaking ecological standards. 
Subsequently, he was detained 
on suspicion of fraud and 
embezzlement. 
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Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9b 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.1 
Coding: 
Ownership 
Joint 
development 
of a gas field 
BASF and 
the 
government 
Gazprom, with the government‘s 
support, did not honour the 
agreement signed in the 1990s 
with Moncrief Oil International to 
jointly develop Yuzno Russkoe 
Gas Field. Instead, Gazprom 
opted for a more politically 
acceptable partner BASF with 
whom it swapped assets. 
Gazprom 
4 Articles,  
ref. 11.3 
Parallel 
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Assets/ 
Ownership 
Building up the 
monopoly 
status 
Gazprom 
(state 
controlled) 
The government picked 
Gazprom as the national leader 
and started to put pressure on 
foreign oil majors to accept 
Gazprom‘s entry as a majority 
shareholder. 
Gazprom 
4 Articles,  
ref. 11.5 
Parallel 
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims/ 
Ownership 
Export 
contracts 
Gazprom 
and 
RosUkrEner
go (state 
controlled) 
Gazprom renegotiated terms of 
supply contracts with Ukraine. 
The deal involved a non-
transparent intermediary 
company. 
Yukos 
23 Articles, 
ref. 12.1 
Parallel 
Coding: 
Ownership/ 
Control/ 
Taxes 
 
Fighting 
political 
opposition and 
restructuring 
oil and gas 
industry 
Rosneft 
(state 
controlled) 
The government was 
(internationally) accused of 
conspiring to expropriate Yukos 
with questionable back taxes 
allegations. 
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Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9b 
Yukos 
8 Articles,  
ref. 12.4 
Coding: 
Bankruptcy 
Charges to 
prevent the 
sale of a 
refinery 
The 
government 
and Rosneft 
In order to make sure that 
Yukos did not find a way to 
avoid bankruptcy, the 
government initiated a set of 
new charges (may be legitimate) 
and used the Prosecutor 
General‘s Office and the 
Russian courts to prevent the 
sale of the Mazeikiu refinery. 
Shell 
25 Articles, 
ref. 13 
Parallel 
Coding: 
Misimplement
ation/ 
Ownership/ 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Renegotiation 
of Production 
Sharing 
Agreements 
Gazprom 
and the 
government 
The government helped 
Gazprom enter the Sakhalin 2 
project by accusing Shell of 
environmental violations. The 
environmental allegations were 
used as a bargaining tool to 
ensure favourable terms for 
Gazprom‘s entry. 
Total 
2 Articles,  
ref. 14 
Parallel 
Coding: 
Ownership/ 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Renegotiation 
of Production 
Sharing 
Agreements 
Gazprom 
and the 
government 
The subsoil resource agency 
accused Total of inflating costs 
and producing too little oil and 
thus breaking the terms of the 
license agreement. The 
campaign against Total 
coincided with the government‘s 
push for greater state 
participation in major oil projects 
and contradicted previous 
agreements. 
ExxonMobil 
2 Articles,  
ref. 15 
Coding: 
Control 
Renegotiation 
of Production 
Sharing 
Agreements 
Gazprom 
and the 
government 
The Federal Service for 
Ecological, Technological and 
Atomic Inspection accused 
ExxonMobil of a number of 
violations. The pressure 
coincided with the government‘s 
drive to renegotiate terms of 
major PSA agreements.  
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Company Reasons for 
State 
Interference 
Prevailing 
Party  
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9b 
TNK-BP 
15 Articles, 
ref. 16.1 
Parallel 
Coding: 
Ownership/ 
Control/ 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Reallocation of 
major 
development 
licences 
Gazprom 
and the 
government 
The government used the 
Prosecutor General‘s Office and 
the Ministry for Natural 
Resources in order to pressurise 
TNK-BP into its acceptance of 
the restructuring plan which 
involved Gazprom‘s participation 
in the massive Kovykta gas 
project. 
TNK-BP 
1 Article,  
ref. 16.2 
Coding: 
Taxes 
Reallocation of 
development 
licences 
Gazprom 
and the 
government 
The government threatened to 
withdraw TNK-BP‘s license to 
develop a gas field in West 
Siberia. The allegations 
coincided with Gazprom‘s 
speculated purchase of the 
stake belonging to a number of 
Russian oligarchs (TNK). 
LUKoil 
2 Articles,  
ref. 17.1 
Coding: 
Ownership 
Establishing 
control over oil 
and gas 
industry 
The 
government 
The government relied on the 
Natural Resources Ministry's 
environmental regulator to 
prevent aggressive bidding and 
force LUKoil into sharing 
licenses. 
Transneft 
2 Articles,  
ref. 18 
Coding: 
Ownership 
Abuses of 
power by 
former 
managers 
The 
government 
The government, being a 
majority shareholder in 
Transneft, began an 
investigation into abuses of 
power by previous managers 
during privatisation of the 
company. The investigation was 
allegedly stemming from a 
conflict of a political nature. 
Evraz 
1 Article,  
ref. 31.2 
Coding: 
Ownership 
Evraz‘s bid for 
Oregon Steel 
N/A The US authorities scrutinized 
links between Abramovich and 
the Russian Government in 
relation to Evraz‘s bid for 
Oregon Steel. It was suspected 
that the former was acting on 
the orders of the latter. 
 
Page 147 
 
According to the reported material in 2006, all corporate disputes involving state 
participation serve as a vivid demonstration of the unchallenged power of the 
authorities. In the most recent year of the investigation the government emerged 
as a clear winner in all reported corporate disputes. The way in which the 
government dismantled Yukos68, restructured the largest oil projects (Shell, TNK-
BP, LUKoil), and selected politically acceptable partners (Aeroflot and Gazprom) 
demonstrates the newly established authority of the state which is not only 
capable of challenging large financial corporations, but also reaching out to the 
regions punishing local opposition (see Rosneft, reference 10.4 for additional 
details). 
 
3.1.1.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to State Interference 
Disputes 
Comparison of the state interference disputes does not unequivocally suggest that 
the perception of the rule of law improved along this dimension.  Conversely, 
based on the coded data presented above, the newly re-established authority of 
the state in 2006 was likely to have been perceived as a threat by foreign investors 
and not a sign of an improved environment. Despite the severely unpredictable 
context, in 1998 corporate assets were being continuously released from the 
government‘s grip creating unprecedented opportunities for private and foreign 
investors. In 2006 this trend reversed in favour of the government thus depriving 
private shareholders of access to a large amount of key assets. However, in both 
years of the study the government‘s motives appear to be rather self-centred. The 
only stark difference is in the effectiveness with which the Russian government 
pursued its interests. 
 
                                                          
68
 An interesting point is that Khodorkovsky (CEO and majority shareholder of Yukos) in 1998 had the image 
of a politically detached businessman famous for his aggressive treatment of minority shareholders. In 2006 
that image was drastically changed (particularly in the western media) to a Russian version of Mandela i.e. a 
liberal fighter for political freedom and corporate justice.  
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3.1.2 Inadequate Information  
Inadequate information is a category that refers to corporate disputes that feature 
an inappropriate level of communication between management and key 
stakeholders. In the corporate governance context examples of such poor 
communication could be a refusal to disclose ownership structures, 
incorrect/incomplete financial reporting and corporate releases, undisclosed sales 
and unadvertised share issues.  
In 1998 there were 11 examples69 of poor corporate communication with diversion 
of claims being the most frequent second order code. There were no reported 
instances of inadequate information in conjunction with bankruptcy, 
misimplementation, taxes and control disputes. Further details of the reported 
instances of this category are presented in graph 4.18 and table 4.5. 
Graph 4.18: Inadequate Information, 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
69
 In total there were 11 separate disputes (no parallel coding). 
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Table 4.5: Inadequate Information, 1998 
Company Inadequate Information Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
MGTS 
4 Articles,  
ref. 3 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Investor tender agreement (permitting a majority 
shareholder new share emission) did not appear in 
the investment prospectus 
Majority 
shareholder (the 
Moscow 
Committee for 
Science and 
Technology) 
Minority 
shareholders 
Rosneft 
8 Articles,  
ref. 10.1 
Coding: Diversion of Assets 
Identity of a purchaser of a 38% stake in 
Purneftegaz (Rosneft‘s subsidiary) was unknown70. 
The stake was sold for a fraction of its estimated 
value. 
Unknown Rosneft 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.6 
Coding: Diversion of Assets 
A large equity stake in a strategic natural-gas 
refining company was sold off to an unknown 
European company for roughly $20 million, a price 
significantly below the company's value. No 
information about the buyer was made available by 
privatization officials although Gazprom‘s 
involvement was suspected. 
Gazprom Minority 
shareholders 
                                                          
70
 The identity of the behind-the-scenes company was unknown, although sources in the media mentioned LUKoil, oligarch Boris Berezovsky and former Rosneft 
managers. An investigation by The Moscow Times traced possible links to LUKoil and Kremlin insider Pavel Borodin, while another possible buyer of the stake was 
directly related to the heads of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
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Company Inadequate Information Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Yukos 
2 Articles,  
ref. 12.6 
Coding: Misimplementation 
Undisclosed cash transfers, unaudited books, and 
questionable claims of proven oil reserves. 
Majority 
shareholders 
(Khodorkovsky 
and Berezovsky) 
Foreign investors 
and minority 
shareholders 
Transneft 
7 Articles 
ref. 18 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
The sale of Transneft‘s shares was conducted 
through non-transparent off-shore companies and 
one British company with an untraceable 
ownership. Appraisal of shares was completely 
flawed. 
Management Minority 
shareholders 
(workers) 
Surgutneftegaz 
2 Articles,  
ref. 19 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Surgut's interest in three subsidiaries - Ruchi, 
Nefto-Kombi, and Krasny Neftyanik - was sold off 
for an undisclosed sum to a group of local 
‗investors.‘ 
St. Petersburg 
administration 
and local 
‗investors.‘ 
Parent company 
Surgutneftegaz 
Sibneft 
1 Article,  
ref. 21.3 
Coding: Ownership 
The State Antitrust Committee failed to determine 
owners of Sibneft because investment banks could 
not be forced to disclose ownership information. 
Also, the company refused to disclose the identity 
of its majority shareholder (although according to 
numerous speculations in the media and among 
market analysts it was Boris Berezovsky). 
Sibneft majority 
shareholders 
Dart Management 
(minority 
shareholder of a 
Sibneft subsidiary 
whose ownership 
stake was under 
investigation71) 
                                                          
71
 The investigation was possibly linked to Dart’s criticism of Russian corporate governance and more specifically his allegations against Sibneft’s consolidation. There 
might have been an influential player - Berezovsky - behind the investigation. 
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Company Inadequate Information Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Sidanko 
6 Articles,  
ref. 22.1 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
The closed bond issue was not advertised to 
minority shareholders when they were buying in. 
Majority 
shareholder 
Minority 
shareholders 
Norilsk Nickel 
1 Article,  
ref. 28.2 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Renaissance falsely reported that Norilsk 
shareholders had voted to approve a new closed 
share issue. Over the following two days, the share 
price of Norilsk preferred shares fell by more than 
10 percent. Uneximbank ultimately relented and 
changed the terms of the issue which included 
preferred shareholders72. 
Ordinary 
shareholders  
Preferred 
shareholders 
SBS Agro 
3 Articles,  
ref. 33 
Coding: Ownership 
Although the Central Bank had said SBS-Agro 
depositors could have access to their funds, it later 
retracted that pledge73.  
 
 
 
SBS Agro Depositors 
                                                          
72
 Investors suggested that the mistake was either a massive coincidence or a massive manipulation. 
73
It appears that unfulfilled promises by Sberbank to pay depositors were used to delay resolution and confuse the parties involved. 
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Company Inadequate Information Benefiting Party Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Lomonosovsky  Porcelain 
Factory 
1 Article,  
ref. 53 
Coding: Ownership 
Foreign investors claimed that they had 
determined that the St. Petersburg brokerages had 
the right to sell the shares, although they did not 
know the details of how the brokers acquired the 
shares of Lomonosovsky Porcelain Factory. A 
financial consultant to the factory, however, said 
the investors did not exercise due diligence when 
dealing with the brokerages, which were reported 
to have been involved in questionable stock 
transactions in the past74. 
Potential Russian 
investors with 
strong contacts 
Foreign investors 
                                                          
74
 Lomonosov was a closed joint-stock company, which meant a shareholder could not sell his shares to a third party without the consent from all shareholders. The 
shares were transferred through a scheme by which a factory employee gave one of his shares as a gift to an intermediary company, which thus became a shareholder 
and could buy any number of shares.  
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According to the above table, sacredly guarded identity of corporate owners was a 
prominent feature of the perceived environment in 1998. The most vivid example 
of such non-disclosure was the secret identity of a Sibneft‘s majority shareholder. 
Many speculated him to be Mr. Berezovsky, but the latter continuously denied his 
association with the company75. Moreover, disputes involving such companies as 
MGTS, Yukos, Sidanko and Norilsk Nickel demonstrate that systematic ambiguity 
around closed share issues made minority shareholders extremely vulnerable to a 
substantial dilution.  
In 2006 the Moscow Times reported 13 disputes76 involving inadequate 
information as defined above. Taxes, control and diversion of assets were not 
featured in the hierarchy of second order codes whereas the ownership category 
was the most widely represented. Further details of inadequate information 
disputes reported in 2006 are presented below in graph 4.19 and table 4.6. 
 
Graph 4.19: Inadequate Information, 2006 
 
                                                          
75
 A fascinating fact is that despite such denials in the past, Mr. Berezovsky took the Russian government to 
court in 2008 over the price for which he was allegedly forced to sell his majority stake in Sibneft to Roman 
Abramovich. 
76
 In total there were 11 individual disputes of which 2 were parallel coded. 
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Table 4.6: Inadequate Information, 2006 
Company Inadequate Information Benefiting 
Party 
Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
Svyazinvest 
1 Article,  
ref. 2 
Coding: Ownership 
The Russian government promised to privatize the 
remaining 75% stake in Svyazinvest, but kept 
delaying the sale77. Because of the uncertainty with 
privatisation a number of strategic investors 
(including George Soros) sold their stakes at a loss. 
The 
government 
Minority 
shareholders and 
potential 
investors 
VimpelCom 
1 Article,  
ref. 4 
Coding: Misinvestment 
Telenor accused VimpelCom of providing 
misleading information to shareholders regarding 
VimpelCom's purchase of Ukrainian RadioSystems. 
Alfa Group 
(owner of a 
blocking 
stake in 
VimpelCom) 
Telenor (owner of 
a blocking stake 
in VimpelCom) 
MagaFon 
2 Articles,  
ref. 5 
Parallel Coding: 
Diversion of Claims/ 
Ownership 
A Bermuda-based investment fund that controlled a 
significant proportion of Russia's telecoms industry 
continued to deny that IT and Communications 
Minister Leonid Reiman was one of its owners 
despite a Zurich court‘s claim to the contrary. 
Alfa Group Investment Fund 
IPOC and IT and 
Communications 
Minister Leonid 
Reiman 
                                                          
77
 The government broke its promise to sell a 75% stake in Svyazinvest to strategic investors because it was looking for a politically acceptable partner. 
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Company Inadequate Information Benefiting 
Party 
Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
Rosneft 
2 Articles,  
ref. 10.1 
Coding: Diversion of 
Claims 
A 26.79 percent stake in Yugansk had been 
transferred to Rosneft's balance sheet from Baikal 
Finance Group78, an opaque shell company used to 
sidestep legal risks in a highly controversial 
government auction of Yukos‘ main production unit. 
Rosneft and 
the 
government 
Shareholders of 
Yugansk-
neftegaz 
Gazprom 
4 Articles,  
ref. 11.5 
Parallel Coding: 
Diversion of Claims/ 
Ownership 
All gas delivered to Ukraine, and some of the gas 
delivered to Europe, was handled by RosUkrEnergo, 
a Swiss-registered trading company with a dubious 
reputation that was half-owned by Gazprom. The 
other half was held by Raiffeisen Bank on behalf of 
a group of investors whose identities had not been 
disclosed. 
Gazprom, 
Russian and 
Ukrainian 
officials. 
Customers 
Yukos 
8 Articles,  
ref. 12.4 
Coding: Bankruptcy 
There was a lack of information in the West about 
Yukos and GML assets, which, according to 
different estimates, total between $5 billion and $20 
billion. 
Rosneft and 
the 
government 
Yukos‘ minority 
shareholders 
                                                          
78
Baikal Finance Group was registered in the same building as a grocery store in the city of Tver.  
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Company Inadequate Information Benefiting 
Party 
Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
Transneft 
2 Articles,  
ref. 18 
Coding: Ownership 
Detailed information about the owners of Transneft's 
preferred shares had to be disclosed because of an 
ongoing criminal investigation into abuses by former 
Transneft managers during the company's 
privatization79.  
The 
government 
Preferred 
shareholders 
Severstal 
4 Articles,  
ref. 30.2 
Coding:  
Misimplementation 
Several European brokerages and investor 
consultancy groups criticized the speed with which 
Arcelor's management arranged the Severstal 
merger and the lack of information provided about 
the Russian company and its majority owner80. 
Acelor Severstal 
(Mordoshov) 
Evraz 
1 Article,  
ref. 31.2 
Coding: Ownership 
The US authorities wanted to determine the nature 
of the relationship between the Russian government 
and Abramovich (majority shareholder of Evraz) 
before approving the Russian company‘s bid for 
Oregon Steel. 
The US 
government 
N/A 
                                                          
79
 Deutsche UFG suggested that asking brokerages to disclose beneficiary owners of the company's shares was ‘an unprecedented case for the Russian stock market, 
which in our view will likely further worsen sentiment surrounding Transneft shares’. 
80
 Arcelor’s shareholders voted down Mordoshov’s offer despite recommendations from the board. Mordoshov may have had an informal agreement with the board of 
Acelor promising their support in return for some sort of compensation. 
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Company Inadequate Information Benefiting 
Party 
Disadvantaged 
Party 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
RusAl 
3 Articles,  
ref. 32.3 
Coding: Ownership 
The EBRD and IFC used the possibility of a 
corporate loan as a means of forcing RusAl to 
disclose its ownership structure81. 
EBRD and 
IFC 
Sole owner of 
RusAl Oleg 
Derepaska 
Eurocement 
1 Article,  
ref. 37 
Coding: Diversion of 
Claims 
The American registered fund upset the majority 
owners of the Eurocement group by blocking new 
share issue. The majority owners responded by a 
refusal to send financial information to the fund. 
Majority 
shareholder 
Minority 
shareholder 
(American 
investment fund) 
                                                          
81
 Further to the disclosure, a former business partner of Derepaska went for litigation to extract more money that he felt RusAl owed him. To address these concerns 
the company recruited two high-profile non-executive directors. 
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In 2006 there were examples when stakeholders received inaccurate/incomplete/ 
misleading information. With the exception of VimpelCom and Eurocement 
however, it was the government who created such confusion by either abandoning 
promises to privatise a stake in Svyazinvest, or refusing to publicly disclose Yukos‘ 
financial flows. Similar to 1998, undisclosed ownership continued to be a 
characteristic of the Russian corporate environment. Owners of IPOC (Megafon), 
Baikal Finance Group, and RosUkrEnergo remained officially undisclosed in 2006 
despite serious concerns from existing and potential investors.  
 
3.1.2.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Inadequate Information 
Disputes 
Similar to the previous category no stark improvements occurred on this front. The 
environment in 2006 continued to be filled with secret entities with undisclosed 
ownership and unaudited financial information. In the instance of RosUkrEnergo, 
KPGM simply resigned as the company‘s auditor due to concerns over its own 
reputation82. The prominence of companies in question speaks volumes of the 
negative impact such non-disclosures had on investor perception of the rule of law 
in the country. 
However, there was a positive example when a shareholder formally 
acknowledged the fact that he was a sole beneficiary in exchange for a corporate 
loan from the EBRD (RusAl). Although such a disclosure led to additional litigation 
instigated by previous business partners, hopeful investors could be forgiven for 
treating this as a sign of more possible disclosures of this nature in the future. 
However, little change occurred in terms of the severity of misrepresentations with 
reference to purely corporate conflicts. In 1998 such a misrepresentation 
manifested itself through lack of information about new share issues. In 2006 
                                                          
82
 An interesting fact is that according to reported material in 2007, PricewaterhouseCoopers in an 
unprecedented act withdrew their financial audits of Yukos further to a forceful request from the 
government. In general, this opens up a debate about integrity of even reputable auditors in the Russian 
context. The audit reports in question were over 8 years old and would not have been withdrawn had it not 
been for the government’s interference. In general, private companies in Russia are keen to work with the 
big 5 in order to ensure access to international funding and improve their image abroad. 
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matching disputes involved intentionally misleading a corporate partner in relation 
to a proposed acquisition (VimpleCom) and a refusal to send financial information 
as a punishment for blocking a vote proposed by a majority shareholder 
(Eurocement). 
 
3.1.3 General Meeting 
This third order category refers to instances when important corporate decisions 
were made at general meetings of shareholders. The content of this category not 
only reveals the nature of corporate decisions at hand, but also shows how this 
crucially important corporate governance mechanism operates in the Russian 
environment.   
In 1998 there were 12 disputes83 reported in the Moscow Times in which general 
meetings played an important role in corporate proceedings. As opposed to 
previous third order categories, general meetings were most instrumental in 
disputes also coded as control and diversion of claims, see graph 4.20. Additional 
details of reported disputes featuring general meetings are presented in table 4.7. 
Graph 4.20: General Meetings, 1998 
 
 
                                                          
83
 10 individual disputes of which 2 were parallel coded. 
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Table 4.7: General Meetings, 1998 
Company Issue (decision 
for approval) 
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9a 
Rosneft 
1 Article,  
ref. 10.3 
Coding: Control 
 
The board of 
directors of a 
Rosneft‘s 
subsidiary was 
given authority 
to sell up to 50% 
of the 
company‘s 
assets. 
Under the Joint Stock Company law, 
charter amendments require a 75 percent 
vote. Rosneft was able to get a favourable 
verdict due to the fact that only 75 percent 
of the subsidiary‘s votes were present at 
the meeting, thereby giving its 51 percent 
stake a 68 percent weighting. Finding the 
other 7 percent was a matter of bargaining 
and subtle stealth. 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.2 
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Allow the board 
of directors to 
issue new 
shares without 
shareholder 
approval. 
Proposal was voted down by suspicious 
minority shareholders. 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.3 
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims 
 
Authorise a 
subsidiary to 
guarantee a 
$500 million 
foreign loan to 
Yukos. 
The motion was passed by only 58.2 
percent of voting shareholders, the vast 
majority of which represented Yukos 
interests. Arrowhead Enterprises Ltd., 
which claimed 12.3 percent of the voting 
stock of Yukos‘ subsidiary 
Samaraneftegaz, alleged that the vote 
violated Russian joint-stock law. The 
Federal Securities Commission was asked 
to investigate the matter. 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.8 
Coding: Taxes 
 
Transfer 
executive 
powers from 
Eastern Oil Co. 
to Yukos in 
response to 
bankruptcy of 
the former. 
 
 
 
 
 
The decision was declared illegal by the 
Tomsk Regional Property Fund and the 
transfer was blocked. 
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Company Issue (decision 
for approval) 
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9a 
Surgutneftegaz 
2 Articles,  
ref. 19 
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Strike the parent 
off the charter 
documents. 
 
A representative from Surgut (parent) was 
allowed into the meeting, though he was 
forbidden to participate. The reason was a 
faxed power of attorney letter, an act 
deemed in violation of the AGM 
procedures established by the subsidiary‘s 
management. The representative watched 
helplessly as Surgutneftegaz's stake in the 
company was diminished from 42 percent 
to 11 percent.  
Krasnoyarsk 
Hydro Plant 
4 Articles,  
ref. 24 
Parallel Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims/Control 
Sale of a 
majority stake. 
It was alleged that Krasnoyarskenergo's 
chief executive, Vladimir Kolmogorov, was 
not allowed to vote the company's 28 
percent stake in the power plant because 
he had been elected at a general meeting 
that was declared invalid by a local court. 
KrAZ denied that there had been any 
irregularities at the meeting.  
Mosenergo 
1 Article,  
ref. 26 
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims 
New share 
issue. 
 
The decision made economic sense and 
was approved at a general meeting despite 
the fact that some minority holdings were 
diluted.  
Novolipetsk 
4 Articles,  
ref. 29.1 
Coding: Control 
Nominations 
 
Despite holding 40 percent, a group of 
investors was blocked from getting board 
representation at Novolipetsk. The old 
management clearly did not want to share 
power with the new shareholders, some of 
which appeared as a result of the 
controversial loan-for-shares deals. Once 
the court returned the ruling in favour of the 
shareholders, the old management 
attempted to avoid allowing the 
shareholders to vote in their 
representatives by removing voting from 
the agenda of the general meeting84.  
                                                          
84
 The culture of looking for loopholes and technical irregularities is very much visible in these sorts of 
conflicts. It appears that the spirit of the law is secondary to minor technicalities. 
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Company Issue (decision 
for approval) 
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9a 
Knauf 
1 Article,  
ref. 36.1 
Parallel Coding: 
Control/ 
Ownership 
 
Challenging 
leadership and 
ownership of the 
company. 
 
Sergiyenko was suspended from office by 
Knauf on allegations of theft, 
mismanagement and tax manipulation. His 
response was to hold his own meetings, 
physically remove Knauf from the building, 
and issue 64 percent new shares to dilute 
the Germans' stake. The local governor's 
office supported the share emission, 
saying it thought the factory should be re-
nationalized.  
Inkombank 
1 Article,  
ref. 42  
Coding: Control 
Dismantling the 
board of 
directors 
 
Uneximbank-MFK prevented 
representatives from Inkombank from 
voting on dismantling the board due to an 
error on the part of the board. Inkombank 
representatives did not receive ballots for 
the vote. Inkombank successfully 
petitioned the St. Petersburg Arbitration 
Court for an injunction on the meeting. 
Even though initially the ruling was 
ignored, the decision of the court was 
eventually complied with upon delivery of 
the documents. 
 
Analysis of the content of reported material belonging to this category unveils two 
main scenarios when general meetings were an integral part of corporate conflicts. 
The first scenario relates to decisions about the amount of authority85 the board of 
directors and consequently majority shareholders should have. Examples involving 
decisions considered at Yukos and Rosneft‘s general meetings reveal the extent 
of authority desired by the management. Perhaps Yukos‘ example is the most 
extreme when the board of directors asked shareholders to grant them authority to 
issue new shares without approval of the latter. Although this resolution was voted 
down, it nevertheless exposed the level of alertness required from minority 
investors. On a practical level however, it is evident that general meetings were a 
weak form of protection because of secret collusions and subtle stealth that could 
lead to approval of the most daring proposals (Rosneft). The second scenario 
                                                          
85
 Hence control is a strongly represented second order code. 
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extracted from the reported material refers to situations when general meetings 
were treated as a formality with the actual decision being made behind closed 
doors. The key point here is that in some cases approval of shareholders was not 
even considered as necessary since they were simply prevented from voting on 
either minor technicalities (Surgutneftegaz, Inkombank) or by physical removal 
from the venue (Knauf). 
In 2006 there were only three disputes featuring general meetings. Those disputes 
were coded together with misimplementation, diversion of assets and claims 
categories. This is a visible reduction in reported material directly associated with 
general meetings. Further details of this category are presented in graph 4.21 and 
table 4.8. 
 
Graph 4.21: General Meetings, 2006 
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Table 4.8: General Meetings, 2006 
Company Issue (decision 
for approval) 
Comments 
Template 
Details 
Appendix 9b 
VimpelCom 
1 Article, 
 ref. 4  
Coding: 
Misinvestment 
Acquisition 
 
Telenor executives accused VimpelCom of 
convening an illegal extraordinary 
shareholders meeting and providing 
misleading information to shareholders 
regarding VimpelCom's purchase of 
Ukrainian RadioSystems for $231.3 million. 
Both shareholders of VimpelCom have a 
blocking stake. One of them was interested in 
a purchase of a competitor of the other. The 
Russian shareholder provided misleading 
information at the disputed extra-ordinary 
shareholders meeting and got the vote its 
way. 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.5  
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Dismissal of two 
managers who 
were accused of 
trying to hide the 
company‘s 
assets. 
 
The decision to get rid of the two Yukos 
managers (Bruce Misamore and David 
Godfrey) was made by the court appointed 
Yukos receiver (Eduard Rebgun) and 
enforced by means of an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting that was ruled to be 
legitimate by a Dutch court86. The two 
managers were accused of trying to hide the 
company‘s assets. 
LUKoil  
2 Articles, 
ref. 17.2 
Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Valuation of 
target 
companies. 
A minority shareholder (Prosperity Capital 
Management) sought to boost its stake in 
the subsidiary Ritek (one of LUKoil's 
production units) to 25% in order to be in a 
position to block the merger at the upcoming 
general meeting. The fund offered a 17% 
premium to other minority shareholders.  
 
In 2006 there was only one dispute that revealed a questionable conduct at a 
general meeting of shareholders (VimpelCom). Telenor (significant, but minority 
                                                          
86
 A shareholder meeting (which was acknowledged by a Dutch court as legitimate) authorised the decision 
of the Yukos receiver to fire managers accused of hiding assets in a complex web of transactions. 
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shareholder) received inaccurate information about a proposed acquisition and 
was simply tricked into voting in favour of what turned out to be a potentially 
damaging resolution. Conversely, the dispute involving LUKoil showed that some 
shareholders began treating general meetings as a reliable mechanism for 
controlling corporate decisions. 
 
3.1.3.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to General Meetings 
Disputes 
Unlike previous categories, analysis of disputes involving general meeting 
proceedings exposes a considerable improvement in investor perception of the 
rule of law in the country. On the surface this conclusion is supported by a 
significant drop in the number of reported disputes featuring general meetings (11 
in 1998 and only 3 in 2006). Furthermore, in terms of the actual content of 
reported disputes, the blatant abuses of (shareholder) voting rights and illegal 
resolutions appear to be perceived as a legacy of the past.  
Disputes reported in 2006 were fundamentally different in terms of the analysed 
category. The case involving VimpelCom (2006) was not as straightforward as 
disputes reported in 1998. Here, a shareholder (Alfa Group) proposed an 
acquisition of a competitor of the other shareholder (Telenor). Arguably, as far as 
the company and other minority shareholders were concerned that was a 
reasonable proposition that happened to be at odds with independent interests of 
Telenor. Of course it was no justification for withholding or misrepresenting 
relevant information87, but nevertheless the decision at hand probably made 
economic sense for the entity in question. This is in stark contrast to some of the 
completely self-centred decisions pushed through at the general meetings 
reported in 1998. Moreover, in relation to the dispute involving LUKoil the 17% 
premium on shares paid by a minority shareholder wishing to boost their holding to 
a blocking stake was a demonstration of the confidence in the legitimacy of the 
voting process. Such confidence simply did not exist in 1998. 
                                                          
87
 Unfortunately, this characteristic remained an aspect of the perceived environment. 
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3.1.4 Unclear Rules, Laws, Regulations  
This category refers to contradictory laws, regulations and court rulings as well as 
unfulfilled contracts and corporate obligations that cause confusion among 
affected parties. Such contradictions can arise as a result of directly conflicting 
pieces of legislation as well as inadequate arbitration. This category serves as an 
indication of the perceived level of ambiguity within the primarily external 
environment. 
In 1998 there were 21 disputes88 involving elements of regulatory contradiction 
with varying degrees of severity. The largest number of such disputes was 
associated with the second order code of ownership followed by control and 
diversion of claims disputes. Conversely to previous categories, a number of 
bankruptcy disputes also coincided with a great deal of regulatory ambiguity within 
the environment. Graph 4.22 and table 4.9 provide an overview and content of the 
reported material corresponding to this category. 
Graph 4.22: Unclear Rules, Laws and Regulations, 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
88
 18 individual disputes of which 3 were parallel coded. 
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Table 4.9: Unclear Rules, Laws and Regulations, 1998 
Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
MGTS 
4 articles,  
ref. 3 
Coding: Diversion 
of Claims 
Conflict between Joint 
Stock Company Law 
and Investor Tender 
Agreement supported 
by presidential decree 
1210. 
The Joint Stock Company Law 
(1996) prescribed the right of first 
refusal, whereas the investor 
tender agreement permitted the 
majority shareholder to issue new 
shares and buy them at par 
value. A presidential decree89 
ruled in favour of the investor 
tender agreement. 
GAZ 
1 Article,  
ref. 7 
Coding: Taxes 
Conflict between a 
presidential decree 
granting a series of tax 
breaks and existing tax 
legislation together 
with the requirements 
of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
The International Monetary 
Fund‘s opposition forced Russian 
authorities to scale back on the 
tax incentives breaking the formal 
promise to the venture. 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.1 
Coding: Ownership 
Despite a ban 
(presidential decree) 
on foreign ownership 
of Gazprom‘s shares, 
there were various 
schemes designed to 
circumvent the rule. 
Regent Fund Management 
Limited set up a Cayman Islands-
based entity called Regent GAZ, 
which announced plans to buy 
$200 million worth of domestic 
Gazprom shares and sell 
derivatives to foreign investors 
avoiding not only the decree, but 
also local taxes. 
Yukos 
2 Articles,  
ref. 12.5 
Coding: Ownership 
Yukos broke an earlier 
signed agreement with 
Amoco to jointly 
develop an oil field. 
Yukos and Amoco signed an 
agreement to develop an oil field 
in 1993 and together won a 
tender to secure development 
rights. Amoco invested more than 
$100 million in preliminary 
development of the field. Yukos, 
however, surprised the oil 
community when it stated it had 
"no business relationship" with 
Amoco. 
                                                          
89
 The presidential decree 1210 ruled in favour of the 1995 investor tender agreement even though it was in 
breach of the JSC law governing new share emissions. Analysts suggested that Yeltsin issued the decree 
because of his connection to Luzhkov, the majority shareholder. The investor-tender agreement did not 
appear in the investment prospectus. 
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Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Transneft 
7 Articles, 
ref. 18 
Coding: Diversion 
of Claims 
The Moscow 
Arbitration Court 
returned two conflicting 
rulings with reference 
to the legitimacy of a 
share issue. 
Before the Finance Ministry 
annulled the share issue, 
Transneft‘s management tried to 
fight the share dilution in courts. 
The Moscow Arbitration Court 
however returned two conflicting 
verdicts which left two groups of 
investors claiming control over 
the company.  
UES 
8 Articles, 
ref. 25.4 
Coding: Ownership 
A bill restricted foreign 
ownership in the 
company below 
existing at the time 
level. 
The State Duma, passed a bill 
restricting foreign ownership of 
UES to 25%. The issue was 
complicated as at the time 
foreigners had already purchased 
around 30% of the company. The 
mechanism for buying back the 
5% was unclear90.  
Electrosila 
1 Article,  
ref. 27 
Coding: Control 
Majority shareholder 
ignored decision of the 
Moscow Arbitration 
Court to reinstate a 
fired director. 
When the director was replaced, 
Siemens took the case to court 
and received a ruling in its favour 
(the decision to replace the 
director was in violation of the 
company‘s charter). EMK, 
majority shareholder in 
Elektrosila, ignored the decision 
and installed a new director who 
was working alongside the old 
one. Most analysts suggested 
that Siemens would lose because 
EMK was a majority shareholder 
and a powerful corporation. 
Novolipetsk 
4 Articles,  
ref. 29.1 
Coding: Control 
There were a number 
of conflicting decisions 
that the Lipetsk 
arbitration court 
returned. 
A 40 percent minority was 
blocked from getting a fair board 
representation.   
                                                          
90
 The Russian Constitution explicitly forbids expropriation of property, but the state could not afford the 
$600 million it would have cost to buy back the 5 percent of the foreign-owned stock.  
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Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Magnitogorsk 
3 Articles:  
ref. 33 
Coding: Ownership 
A renegade91 director 
was reinstated by a 
Moscow district court 
even though he was 
accused of direct 
insubordination.  
A company that managed shares 
of Magnitogorsk refused to hand 
in the shares that were meant to 
be used as collateral for a loan 
from the EBRD. The director of 
the company that hid the shares 
was sacked but later reinstated 
by a court leading to the two 
parties to the conflict holding their 
own board meetings. 
Lebedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant 
2 Articles,  
ref. 34 
Coding: Ownership 
Russian courts 
returned a number of 
contradictory rulings 
with regard to the 
ownership of the 
government‘s stake in 
the plant.  
The disputed stake went through 
a series of transactions, which 
the courts tried to unravel. 
Eventually, the court system 
came up with two contradictory 
rulings complicating the 
situation92. Finally, the 
government suggested that 
although the ultimate stock holder 
obtained the shares legitimately, 
it was not theirs as in the past the 
disputed stock was sold 
improperly. 
Achinsk Alumina 
Combine 
1 Article,  
ref. 35 
Coding: 
Bankruptcy/ 
Misinvestment/ 
Control 
A higher-order court 
accepted an appeal 
and sent the case back 
to Kransoyarsk 
arbitration court for 
another hearing. 
The creditors (including Alfa 
Groups) were pressing for 
bankruptcy while regional 
administration argued that the 
bankruptcy would be disastrous 
for the region. The conflicting 
decisions of the courts appeared 
to be consistent with the change 
of heart of the Governor Lebed 
who suddenly withdrew his 
support for the creditors. 
                                                          
91
 A renegade director is someone who refuses to accept or openly challenges authority of rightful owners. 
92
 An arbitration court cancelled the sale soon after, ruling that it constituted insider trading. However, the 
Belgorod regional court, a higher authority, said the sale could go ahead. 
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Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
AssiDoman 
6 Articles,  
ref. 38.2 
Coding: Ownership 
The State Anti-Trust 
Committee sold a 
stake in a paper mill to 
AssiDoman. The 
Moscow Arbitration 
Court declared the 
sale illegal. 
Legality of the purchase was 
questioned because allegedly 
someone else became interested 
in the stake. The courts were 
used to challenge the legitimacy 
of the stake. Subsequently, 
AssiDoman expressed a wish to 
sell its stake saying that it had 
underestimated problems with 
Russian bureaucracy. 
SBS Agro 
5 Articles,  
ref. 40.2 
Coding: 
Bankruptcy 
Sberbank promised to 
repay SBS Agro‘s 
clients, but later 
retracted its offer. 
Although the Central Bank had 
said SBS-Agro depositors could 
have access to their funds, it later 
retracted that pledge. At some 
point due to lack of cash, the 
bank decided to pay depositors 
on the basis of their needs. This 
was an arbitrary approach open 
to abuse. 
EBRD 
1 Article,  
ref. 45 
Coding: 
Bankruptcy 
The put option 
designed under the 
British law was not 
recognised by the 
Russian law. 
The put option would have 
allowed the EBRD to sell back a 
stake in Tokobank. The option 
was not recognised by the 
Russian law (equal treatment of 
all shareholders) in the face of 
bankruptcy proceedings. The 
EBRD accepted the loss of the 
stake and wrote off its 
investment. 
Tokobank 
1 Article,  
ref. 46 
Coding: Diversion 
of Claims 
Futures contracts. Tokobank used a loophole in the 
Russian law to avoid settling 
futures contracts which became 
highly unprofitable as a result of 
the devaluation of the ruble. 
Currency forward contracts were 
treated as wagers and according 
to the Russian civil code wagers 
could not be settled by a court 
unless one of the sides was 
coerced or deceived into making 
the bet. 
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Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Rossiisky Kredit 
1 Article,  
ref. 47 
Coding: Diversion 
of Claims 
Conflict between a 
court order and actions 
of the tax authorities 
The bank (Rossiisky Kredit) 
refused to transfer its client‘s 
deposit meant for wages and 
taxes. The court ruled in favour of 
the client and bailiffs seized the 
property of the bank. However, 
the bank argued that the 
transaction was declined because 
the tax authorities had frozen the 
account of the client. The bank 
appealed the decision. 
Kosmos TV 
1 Article,  
ref. 49 
Coding: Control 
Conflict between the 
Joint Stock Company 
Law and the Labour 
Code 
A renegade director took the 
shareholders of Kosmos TV to 
court over his dismissal. In the 
1990s the Russian courts were 
much more familiar with the 
Labour Code than the JSC Law 
and used the former much more 
readily. The decision raised 
concerns since it proved 
impossible for companies to sack 
their directors even on legitimate 
grounds93. 
Kuznetsky Mine 
1 Article,  
ref. 54 
Parallel Coding: 
Ownership/ 
Misimplementation 
An appeals court 
invalidated the ruling of 
Kemerovo Arbitration 
Court 
The local court challenged the 
legitimacy of the mine‘s 
privatisation, but the appeals 
court invalidated the ruling. 
 
In summary, 1998 was a fairly contradictory environment where the same court 
returned completely opposing rulings (Transneft, Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant and 
Novolipetsk), appeals were used to procrastinate and delay verdicts, (Kuznetsky 
Mine, Rossiisky Kredit and Achinsk Alumina Combine), presidential decrees 
openly challenged existing legislation (MGTS and GAZ), new pieces of legislation 
destroyed the status quo (UES) and crucially where there was a complete 
disregard for the newly enforced Law on Joint Stock Companies (1998). Despite 
                                                          
93
 Foreign investors and the Russian partners respected the decision of the court and were forced to 
reinstate the renegade director.  
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being a higher order law it was frequently ignored in favour of the Labour Code 
which was developed under the Soviet system and enjoyed a greater support from 
the Russian judiciary (Magnitogorsk, Kosmos TV and MGTS).   
In 2006 there were 1194 disputes pertaining to the category reported in the 
newspaper. The most significant second order codes here were represented by 
diversion of claims and ownership conflicts.  
Graph 4.23: Unclear Rules, Laws and Regulations, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.10: Unclear Rules, Laws and Regulations, 2006 
Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
AvtoVaz 
2 Articles,  
ref. 6      
Parallel Coding: 
Control/Taxes 
 
The General 
Prosecutor‘s Office 
cancelled a criminal 
investigation into 
AvtoVaz without 
giving any 
explanations.  
The city of Samara police opened 
a criminal investigation into 
unidentified AvtoVAZ employees 
over the alleged non-payment of 
230 million rubles ($8 million) in 
back taxes. Allegedly, the charges 
were dropped because influential 
stakeholders of AvtoVaz agreed to 
co-operate with the government. 
                                                          
94
 7 individual disputes of which 4 were parallel coded. 
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Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
Rosneft 
3 Articles,  
ref. 10.2 
Coding: Diversion of 
Claims 
 
Lack of legislation 
on valuation 
methods. 
Companies are allowed to pick a 
valuation method. Management of 
Rosneft used the most favourable 
one and with the legal profession 
lacking expertise, accountants had 
greater freedom to ‗massage‘ the 
figures. 
Gazprom  
1 Article,  
ref. 11.1 
Coding: Ownership 
Gazprom broke an 
agreement with 
Moncrief Oil 
International to 
jointly develop a gas 
field95. 
According to Gazprom the 
agreement unambiguously 
specified that any arising disputes 
must be settled in the Russian 
Courts. 
Gazprom 
4 Articles,  
ref. 11.3 
Parallel Coding: 
Diversion of Assets/ 
Ownership 
De facto rules were 
established before 
the law came out. 
The government decided to 
consolidate control over the oil and 
gas sector (Gazprom was the main 
beneficiary of this action), yet 
systematically delayed the law on 
strategic assets.  
Gazprom 
4 Articles,  
ref. 11.5 
Parallel Coding: 
Diversion of 
Claims/Ownership 
Failure to honour a 
supply contract. 
Gazprom suddenly moved to 
breach a five-year contract signed 
with Ukraine in August 2004 that 
set the gas price at $50 pcm. The 
move was hailed as politically 
motivated. 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.3 
Coding: Diversion of 
Claims 
Insider dealing was 
not a crime under 
Russian law. 
Gazprombank executives used 
insider information when they sold 
Yukos shares short one day before 
a Russian court upheld a back-tax 
bill of $3.5 billion against the 
company. 
                                                          
95
 Moncrief Oil International wanted to sue BASF over its involvement in Gazprom's vast Yuzno-Russkoye 
gas field. In the 1990s there was an agreement that Moncrief would take 40% in the field but instead 
Gazprom swapped assets with BASF. 
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Company Source of 
Contradiction 
Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
IKEA 
4 Articles,  
ref. 48 
Parallel Coding: 
Misimplementation/ 
Diversion of Claims 
The fire code was 
very vague and 
open to different 
interpretations. 
An IKEA owned shopping complex 
was closed by a local court for fire 
violations96. The closure coincided 
with the busy Christmas period and 
may have been linked to an 
unidentified business group that 
allegedly benefited from the 
closure. 
 
The most recent year of the investigation reveals a number of sources of 
ambiguity related to the above-mentioned category. With the corporate 
governance reform going strong for some time and large Russian corporations 
preparing for international Initial Public Offerings it was extremely surprising to see 
insider dealing as a legal activity in Russia in 2006 (Yukos). This is particularly 
confusing in the Russian context where ubiquitous political and corporate cronyism 
was a key concern among legislators and investor analysts. Vague rules (IKEA), 
controlled regulatory pressure (AvtoVAZ, Gazprom) and broken contractual 
obligations (Gazprom) continue to be a feature of the Russian environment firmly 
set in the minds of foreign investors.  
 
3.1.4.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Unclear Rules, Laws 
and Regulations Disputes 
Comparison of the reported disputes pertaining to the two years of the 
investigation reveals a moderate improvement in the environment with reference 
to a perceived level of regulatory ambiguity. First, the number of instances 
featuring this category fell by 10 entries in the more recent year of the study. 
Moreover, 2006 was largely free from crude forms of regulatory contradiction 
                                                          
96
 An inspection commission accused the mall of 887 fire-code violations. The company corrected 214 
violations but another 22 were discovered. A final inspection revealed that 741 fire code violations 
remained uncorrected. 
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stemming from conflicting laws and presidential decrees. However, a degree of 
caution must be expressed with regard to this proposition because in 2006 there 
were still plenty of peripheral laws that allowed arbitrary interpretation making 
corporate raids possible from the legislative perspective (e.g. fire code and 
environmental legislation). Additionally, emergence of unwritten rules generated a 
great deal of negative publicity. In an unambiguous environment formal rules 
determine practice. But in the instance of the Russian government‘s drive to 
renationalise key strategic assets, practice preceded the rules. Partially, it is for 
this reason that foreign investors have a strong impression that in 2006 the 
Russian government was above the law in the country.  
 
3.1.5 Transactions with Self-Interest 
This category views corporate disputes from the perspective of interested parties. 
It includes practices such as transfer pricing, insider dealing, assets stripping, 
appraisal of assets and share dilution. However, the main focus of the analysis is 
on the alleged identity of benefiting parties. Here association with second order 
codes demonstrates whether such self-centred actions were limited to a 
straightforward diversion of funds or, in more extreme cases, led to noticeable 
changes in ownership structure and levels of control.  
In 1998 there were 55 disputes97 with elements of the above category. This is the 
biggest third order code in the study. It is not surprising since very often corporate 
conflicts are fuelled by self-centred actions of the stakeholders involved98. In 1998 
a vast majority of reported disputes were under the hierarchy of the diversion of 
claims code. However, control and ownership codes were also visibly represented 
in the graphical representation of the reported material (see graph 4.24 and table 
4.11). 
 
 
                                                          
97
 43 individual disputes of which 12 were parallel coded. 
98
 Agency theory 
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Graph 4.24: Transactions with Self-Interest Disputes, 1998 
 
 
Table 4.11: Transactions with Self-Interest Dispute, 1998 
Company Benefiting Party Nature of the 
Transactions 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Aeroflot 
1 Article,  
ref. 1 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholder 
(Boris Berezovsky) 
Insider dealing 
MGTS 
4 Articles,  
ref. 3 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
AO Sistema (a secretive 
outfit with links to Yury 
Luzhkov) 
Share dilution 
VimpelCom 
2 Articles,  
ref. 4 
Coding: Control 
First Deputy Prime 
Minister Yury Maslyukov 
Insider dealing 
AvtoVaz 
1 Article,  
ref. 6 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Criminal dealerships  Insider dealing 
KamAz 
2 Articles,  
ref. 8 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholders Share dilution 
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Company Benefiting Party Nature of the 
Transactions 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Rosneft 
8 Articles,  
ref. 10.1 
Coding: Diversion of Assets 
Creditors and unidentified 
buyers 
Appraisal of assets 
Rosneft 
2 Articles,  
ref. 10.2 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Managers of Purneftegaz 
and Sibneft‘s 
shareholders (allegedly 
Berezovsky) 
Transfer pricing 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.6 
Coding: Diversion of Assets 
Gazprom managers Appraisal of assets 
Gazprom 
1 Article, 
ref. 11. 7 
Diversion of Claims 
Management of Gazprom Insider dealing 
Yukos 
10 Articles,  
ref. 12.1 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Claims/Control 
Majority shareholder 
(Khodorkovsky) 
Transfer pricing 
Yukos  
1 Article,  
ref. 12.2 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Directors of Yukos Share dilution 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.3 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholder 
(Khodorkovsky) 
Asset stripping 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.4 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
 
Majority shareholder 
(Khodorkovsky) 
Asset stripping 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref.12.9 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Menatep Group Share dilution 
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Company Benefiting Party Nature of the 
Transactions 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Transneft 
7 Articles,  
ref. 18 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Former president of 
Transneft and several of 
his deputies. 
Appraisal of assets 
Surgutneftegaz 
 
2 Articles,  
ref. 19 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
St. Petersburg 
administration and local 
criminal underworld. 
Transfer pricing 
Sibneft 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 21.1 
Coding: Control 
Majority shareholder 
(allegedly Berezovsky). 
Transfer pricing and 
insider dealing 
Sibneft 
5 Articles,  
ref. 21.2 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Claims/Diversion of Assets 
Majority shareholder 
(allegedly Berezovsky). 
Transfer pricing and 
share dilution 
Sidanko 
6 Articles,  
ref. 22.1 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
 
Majority shareholder 
(Potanin) 
Share dilution 
Sidanko 
2 Articles,  
ref. 22.4 
Coding: Bankruptcy 
Majority shareholder 
(Potanin) 
Transfer pricing 
Tyumen 
 
7 Articles,  
ref. 23 
Coding: Control 
 
 
 
Alfa Group (Mikhail 
Fridman) 
Appraisal of assets 
Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant 
4 Articles,  
ref. 24 
Parallel Coding: Control/ 
Diversion of Claims 
Financial Industrial Group 
Tanako 
Appraisal of assets 
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Company Benefiting Party Nature of the 
Transactions 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
UES 
11 Articles,  
ref. 25.1 
Coding: Control 
Chairman of UES 
(Dyakov) 
Transfer pricing and 
insider dealing 
UES 
4 Articles,  
ref. 25.2 
Coding: Control 
Chubais (a well 
connected politician and 
one of the contenders for 
the CEO position). 
Insider dealing 
Mosenergo 
1 Article,  
ref. 26 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholders Share dilution 
Norilsk Nickel 
1 Article,  
ref. 28.1 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholder 
(Potanin). 
Appraisal of assets 
Norilsk Nickel 
1 Article,  
ref. 28.2 
Coding: Ownership 
Ordinary shareholders Share dilution 
Novolipetsk 
3 Articles,  
ref. 29.2 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Claims/Control 
Trans-World Group. Transfer pricing 
Magnitogorsk 
3 Articles,  
ref. 33 
Coding: Ownership 
 
Sharipov (CEO of a 
company that was 
charged with the task of 
managing a 25% stake). 
Asset stripping 
Lebedinsky Ore Mining 
Plant 
2 Articles,  
ref. 34.1 
Coding: Ownership 
 
 
 
ZAO RudementInvest Insider dealing 
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Company Benefiting Party Nature of the 
Transactions 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Lebedinsky Ore Mining 
Plant 
1 Article,  
ref. 34.2 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholder and 
management 
Share dilution 
Knauf 
1 Article,  
ref. 36.1 
Parallel Coding: 
Control/Ownership 
Director of joint venture 
Kubansky Gips-Knauf 
(Alim Sergiyenko). 
Share dilution 
Knauf 
1 Article,  
ref, 36.2 
Parallel Coding: 
Taxes/Control 
Tax police and an 
unidentified third party. 
Asset stripping 
MOST Bank 
1 Article,  
ref. 43 
Parallel Coding: 
Misimplementation/ 
Diversion of Claims 
Uneximbank‘s officials. Insider dealing 
Pioneer Group 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 44 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Pioneer Bank officials. Insider dealing 
Channel 5 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 50 
Diversion of Claims 
Advertising companies 
Premier SV and LISS 
owned by Lisovsky (close 
ally of Berezovsky). 
Assets stripping and 
transfer pricing 
ORT 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 51.1 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Yeltsin, Beresovsky, 
Korzhakov. 
Insider dealing 
Subway 
 
7 Articles,  
ref. 52 
Parallel Coding: 
Control/Diversion of 
Assets/Ownership 
A renegade director of 
the joint venture 
(Bordug). 
Insider dealing 
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Company Benefiting Party Nature of the 
Transactions 
Template Details 
Appendix 9a 
Lomonosov Porcelain 
Factory 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 53 
Coding: Ownership 
Brokerages and criminal 
circles. 
Appraisal of assets 
Kuznetsky Mine 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 54 
Parallel Coding: Ownership/ 
Misimplementation 
Kemerovo administration. Appraisal of assets 
MCCI 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 55 
Parallel Coding: Control/ 
Diversion of Assets/ 
Ownership 
A state owned company 
GlavUpDK. 
Insider dealing 
Standard MNT 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 56 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
A police department in St. 
Petersburg. 
Assets stripping 
Post Office 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 57 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
The Russian Post Office 
and key bureaucrats 
close to the company. 
Transfer pricing, 
insider dealing 
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Below is the summary of various forms of transactions reported in 1998: 
Type of transaction Companies 
 
Insider Dealing 
 
 
 
 
 
Appraisal of Assets 
 
 
 
 
Asset Stripping 
 
 
Transfer Pricing 
 
 
 
Share Dilution 
 
 
Aeroflot, VimpelCom, AvtoVaz,  
Gazprom, Sibneft, UES, UES,  
Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant, MOST  
Bank, Pioneer Group, ORT, Subway,  
MCCI, Post Office (14 disputes). 
 
Rosneft, Gazprom, Transneft, Tyumen,  
Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant, Norilsk Nickel,  
Lomonosov Porcelain Factory,  
Kuznetsky Mine (8 disputes). 
 
Yukos, Yukos, Magnitogorsk, Knauf,  
Channel 5, Standart NMT (6 disputes). 
 
Rosneft, Yukos, Surgutneftegaz, Sibneft,  
Sibneft, Sidanko, UES, Novolipetsk,  
Channel 5, Post Office (10 disputes). 
 
MGTS, KamAz, Yukos, Yukos, Sidanko,  
Mosenergo, Norilsk Nickel, Lebedinsky  
Ore Mining Plant, Knauf (9 disputes). 
 
 
In summary, 1998 involved a variety of stakeholder groups who allegedly abused 
the corporate system to their advantage. On the government‘s side there were 
examples of when Boris Yeltsin allegedly received a large number of shares in 
ORT as a bribe from the then financial tycoon Boris Berezovsky and Anatoly 
Chubais (Chief Executive of UES) who allegedly walked out of the Russian white 
house with a $90 thousand dollar bribe for fixing a privatisation deal99. On the local 
administration level, there was a case involving Surgutneftegaz when subsidiaries 
diluted the stake of the parent to almost nothing with the help of St. Petersburg 
officials. Additionally, there were a lot of transactions to the benefit of well-
connected individuals like Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky, Potanin, Fridman on the 
                                                          
99
 Interestingly, Chubais sued an investigative journalist and a radio station for libel at the time of the 
alleged offence when the journalist openly accused him of accepting the bribe. Although Chubais was never 
convicted, a Moscow district court ruled in favour of the journalist and did not award any damages.  
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oligarchic level and Bordug, Lisovsky, Sharipov and Sergiyenko on a more modest 
level of private ‗entrepreneurs‘.    
In 2006 a vast majority of disputes associated with transactions with self-interest 
were also connected with the diversion of claims code. In total there were 31 
disputes100 with only a single category of misinvestment not represented in the 
hierarchy of codes. 
Graph 4.25: Transactions with Self-Interest Disputes, 2006 
 
Table 4.12: Transactions with Self-Interest Disputes, 2006 
Company Benefiting Party Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
MegaFon 
2 Articles,  
ref. 5 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Assets/ Control 
IT and 
Telecommunications 
minister Leonid 
Reiman 
Share dilution 
Rosneft 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 10.1 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Unidentified 
government and 
Rosneft officials. 
Insider dealing 
                                                          
100
 21 individual disputes of which 10 were parallel coded. 
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Company Benefiting Party Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
Rosneft 
 
3 Articles,  
ref. 10.2 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholder 
(the Russian state) 
Appraisal of Assets 
Rosneft 
1 Article,  
ref. 10.3 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Assets/ Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholders 
of Rosneft (Russian 
government). 
Transfer pricing 
Rosneft 
6 Articles,  
ref. 10.5 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Assets/ Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholders 
of Rosneft (Russian 
government). 
Appraisal of Assets 
Gazprom 
1 Article,  
ref. 11.2 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Assets/ Diversion of Claims 
Management of 
Gazprom and Itera. 
Asset stripping 
Gazprom 
4 Articles,  
ref. 11.5 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Claims/ Control 
Russian politicians and 
secret owners of 
RosUkrEnergo. 
Insider dealing 
Yukos 
 
23 Articles,  
ref. 12.1 
Parallel Coding: 
Ownership/Control/Taxes 
Rosneft and the 
government 
Asset stripping 
Yukos 
2 Articles,  
ref. 12.2 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Rosneft and the 
government 
Asset stripping 
Yukos 
1 Article,  
ref. 12.3 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Gazprombank 
executives 
Insider dealing 
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Company Benefiting Party Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
Yukos 
8 Articles,  
ref. 12.4 
Coding: Bankruptcy 
The government Insider dealing 
Yukos 
6 Articles,  
ref. 12.6 
Coding: Diversion of Assets 
Rosneft shareholders 
(the state) 
Appraisal of Assets 
Yukos 
2 Articles,  
ref. 12.7 
Coding: Control 
Unnamed third parties. Transfer pricing 
LUKoil 
2 Articles,  
ref. 17.2 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority shareholders 
of LUKoil 
Appraisal of Assets 
Novolipetsk 
1 Article,  
ref. 29 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Claims/ Control 
The chairman Vladimir 
Lisin 
Transfer pricing 
Severstal 
2 Articles,  
ref. 30.1 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Claims/Control 
CEO Mordoshov Transfer pricing 
Evraz 
 
1 Article,  
ref. 31.1 
Coding: Taxes 
Majority shareholder 
(Abramovich) 
Transfer pricing 
RusAl 
1 Article,  
ref. 32.1 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Minority shareholders 
(Derepaska) 
Appraisal of Assets 
RusAl 
1 Article,  
ref. 32.2  
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
RusAl shareholders 
(Derepaska) 
Appraisal of Assets 
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Company Benefiting Party Comments 
Template Details 
Appendix 9b 
Eurocement 
1 Article,  
ref. 37 
Coding: Diversion of Claims 
Majority owners of 
Eurocement. 
Transfer pricing 
IKEA  
4 Articles,  
ref. 48 
Parallel Coding: Diversion of 
Claims/ Misimplementation 
An unidentified 
business group. 
Asset stripping 
 
Below is the summary of various forms of transactions with self-interest reported in 
2006: 
Type of transaction Companies 
 
Insider Dealing 
 
Appraisal of Assets 
 
 
Asset Stripping 
 
Transfer Pricing 
 
 
Share Dilution 
 
Rosneft, Gazprom, Yukos, Yukos, (4 disputes). 
 
Rosneft, Rosneft, Yukos, LUKoil, RusAl, RusAl. (6 
disputes). 
 
Gazprom, Yukos, Yukos, IKEA (4 disputes). 
 
Rosneft, Yukos, Novolipetsk, Severstal, Evraz, 
Eurocement (6 disputes). 
 
MagaFon (1 dispute) 
 
The main characteristic in 2006 was a very clear shift away from private 
individuals benefiting from questionable corporate conduct towards the 
government. Even disputes involving private individuals like Severstal‘s 
Mordoshov and Evraz‘s Abramovich were all visibly connected to the 
government‘s agenda; perhaps with the exception of the cases involving 
MagaFon‘s share dilution by the IT and Communications Minister Leonid Reiman, 
Eurocement‘s transfer pricing and IKEA‘s assets stripping. All remaining 
transactions were conducted to the benefit of the government or were forcefully 
challenged if they were not in the interests of the latter.  
Page 187 
 
3.1.5.1 Implications for the Rule of Law with Reference to Transactions with Self-
Interest Disputes 
The number of disputes falling into this category fell by 24 in 2006 in comparison 
with the 1998 data. This fall is a sign of a positive change in perception determined 
by the reported material. Fewer instances of transactions with self-interest can 
only be greeted positively by the investment community. In terms of the change in 
the substance of the reported material, the extent of misappropriation subsided 
only with regard to private companies such as Severstal, Evraz and RusAl. A vivid 
example here is what was felt as an inadequate valuation of RusAl‘s assets. Of 
course it is possible that the valuation was in fact inadequate, but at the same time 
outright misappropriation would have been a corporate death for a company 
preparing for an Initial Public Offering. Similar logic was also applicable to 
Severstal and Evraz. This trend was not repeated by massive state corporations 
which continued to be associated with numerous self-centred transactions. The 
main difference however is that in the 1990s the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
outright misappropriation were identifiable from reported material, whereas in 2006 
the end stakeholders were hidden behind sprawling state-controlled entities.  
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Section 4: Analysis of the Content of the Third Order Codes 
In this section, the content of dispute resolution codes is discussed. All of the disputes mentioned 
here have been referred to previously. However, the emphasis of the analysis is not on the nature  
of the disputes themselves, but on what the parties do under the circumstances.  
 
4.1 Third Order Codes (Dispute Resolution) 
The current theme is designed to depict the process of dispute resolution. In the 
instance of a conflict of interests (defined by the hierarchy of codes presented at 
the beginning of this chapter), there could be a variety of strategies employed by 
the affected parties. In the western context litigation would be the most immediate 
and understandable example of how parties go about protecting their interests. 
However, for a variety of reasons previously discussed in the literature review 
chapter, in the Russian context a number of alternative enforcement strategies 
need to make up for the deficiency of the legal system101. In this section of the 
analysis, the evolving nature of these strategies is discussed with reference to the 
collected data and in conjunction with the second order codes. Similar to the 
previous sections, the analysis focuses on the content of selected codes and 
seeks to conclude with regard to the implications for the rule of law in the country. 
 
4.1.1 Relationship-Based Resolution 
The relationship-based form of dispute resolution refers to situations when 
affected parties either choose to resolve conflicts by reaching a mutually 
acceptable agreement, or use personal ties to exploit the situation to their 
advantage and at the expense of other stakeholders. The latter aspect of the 
relationship-based resolution seeks to portray the extent of corporate cronyism 
whereas the former relates to grid-lock situations which can only be resolved by 
means of a compromise.  
                                                          
101
 Relationship-based, self, third party, private enforcements as well as administrative levers of the state, 
shadow of enforcement and litigation. 
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In 1998 there were 19 disputes102 with elements of the relationship-based 
resolution. Below is a graphical representation of the second order disputes 
reported in 1998 which related to the above category. 
Graph 4.26: Relationship-Based Enforcement, 1998 
 
In 1998 the following conflicts required a compromise from the affected parties: 
Table 4.13: Relationship-Based Enforcement Involving Compromise, 1998103 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
MGTS 4 ref. 3 Diversion of Claims 
KamAz 2 ref. 8 Diversion of Claims 
Tatneft 1 ref. 20 Bankruptcy 
Sidanko 6  ref. 22.1 Diversion of Claims 
Sidanko 2 ref. 22.5 Control, Bankruptcy 
Tyumen 7 ref. 23 Control 
                                                          
102
 16 individual disputes of which 3 were parallel coded. 
103
 The tables in this section contain company names, number of articles dedicated to a particular dispute, 
reference to the corresponding template and second order codes. Parallel coding is used when more than 
one second order code is shown. Entries in bold emphasise disputes that were covered in more than 4 
articles. 
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Kosmos TV 1104 ref. 49 Control 
Channel 5 1 ref. 50 Diversion of Claims 
 
In terms of the conflicts involving MGTS, KamAZ, Tatneft and Sidanko (both 
disputes) nothing took place, which was somewhat alien to foreign investors. 
Admittedly, the disputes were indeed serious, but the affected parties needed to 
reach a workable compromise, sometimes called for by a watchdog (the Federal 
Securities Commission). Share issues at MGTS and KamAz, the bond issue and 
debt restructuring at Sidanko and Tatneft, all involved a compromise that parties to 
the conflicts could potentially benefit from. A good example here is Tatneft‘s 
negotiations with creditors. The company was on the brink of bankruptcy and 
could not meet its liabilities in a timely fashion. However, from the view point of 
creditors, a debt restructuring plan was a better option than turning the 
management of the company against them by demanding immediate payment. 
The latter approach could increase the risk of receiving nothing. Situations like this 
required mutually acceptable solutions which in turn favoured a dialogue to 
unilateral action. However, conflicts involving Tyumen, Kosmos TV and Channel 5 
were altogether different. There, an out-of-court settlement appears to have been 
the ultimate aim of self-centred parties looking for a quick gain. Some businesses 
were vulnerable to this kind of attack because essentially anybody could challenge 
property rights and in the 1990s mangers (appointed by shareholders) were in the 
best position to do so. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104
 This dispute was very extensively reported on in 1997. 
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Table 4.14: Corporate Cronyism, 1998 
Companies   No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Rosneft 2 ref. 10.2 Diversion of Claims 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.7 Diversion of Claims 
UES 11 ref. 25.1 Control 
UES 4  ref. 25.2 Diversion of Claims 
Achinsk Alumina 
Combine 
1 ref. 35 Bankruptcy, Misinvestment 
and Control 
AssiDoman 2 ref. 38.1 Taxes 
SBS Agro 1 ref. 40.3 Misinvestment 
ORT 1 ref. 51.1 Diversion of Claims 
 
In 1998 a great deal of enforcement power depended upon a close association 
with key individuals. Managers of Rosneft and Gazprom were able to set up some 
of the biggest transfer pricing schemes due to their personal affiliation with the 
right people. Chubais received the CEO job in UES as a result of political 
bargaining that was only possible if one enjoyed close ties with key individuals in 
the government. On a local level, the situation was almost identical with bigger 
deals being arranged only with the informal blessing of governors (Achinsk 
Alumina Combine). Another example of the role of relationships is Berezovsky‘s 
ties with Yeltsin when the former allegedly transferred a large number of shares in 
ORT to president Yeltsin enabling the tycoon to continue building his 
unprecedented business portfolio (appendix 9a template 51.1). From this it is 
possible to determine what kind of perception investors had in terms of the 
importance of personal connections and affiliations with regard to the business 
environment in 1998.  
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In 2006 11 examples105 of this category were extracted from the Moscow Times 
reports. Similar to 1998, compromise and corporate cronyism were the themes 
identified in the reported data.  
Graph 4.27: Relationship-Based Enforcement, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.15: Relationship-Based Enforcement Involving Compromise, 2006 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
RusAl 
(template 3) 
3 ref. 32.3 Ownership 
RusAl 
(template 4)  
1 ref. 32.4 Ownership 
 
Unlike 1998, the more recent year of the study offers only two disputes featuring 
compromise as a way of resolving conflicts of interests. The first instance related 
to the disclosure of ownership which meant that previous partners of the ultimate 
beneficiary had to be silenced by an out-of-court settlement. The second example 
referred to two oligarchs who had to overcome years of bitter rivalry for the sake of 
potential benefits from the industry consolidation. Even though this theme was 
                                                          
105
 8 individual disputes 3 of which were parallel coded. 
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present in the reports of the newspaper in 2006, the relatively small amount of 
coverage and fairly non-controversial content rendered compromise less 
significant in terms of shaping investor perception in the later year of the study. 
Table 4.16: Corporate Cronyism, 2006 
Companies  No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
Rosneft 6 ref. 10.5 Diversion of Claims, Diversion 
of Assets 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.2 Diversion of Claims 
TNK-BP 15 ref. 16.1 Control, Ownership, Diversion 
of Assets 
TNK-BP 1  ref. 16.2 Taxes 
Severstal 4 ref. 30.2 Misimplementation 
RusAl 1 ref. 32.2 Diversion of Claims 
 
Conversely, corporate cronyism is the category that continued to be visibly 
represented in the Moscow Times material. Its extent was truly incredible in 2006 
with companies like BP trying to get on the right side of the Russian government 
by opening joint venture discussions with Gazprom and participating in Rosneft‘s 
Initial Public Offering. BP officials openly admitted that both were seen as 
relationship building opportunities aimed at receiving help with licence allocation 
and not commercial investments. Another vivid example of corporate cronyism 
transcended national boarders when RusAl was accused of conspiring with the 
president of Nigeria in order to influence the decision in favour of its less attractive 
bid for Alscon‘s assets. Finally, connections with high-ranking officials helped to 
stave off arrest attempts even against a former Yukos employee, Golubovich. 
Although he was eventually arrested, it did not happen until after president Putin 
had fired a number of high-ranking FSB106 officials. 
                                                          
106
 The Federal Security Bureau or FSB is the successor to the Committee of Government Security or KGB. 
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In comparative terms a positive change must be acknowledged with reference to 
the forced out-of-court settlements that were frequently reported in 1998 and only 
once in 2006 (RusAl). However, there appears to be deterioration with reference to 
the corporate cronyism sub-theme which was elevated to the institutional level in 
the year 2006. Conversely to 1998 when personal contacts led to favouritism, in 
2006 loyalty to the establishment was the perceived key to most valuable assets, 
licences, permissions and approvals. 
 
4.1.2 Self-Enforcement 
The self-enforcement category refers to the situation when parties to the conflict 
manage to resolve the issue themselves. Although this category could be seen as 
similar to relationship-based resolution, it is still fundamentally different in that no 
compromise needs to be reached and unilateral action is a possibility. This 
category reveals the nature of protective action that stakeholders themselves 
select to follow without resorting to outside support. Put differently, this method of 
resolution is about individual action rather than the system.  
In 1998 there were 25 examples107 of self-enforcement with the second order code 
of diversion of claims most widely represented. Below is the graphical 
representation of the reported material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
107
 22 separate disputes, 3 of which were parallel coded. 
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Graph 4.28: Self-Enforcement, 1998 
 
 
Table 4.17: Self-Enforcement, 1998 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Rosneft 1 ref. 10.3 Control 
Gazprom  1 ref. 11.1 Ownership 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.2 Diversion of Claims 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.7 Taxes 
Transneft 7 ref. 18 Diversion of Claims 
Sidanko 6 ref. 22.1 Diversion of Claims 
Krasnoyarsk 
Hydro Plant 
4 ref. 24 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Mosenergo 1 ref. 26 Diversion of Claims 
Norilsk Nickel 1 ref. 28.2 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Novolipetsk 3 ref. 29.2 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Magnitogorsk 3 ref. 33 Ownership 
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Knauf 1 ref. 36.1 Control, Ownership 
Vyborg Paper 3 ref. 39 Ownership, Misimplementation 
MOST Bank 1 ref. 43 Misimplementation, Diversion 
of Claims 
Pioneer Group 1 ref. 44 Diversion of Claims 
EBRD 1 ref. 45 Bankruptcy 
Lomonosov 
Porcelain Factory 
1 ref. 53 Ownership 
Kuznetsky Mine 1 ref. 54 Ownership, Misimplementation 
Post Office 1 ref. 57 Diversion of Claims 
 
In the majority of cases self-enforcement amounted to blocked resolutions (Yukos, 
Sidanko, Novolipetsk), heated debates at general meetings and in board rooms 
(Rosneft, Krasnoyarsk Hydro, Mosenergo) as well as exit in apparent defeat 
(Norilsk Nickel, Novolipetsk, MOST Bank, Pioneer Bank, EBRD). However, there 
were a number of extreme measures that parties to the conflict opted to take. The 
first example is when thousands of irate workers and citizens in the Siberian town 
of Neftegansk blocked Yukos‘ President Sergei Muravlenko and other company 
officials inside a meeting room for 12 hours, demanding settlement of local taxes 
and wages. A similar case took place at Vyborg Paper Mill when the unions 
encouraged seizure of the factory‘s building and blockage of a vital motorway to 
prevent new owners from making compulsory redundancies. Additionally, 
managers at Transneft forced employees to sell their shares at a discount or face 
unpleasant consequences108. Last, but not least, is the example of how Knauf, the 
rightful owner of the Kubansky Gyps-Knauf gypsum mine, refused to leave the 
office as a renegade director attempted to seize control over the company. The 
Germans barricaded themselves in the building believing that physical possession 
                                                          
108
 Management used the tactics of intimidation such as threats of being fired, refusal to issue ownership 
certificates, and deprivation of social benefits if the workers refused to sell. 
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was more valuable than meaningless court orders. Eventually, the tactics proved 
effective and the Germans regained control over the factory.  
In 2006 there were considerably fewer examples of self-enforcement reported in 
the newspaper. Coupled with a decline in relationship-based resolution, this 
serves as an indication of the fact that in 2006 companies relied more on external 
means of enforcement. This aspect will be considered shortly.  
 
Graph 4.29: Self-Enforcement, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.18: Self-Enforcement, 2006 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.5 Diversion of Assets 
Yukos  2 ref. 12.7 Control 
LUKoil 2 ref. 17.2 Diversion of Claims 
Novolipetsk 1 ref. 29 Diversion of Claims, 
Ownership 
Severstal 2 ref. 30.1 Diversion of Claims, 
Ownership 
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In 2006 all of the examples of self-enforcement were positive except Yukos‘ when 
the company was effectively split into overseas and Russian units. There were 
endless general meetings and board room battles with foreign investors fighting a 
doomed battle with the Russian government. In one instance, a foreign unit‘s 
board of directors sacked its member for allegedly overseeing a transfer pricing 
scheme only to see his promotion on the Russian side of the fence. However, 
cases involving LUKoil, Novolipetsk and Severstal demonstrate that when it comes 
to private companies, minority shareholders and creditors can in fact exert 
adequate pressure on the management in order to protect their interests.  
According to the above analysis the two years of the study differ substantially with 
reference to the category of self-enforcement. This difference manifests itself not 
only through fewer reported examples of the category, but also in the fact that 
2006 saw a much more developed resolution process. There were no instances of 
‗barbarian‘ behaviour so vividly portrayed by the Knauf ordeal, nor were there any 
examples of severe union actions reported in 1998. Therefore, in terms of foreign 
investor perception, it is possible to conclude that in 2006 the situation improved 
drastically, particularly in relation to private companies‘ conduct that showed a 
more balanced cooperation between the stakeholders in question. The reasons for 
such an encouraging trend could be related to improvements in the formal 
institutions which have become more effective at protecting investor rights in the 
instances of blatant violations. Additionally, the wishes of private owners to 
improve their corporate image may have produced an incentive to resort to more 
socially acceptable means of enforcement.  
 
4.1.3 Third-Party Enforcement 
Third-party enforcement refers to actions taken by outside entities (other than 
courts, governmental agencies and designated institutions) aimed at representing 
the interests of one of the parties in a corporate dispute. These third parties may 
be acting in their own self-interest as well or may simply be protecting/promoting a 
friendly organisation.  
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In 1998 there were 26109 examples of a third-party involvement in deciding the fate 
of a corporate dispute. Further details of the category are presented below. 
 
Graph 4.30: Third-Party Enforcement, 1998 
 
 
Table 4.19: Third-Party Enforcement, 1998 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
GAZ 1 ref. 7 Taxes 
KIA 1 ref. 9 Taxes, Diversion of Claims 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.3 Ownership 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.9 Diversion of Claims 
Surgutneftegaz 2 ref. 19 Diversion of Claims 
Tatneft 1 ref. 20 Bankruptcy 
Sibneft 1 ref. 21.1 Control 
Sidanko 2 ref. 22.5 Control, Bankruptcy 
                                                          
109
 19 separate disputes, 7 of which were parallel coded. 
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Tyumen 7 ref. 23 Control 
Krasnoyarsk Hydro 
Plant 
4 ref. 24 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Electrosila 1 ref. 27 Control 
Novolipetsk 3 ref. 29.2 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Magnitogorsk 3 ref. 33 Ownership 
Achinsk Alumina 
Combine 
1 ref. 35 Bankruptcy, Misinvestment, 
Control 
Knauf 1 ref. 36.2 Taxes, Control 
AssiDoman 6 ref. 38.2 Ownership 
Inkombank 1 ref. 42 Control 
Channel 5 1 ref. 50 Diversion of Claims 
ORT 1  ref. 51.2 Bankruptcy 
 
In 1998 there were a number of outside forces to be reckoned with in the 
corporate arena. The first, and probably most visible force, were the Financial 
Industrial Groups who on the one hand protected and watched over their friendly 
organisations (Yukos‘ Menatep, and Achinsk Alumina Combine‘ KRAZ as well as 
financial structures behind Novolipetsk) and on the other were instrumental in 
redistributing claims, often to their own advantage (Sibneft, Sidanko, Tyumen, 
Krasnoyarsk Hydro, Electrosila and AssiDoman). From the reported material in 
1998 it was evident that the Financial Industrial Groups (FIG) were capable of 
negotiating the environment much more effectively than smaller entities and 
foreign investors. In a dispute over the replacement of a director of Electrosila, 
EMK (the FIG that instigated the action) simply ignored the decision of a court that 
had ruled that the replacement of the director was unlawful. Siemens, the other 
party to the conflict, was predicted by analysts to lose in the conflict purely 
because of the power of EMK. Moreover, in a dispute over the Kranoyarsk Hydro 
Plant, Tanako (a local FIG) took on the government in a fight for control of a 23% 
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stake in the plant. In 1998 the only match for enforcement powers of a FIG was 
another FIG. In a conflict over Inkombank‘s assets when two banking empires 
clashed, court rulings were the deciding factor because of the equal clout of the 
affected power structures.   
In addition, foreign creditors were very powerful in the 1990s. It was the IMF and 
the World Bank that demanded tax and industry reforms in the country before 
releasing their financial support. These organisations were influential arbitrators in 
particularly large corporate conflicts with national interests at stake. Moreover, on 
a slightly smaller scale, a lot of foreign creditors managed to negotiate substantial 
stakes in major Russian corporations as collateral for the loans that were often 
never going to be repaid. Although Russian organisations frequently illegally 
expropriated such collateral (Yukos), or even failed to transfer it (Magnitogorsk), 
foreign creditors were nevertheless a force to consider in certain corporate 
disputes at the time (Tatneft).  
Finally, unidentified (possibly criminal) groups were also important power 
structures at the time. These groups acted in concert with tax authorities (KIA 
Motors, Knauf), courts (AssiDoman) and local administration (Surgutneftegaz). 
Due to their suspected illegal nature, very little was known about the way these 
entities functioned in the environment. Nevertheless, their influence was constantly 
discussed in the reported material. 
Conversely, in 2006 only three examples of third-party enforcement were 
extracted from the Moscow Times reports. This is the smallest dispute resolution 
category. 
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Graph 4.31: Third-Party Enforcement, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.20: Third-Party Enforcement, 2006 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
RusAl 3 ref. 32.3 Control 
Eurocement  1 ref. 37 Diversion of Claims 
IKEA 4 ref. 48 Diversion of Claims, 
Misimplementation 
 
However, despite the small number of reported cases falling into this category, all 
of the sub-themes extracted from the 1998 data were also identified in 2006. 
First, Financial Industrial Groups continue to be a powerful arbitrator in the 
environment. With reference to the conflict involving Eurocement, an American 
Fund called Russian Partners was forced to recruit the services of A1 (a unit of 
very powerful Financial Industrial Group Alfa) in order to increase its chances in 
the battle against a large scale expropriation. A single reported example of this 
kind of a corporate dispute resolution probably signifies that there was a greater 
degree of clarity in terms of who arbitrates and helps to resolve corporate conflicts 
in 2006. Moreover, from the reported material it was apparent that the FIGs like 
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Alfa Group started offering formal services to smaller corporate entities that are 
aimed at increasing chances of a fairer resolution on the most basic level of an 
association with a powerful structure.  
In terms of the role of foreign creditors, RusAl‘s example of ownership disclosure 
reveals a positive outcome of engaging with outside finance providers. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International 
Financial Corporation forcefully persuaded the company to disclose its ownership 
structure using the $150m. loan as a bargaining tool. Although Russian companies 
were less desperate for outside finance in 2006 (a proposition based on the 
reduced number of associated disputes) there were understandable incentives for 
them in maintaining constructive partnerships with foreign investors (as 
demonstrated by the RusAl‘s example). The size of this incentive is directly 
proportionate to the enforcement powers that international creditors (and 
shareholders) can justifiably rely on in the Russian context. 
Finally, and perhaps not so encouragingly, anonymous power structures continue 
to be active in the environment. The example of IKEA was no different to the 1998 
disputes involving KIA, AssiDoman and Surgutneftegaz. Corporate raids involving 
a collusion among a usually unidentified ‗business group‘ and authorities (in the 
case of IKEA it was fire inspectorate) remained a strong feature of the perceived 
environment110. 
 
3.1.4 Private Enforcement  
Private enforcement111 is the crudest form of corporate dispute resolution when 
affected parties resort to extra judiciary behaviour. Normally, such undue pressure 
                                                          
110
 Raiders, as they are often referred to, bribe various inspectorates who conduct checks of target 
companies. Taking advantage of vaguely worded regulations (fire code, health and safety, employment law, 
environmental law) inspectors always achieve the task of finding ‘severe  violations’. When the inspectors 
threaten the closure of the business, a buyer (raiders) suddenly appears offering a highly discounted price 
for the assets. These tactics are used to take over business, force sales of key assets, put pressure on 
competitors as well as for political reasons.  
111
 Private security firms have evolved from criminal groups (typical in 1990s) to licensed organisations that 
offer a range of security services. However, in terms of the conduct of these organisations, little change 
occurred. Often, fully licensed security firms employ bandit practice and engage in extra judiciary forms of 
enforcement.  
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is exerted on behalf of the stakeholders involved and often leads to violence or 
physical threats.  
In 1998 there were 12 examples112 of such behaviour reported in the Moscow 
Times. Similar to most of the categories, ownership and control disputes represent 
the most pronounced connection with the second order codes. 
Graph 4.32: Private Enforcement, 1998 
 
 
Table 4.21: Private Enforcement, 1998 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
VimpelCom 2 ref. 4 Control 
AvtoVaz 1 ref. 6 Diversion of Claims 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.7 Taxes 
Surgutneftegaz 2 ref. 19 Diversion of Claims 
Knauf 1 ref. 36.1 Control, Ownership 
Subway 7 ref. 52 Control, Diversion of Assets, 
Control 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
112
 8 separate disputes of which 4 were parallel coded. 
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Lomonosov 
Porcelain Factory 
1 ref. 53 Ownership 
Kuznetsky Mine 1 ref. 54 Ownership, Misimplementation 
In terms of the content, in 1998 examples of private enforcement revealed the 
most extreme behaviour by affected parties. When AvtoVAZ CEO Mr. Kadannikov 
announced a campaign to renegotiate suspect sales margins by the dealers, the 
company‘s deputy commercial director was murdered and the director of the spare 
parts centre was severely beaten. In another reported example, a popular mayor 
of a town of residence for one of Yukos‘s subsidiaries was killed after he criticised 
the company for many of the town‘s problems. Additionally, VimpelCom‘s 
employees received death threats and were physically assaulted at the time when 
influential stakeholders were fighting for control over the company that was 
benefiting from booming growth. Similar events occurred at Lomonosov Porcelain 
Factory and Kuznetsky Mine when employees were beaten up and corporate 
property was destroyed amid a fight for control and ownership. In the instance of 
the latter, local administration and federal agencies were alleged by the 
newspaper to be the perpetrators of these actions. Finally, slightly more subtle, but 
by no means less forceful use of this enforcement strategy was demonstrated by 
the role of a private bodyguard at the Subway – Minutka conflict, the use of the 
Cossack army in the Knauf dispute and finally, the blackmailing practice of a police 
department with reference to Standart NMT. This practice is very difficult to resist 
without resorting to similar measures of extra-judiciary enforcement.  
In 2006 there were 9 examples of private enforcement. However, these were 
reported with reference to only 4 separate disputes with the remaining 5 
representing parallel coding in the hierarchy. 
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Graph 4.33: Private Enforcement, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.22: Private Enforcement, 2006 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
Gazpom 4 ref. 11.5 Diversion of Claims, 
Ownership 
Yukos 23 ref. 12.1 Ownership, Control, Taxes 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.2 Diversion of Claims 
TNK-BP 15 ref. 16.1 Control, Ownership, Diversion 
of Assets 
 
In terms of the content, this category was completely dominated by the way the 
Russian government dealt with the re-nationalisation of Yukos. On the one hand, 
there were a number of extradition cases filed by the Russian government against 
former Yukos employees accusing them of attempted murder (Nevzlin) and large 
scale fraud (Golubovich). However, on the other hand, there were reports 
suggesting that the Russian government initiated a campaign of intimidation 
against Yukos employees and their lawyers. According to numerous reports jailing 
and beatings were used in order to force confessions and silence Russian lawyers 
Page 207 
 
and extradition procedures against foreign employees and lawyers. As far as 
investor perception is concerned however, the Russian government was reported 
as being the main violator in this conflict113 with American courts trying to serve top 
Russian officials with the help of an Irish private investigation firm. Additionally, 
there were instances of a criminal involvement in RosUkrEnergo dealings and a 
suspected contract killing of a TNK-BP official. 
Collected data suggests that although there were fewer reported instances of this 
category in 2006, the extent of perceived violence with regard to corporate affairs 
in the country did not change. However, it has to be acknowledged that the origin 
of this form of enforcement evolved substantially. In 1998 there were a number of 
isolated examples of this category with reference to private entities whereas in 
2006 private enforcement, as described above, radiated from the government 
itself. The latter proposition is re-enforced by the substantial amount of coverage 
associated with Yukos and TNK-BP examples. 
 
4.1.5 Administrative Levers of the State  
According to the reported content this category refers to situations when the 
government acts as an arbitrator of corporate disputes. This category is different to 
state interference in that here, the state is not necessarily party to a dispute and 
the emphasis is more on the actual actions that officials take. This category 
identifies tools (administrative levers) that officials resort to with reference to the 
process of dispute resolution in the respective environments. An example of the 
use of administrative levers would be an official assisting a friendly business with 
applying for a licence or state funding in its minor form and active interference in 
the formal process of dispute resolution in its most crude format. 
In 1998 a large proportion of corporate disputes were resolved by the government 
on both local and federal levels. Although this process was not always to the 
mutual interest of the parties involved it nevertheless complemented the judiciary 
and at times was the only workable approach to a dispute resolution. As depicted 
                                                          
113
 Possibly, this is where the pro foreign bias of the newspaper played a significant role in the way this 
particular dispute was covered.  
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in graph 4.34, the Russian government used its influence primarily with reference 
to control, diversion of claims and ownership disputes.  
 
Graph 4.34: Administrative Levers of the State, 1998 
 
 
Table 4.23: Administrative Levers of the State, 1998 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Aeroflot 1 ref. 1 Diversion of Claims 
MGTS 4 ref. 3 Diversion of Claims 
VimpelCom 2 ref. 4 Control 
KIA 1 ref. 9 Taxes, Diversion of Claims 
Rosneft 8 ref. 10.1 Diversion of Assets 
Gazprom 3 ref. 11.2 Taxes 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.6 Diversion of Assets 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.5 Ownership 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.6 Misimplementation 
Page 209 
 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.7 Taxes 
Transneft 7 ref. 18 Diversion of Claims 
Surgutneftegaz 2 ref. 19 Diversion of Claims 
Sibneft 1 ref. 21.1 Control 
Sibneft 1 ref. 21.3 Ownership 
Sidanko 6 ref. 22.1 Diversion of Claims 
Sidanko 4 ref. 22.2 Taxes 
Sidanko 2  ref. 22.3 Control, Taxes 
Tyumen 7 ref. 23 Control 
Krasnoyarsk Hydro 4 ref. 24 Diversion of Claims, Control 
UES 11 ref. 25.1 Control 
UES 4 ref. 25.2 Control 
UES 8 ref. 25.4 Ownership 
Norilsk Nickel 1 ref. 28.1 Ownership 
Novolipetsk 3 ref. 29.2 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Magnitogorsk 3 ref. 33 Ownership 
Lebedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant 
2 ref. 34.1 Ownership 
Lebedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant 
1 ref. 34.2 Diversion of Claims 
Achinsk Alumina 
Combine 
1 ref. 35  Bankruptcy, Misinvestment, 
Control 
Knauf 1 ref. 36.1 Control, Ownership 
AssiDoman 2 ref. 38.1 Taxes 
AssiDoman 6 ref. 38.2 Ownership 
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Vyborg Paper  3 ref. 39 Ownership, Misimplementation 
SBS Agro 4 ref. 40.1 Diversion of Claims 
SBS Agro 5 ref. 40.2 Bankruptcy 
SBS Agro 1 ref. 40.3 Misinvestment 
MFK Renaissance 1 ref. 41 Control 
Channel Five 1 ref. 50 Diversion of Claims 
ORT 1 ref. 51.1 Diversion of Claims 
ORT 1 ref. 51.2 Bankruptcy 
Subway 7 ref. 52 Control, Diversion of Assets, 
Ownership 
MCCI 1 ref. 55 Control, Diversion of Assets, 
Ownership 
Standart NMT 1  ref. 56 Diversion of Claims 
 
In terms of the content of this category, an important distinction between local and 
federal government‘s involvement needs to be drawn. According to the reported 
material, 9 disputes were influenced by local governments (KIA, Yukos, 
Surgutneftegaz, Sibneft, Sidanko, Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant, Achinsk Alumina 
Combine, Knauf, Subway and Standart NMT). In general such an influence 
manifested itself through legal assistance, i.e. local administration had a significant 
capacity to ensure that local courts return rulings favourable for a certain party. In 
a dispute over a St. Petersburg subsidiary of Surgutneftegaz, it was reported that 
the parent could not achieve anything through the local courts, simply because the 
administration was not on its side. In a conflict involving Achinsk, the local courts 
readjusted their vision of the situation consistently with the changing opinion of the 
governor. A similar point was made with reference to reported conflicts involving 
Sibneft, Lebedisnky Ore Mining Plant and Knauf. Moreover as demonstrated by 
the Subway dispute, the local government could influence the process of 
resolution by complete disengagement even after the wrongdoer had been 
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determined by both international and local courts. In this sense, parties to the 
conflict could rely on technicalities such as an emergency change of nominal 
ownership in order to cancel out rulings on the substance of the matter. The key 
point here is that local administrations often tolerated small scale corruption that 
made it possible for example to re-register businesses in a matter of hours. 
Selective reprimanding (or non-reprimanding) of such behaviour within the system 
represented a very effective administrative resource that ensured pre-determined 
resolutions. The Russian partners in the Subway dispute changed the name of the 
registered entity, and on those grounds refused to follow orders of the court. The 
local administration did not intervene. Moreover, disputes involving KIA and 
Standart NMT demonstrate how tax authorities and police departments followed 
the same pattern of behaviour.  
On the federal level, there were examples of a similar nature where allegations 
against certain people were dropped (Aeroflot, UES) and laws were applied 
selectively, MGTS, VimpelCom. Similar to the nature of engagement of local 
administrations, the key to administrative levers was in the right associations with 
government officials. A conflict involving AssiDoman was a very good practical 
demonstration of the latter point when the company felt it was necessary to cease 
production in the wake of the government reshuffle. According to the Moscow 
Times reports this was a precautionary measure determined by the loss of the 
aforementioned association. Furthermore, if such association was missing or 
destroyed, companies were in danger of being forced out of business by means of 
‗manufactured‘ allegations in the same manner as Trans World lost its ground in 
the conflict with the new owners of Novolipetsk. In this particular example, the 
‗manufactured‘ allegations were against the Trans World director who was 
accused of spying. The company‘s problems coincided with the sacking of a 
government official who was connected to Trans World. Lastly, the government 
resorted to the use of administrative levers in order to punish non-conformist 
behaviour of power structures which was rather typical in 1998. ‗Find and punish‘ 
instructions by the president were frequently heard (Rosneft, UES, Magnitogorsk, 
Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant), but sometimes amounted to populist exclamations 
with severely delayed or limited impact (Knauf, Magnitogorsk). The latter point 
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exposed a gap in the federal government‘s grip over corporate affairs in the 
country in 1998. 
In 2006 the intensity of reported material falling into this category remained high. 
The government continued to use administrative levers while influencing the 
resolution of reported corporate conflicts falling into a wide range of second order 
codes.  
Graph 4.35: Administrative Levers of the State, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.24: Administrative Levers of the State, 2006 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
Aeroflot 1 ref. 1 Diversion of Claims 
Svyazinvest 1 ref. 2 Ownership 
MegaFon 2 ref. 5 Diversion of Claims, Ownership 
AvtoVaz 2 ref. 6 Control, Taxes 
Rosneft 2 ref. 10.1 Diversion of Claims 
Rosneft 11 ref. 10.3 Diversion of Claims, Diversion of 
Assets 
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
Rosneft 1 ref. 10.4 Taxes 
Rosneft 6 ref. 10.5 Diversion of Claims, Diversion of 
Assets 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.1  Ownership 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.2 Diversion of Assets, Diversion of 
Claims 
Gazprom 4 ref. 11.3 Diversion of Assets, Ownership 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.4 Control 
Gazprom 4 ref. 11.5 Diversion of Claims, Ownership 
Yukos 23 ref. 12.1  Ownership, Control, Taxes 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.3 Diversion of Claims 
Yukos 8 ref. 12 Bankruptcy 
Yukos 6 ref. 12.6 Diversion of Assets 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.7 Control 
Shell 25 ref. 13 Misimplementation, Ownership, 
Diversion of Assets 
Total 2 ref. 14 Ownership, Diversion of Claims 
ExxonMobil 2 ref. 15 Control 
TNK-BP 15 ref. 16.1 Control, Ownership, Diversion of 
Assets 
TNK-BP 1 ref. 16.2 Taxes 
LUKoil 2 ref. 17.1 Ownership 
Severstal 4 ref. 30.2 Misimplementation 
RusAl 1 ref. 32.4 Ownership 
IKEA 4 ref. 48 Diversion of Claims, 
Misimplementation 
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According to the reported material, administrative levers of the state were used in 
much the same way in 2006. The only noticeable change was in the emergence of 
the monopoly of the federal government which did not allow local administrations 
to take any advantage of enforcement powers without the warrant of the former. 
On one occasion, the Nenetz governor was detained on suspicion of fraud and 
embezzlement allegedly after/because he complained against a Rosneft‘s 
subsidiary (state owned) which did not pay taxes and broke ecological standards. 
Conversely, the federal government demonstrated an ever growing capacity to 
influence the judiciary with an unprecedented intensity. Additionally, the 
government relied on the services of various state agencies while orchestrating a 
mass re-allocation of ownership within the strategic sector. The state agencies that 
were frequently referred to by the newspaper were the tax authorities (Yukos), the 
National Resources Ministry (Shell, TNK-BP, LUKoil), the Sub-soil Resources 
Agency (Total), the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Atomic 
Inspection (ExxonMobil), the Prosecutor General‘s Office (TNK-BP). These 
disputes received a great deal of coverage making a substantial impact on the way 
the environment was perceived in 2006.  
The biggest difference between the two years of the study is the ever growing 
amount of the state‘s command of its own ministries and institutions. In 1998 these 
did not function in unison with, for example, tax authorities attempting to bankrupt 
state entities and local administrations hunting for anything valuable in its vicinity. 
This was not the case in 2006 when there were a number of examples indicating 
that such instances of insubordination stopped happening. Nevertheless there 
were examples of a suspected corrupt use of public institutions (IKEA‘s troubles 
over fire code violations) apparently unconnected to the federal government. 
However, such behaviour was not in the way of the re-nationalisation agenda, and 
could have been interpreted as an imitation of the above described approach but 
on a smaller scale.114 
 
                                                          
114
 IKEA’s trouble over fire violations was a classic example of a corporate raid when the fire inspectorate 
acted on behalf of a third party (see appendix 9b, template 48).  
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4.1.6 Shadow of Enforcement 
This category refers to examples where the threat of referring to a potential 
arbitrator is in itself a way of resolving a corporate dispute. Typically, this relates to 
situations where a disadvantaged party makes it known to a benefiting party that if 
the situation is not corrected, a certain action (suit, private enforcement, or third-
party involvement) will be taken.  
In 1998 there were 8 examples115 of this type of enforcement extracted from the 
Moscow Times. Diversion of claims is the most significant second order code with 
misimplementation, taxes and control also represented with one instance each 
(graph 4.36 and table 4.25). 
Graph 4.36: Shadow of Enforcement, 1998 
 
 
Table 4.25: Shadow of Enforcement, 1998 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Aeroflot 1 ref. 1 Diversion of Claims 
Gazprom 3 ref. 11.2 Taxes 
                                                          
115
 7 separate disputes of which one was parallel coded. 
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.3 Diversion of Claims 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.4 Diversion of Claims 
UES 11 ref. 25.1 Control 
UES 1 ref. 25.3 Diversion of Claims 
MOST Bank 1 ref. 43 Misimplementation, Diversion of 
Claims 
 
In relation to the content of the reported material, minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders threatened legal action a number of times (Yukos, Most Bank and 
Aeroflot). It was very difficult to determine the effectiveness of such a move, but 
the message was frequently very clear. In the instance of the conflict over UES 
dividends, a shareholder (the National Reserve Bank) said that they would wait 
and see whether the new management would agree to pay the money. The 
shareholder also made it clear that if the liability was not settled, the case would 
be referred to the Russian courts. Additionally, there was a noticeable element of 
reliance on self-enforcement powers with reference to this category. In other 
words, stakeholders threatened to instigate punitive actions that they themselves 
were capable of seeing through. To illustrate the point, the EBRD used the sell 
option as leverage in persuading the management of Yukos to come up with a 
credible restructuring plan. 
Furthermore, Gazprom proposed that an action taken against the companies‘ two 
subsidiaries would lead to far-reaching economic consequences and that the 
company could exacerbate the negative impact. And finally, threats to reveal the 
‗truth‘ about contenders for the top positions at UES very much determined the 
candidates‘ actions and behaviour116.  
                                                          
116
 Threats came from the candidates themselves and their respective political clans. 
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In the more recent year of the study, there were also 8 examples117 of shadow of 
enforcement with a wider spread of matching second order codes largely due to a 
greater degree of parallel coding. Graph 4.37 and table 4.26 provide further details 
of the reported material.  
 
Graph 4.37: Shadow of Enforcement, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.26: Shadow of Enforcement, 2006 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
VimpelCom 1 ref. 4 Misinvestment 
Rosneft 3 ref. 10.2 Diversion of Claims 
Shell 25 ref. 13 Misimplementation, 
Ownership, Diversion of 
Assets 
TNK-BP 15 ref. 16.1 Control, Ownership, Diversion 
of Assets 
 
                                                          
117
 5 separate disputes 3 of which were parallel coded. 
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In 2006 there were two reported instances when minority shareholders threatened 
legal action. In the first instance it was the minority of Rosneft who were hopeful 
that the company would surrender to their requests ahead of the LSE IPO118. The 
second instance was linked to the conflict at VimpelCom where the company‘s 
purchasing strategy was disputed by one of its shareholders (Telenor). The key 
point here is that the shareholder had already filed two suits in the Russian courts 
and threatened to take the case to a US court. All the remaining cases of this 
category related to the government and large state companies threatening 
international oil companies. In all of the reported instances the manufactured 
threats of licence withdrawal (based on environmental allegations) subsided or 
altogether evaporated once the projects in question were opened up to state 
companies. In retaliation, a number of foreign diplomats responded with warnings 
that foreign direct investment would fall significantly if the Russian government did 
not clarify the rules of the game in formal terms.  
In comparative terms, threats of self-enforcement were not found in reports 
pertaining to 2006. This fact confirmed a declining role of self-enforcement as 
previously discussed. Additionally, this suggests that a greater status was 
attached to external arbitrators and enforcers in 2006 than in 1998. Also in 2006 
the threat of foreign (namely US) litigation was used as a powerful message in 
conflict resolution. Finally, and in consistence with previously discussed 
categories, the government and state companies demonstrated their growing 
enforcement powers by simply threatening allegations as a way of persuading 
private entities to accept their terms of cooperation. In 1998 such examples were 
visibly missing from the reported material of the Moscow Times. 
 
4.1.7 Litigation 
This category refers to instances when courts or other formal institutions are used 
in the process of corporate dispute resolution. The content of this category reveals 
the level of perceived adequacy of the court system in Russia and exposes 
instances when the arbitration is influenced by other parties to the conflict.   
                                                          
118
 Initial Public Offering and London Stock Exchange 
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In 1998, litigation was used with reference to a variety of reported conflicts with 
control, ownership and diversion of claims being the most prominently represented 
second order codes. Altogether, there were 58 examples119 when courts and other 
formal institutions were featured as a resolution mechanism. Further details of the 
category are presented in graph 4.38 and table 4.27. 
Graph 4.38: Litigation, 1998 
 
 
Table 4.27: Litigation, 1998 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Rosneft 8 ref. 10.1 Diversion of Assets 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.4 Ownership 
Yukos 10 ref. 12.1 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.8 Taxes 
Transneft 7 ref. 18 Diversion of Claims 
Surgutneftegaz 2 ref. 19 Diversion of Claims 
Sibneft 1 ref. 21.1 Control, Taxes 
                                                          
119
 41 separate disputes 16 of which were parallel coded. 
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Sibneft 5 ref. 21.2 Diversion of Claims, Diversion 
of Assets 
Sidanko 6 ref. 22.1 Diversion of Claims 
Sidanko 2 ref. 22.3 Control, Taxes 
Sidanko 2 ref. 22.4 Bankruptcy 
Sidanko 2 ref. 22.5 Control, Bankruptcy 
Tyumen 7 ref. 23 Control 
Krasnoyarsk Hydro 
Plant 
4 ref. 24 Diversion of Claims, Control 
UES 4 ref. 25.2 Control 
UES 8 ref. 25.4 Ownership 
Electrosila 1 ref. 27 Control 
Norilsk Nickel 1 ref. 28.1 Ownership 
Norilsk Nickel 1 ref. 28.3 Taxes 
Novolipetsk 4 ref. 29.1 Control 
Novolipetsk 3 ref. 29.2 Diversion of Claims, Control 
Magnitogorsk 3 ref. 33 Ownership 
Lebedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant 
2 ref. 34.1 Ownership 
Lebedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant 
1 ref. 34.2 Diversion of Claims 
Achinsk Alumina 
Combine 
1 ref. 35 Bankruptcy, Misinvestment, 
Control 
Knauf 1 ref. 36.1 Control, Ownership 
Knauf 1 ref. 36.2 Taxes, Control 
AssiDoman 6 ref. 38.2 Ownership 
Page 221 
 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9a 
Second Order Code 
Vyborg Paper 3 ref. 39 Ownership, Misimplementation 
SBS Agro 4 ref. 40.1 Diversion of Claims 
SBS Agro 5 ref. 40.2 Bankruptcy 
Inkombank 1 ref. 42 Control 
Tokobank 1 ref. 46 Diversion of Claims 
Rossiisky Kredit 1 ref. 47 Diversion of Claims 
Kosmos TV 1 ref. 49 Control 
Channell 5 1 ref. 50 Diversion of Claims 
ORT 1 ref. 51.2 Bankruptcy 
Subway 7 ref. 52 Control, Diversion of Assets, 
Ownership 
Lomonosov 
Porcelain Factory 
1 ref. 53 Ownership 
Kuznetsky Mine 1 ref. 54 Ownership, Misinvestment 
MCCI 1 ref. 55 Control, Diversion of Assets, 
Ownership 
 
According to the reported material, the courts were used with varying degrees of 
success in 1998. From the review of the litigation category four sub-themes 
emerged. These sub-themes are government and legislation, ignored court 
rulings, the role of international courts and finally integrity of formal institutions. 
The first sub-theme relates to instances when the courts were used in resolving 
corporate conflicts with government participation (Rosneft, Gazprom, Transneft, 
ORT, Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant and UES). Although the federal government 
managed to hold its ground in the majority of disputes, there was a clear indication 
that the judiciary was often at odds with the government‘s agenda. During a 
conflict over bankruptcy proceedings against ORT, the court ruled against the 
company despite its immediate affiliation with president Yeltsin. Eventually, court 
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marshals were sent to seize the property of ORT in lieu of its debts. Moreover, a 
number of times the judiciary was used as a tool for reversing transactions that 
harmed the government‘s hold over its own assets (Rosneft, UES, Transneft and 
Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant, Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant). The government strongly 
insisted on legal support that was not always effective and sometimes led to 
valuable assets being channelled away by unidentified parties (Rosneft, 
Transneft). Furthermore, inconsistent legislation stemming from political 
differences between the government and communist-dominated parliament led to 
contradictory bills that had to be challenged in Constitutional and Supreme courts. 
Even though the government initiated the suits, analysts expressed uncertainty as 
to which side the courts would take. This uncertainty was a demonstration of a 
relative independence of the judiciary from the main power structure (i.e. the 
government) in the country. A conclusion that the judiciary was independent in 
1998 clearly cannot be drawn from this data. However, the fact that the 
government was often challenged by the judiciary is visible from the analysis of the 
reported material. In terms of the relationship between local administrations and 
the judiciary, there were a number of examples suggesting that the local courts 
were very much under the influence of the former.  With reference to 
Surgutneftegaz, a decision on the ownership of the company‘s subsidiaries was 
constantly postponed by St. Petersburg courts. This was in the interest of the local 
administration which was trying to win control over the assets. In the example 
featuring Achinsk Alumina Combine, the governor‘s changing stance on the issue 
was a key factor in determining decisions of the local courts. Moreover, in the 
example involving Kuznetsky Mine the foreign investor considered leaving the 
project because s/he was unable to get anywhere through the local courts which 
allegedly acted on behalf of the local administration that tried to get control over 
the recently refurbished factory. The investor concluded that it was impossible to 
get anywhere if the bureaucrats were not supportive.  
Another sub-theme within the perceived environment refers to examples when 
court rulings were simply ignored. According to the reported material depicting the 
corporate dispute at Electrosila, a local Financial Industrial Group (EMK) did not 
respond to a ruling of the court against it. Moreover, analysts suggested that the 
FIG would prevail in the conflict because it was a large group capable of exerting 
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pressure on the judiciary. In a more extreme conflict involving Knauf 30 court 
decisions were ignored by a renegade director who was supported by the local 
administration.  
Separately, there were instances when international courts were used. According 
to the reported material, this method of dispute resolution was particularly effective 
when parties to the conflict were financially exposed to the jurisdiction of the 
selected international court. When Trans World was forced to leave Novolipetsk, 
the foreign investor won a suit in a Dutch court that ordered the seizure of 
Novolipetsk‘s metal in Rotterdam. In cases when there was no proportionate 
exposure, even when the rulings of international courts were endorsed by both 
Russian common and supreme courts, the abusing party often managed to 
prevent official enforcement. In the example involving Subway, the legal challenge 
was annulled by the fact that the Russian partners re-registered the entity in 
question using a different name.  
Finally, there were a number of positive examples when the courts and other 
relevant formal institutions were capable of arbitrating and enforcing their 
decisions. Examples here primarily related to corporate governance violations 
such as a disputed rights issue (Sibneft), bond issue (Sidanko) and authority of the 
board (Yukos). The Federal Securities Commission (FSC) was reported as a 
powerful arbitrator capable of cancelling decisions of the respective boards.  
Moreover, in a conflict over missing shares of Magnitogorsk, the FSC closed down 
a local share registrar that authorised deals involving the disputed shares. 
Furthermore, a Russian court demonstrated its substantial enforcement powers in 
a conflict when a bank (Rossiisky Kredit) refused to transfer a deposit to its client. 
After a court ruling in favour of the client, bailiffs seized the property of the bank on 
behalf of the disadvantaged party. This case showed that the system was in 
principle capable of meeting the challenges of policing the environment particularly 
with reference to conflicts where powerful officials did not have personal interests 
at stake. 
Page 224 
 
In 2006 there were 34 examples120 of this category reported in the Moscow Times. 
All of the second order codes were featured in the hierarchy with ownership and 
diversion of claims disputes being the most widely represented. Graph 4.39 and 
table 4.28 provide additional information about the category.  
 
Graph 4.39: Litigation, 2006 
 
 
Table 4.28: Litigation, 2006 
Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
VimpelCom 1 ref. 4 Misinvestment 
MegaFon 2 ref. 5 Diversion of Claims, 
Ownership 
AvtoVaz 2 ref. 6 Control, Taxes 
Rosneft 3 ref. 10.2 Diversion of Claims 
Rosneft 6 ref. 10.5 Diversion of Claims, 
Diversion of Assets 
                                                          
120
 22 separate disputes 12 of which were parallel coded.  
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Companies No of 
Articles 
Reference 
Appendix 9b 
Second Order Code 
Gazprom 1 ref. 11.1 Ownership 
Gazprom 4 ref. 11.3 Diversion of Assets, 
Ownership 
Yukos 23 ref. 12.1 Ownership, Control, Taxes 
Yukos 2 ref. 12.2 Diversion of Claims 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.3 Diversion of Claims 
Yukos 8 ref. 12.4 Bankruptcy 
Yukos 1 ref. 12.5 Diversion of Assets 
Shell 25 ref. 13 Misimplementation, 
Ownership, Diversion of 
Assets 
Total 2 ref. 14 Ownership, Diversion of 
Claims 
TNK-BP 15 ref. 16.1 Control, Ownership, 
Diversion of Assets 
TNK-BP 1 ref. 16.2 Taxes 
Transneft 2 ref. 18 Ownership 
Evraz 1 ref. 31.1 Taxes 
RusAl 1 ref. 32.2 Diversion of Claims 
RusAl 3 ref. 32.3 Ownership 
Eurocement 1 ref. 37 Diversion of Claims 
IKEA 4 ref. 48 Diversion of Claims, 
Misinvestment 
 
In 2006 three main sub-themes emerged from the analysis of the reported material 
namely international courts, government and legislation, and integrity of formal 
institutions. 
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The biggest sub-theme here refers to the role of the state in the court rulings. 
Previously discussed categories already revealed that in 2006 the Russian 
government was capable of exerting a great deal of pressure on all institutions in 
the country. Details of how the government interacted with the judiciary however 
not only unveiled the extent of this pressure, but also exposed the level of 
perceived independence of the legal system. All reported cases of corporate 
disputes falling into this sub-theme showed that the government achieved total 
control over the legal system. With reference to one of the reported disputes over 
an ownership stake in a project led by Gazprom, signed agreements specified that 
all arising conflicts had to be settled in Russian courts only. Analysts suggested 
that suing the state-owned giant on its own territory was not going to produce any 
results other than those acceptable to the company and the government. Another 
example of the state‘s involvement in the process of formal-dispute resolution was 
the case involving AvtoVaz when the Prosecutor‘s General Office suddenly and 
inexplicably cancelled all criminal challenges allegedly because an agreement was 
reached with the Russian government. In a society where the judiciary is 
independent, criminal charges are resolved by the courts and should not be 
conditioned by non-transparent agreements of the parties instigating the criminal 
challenge. Disputes involving Yukos, Shell, ExxonMobil, etc. serve as a further 
demonstration of the prevalence of this perceived characteristic of the Russian 
judiciary that frequently acts on strict instructions by the government. Additionally, 
the TNK-BP‘s example when the company was taken to court for allegedly buying 
state secrets from government officials further convinced international investors of 
the level of fabricated regulatory pressure that the government was prepared to 
resort to while achieving its corporate goals. 
With reference to disputes when international courts were referred to for 
arbitration, in 2006 the Russian state frequently protected itself by arguing a lack 
of jurisdiction. In a dispute over Yukos, a number of high-ranking Russian officials 
were served with a US court summons. However, diplomatic immunity and the fact 
that any rulings had to be endorsed by a Russian court protected the benefiting 
party (i.e. Rosneft) to the extent that the litigation did not even affect its London 
Stock Exchange public offering.  Similarly, the Russian side argued that the rulings 
of a US court were inconsequential in a conflict over RusAl‘s bid for Alscon as the 
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American court lacked jurisdiction. The bid was blessed by the Russian 
government and therefore it was suggested that under no circumstances would 
the Russian courts rule against RusAl even though the company was suspected of 
severe misconduct. However, the rulings of international courts were not always 
against the Russian government. A Dutch court ruled in favour of a decision made 
by a Yukos receiver to fire two directors representing the interests of foreign 
shareholders. Furthermore, the Russian courts tried to prevent the sale of Yukos‘ 
Mazeikiu refinery by declaring it bankrupt. Although Yukos International UK 
refused to follow the ruling initially, it ultimately complied after a US court returned 
a similar ruling on the matter. 
With reference to the perceived integrity of the Russian court system in conflicts 
between private parties, powerful associations described in 3.4.4 were still 
crucially important in navigating a very convoluted and ambiguous court system. 
The fact that foreign investors of Eurocement were forced to recruit the services of 
Alfa (a very powerful FIG) suggested that chances of a fair resolution were much 
higher with a powerful stakeholder on board than without. 
In terms of the differences between the two sets of presented data the nature of 
greater state interference has once again been revealed. It appears that the 
Russian court system had more authority in 2006 than in 1998 because of the 
absence of the ‗ignored decisions‘ sub-theme. Unlike in 1998, all court rulings 
were complied with in relation to corporate disputes reported in 2006. It is difficult 
to establish whether that would have been the case had the courts returned rulings 
against the government itself because of the absence of such rulings on Russian 
soil. Additionally, the intensity of anti-government legal pressure considerably 
subsided making it difficult to even speculate what the response would have been 
to such actions in 2006. Conversely, the role of the international judiciary in 
corporate dispute resolution increased in the more recent year of the study despite 
its enforcement powers being considerably reduced by the necessity of the 
Russian courts‘ endorsement. However, with a greater degree of financial 
exposure of Russian corporate entities in various jurisdictions, international 
arbitration should continue to gather momentum. 
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Section 5: Analysis of the Interview Data 
In this section corporate disputes mentioned in the interveiws will be compared with the coded 
data. Additionally, the newspaper‘s independence, accuracy and influence will be dicsussed.  
 
5.1 Interview Data 
In order to test the coded data121 and determine the newspapers‘ independence, 
accuracy and influence, 5 interviews with the Moscow Times reporters have been 
conducted (chapter 3, sections 2 and 3; the interview guide is presented in 
appendix 4). With reference to mentioned corporate disputes, the transcripts of 
these interviews have been compiled into templates based on the same categories 
that were used in relation to the reported material.  
This section of the analysis chapter presents the interview data for the two years 
examined. For the purposes of triangulation, the coding profiles122 of all 
corresponding companies and disputes extracted from the newspaper articles 
have also been provided.  
Additionally, all of the Moscow Times reporters were asked about the paper‘s 
independence, accuracy and influence. These questions were designed to analyse 
possible biases of the reported material as well as comment on the impact that the 
Moscow Times created in forming investor perception.  
The section begins with the analysis of the three interviews with the Moscow 
Times reporters from 1998 followed by two interviews from 2006. Here, the 
content is considered with reference to the previously constructed templates. 
Subsequently, analysis of the Moscow Times reporters‘ opinion about the 
newspaper is presented.  
 
 
 
                                                          
121
 The test needs to establish how fully the constructed templates reflect the reported material of the 
newspaper. 
122
 Templates of the coding profiles are presented in the Appendices 9a and 9b. 
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5.2 Interviews with 1998 Reporters 
Interview 1123 
During the interview three companies were discussed124. Table 4.28 shows the 
following information: 
1. Companies referred to in the discussion; 
2. References to the corresponding templates (appendices 9a and 9b); 
3. Coding profile of the identified disputes; 
4. Number of articles written in connection with each dispute. 
 
Table 4.29: Coding profiles of companies mentioned during interview No 1, 1998 
Company Gazprom     Yukos     Transneft   
Reference 11.4.   12.1. 
Parallel 
Coding   18.   
Coding Profile 1.1   1.2 1.1   1.2   
  1.1.2   1.2.2 1.1.6   1.2.2   
  1.1.2.1   1.2.2.1 1.1.6.1   1.2.2.2   
  1.1.2.12   1.2.2.5 1.1.6.5   1.2.2.4   
      1.2.2.12 1.1.6.12   1.2.2.5   
            1.2.2.7   
            1.2.2.10   
            1.2.2.12   
Number of 
Articles 1   10     7   
 
It is not surprising that it was the biggest companies that the reporter chose to 
refer to in response to the question about the most representative corporate 
disputes of the time. Two out of three disputes were extensively covered in the 
Moscow Times and all of the companies were captured in the coding of the 
articles.  
                                                          
123
 The interviewee authored a large number of articles particularly with reference to major oil companies. 
The person was very co-operative and easy to interview. The reporter did not work for the newspaper in 
2006. Additional information about the person cannot be revealed due to the guaranteed anonymity and 
confidentiality. 
124
 The companies were mentioned in response to the question about the most representative disputes. 
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With reference to Gazprom, it was mentioned that the cancellation of the 
agreement according to which the CEO Rem Vyakhirev managed the 
government‘s 35% stake was due to two factors. First, Rem Vyakhirev simply „fell 
out of favour with the government125‟. Second, minority shareholders tried to stop 
the transfer of assets from Gazprom to Itera (the largest independent gas producer 
in the country) that was happening under Vyakhirev. According to the reporter, 
minority shareholders “...accused Gazprom of transferring assets to Itera at below 
market prices or for free...”126. The minority was led by the head of the Federal 
Securities Commission127. Additionally, the pressure on the Chief Executive to 
leave was further raised by a report compiled by the Audit Chamber that disclosed 
some “very damaging information” about the transfer of assets at Gazprom. 
However, both the FSC and the Audit Chamber avoided direct accusations and 
decisive actions because they were „afraid‟ of retaliatory measures from whoever 
organised the deals. This data confirms the conclusion drawn in the third section 
of the analysis that in 1998 formal institutions were frequently weaker than 
unidentified power structures that orchestrated various value-reducing 
transactions. Moreover, Gazprom‘s example demonstrated that even the biggest 
state companies were defenceless against very crude forms of corporate 
mismanagement.  
The second company referred to in the interview was Yukos. The reporter gave 
the example of transfer pricing that was organised by the parent company 
Menatep who was poised to dilute holdings of the minority shareholders128 
(including the government)129. Table 4.29 shows the coding profile of the dispute 
which is consistent with the information provided by the reporter. The key concern 
here was the diversion of claims that minority shareholders loudly protested 
against ―using both legal suits and PR campaigns”130. The reporter recalled that 
even though some of the biggest transfer pricing schemes never materialised, the 
Russian courts consistently ruled in favour of Khodorkovsky (the majority 
                                                          
125
 Conflict with the State - D1 – 1.1.2.1 
126
 Transactions with Self-Interest - D5; this code was not detected through the review of articles. 
127
 Litigation - ES12 – 1.1.2.12 
128
 Transactions with Self-Interest - D.5 – 1.2.2.5 – 1.1.6.5 (Parallel Coding) 
129
 Conflict with the State - D.1 – 1.2.2.1 – 1.1.6.1 
130
 Litigation - ES.12 – 1.2.2.12 – 1.1.6.12 
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shareholder) who was suspected of ―bribing the judges”. One of the particularly 
active foreign minority shareholders Kenneth Dart hired a group of lawyers and 
continuously sued the company for transfer pricing. However, the reporter recalled 
that the action produced little impact on what the oligarch was doing at the time. 
The third company was Transneft. Here the reporter referred to the instance when 
the management of the company was forced to return a stake that had gone 
missing further to a questionable consolidation practice (a number of off- shore 
entities with undisclosed ownership were involved). In addition to the reported 
material found in the Moscow Times the reporter mentioned the role of tax 
police131 that was instrumental in the process of regaining control over the missing 
stake. Although the template of this dispute does not contain this information, the 
corresponding third order code (administrative levers of the state) encompasses 
the practice.  
Interview 2132 
In the second interview two companies were discussed in relation to corporate 
disputes. Similar to interview 1, all mentioned companies and disputes were 
captured by the coding of the reported material. Table 4.30 shows the coding 
profile of the two disputes referred to by the second reporter. 
Unlike the first interviewee, the second reporter did not refer to the biggest 
companies, but recalled the most outrageous corporate disputes of the time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
131
 Taxes - 1.1.6 This second order code was not detected through the review of articles. 
132
 Second reporter was also very co-operative and keen to engage in the discussion. The overall impression 
was that the person was still very much in touch with the corporate life of the country although like 
reporter number 1 was no longer working for the Moscow Times at the time of the interview. 
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Table 4.30: Coding profiles of companies mentioned during interview No 2, 1998 
Company Sidanko     Knauf     
Reference 22.5 
Parallel 
Coding   36.1 
Parallel 
Coding   
Coding Profile 1.1 1.1   1.1 1.1   
  1.1.6 1.1.1   1.1.6 1.1.2   
  1.1.6.6 1.1.1.6   1.1.6.3 1.1.2.3   
  1.1.6.8 1.1.1.8   1.1.6.5 1.1.2.5   
  1.1.6.12 1.1.1.12   1.1.6.7 1.1.2.7   
        1.1.6.9 1.1.2.9   
        1.1.6.10 1.1.2.10   
        1.1.6.12 1.1.2.12   
Number of 
Articles 2     1     
 
The first dispute involved Sidanko‘s loss of control over one of its subsidiaries 
called Chernogorneft. The reporter rather categorically claimed that: 
 “...it was Tyumen Oil Co. (TNK) [that] managed to get Chernagorneft 
from Sidanko in which BP had bought a huge stake and [...] 
managed, through the bankruptcy courts133 essentially to steal 
Chernagorneft out from under Sidanko. It was pretty impressive!”  
This material repeats the coding profile presented on table 4.30. There was an 
additional point about BP‘s incidental participation in the conflict. An interesting 
point here is that during the interview it was suggested by the reporter that BP paid 
for its stake in Chernagorneft twice. The first time it paid for it when the British 
giant bought into Sidanko. The second time it paid for the same asset when much 
later (2003) it merged with Tyumen Oil Co. to form TNK-BP.  
Furthermore, the reporter elaborated on the way the bankruptcy law was used in 
the dispute: 
“... you had to come up with some overdue debts and the way the 
bankruptcy law worked at the time was [that] if you had those [debts] 
you could declare the company bankrupt. Then you have the 
Creditors‟ Committee and if you‟re the first in line [if you‟re the biggest 
in the Creditors‟ Committee] then you could essentially get control of 
the company.” 
 
                                                          
133
 Bankruptcy - 1.1.1 and Control - 1.1.6 (Parallel Coding). 
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Both points were covered in the published material of the newspaper. However, 
the reporter resorted to much stronger language in the interview than the terms 
used in the corresponding articles. Similar to interview 1, the corrupt role of the 
Russian judiciary was discussed134. It was suggested that Tyumen135 was able to 
manipulate the court system and got favourable rulings because at the time the 
judges were ―inexperienced and underpaid”.  
The second dispute that the reporter referred to was Knauf. This dispute was 
constantly featured in the analysis of the coded material and arguably was the 
most shocking example of corporate battles for control and ownership reported by 
the newspaper in 1998. In order to illustrate the point and demonstrate 
consistency with the coding (table 4.30) the following extract from the interview 
has been selected: 
“...essentially this German company called Knauf, a building materials 
company, had bought a controlling stake in the factory136. They were 
concerned about the director they thought he was stealing from 
them137, – and so they decided to try to get rid of him. The director 
had the administrative resource i.e. he knew the head of the local 
administration very well and he had good connections with the local 
Cossacks138. So Cossacks – and I‟m talking full-on Cossacks with the 
hats, the capes, on horses and with swords actually besieged the 
factory supporting the director‟s interests139. By the time I got there a 
lot of the Cossacks were gone but each side had their huge security 
forces – there were two separate security forces in the building and 
there were more security people than there were executives of any 
kind. The Germans were hauled up in one of the rooms in the 
administrative building, their electricity had been cut off, they had a 
generator and a satellite fax and they were sending faxes to Moscow 
saying help us... [and] what do we do140? Anyhow it was one of those 
typical situations where I think the factory already had two boards of 
directors141. The renegade director had chosen his board of directors 
and the Germans had their board of directors...142 [The situation] 
didn‟t get resolved at the administration level; I mean the 
                                                          
134
 Litigation - ES.12 
135
 Third-Party Enforcement - ES.8 
136
 Ownership - 1.1.2 and Control - 1.1.6 (Parallel Coding) 
137
 Transactions with Self-Interest - D.5 
138
 Administrative Levers of the State - ES.10 
139
 Private Enforcement - ES.6 
140
 Self-Enforcement - ES.7 
141
 Control - 1.1.6 
142
 General Meetings - D.3 
Page 234 
 
administration was on the director‟s side and was demanding that the 
Germans give back 25% of the shares that they had bought ... The 
administration said “Give us back 25%” and, we‟ll solve this problem 
… [The situation] was ultimately resolved at the level of a meeting 
between Yeltsin and Cole. It was just impossible to resolve it at any 
level other than that.” 
Besides demonstrating that the coding profile and the corresponding template (ref. 
36.1) match the reporter‘s account, the narrative also suggests that it was a typical 
situation at the time. This is consistent with the content of the second order codes 
associated with the control and ownership categories where the analysis revealed 
a number of instances involving renegade directors and examples of corporate 
insubordination. 
Interview 3143 
The third and final reporter from 1998 mentioned three companies: Yukos, Norilsk 
Nickel and AvtoVaz (manufacturer of Lada cars). Again, all of the companies and 
related disputes were captured in the coding.  
Table 4.31: Coding profiles of companies mentioned during interview No 3, 1998 
Company AvtoVaz   Yukos     
Norilsk 
Nickel   
Reference 6   12.1. 
Parallel 
Coding   28.1   
Coding Profile 1.2   1.2 1.1   1.1   
  1.2.2   1.2.2 1.1.6   1.1.2   
  1.2.2.5   1.2.2.5 1.1.6.5   1.1.2.5   
  1.2.2.9   1.2.2.1 1.1.6.1   1.1.2.10   
      1.2.2.12 1.1.6.12   1.1.2.12   
               
                
                
Number of 
Articles 
 
1   10     1   
 
As far as the previously mentioned dispute involving Yukos was concerned, the 
information recalled by the reporter was identical to what was discussed in the first 
interview. However, the fact that this dispute keeps being mentioned is indicative 
of its importance in forming investor perception. Once again independence of the 
                                                          
143
 The third reporter stopped working for the newspaper a considerable time ago and struggled the most 
remembering facts about corporate disputes. 
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judiciary was in question and the unchallenged powers of the oligarchs were 
acknowledged144. The reporter also reverted to a considerably stronger language 
than that used in the articles. It was suggested that the oligarchs at the time could 
―do anything they wanted” particularly when it came to violating rights of minority 
shareholders145. Even though the reporter pointed out that one of the affected 
shareholders (Kenneth Dart) was very experienced at fighting share dilution, 
numerous court cases were still inconsequential in the fight against oligarchs who 
were very much above the law. An additional point with reference to this particular 
conflict was that the reporter came across a number of instances when ―minority 
shareholders were intimidated by Menatep and Khodorkovsky in particular to the 
extent that legal challenges were simply dropped”. This is a confirmation of the 
applicability of the private enforcement category with reference to the way Yukos 
was managed in 1998146.  
The second company mentioned during the interview with the third reporter was 
AvtoVaz. The reporter recollected the role of severely corrupt dealerships who 
charged abnormally high prices for their services. This information was also 
included in the corresponding template as demonstrated in the coding profile 
presented in table 4.31. An additional point with reference to this conflict however 
was the fact that the problem of corrupt dealerships was confined to AvtoVaz and 
was not necessarily applicable to other car manufacturers some of which were 
fairly well run (e.g. Gaz, the second largest producer of cars in the country). 
Finally, Norilsk Nickel was discussed by the reporter. The dispute was partially 
instigated by a report produced by the Audit Chamber that in general was 
extremely critical of the loan-for-shares deals. Even though the reporter suggested 
that the chances of re-nationalisation were extremely slim, uncomfortable 
questions were still asked about how major assets ended up in the hands of so 
few oligarchs.  
                                                          
144
 Litigation - ES.12 
145
 Transactions with Self-Interest - D.5 
146
 Private Enforcement - ES9; although this category was not detected with reference to this particular 
dispute the use of private enforcement was registered with reference to the company (see template 12.7). 
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Examples of the 1998 disputes mentioned by the reporters not only complement 
the data and corresponding codes, but more importantly confirm the fact that no 
major disputes have been omitted from the analysis of the reported material. In 
total, two additional codes were revealed through the analysis of the interview 
transcripts that were not detected during the main stage of data analysis 
(Gazprom - D5 and Transneft - Taxes). These codes were not included in the 
general coding profiles because the corresponding information was never reported 
and hence did not have such an impact on investor perception147. Nevertheless, it 
is still important to note that these codes add to the accuracy of representation of 
the actual disputes. Hence, the additional codes revealed by the interviews are a 
good measure of the limitations of this study.  In this context the limitations refer to 
the extent to which the reported material reflects actual events148.  
 
5.3 Interviews with 2006 Reporters 
Two reporters who worked for the Moscow Times in 2006 were interviewed. These 
interviews were more fruitful simply because of the proximity to the events with 
some of the mentioned disputes still being resolved at the time of the interviews. In 
this context there was an inevitable overlap with some of the facts pertaining to 
2007 (the year when the interviews were conducted).   
Interview 1149 
In answer to the question about the most representative disputes the first reporter 
referred to two companies which were Rosneft and Yukos. Below are the coding 
profiles of the conflicts in question. 
 
 
                                                          
147
 To make sure that this was the case reported material was scanned again. 
148
 Out of 35 codes used to describe the 7 chosen disputes, omission of 2 additional codes does not seem 
damaging particularly in the context of the complexity and size of the data set. 
149
 The interviewed reporter did not work for the newspaper at the time of the interview. The person was 
very opinionated about the Russian government’s approach to dealing with international oil companies. 
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Table 4.32: Coding profiles of the companies mentioned during interview No 1, 
2006 
Company Rosneft     Yukos       
Reference 10.5 Parallel Coding   12.1 
Parallel 
Coding 
Parallel 
Coding   
Coding Profile 1.2 1.2   1.1 1.1 1.1   
  1.2.2 1.2.1   1.1.2 1.1.6 1.1.5   
  1.2.2.5 1.2.1.5   1.1.2.1 1.1.6.1 1.1.5.1   
  1.2.2.6 1.2.1.6   1.1.2.5 1.1.6.5 1.1.5.5   
  1.2.2.10 1.2.1.10   1.1.2.9 1.1.6.9 1.1.5.9   
  1.2.2.12 1.2.1.12   1.1.2.10 1.1.6.10 1.1.5.10   
        1.1.2.12 1.1.6.12 1.1.5.12   
                
Number of 
Articles 6 
    
23 
    
  
 
The reporter chose to discuss the most talked-about dispute of the year 2006 and 
possibly in the modern history of corporate Russia – re-nationalisation of Yukos. 
As demonstrated by the number of articles published in the Moscow Times, the 
way this conflict was handled by the Russian authorities created a very strong 
impact on the perception of foreign investors about the realities of doing business 
in the country. 
As opposed to 1998 accounts, the interviewed reporter presented Khodorkovsky 
(former Chief executive of Yukos) in very favourable terms. The reporter‘s view 
was completely anti-government with allegations such as ‗... [it] was the legitimate 
political ambitions of Khodorkovsky that led to his arrest‟. The fact of fabricated 
back taxes was also acknowledged: 
“... Yukos was the biggest Russian oil company where the 
management was very capable and ran the company better than 
its competitors. It is difficult to see how this company could 
suddenly accumulate such a massive [back] tax liability, 
particularly remembering the fact that its accounts had been 
publicly audited.” 
The reporter defended Khodorkovsky along with the actions of other primarily 
foreign shareholders who attempted to sue the government in various international 
courts. A great deal was mentioned about the way the Russian government used 
the tax authorities150 in the pursuit of the assets and the FSB in the tasks of 
                                                          
150
 Taxes - 1.1.5, Control - 1.1.6, Ownership - 1.1.2 (Parallel Coding) 
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silencing Russian lawyers through practices like beatings, unlawful jailing as well 
as unjustified extraditions in relation to foreign lawyers151. In terms of the 
benefiting parties it was suggested that the actions were probably initiated by ―... 
one or two individuals on the board of directors [of Rosneft] who were known for 
their readiness to resort to some sort of assistance from the Federal Security 
Bureau”. These people were very firmly set in the Russian government and 
sometimes are referred to as ‗siloviki‘ (the Russian word for force). In many ways 
the opinion of the reporter was fairly one-sided. This fact was ultimately reflected 
in the published material and consequently influenced the template of the dispute 
(12.1).  
The reporter went on to discuss the second company Rosneft. It was very clearly 
suggested that the London IPO of the company was “... equivalent to the 
international acceptance of the re-nationalisation [of Yukos] that Rosneft was the 
sole beneficiary of‘‖. It was suggested that Rosneft‘s assets, a large proportion of 
which previously belonged to Yukos, were legitimised by the sale of its shares on 
the London Stock Exchange. The reporter also mentioned the “relationship 
building exercise” that international oil companies like BP were keen to engage in 
by buying a stake in Rosneft. It was mentioned that the investment was not of a 
commercial charter, but an opportunity for the British company to display its loyalty 
to the Russian government152.  
With reference to the two disputes, the information disclosed by the reporter was 
very consistent with the constructed templates that encompassed all of the 
discussed material.  
 
 
 
                                                          
151
 ES.9 - Private Enforcement 
152
 ES.6 - Relationship-Based Enforcement 
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Interview 2153 
The second interviewee mentioned Gazprom, Shell, TNK-BP and a small 
company that was not featured in the Moscow Times reports154. Table 4.33 
provides the coding profiles and references to the corresponding templates in 
relation to the three disputes mentioned in the second interview. 
Table 4.33: Coding profiles of the companies mentioned during interview No 2, 
2006 
Company Gazprom   Shell     TNK-BP     
Reference 11.3 
Parallel 
Coding 13 
Parallel 
Coding 
Parallel 
Coding 16.1 
Parallel 
Coding 
Parallel 
Coding 
Coding 
Profile 
1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 
  1.2.1 1.1.2 1.1.4 1.1.2 1.2.1 1.1.6 1.1.2 1.2.1 
  1.2.1.1 1.1.2.1 1.1.4.1 1.1.2.1 1.2.1.1 1.1.6.1 1.1.2.1 1.2.1.1 
  1.2.1.4 1.1.2.4 1.1.4.10 1.1.2.10 1.2.1.10 1.1.6.6 1.1.2.6 1.2.1.6 
  1.2.1.10 1.1.2.10 1.1.4.11 1.1.2.11 1.2.1.11 1.1.6.9 1.1.2.9 1.2.1.9 
  1.2.1.12 1.1.2.12 1.1.4.12 1.1.2.12 1.2.1.12 1.1.6.10 1.1.2.10 1.2.1.10 
            1.1.6.11 1.1.2.11 1.2.1.11 
            1.1.6.12 1.1.2.12 1.2.1.12 
Number 
of Articles 4 
  
25     15 
    
 
During the interview all of the mentioned disputes were discussed in the context of 
the government assisted takeovers by state owned companies like Gazprom.  
With reference to the gas producer it was noted that the company was the main 
beneficiary further to the redistribution of assets that previously belonged to Shell 
and TNK-BP. However, unlike Rosneft, the key decision makers in Gazprom did 
not resort to the ‗services‘ of the FSB. Here, “... the preferred tool was the false 
environmental charges” that were used in order to build up pressure until the 
companies in question were prepared to concede control for an acceptable price. 
The difference in approaches meant that there was no unified practice in 
determining the way state companies went about re-gaining control over strategic 
assets. To a large degree, it was the personalities of the chairmen and CEOs of 
                                                          
153
 The reporter continued working for the Moscow Times at the time of the interview which possibly made 
the person refer to some of the events that took place after 2006. The reporter was also very outspoken 
about the role of the Russian government in corporate affairs. 
154
 The reason the small factory outside Moscow was used as an example was because the reporter knew 
the owner and the director of the company personally. 
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Gazprom (more liberal) and Rosneft (‗siloviki‘ or force) that determined the nature 
of attacks on companies like Shell and TNK-BP. In addition, the fact that in 2006 
the Russian government enforced policies through practice and not laws was also 
mentioned during the interview: ―… the bill on investments in strategic sectors did 
not get released until much later meaning that companies like Shell, who 
admittedly purchased their stakes very cheaply in the chaotic environment of the 
1990s, had no idea about what was coming‖155. 
Consistent with the coding profile of Shell the reporter suggested that the company 
could have foreseen the situation and pro-actively invited Gazprom into its 
Sakhalin 2 project. It was suggested that if that had been done, then the company 
would not have experienced the same amount of pressure from the environmental 
agencies and consequently would have been in a better position to ask for more 
money from Gazprom156. Instead Shell announced a $10 billion cost increase 
which meant that the government had to wait longer before it got its share of the 
profits (terms of the Production Sharing Agreement). In this respect, the 
management of Shell made an incorrect assumption that the government would do 
nothing about it. Conversely, the government reacted ―... swiftly and decisively by 
instructing Gazprom to take over the asset, which in turn relied on the Natural 
Resources Ministry that manufactured false environmental allegations”. 
With reference to TNK-BP, in principle, the same situation was described with the 
difference that it was Rosneft behind the mounting pressure on the company. 
Consequently, ‗... because it was Rosneft‟s officials masterminding the attacks on 
the company, alternative agencies and tools were employed.‘  In particular, the 
use of the Prosecutor General‘s Office was emphasised giving rise to speculations 
of their close connections with Rosneft‘s chairman, Igor Sechin. Although the TNK-
BP template does not reveal this connection, it nevertheless captured the fact that 
the Prosecutor General‘s Office was instrumental in this particular conflict. 
Additionally, the interviewee referred to the situation where BP and TNK-BP 
foreign employees suddenly started having problems with renewing their Russian 
                                                          
155
 Unclear Rules - D.4 
156
 Misimplementation - 1.1.3 
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visas. This fact coincided with the company‘s problems with Rosneft and 
Gazprom. In this regard it was noted that:  
“... all foreign employees in Russia break immigration rules to 
some degree because it is simply impossible to adhere to them. 
In general, this is not a problem because nobody pays any 
attention to that fact. However, if you suddenly fall out of favour 
with the government, it is just another weapon they have against 
you.157”  
This fact was not captured by the coding because it referred to the continuation of 
the dispute that was reported later in 2007 (a year not covered by the study). 
Nevertheless, this is very illustrative of the way foreign investors perceived the 
environment because the issue at hand affected all of them who entered the 
country at least once. Lastly, an example of a small manufacturing company was 
used to further confirm the preferred practice of dealing with unwanted investors. It 
was claimed that: 
“... any private entrepreneur has to bribe officials at every level to get 
things done. But the real problem with this is that when you suddenly 
fall out of favour, you have no legal foundation at all. So … the real 
choice is either get completely tangled in endless and meaningless 
bureaucracy or become part of the corrupt system.”   
The point here is that by becoming part of the system foreign entrepreneurs lose 
all means of formal protection and become more vulnerable.  
In general, the presented analysis of the transcripts confirmed the accuracy and 
consistency of the constructed templates. With reference to 1998 and 2006, all 
mentioned disputes (apart from one) were coded and no interviewee revealed any 
information that contradicted the content of the respective templates and codes. 
The fact that the smaller dispute referred to by a 2006 reporter was not found in 
the templates reflects the tendency of the newspaper to publish material about 
larger entities. However, in terms of this research it is not a problem because the 
focus of the study is on the perception of the key features of the respective 
environments that, as it happens, are best described by the events involving larger 
companies.  
 
                                                          
157
 Unclear Rules - D.4 
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5.4 Independence, Accuracy and Influence of the Moscow Times 
- Independence 
One of the key concerns about the data set was the fact that the reported material 
was subject to external influences that distorted the reported material. For 
example, in 2006 there was a great deal of concern over the whole concept of the 
freedom of speech in the Russian context. In order to understand how these 
external forces affected the Moscow Times reporting and hence the data, all 
interviewed reporters were asked the question about the newspapers‘ 
independence. Analysis of reporters‘ answers revealed that there were no 
concerns over the freedom of speech with reference to the newspaper. Both 1998 
and 2006 reporters made it clear that the Moscow Times did not experience any 
political pressure due to the relatively small number of Russian readers. The 
following quotes illustrate the point:   
“… the readership of the newspaper is not big enough to be 
on the Kremlin‟s radar and therefore its reporting is free from 
political pressure, which most Russian language newspapers 
have to deal with.”  
“I don‟t think that the Moscow Times was ever really hugely 
influential inside of Russia, I don‟t think that the Kremlin really 
paid it much attention frankly and I doubt that it does today 
either… I don‟t get the sense that it was never under huge 
pressure politically from the Kremlin, just because they never 
saw it as important, really.” 
 
A reporter who worked for the newspaper in 1998 pointed out that at 
some stage in the 1990s, Khodorkovsky (CEO of Yukos) bought a stake 
in Independent Media, the company that owns the Moscow Times. One of 
the promises that he made prior to the purchase was that he would not 
interfere in the editorial. But the reporter claimed that the promise was 
broken when on a number of occasions Khodorkovky tried to exert 
influence158 about the way Yukos was presented in the newspaper. 
However, ‗… by 1998 Khodorkovsky stopped interfering because he had 
more important things to do like dealing with the financial crisis that hit his 
company and the country‟. In any case, the reporter added that this fact 
                                                          
158
 The reporter suggested that Independent Media was raided by the tax police at Khodorkovsky’s request. 
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did not have a significant influence on the newspaper‘s coverage of 
events, even in connection with Yukos (in the 1990s the newspaper was 
fairly critical of the way the company treated minority shareholders). 
Similarly, a reporter who worked for the newspaper in 2006 admitted that 
occasionally they received letters from companies like Gazprom and 
Rosneft about particularly critical articles. However, the reporter said that 
those letters had a non-threatening tone and simply asked for an 
explanation about why certain things had been written, rather than sought 
to warn or deter reporters from openly criticising the companies. The 
reporter also suggested that the Moscow Times was never under the 
same pressure as its Russian counterparts where reporters were 
intimidated, and in the worst cases even assassinated for their coverage. 
 
- Accuracy 
In terms of the accuracy of the reported material the previously discussed 
bias in favour of foreign investors was unanimously acknowledged by all 
interviewed reporters. The bias was determined by two facts. First, the 
newspaper‘s targeted readership was foreigners living and working in 
Russia. Second, foreign minority shareholders were much more prepared 
to talk to the reporters than Russian officials who frequently were simply 
inaccessible. Although all of the reporters said that they made an effort to 
get the Russian side to talk159, interviews were often very difficult to 
arrange because of the secretive culture of Russian companies.  
 
- Influence 
Finally, according to the interviewed reporters, the Moscow Times 
coverage was an influential factor in determining investor perception 
about the environment. As one of the reporters pointed out: 
                                                          
159
 When the reporters did manage to arrange interviews with Russian managers, often the content was 
very superficial. Additionally, during the course of most of the interviews it emerged that the reporters 
interviewed Russian managers in Russian. Clearly, this is partially an explanation of the pro-western bias 
because, in general, for the reporters, it is much easier to talk in their native language (which with reference 
to all interviewed reporters was English). 
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“... [the newspaper] was very influential among foreigners who 
worked in Russia because it was the only thing many of them 
could read so I once saw Condoleezza Rice with it under her 
arm and I saw John Bolton carrying it around his hotel so it 
was influential with US politicians and business people.” 
Moreover, another reporter said that the newspaper shaped investor 
perception beyond its direct readership:  
„The Moscow Times coverage was very important for foreign 
perception; first of all the foreigners in Moscow read it and the 
people who were interested in Russia read it and it had an 
influence on all the foreign correspondence in Moscow so what 
the Moscow Times wrote influenced what the New York Times 
wrote. I know plenty of cases where … the correspondents 
working for the foreign papers would pick up on stories that were 
first reported in the Moscow Times including the Economist.‟ 
 
In conclusion, the analysed interview data demonstrated/confirmed that the 
constructed templates: 
5. Adequately reflect the reported material of the newspaper (i.e. no major 
disputes were omitted from the coded material); 
6. Are based on the reports which were largely independent, accurate (although 
biased in favour of foreign investors) and influential in terms of forming 
investor perception.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 245 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the numerical overview of coded data, followed by a 
detailed analysis of the content of second- and third-order codes. With reference 
to each code, key comparisons were made between the two years of the study. 
Each time a code was introduced a graphical representation was included in order 
to depict the extent of coverage provided by the newspaper. The content of all 
second-order codes was included in the analysis whereas the third-order codes 
were presented together with references to the corresponding templates.  
The final section of the chapter presented the interview material, analysis of which, 
helped to triangulate the coded data. It was demonstrated that every possible 
precaution was taken in order to ensure that no major disputes were missing out 
from the coded data and consequently analysis.  
The analysis of the codes and their content revealed a number of changes in the 
institutional environment in Russia. The following chapter is designed to present 
these changes with reference to each code.   
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 demonstrated how the collected data set (appendices 9a and 9b) was 
transformed into information about institutional change in Russian corporate 
governance based on the two time periods. The key objective of this chapter is to 
present that information in a structured way with a link to the relevant literature. 
This chapter concludes with a detailed outline of the original contribution of the 
study. 
 
5.2 Framework for Presenting the Findings 
Because of the high level of detail and complexity of the analysis, it is important to 
ensure that the findings are presented in a structured way. In order to make the 
overall comparison possible, the findings about the registered change in 
perception of the environment in Russia will be divided into two groups: 
 Forces that stimulate the improvement of corporate governance 
 Forces that prevent the development of corporate governance. 
The findings presented in table 5.1 need to be considered in conjunction with the 
framework (chapter 2, figure 2.3) that was created at the stage of the literature 
review. The purpose of the framework is to summarise the key drivers in the 
process of institutional evolution in the context of Russian corporate governance. 
The table shows all used codes, corresponding forces and additional references to 
related codes (necessary because of parallel coding).  
Page 247 
 
Table 5.1: Forces that determine institutional change in Russian corporate governance. 
Coding 
 
Forces that stimulate improvement of 
corporate governance 
Forces that prevent the development of 
corporate governance  
Bankruptcy 
1.1.1 
 
 Formal institutions have accumulated much 
greater enforcement powers capable of 
confronting even the most powerful oligarchs 
 Protection of unviable businesses has 
subsided 
 Bankruptcies have stopped being used by 
private groups as a mechanism for seizing 
control; reference: 1.1.6. 
 A precedent has been set when bankruptcy 
proceedings were used to destroy a financially 
viable entity for political reasons; reference: 
1.1.2, 1.1.6, 1.2.1, D.1, D5, ES.10. 
 
Ownership 
1.1.2 
 
 Property rights have become stronger in 
conflicts without state involvement 
 Private ownership has become more 
transparent; reference: D.2. 
 Politically motivated re-allocation of property 
has gathered momentum; reference: 1.2.1, 
D.1, D.5, ES.10. 
 
Misinvestment 
1.1.3 
 Shareholders have begun to challenge 
investment projects more effectively; 
reference: D.3. 
 
Misimplementation 
1.1.4 
  Implementation of viable investment project 
has become more difficult due to increased 
government interference; reference: D.1, 
ES.10. 
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Coding 
 
Forces that stimulate improvement of 
corporate governance 
Forces that prevent the development of 
corporate governance  
Taxes 
1.1.5 
 
 Emergency tax collection has become less of 
a feature of the environment 
 Tax authorities have stopped acting on behalf 
of self-centred private individuals; reference: 
1.1.2, 1.1.6, D.5. 
 Tax authorities have become instrumental in 
the political re-distribution of property; 
reference: 1.1.2, 1.1.6, D.1, D.5, ES.10. 
 
Control 
1.1.6 
 
 Legitimate shareholders have a greater level 
of control over private corporate entities which 
do not attract the attention of the state 
 Culturally, there is a greater level of 
acceptance of authority of private owners; 
reference: 1.1.2. 
 There has been complete lack of regard for 
legitimate owners‘ authority when the 
government was involved in corporate 
disputes; reference: D.1, ES.10. 
 
Diversion of 
Assets 
1.2.1 
 Private companies in need of foreign finance 
have become more pressured to price their 
assets according to the market value. 
 Acquisitions of valuable assets by state 
companies have not followed market rules; 
reference: D.1, ES.10. 
Diversion of 
Claims 
1.2.2 
 Private companies have improved their 
corporate image by not engaging in the 
practice of blatant expropriation; reference: 
D.5.  
 The government has engaged in the most 
daring expropriation of assets reference: D.1., 
D.5, ES.10. 
State Interference 
D.1 
 
  The government has become much more 
aggressive and capable of regaining control 
and ownership over key assets (re-
nationalisation) despite existing agreements 
and contracts; reference: 1.1.2, 1.1.6, D.5, 
ES.10.  
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Coding 
 
Forces that stimulate improvement of 
corporate governance 
Forces that prevent the development of 
corporate governance  
Inadequate 
Information 
D.2 
 
 Ultimate beneficiaries have started the trend 
of disclosing their holdings; reference: 1.1.2. 
 
 The environment continues being filled with 
secretive entities with undisclosed ownership 
and unaudited financial information 
 Shareholders continue to receive confusing 
and misleading information ahead of important 
votes. 
General Meetings  
D.3 
 
 Blatant abuse of voting rights and illegal 
resolutions have become less prominent 
 Confidence in the adequacy of board 
representation has increased160. 
 
Unclear Rules 
D.4 
 
 Clarity of rules and laws has increased. 
 
 Corporate raids continue to be made possible 
by existence of laws which are impossible to 
follow; reference: 1.1.2; 
 The government has been enforcing policies 
based on practice and not laws; reference: 
1.1.2, 1.1.6, D.1, D.5, ES.10, ES.12. 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
D.5 
 Self-centred actions initiated by private 
owners have become less visible. 
 Massive self-centred dealings continue to be a 
feature of non-transparent state companies; 
reference: D.2. 
Relationship-
Based 
Enforcement 
ES.1 
 Non-transparent out-of-court settlements have 
become a less prominent feature of the 
environment; reference: D.2. 
 Corporate cronyism has elevated itself to the 
institutional level. 
 
                                                          
160
 Previously, ownership did not necessarily translate into proportionate board representation and voting rights. 
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Coding 
 
Forces that stimulate improvement of 
corporate governance 
Forces that prevent the development of 
corporate governance  
Self-Enforcement  
ES.2 
 
 Barbarian corporate behaviour initiated by 
private parties has subsided in prominence; 
reference: 1.1.2, 1.1.6, D.5; 
 Unions have stopped being abused in 
corporate conflicts 
 The process of dispute resolution has 
generally become more sophisticated.  
 Financial Industrial Groups continue to be 
powerful arbitrators in the environment 
 Anonymous power structures continue to be 
active in the environment; reference: D.2. 
 
Third-party 
Enforcement 
ES.3 
 
 Finance providers have begun to act as 
important enforcers of good corporate 
governance standards. 
 Financial Industrial Groups continue to be 
powerful arbitrators in the environment 
 Anonymous power structures continue to be 
active in the environment; reference: D.2. 
Private 
Enforcement 
ES.4 
  Corporate violence has not subsided, and now 
radiates from the establishment rather than 
private individuals; reference: ES.10. 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
ES.5 
  The level of centralised state command of its 
own ministries and institutions has grown 
considerably.  
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
ES.6 
  Greater capacity of the state has begun to act 
as a stronger deterrent of corporate actions 
against the government. 
Litigation 
ES.7 
 
 International arbitration has gathered 
momentum 
 Courts have begun to be taken more 
seriously. 
 The state continues to exert a lot of influence 
over all levels of judiciary in the country. 
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It is important to reiterate that the above statements correspond to key drivers 
which determine the change in the institutional make-up of the country in 
perceived terms. Although they appear to be real factors illustrating the 
evolutionary process of Russian governance there is an important limitation that 
refers to the capacity of the newspaper to reflect the actual situation.  
With reference to figure 2.1 (chapter 2), the presented material adds to the 
understanding of the dynamics of the institutional change in the country. Some of 
the forces identified in the figure are not consistent with the content of table 5.1. 
The inconsistencies primarily relate to the role of the state in ensuring a general 
trend towards the rule of law in the country.  
 
5.3 Institutional Change in Russian Corporate Governance 
From the presented findings, an important distinction needs to be drawn. A 
meaningful discussion of the institutional change in Russian corporate governance 
has to distinguish between state companies and private entities and shareholders.  
 
5.3.1 Institutional Change in Russian Corporate Governance: The Role of the 
State 
According to the detailed analysis of corporate conflicts, there appears to have 
been a significant deterioration in the perception of the institutional environment in 
Russia. This perceived deterioration manifested itself through a number of factors 
that refer to 2006 and were not as prevalent in 1998. These factors are: 
 The policy of widespread re-nationalisation of key strategic assets into the 
hands of non-transparent entities 
 A court system which is subordinate to the administrative elite161 
                                                          
161
 Frequently, self-centred actions are sold to the public as a coherent political agenda with national 
interests in mind. 
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 Governmental agencies and ministries that resort to selective sanctioning in 
resolving important corporate conflicts 
 Culture of extra-judiciary involvement originating from the government. 
Additionally, the following negative features of the environment were detected in 
both years of the study: 
 Low level of observance of formal agreements and contracts; 
 Weak markets incapable of dictating terms of major transactions; 
 Culture of corporate cronyism within the government; 
 Administrative elite which consists of self-centred individuals; 
 Artificially created bureaucratic hurdles that are designed to act as ‗gate-
keepers‘ for the government officials. 
In terms of the moderately positive changes in 2006, the Russian government: 
 Increased its capacity to regulate the environment; 
 Increased its financial stability and independence; 
 Increased control over local administrations and competing power 
structures.  
The above findings demonstrate that the increased capacity of the state 
contributed a great deal to the deterioration of the perceived integrity of the 
institutional environment in the country. This is in contrast to Gel‘man (2004) and 
Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova (2003) who suggested that a stronger state should lead 
to a diminishing power of informal institutions. On the contrary, in the Russian 
context the increased capacity of the state (in the short to medium term) has led to 
the incorporation of previously autonomous informal networks into the 
establishment. The latter has begun to rely on extra-judiciary enforcement in the 
instances where formal arbitration does not produce the desired (by the 
government) effects. The coded material reveals evidence that on the level of 
perception, this fact has led to a further entrenchment of informal institutions which 
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started to function as an executive arm of the enforcement machinery of the state. 
Put differently, in the Russian context, it is not about the contradiction between 
informal power structures and the state, but the state seeking to co-operate with 
the informal institutions in the quest for a greater level of control over commercial 
activities in the country.  
Therefore, the growing capacity and power of the government are being perceived 
as a threat to the desired development of a predictable regulatory infrastructure 
(i.e. formal institutions). In this sense, the expected change toward a more 
developed culture of market control is unlikely to be perceived as a feasible 
outcome of the ongoing trend. This is an important addition to Roberts‘ (2004) 
findings who predicted an improvement of corporate conduct once companies 
become exposed to international markets. The coded data suggests that with 
reference to state companies, the latter proposition needs to be treated with 
additional caution.  
Furthermore, the concept of ‗administrative government‘ (Pistor & Xu, 2005) has 
discredited itself to the extent that it cannot be perceived as a viable alternative to 
legal governance in the Russian context. Moreover, the coded data suggests that 
the frequently cited proposition that it is the incomplete laws in Russia that have 
hindered the development of capital markets (Pistor & Xu, 2005) does not hold 
true from the perspective of the state companies. In terms of perception, the 
analysed data suggests that even if all the required laws were in place, the culture 
of the Russian administration does not preclude the use of various administrative 
techniques that inhibit justice and hence destroy confidence in the capital markets. 
In this regard, the data supports Black‘s (2001) proposition that it is the fact of 
inferior enforcement that constitutes the central problem for the Russian corporate 
governance. However, this study emphasises the destructive role of the state in 
the latter proposition and predicts further deterioration of the sentiment in relation 
to the development of capital markets in the country. In other words the 
consequences of the corrupt government described by Black, Kraakman & 
Tarassova (2000) are coming into fruition in the context of its extended financial 
power and control. Furthermore, it is irrelevant to discuss the progress of 
corporate governance reforms until formal institutions such as the courts and 
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market regulators acquire sufficient integrity to challenge the state. The analysed 
data suggests that, in perceived terms, the opposite is happening in Russia.  
Moreover, to a limited degree this phenomenon of the Russian corporate 
environment has been exported (alongside billions of barrels of oil) to even some 
of the most established international markets, where investment decisions (for 
example Rosneft‘s listing on the London Stock Exchange) were made on the basis 
of political manoeuvring rather than in the commercial interests of the 
shareholders. In this context, contrary to Roberts (2004), it is possible to suggest 
that the international capital markets may be negatively affected by the strong 
presence of Russian state companies. This is particularly true for the state 
monopolies from strategic sectors that together with their substantial resources 
impose political bargaining and, in general, inferior corporate culture. 
It is also important to acknowledge that the system is very inert and is unlikely to 
change drastically due to the strong presence of cronyism within the government. 
Helmke & Levitsky (2004) refer to the role of the legacy of the past in forming the 
actual institutional make-up of a country. According to the collected data in the 
Russian context, this legacy is unlikely to be eroded, and on the contrary, may 
increase in its perceived presence because of the self-perpetuating nature of the 
Russian government162.   
On the positive side, greater capacity of the state has increased clarity as to which 
power structures represent the true authority in the country. In the 1990s it was 
possible for local administrations and Financial Industrial Groups to determine 
their own rules of co-operation with major investors in their immediate environment 
(Brown, Guriev,& Volchkova, 2000). The power was decentralised and therefore 
the environment was demarcated into separate constituencies with their own 
institutional peculiarities (e.g. involvement of the Cossack army in the dispute 
resolution at Knauf-Kubansky Gyps factory). Under Yeltsin, the government 
claimed control of these power structures, but never really had much influence 
over what they actually did on their own territory. In perceived terms, the coded 
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 The Russian political elite survived the change from communism to capitalism. It is a well-known fact 
that Putin was a KGB agent under the Soviet system and a president and later Prime Minister of supposedly 
capitalist Russia. 
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data suggests that it was absolutely not the case in 2006 when the central 
government very easily extended its administrative resource against rebelling 
governors and Financial Industrial Groups.  As far as foreign investors are 
concerned, the environment now offers a lot more clarity in terms of exactly who 
needs to be approached for the authorisation of large commercial deals. But this is 
where the positive change ends. The gathered data answers the question posed 
by Pomeranz (2004) about where the property rights would go under Putin. In 
perceived terms, there is evidence to suggest that the government is readily 
prepared to change its mind in connection with previously signed agreements 
about commercial property. In other words, although foreign investors now know 
who is responsible for regulating the environment and allocating property rights, 
they also know that there is a real risk of falling out of favour with the government 
and losing everything. This risk is exacerbated by the apparent unpredictability of 
the administrative elite and key decision makers within the government. Such an 
image of the Russian environment will inevitably lead to a new discount on sales 
of major Russian assets directly proportionate to the perceived risks of this nature. 
Clearly this fact is recognised by the government itself which is very keen to 
improve its corporate image by promoting concepts like the rule of law and formal 
institutions. Unfortunately, the analysed data suggests that in perceived terms 
these concepts are not maintained with reference to disputes over strategic 
assets.  
Therefore, in the context of pervasive cronyism that stagnates the necessary 
cultural change, the rule of law will not radiate from the government. This will 
continue to be the case until the benefits from creating a positive corporate image 
start to outweigh the gain from crude re-distribution of property (see literature 
review chapter 2, section 3.1.2). In the context of the ever-rising value of natural 
resources and struggling global markets this is unlikely to happen.  
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5.3.2 Institutional Change in Russian Corporate Governance: The Role of 
Private Capital 
With reference to conflicts involving private companies and shareholders, collected 
data suggests that the perception of corporate governance practice in the country 
has improved. This improvement is determined by a number of positive factors 
associated with 2006 that were not characteristic of 1998: 
 Recognition of private property by immediate stakeholders 
 Businesses less bound by social obligations 
 More sophisticated corporate culture displayed by 
shareholders/stakeholders in the instance of a corporate conflict 
 Dependence of commercial entities on external financing 
 Formal arbitration as an accepted norm 
 Less ambiguous environment and more transparent corporate entities. 
On the negative side: 
 Financial Industrial Groups continue to dominate the corporate environment 
 Corporate raids continue to take place 
 Secretive culture continues to be a factor. 
One of the key improvements within the environment relates to private entities 
which have become exposed to the control of recognisable corporate governance 
mechanisms. In particular, creditors and minority shareholders are in a much 
better bargaining position when it comes to negotiating their end of the deal. In 
perceived terms this did not happen due to an apparent and significant progress in 
the development of effective institutions, but because of the dependence of 
stakeholders on each other (Black & Kraakman, 1996). Large companies need 
working capital, and finance providers (creditors and shareholders) need to invest 
their money. The needs of large companies are determined by their owners‘ wish 
to protect their own capital (largely from the state) whereas the banks and 
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investors agree to provide the capital only on certain conditions. Due to the risk of 
re-nationalisation, private companies need to protect themselves more and more. 
Banks (particularly foreign) capitalise on this fact by demanding better corporate 
governance standards. Although the threat of re-nationalisation is generally not 
good, the vulnerability of current owners forces them to accept ever growing 
demands of external finance providers. A good demonstration of this point is the 
disclosure of the identity of RusAl‘s ultimate beneficiary after it was demanded by 
the EBRD. Derepaska (100% shareholder of RusAl) needed to accept this 
condition to protect his own money by receiving a loan from the European bank.  
Similar logic applies to foreign minority shareholders who are now in a better 
position to protect their interests. In Russia, 100% ownership is perceived as a 
very dangerous position to be in. One of the reasons the Yukos affair was so 
painful for the Russian government was because of the involvement of foreign 
minority shareholders who put up a real fight in the international courts suing even 
top government officials. Had Khodorkovsky (CEO of Yukos) been a 100% owner, 
the story would not have been published in the newspaper more than once. 
Private owners in Russia realised this fact and became very keen to invite foreign 
minority stakeholders. Consequently, corporate behaviour improved because of 
that keenness (which is stimulated by the risk of losing everything). This provides 
an insight into how the self-enforcing model of corporate law (Black, 1996) actually 
evolved in the Russian context. 
Additionally, although the capital markets are still perceived as under-developed, 
transactions involving private companies are naturally gravitating towards 
appropriate valuations. No longer do severely discounted sales constitute a 
feature of the perceived environment in the context of private transactions. Hence 
with regard to private companies, the coded data serves as a confirmation of the 
findings by Roberts (2004). Moreover, due to the previously mentioned proximity 
to market valuations major private sales are not typically followed by fierce battles 
for control. Renegade directors have disappeared from the perceived corporate 
scene and no longer cause confusion as to who the real owners are. This fact 
serves as an explanation for the falling degree of violence (often referred to as 
‗gun battles‘ in the press) initiated by private parties. Admittedly, if no one 
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challenges property rights, then there is no need to resort to the extra-judiciary 
resolution163. 
Additionally, the inevitable profit-driven agenda of private entities has forced 
companies to shed their externally imposed social obligations (Fox & Heller, 
2000). In perceived terms, the gathered data suggests that the workers collectives 
(unions) stopped playing as big a role in 2006 as they did in the 1990s. Moreover, 
there is reduced pressure on major companies to invest in social projects and 
maintain certain levels of employment. Therefore, in terms of balancing the needs 
of key stakeholders, there are fewer conflicting demands with which the 
management typically needs to be concerned (Black & Kraakman, 1996). In this 
respect, the overall perception is that the government is the only stakeholder 
whose interests require careful consideration. 
In terms of the judiciary, although there is an element of bigger companies‘ ability 
to more effectively navigate the court system, the fact that according to the 
reported material the court rulings are usually complied with suggests greater 
integrity of the judiciary with reference to private conflicts. In this respect, it is 
suggested that stronger property rights and the more profit-driven environment 
have encouraged longer term investments that in turn place greater importance on 
corporate image, which then forces bigger companies to respect court decisions 
(even when they have the financial clout to challenge/undermine the judiciary).  
In terms of the analysis of the reported data, the most significant drop in reported 
corporate disputes occurred in relation to private companies. Although corporate 
raids continue to send shockwaves across investment communities in Russia, in 
perceived terms, private entities have entered a new era of corporate governance 
where efficient capital markets, adequate judiciary and cultural integrity are 
recognisable ingredients in the developing corporate environment in Russia.  
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 And if the government challenges ownership, then in most cases the perception is that nothing can be 
done about it. 
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5.4 Original Contribution 
1. In terms of the gap in contemporary literature on Russian corporate 
governance, this study attempts to address the call to generate more enterprise 
data (Fox & Heller, 2000) and investigate the subject of institutional change in 
Russian corporate governance. This was achieved by studying company practice 
from a unique perspective (Iwasaki, 2007). One of the key research outputs of this 
study is a comprehensive data base of the reported corporate disputes covering 
the two years of the study. The database (appendices 9a and 9b) can be used by 
both academics and practitioners by tracing general conclusions back to the detail 
of the individual company‘s behaviour. Here, the changes within the reported 
practice serve as a foundation for inferences about the institutional change in 
Russia.  
2. This study explains the nature of corporate disputes and methods of their 
resolution based on the analysis of the reported material. It exposes the 
weaknesses of positivistic categorisations and capitalises on a more flexible 
coding system. In this context the findings reveal a compelling call for separating 
state companies from private entities in the analysis of corporate disputes (table 
5.1). With reference to state companies, a considerable deterioration has been 
registered according to the reported practice of such entities. The key negative 
force here is determined by the acceptance of the culture of selective application 
of law in favour of state-run companies and at the expense of private shareholders 
and foreign companies. The exposure of state companies to international capital 
markets has imposed a number of valid restrictions on their conduct. However, the 
growing power of these entities poses a question whether even the most 
developed capital markets will be a strong enough mechanism for aligning the 
conduct of state-run Russian companies in line with the Western norm. 
Additionally, the collected data suggests that with reference to private entities 
there is a noticeable improvement in the way corporate disputes are resolved. This 
primarily refers to the growing costs of reputational damage vis-a-vis foreign 
investors and market institutions rather than significant improvements in the 
Russian institutional environment. 
Page 304 
 
3. Although the wide spectrum of generated codes (appendix 6b) is not ideal for 
quantitative investigations, it illuminates areas not covered by formal frameworks 
of corporate disputes in Russia (Fox & Heller, 2000; Dyck et al., 2008). This 
contribution can serve as a basis for expanding the two existing frameworks, as 
well as inform the development of new ones. Similarly, the nature of enforcement 
practices (Hendley et al., 1999; Hendley et al., 2000) has been updated and 
expanded in the context of Russia‘s continuing transition. Here, future 
investigations need to focus on administrative levers of the state and litigation 
(chapter 4, section 4, 4.1.5 and 4.1.7) as the most visible enforcement practices in 
the country.  
Finally, this study utilises the method of template analysis (King, 2004) in its less 
traditional application. Therefore, the coding experience accumulated in the 
process constitutes an additional contribution to knowledge. In order to explain the 
last point in more detail, the researcher‘s reflections on the method of analysis 
need to be considered (see chapter 6). 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the findings of the study and discussed a number of 
relevant links to the literature. Table 5.1 summarised the key forces behind the 
institutional change in Russia and revealed the underlying distinction between the 
role of state-run and private companies in determining the institutional context in 
the country. It was concluded that a noticeable deterioration of the institutional 
context occurred based on the practice of state-run companies and an 
improvement with regard to the conduct of private entities.  
Original contribution of this work has been formulated and identified within the 
thesis. Firstly, the call for a multi-faceted approach to investigations of corporate 
governance has been addressed. Secondly, the change in the institutional 
environment in the country has been analysed from a unique perspective. Thirdly, 
the categorisation of corporate disputes and methods of their resolution has been 
developed. Lastly, the main method of analysis has been applied to the reported 
data in an innovative way. 
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter briefly reiterates the main findings of the study, provides a detailed 
revision of the research objectives and also shares reflections on the use of 
template analysis. The work is concluded by referring to key limitations and further 
research suggestions. 
 
6.2 Institutional Change in Russian Corporate Governance 
The study registered institutional change in Russian corporate governance as per 
the Moscow Times reports. The biggest change occurred in the perceived role of 
formal institutions and the way the Russian government chooses to employ those 
while dealing with large businesses. Here, there is little hope for an improved 
institutional environment because of the culture of key stakeholders within the 
government who continue to accept the practice of selective application of rules 
and laws. This conclusion is based on the reported actions that the state exhibited 
in its drive to re-nationalise some of the assets, particularly in the strategic sectors 
such as oil and gas. Support for this conclusion lies in the numerous examples of 
state companies‘ behaviour revealed by the analysis of the coded material. This 
practice is imitated by smaller-scale officials who facilitate corporate raids through 
manufactured allegations against targeted entities. Although the reform to tackle 
this problem is currently under way, it is likely to produce a limited impact unless 
the culture of the Russian administrative elite changes accordingly. 
With respect to private entities, the reported practice shows a greater degree of 
reliance on formal institutions in the process of dispute resolution. Although there 
is a perceived dominance of Financial Industrial Groups, there are also examples 
of behaviour that accounts for basic corporate governance principles. This shift in 
attitude of private entrepreneurs is determined by the evolving set of motives that 
encourage compliance with the law. The growing threat of re-nationalisation has 
created a pressing need to involve western finance providers since they are seen 
as more effective guards of property rights. This effectiveness is determined by the 
fact that the Russian government chooses not to violate the rights of foreign 
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investors as blatantly as it does in relation to Russian owners. Therefore, private 
owners in the country are keen to engage in long-term partnerships with western 
investors. In order to make these partnerships work, the Russian owners feel 
pressure to display higher standards of corporate governance. 
 
6.3 Revisiting Research Objectives 
1. Gap in the Literature 
The literature on Russian corporate governance is filled with positivistic studies 
that investigate correlations between certain corporate or institutional 
characteristics and firm structure and performance (Iwasaki, 2007). Having 
reviewed most of the studies of this nature, it was possible to see that the existing 
knowledge about the actual interaction between various institutions and corporate 
entities is very limited. Fox & Heller (2000) explain this lack of research in terms of 
the difficulties associated with gaining access to companies in Russia. The 
literature review (chapter 2) provides an overview of the state of Russian corporate 
governance and outlines the gap in academic knowledge in the context of this 
study. Investigations of Russian corporate governance need to be carried out from 
a wide range of perspectives (Iwasaki, 2007). Hence, the research question was 
formulated with this in mind. Previous work that helped to formulate and address 
the research question was considered with maximum detail.  
2. Data Collection 
The selected method of data collection produced a rich data set for subsequent 
analysis. The amount of the Moscow Times coverage of corporate disputes was 
greater than expected. In total over 300 articles were selected covering a wide 
range of companies, disputes and practices (Chapter 3). The extent of coverage of 
corporate disputes was varied, but in most cases sufficient for the selected method 
of coding. 
3. Data Analysis 
The research question was developed with the available data set and method of 
analysis in mind. Due to the wide gap in the literature and the fairly unusual 
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methodology of this study the original contribution of this work was not 
compromised by the necessary adjustments. Hence the chosen method of data 
analysis helped the researcher to code a great deal of textual data in a way that 
was consistent with the research question.  
4. Coding 
The coding of the textual data was done manually164. The selected hierarchy fully 
covered the data set due to the flexibility of the coding process which is allowed by 
the method of analysis. Although this fact detracted from the meaningfulness of 
the numerical overview (chapter 4, section 1), it contributed a great deal to the 
level of detail captured by the analysis (chapter 4, sections 2, 3 and 4). It is felt 
that the final codes and their content reflect the nature of corporate disputes 
covered by the newspaper with a high degree of accuracy.  
5. Interviews 
Although the interviews were challenging to arrange, it is deemed that the five 
interviews conducted produced sufficient material to triangulate the extent to 
which the coded data covered the material reported by the newspaper (Chapter 4, 
section 5). During the process, invaluable experience of conducting telephone 
interviews for academic purposes was gained. 
6. Findings 
The output of data analysis is presented in table 5.1. The table is a detailed 
summary of factors stimulating and preventing the development of formal 
corporate governance institutions in the country (Chapter 5). Identification of these 
forces is necessary in order to understand the dynamics of the institutional change 
in the country. Although the identified forces were constructed from the reported 
material and are based on the perception of the environment, it is likely that their 
applicability can be extended to explain changes in the actual environment.   
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 This fact allowed the researcher to acquire a great deal of practical experience in this method. 
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6.4 Reflections on the Use of Template Analysis 
In methodological terms, this study contributes to the subject of corporate 
governance by demonstrating how template analysis can be applied to reported 
material and more specifically corporate disputes. This research exposes various 
stages of the coding process which accounts for the complexity of the chosen unit 
of analysis (i.e. corporate disputes). The main benefit of the method is its 
acceptance of individual interpretations165. Here, credibility is maintained by the 
transparency of the coding process while subjective interpretations highlight the 
unique intricacies of the data set. 
1. Unit of Analysis 
The data set of this study originates from newspaper articles which were written 
with the primary purpose of informing the reader. The fact that these articles also 
address the research question is a by-product. This is different in the case of 
interview transcripts which are usually created specifically to address certain 
questions. To remedy this situation it is necessary to select a clear unit of analysis 
which is easily identifiable. It was discovered that corporate disputes are 
recognisable in newspaper reports and therefore act as an appropriate filter for 
selecting relevant articles. This selection process is necessary to ensure that the 
content of the raw (un-coded) data is consistent with the research question. 
Therefore, in this context the quality of the data set is contingent upon the level of 
‗identifiability‘ of the unit of analysis. Corporate disputes, although recognisable to 
a reader of articles, cannot be captured inclusively by means of key search words. 
Hence, appropriate research time needs to be set aside for a careful screening of 
the content of reported material. This is a very labour intensive task which is best 
performed manually in order to ensure maximum consistency of the data set and 
research question. 
2. Evolution of Codes 
Once the data set has been created the task of coding becomes the individual 
effort of the researcher. It is recognised that the evolution of codes is a creative 
process that contains an element of subjectivity. This freedom of subjectivity is 
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 Almost constructionist perspective. 
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necessary in order to ensure the maximum reach of final codes. However, it is also 
critical to demonstrate the logic of the decisions made. In other words, the 
relationship between the codes and the corresponding content must be visible. In 
this respect, the researcher inevitably takes the risk of failing to expose such a 
connection. The coding experience of this study leads to the conclusion that in 
order to minimise such a risk, the relationship between the chosen codes and 
content must not be too inferential. Template analysis allows additions to and 
alternations of the employed codes and, therefore, the researcher was able to 
avoid overly complicated inferences by constantly revising the coding structure. 
3. Reported Material and Interviews 
This research demonstrates how the coded data can be triangulated by means of 
interviews with the reporters of the newspaper. It is felt that the result is 
satisfactory because the content of the coded material closely matches the content 
of conducted interviews. However, this triangulation primarily refers to the coding 
process and not extended generalisability of the findings. It is understood that the 
interviewed reporters would most likely refer to disputes they themselves wrote 
about. Unless there is a serious concern about freedom of speech, the content of 
the reported material should match the reporters‘ accounts. This in itself does not 
contribute anything to the status of the findings. What is an important contribution 
of triangulation in this context is the fact that no important dispute was omitted 
from the coding. In this respect, this research invites the triangulation of reported 
material in order to address concerns about the unit of analysis, the coding 
process, and the quality of the coded material. 
4. Usability of the Method 
In order to address the call for a multi-faceted approach to investigations of 
corporate governance in Russia more extensively, a greater use of this technique 
is completely justified. A great deal more can be learnt about the way institutions 
evolved in the country by a similar analysis of a different time span and source of 
media. Additionally, this research focused on the negative reporting associated 
with corporate disputes. Conversely, the same method can be applied to reported 
material on good corporate practice in the country. Here, any positive corporate 
news reported in the newspaper can be a justifiable unit of analysis. Finally, this 
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method can be used to complement the findings of more generalisable studies by 
borrowing their units of analysis and applying those to the reported material in a 
similar way. For example, studies that investigate the effects of ownership 
(Woodruff, 2004; Melentieva, 2000; Yudaeva et al., 2003) can be exposed to an 
additional level of scrutiny by analysing reported material in the proposed way. 
5. Limitations of the Method 
It is important to acknowledge that a great deal of diligence and thoughtfulness 
that is invested in the revision of codes remains largely behind the scenes166. 
Hence, the first limitation of this method is the fact that it relies on the 
thoroughness of the individual undertaking this method of analysis and his/her 
integrity as a researcher. The method needs to be treated with caution, particularly 
when it comes to the status of the findings. It involves an element of subjectivity 
and cannot function without acknowledging limited generalisability, reliability and 
validity. In order to address this point, alternative quality checks have to be 
selected. In connection with this research, credibility and trustworthiness of the 
findings are achieved by a transparent presentation of the coded data    
(appendices 9a and 9b as well as chapter 4, sections 2, 3 and 4) and 
complemented/triangulated by means of the interview material. 
Second, because of the flexibility of the coding process, it is difficult to predict the 
end result of the analysis. The limitation here relates to the applicability of the 
original data set which very much dictates the extent to which the research 
question can be addressed. As previously stated, this research relies on the 
textual data that was not originally created for the purpose of addressing the 
research question. Hence there is a limitation with regard to the actual applicability 
of the selected data set. Again as suggested previously, the remedy here is the 
connection of the research question with the data set through the chosen unit of 
analysis. If the connection is unclear, the required level of applicability can be 
questioned. 
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 It would be an impossible task to take the reader through every stage of the coding process because of 
the extent of alterations however appendices 6a and 6b present a priori and final codes. Also, chapter 4 
sections 2, 3 and 4 present the adopted definitions of the codes. 
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Third, replicability of the findings cannot be tested. This is because the coding 
structure evolves constantly and is not ready until the entire data set has been 
coded. Again, the solution here is the maximum exposure of the coded material 
which features in chapter 4 (sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). 
Finally, graphs and the numerical data presented in chapter 4 are subject to the 
limitation of the inherent subjectivity of the coding process. Therefore their purpose 
is to assist the task of presenting the findings and not correlating importance with 
frequency of reporting. Therefore, the conclusions of this study avoid allocating 
undue importance to the numerical trends. 
 
6.5 Limitations of the Study 
In addition to limitations presented in chapter 3 section 3 and chapter 6, it is 
important to stress that the findings presented in table 5.1 (chapter 5) primarily 
register a change in perception of the institutional environment in the country. 
Although anecdotal evidence (interviews with the Moscow Times reporters) 
suggests that the newspaper covers corporate conflicts in full, scientifically, this 
study analysed the expected change in perception, and conclusions about the 
actual institutional change in the country are inferential.  
Second, this study analysed reported material produced by a single newspaper. 
Although in 1998 it was the only English speaking news provider in the country, in 
more recent years a number of specialised English speaking media outlets in 
Russia have been established. 
Finally, the time span of the study is limited to two years. Although for a single 
researcher it is a considerable undertaking, the strength of inferences could have 
been improved by covering more years. 
   
6.6 Further Research 
Further research can address some of the above limitations of this study by 
expanding the time span and relying on more than a single media outlet. 
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One of the key lines of enquiry that further research is urged to pursue is 
extending the comparative dimension to include Russian publications. By 
comparing coded material produced on the basis of western and Russian media, 
not only additional knowledge about the subject matter can be extracted, but also 
important inference about the western bias and the freedom of reporting of 
corporate events in Russia can be determined. Here, a bilingual researcher will be 
necessary to ensure systematic coding of articles written in English and Russian. 
Second, this work can serve as a foundation for exploring various types of 
disputes and enforcement practices in more detail. The study produced a number 
of well defined units of analysis in the form of final codes. For example, the 
changing nature of private enforcement can be investigated on its own over a 
longer period of time. The produced content of the code can be used as a basis for 
developing a framework for further investigations of this type of enforcement 
practice in Russia and other environments. These more narrowly defined units of 
analysis are expected to inform more focused investigations with clear policy 
implications. 
Lastly, the subject of institutional change in Russian corporate governance needs 
to be discussed further as new evidence emerges with time. The same research 
question can be used in conjunction with a whole spectrum of both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies if the complexity of the process is to be fully examined. 
 
6.7 Concluding Comment 
The developing nature of corporate governance institutions needs to be under 
continuous scrutiny by academics. This study provides a useful contribution to 
understanding the evolutionary aspect of the phenomenon in the context of 
Russia‘s continuing transition. 
The greatest challenge of this study was determined by the level of complexity of 
the matter at hand which was accommodated for by the flexibility of the chosen 
methods of data collection and analysis. This complexity is expected to rise to a 
new level as Russia becomes more exposed to the global economy. The country‘s 
financial markets have been affected a great deal by the current economic 
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downturn (Adelaja, 2008) despite the existence of a massive stabilisation fund. In 
political terms, the deficiencies of the system are likely to be temporarily forgotten 
and replaced by rhetoric against capital markets and in favour of a greater role of 
the state in corporate affairs in the country. The government will be keen to blame 
external factors and will likely get support from the public in the short-term. In this 
context, the institutional reform will lose momentum as both Russian and foreign 
investors seek to minimise the extent of their financial exposure. Already, the 
government is resorting to extreme measures of shutting down capital markets at 
times of extreme volatility in order to protect holdings of certain individuals. 
Ironically, the current financial crisis represents a substantial opportunity for 
researchers to learn about the way the crisis is to be handled in the Russian 
context. The press continuously features reports alleging friendly bail-outs and 
corporate battles with private shareholders who seek to minimise their losses. 
Here, the tone set by the government and state companies will determine how the 
country will overcome the downturn. In any case, the behaviour of key 
stakeholders will have a significant impact on the future development of the 
institutional context in the country. However, if Russia is to take its rightful place 
among key economic powers, the basic premise is still as relevant as ever - the 
administrative elite in the country must be constrained by uncorrupt formal 
institutions. In the context of previously unsuccessful attempts the task of building 
such a system needs to be given overriding priority. 
Finally, regardless of the findings of this study that suggest an increased role of 
the state in corporate affairs in the country, foreign investments will continue to 
flow into Russia. This fact is largely independent of the success of the government 
at implementing market reforms and strengthening formal institutions. Here, the 
bargaining power will continue to be on the Russian side because of the current 
abundance of natural resources that are simply unavailable elsewhere. This very 
fact does not render successful reforms as a precondition for receiving much 
needed foreign investments. Hence, reforms in Russia are unlikely to be prioritised 
to the same extent as they would have been if the country had to compete for 
foreign capital and expertise on the same terms as other former Soviet republics. 
The reforms there are linked to the very survival of the economies and hence have 
been and are treated much more seriously than in Russia. Consequently, Russia 
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is suffering from a variation of the Dutch Disease167 which paradoxically is caused 
by Russia‘s inherited wealth. However, the most dangerous downside here is not 
the crumbling domestic industry (the classic effect of the Dutch Disease), but 
excessively deconstructive role of the state that pursues its own self-perpetuating 
style of governance. This style of governance, in immediate terms, blocks 
governance reforms, but more fundamentally transcends and becomes more 
embedded in the accepted norms of the society which in turn becomes less 
equipped to function normally in the context of the free market setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167
 The term Dutch Disease refers to the adverse effects on manufacturing that natural resource discoveries 
have essentially through the subsequent appreciation of real exchange rate. The term originates from the 
1960s Holland when the local economy suffered from gas discoveries and subsequent appreciation of the 
Dutch guilder (Corden, 1984). 
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Appendix 1 a: Background Information about the Moscow Times 
 
THE MOSCOW TIMES Part of Independent Media-Sanoma 
Magazines Publishing House. 
Hard Copy 
Published Since     1992 
Format       А3 
Volume       16-32 
Language       English 
Frequency        Monday through Friday 
Circulation, number of copies    35,000 
Readership over six months   357,400  
Readership per single issue   26,600 
Current Editor:      Andrew McChesney 
Business Editor:      Tim Wall 
 
Distribution system — distributed for free in over 500 of Moscow's most prestigious 
locations such as business centres, international airlines, embassies, hotels, medical 
centres, restaurants, supermarkets and sport clubs. 
 
On Line: www.themoscowtimes.com 
Readership:      20,000 visitors per day 
Audience:      25% Russian, 75% foreign 
 
The website is particularly popular with representatives of the following industries: - 
Finance and Insurance Banking 
- Academic Research 
- IT and Telecommunication 
- Education 
- Government and Public Services 
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28.7% of readers are top managers of Russian and Western companies in Russia and 
abroad. 
 
Archive:   139,000 articles covering over a decade of 
news events in Russia and around the world 
 
Content: General News, Business, Opinion, World, 
Real Estate, Job Opportunities, Mini-guide, 
Sports, Arts & Ideas  
 
 
 
 
Source: NRS Gallup Media, NRS Moscow (September 2007 – February 2008) 
 
 
Appendix 1 b: Opinion of the Moscow Times reporters about the paper‟s 
independence and influence 
  
„…the readership of the newspaper is not big enough to be on the 
Kremlin‟s radar and therefore its reporting is free from political pressure, 
which most Russian language newspapers have to deal with‟.  
 
 
 
 
Certainly, it gave an accurate portrayal of many of the problems of 
corporate governance because they tend to focus on those kind of 
things, right? Because they were news. 
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The Moscow Times coverage was very important for foreign perception; 
first of all the foreigners in Moscow read it and the people who were 
interested in Russia read it and it had an influence on all the foreign 
correspondence in Moscow so what the Moscow Times wrote influenced 
what the New York Times wrote. I know plenty of cases where the 
journalists – the correspondents working for the foreign papers would pick 
up on stories that were first reported in the Moscow Times including the 
Economist. 
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Appendix 2: Framework of Russian Corporate Governance Pathologies 
 
I. Non -Maximization of Residuals168 
Pathology 1: 
Unreformable 
value-destroying 
firms fail 
to close 
 
Arises when an unreformable value-destroying firm 
can dissipate cash reserves or salvageable assets. 
Corporate governance is not the key issue when a 
firm has no reserves or salvageable assets, or when 
subsidies or unsuitable credits are present. 
Pathology 2: 
Viable firms fail to 
use existing 
capacity 
efficiently 
 
Arises when continued firm operation, if undertaken 
as efficiently as possible and without new 
investment, would be a positive net present value 
(NPV) decision; but costs 
are not minimized, the best price is not obtained for 
given output, or a non profit-maximizing output level 
is chosen. 
Pathology 3: 
Firms misinvest 
internally generated 
cash flows 
Arises when a firm uses internally generated cash 
flow to invest in new negative NPV projects instead 
of paying out this cash flow to shareholders who 
could invest the funds 
better elsewhere in the economy. 
Pathology 4: 
Firms fail to 
implement positive 
NPV projects 
 
Arises when a firm identifies but then fails to act on 
positive NPV projects. Managers tend to be averse 
to risk because they cannot diversify away from 
unsystematic risk of a firm‘s project. If others do not 
pick up the opportunity, the 
firm‘s failure also reduces social welfare. 
Pathology 5: Arises when a firm‘s managers fail to identify 
positive NPV projects that the firm is particularly well 
                                                          
168
 This framework of corporate governance pathologies served as a basis for the development of some of 
the themes and codes. However, it is critically important to point out that the final codes are defined by the 
actual content and not their a priori meaning.  
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Firms fail to 
identify positive 
NPV 
projects 
positioned to find. The possibility of venture 
financing and spin-offs can reduce the prevalence 
and social costs of this pathology. 
II. Non Pro Rata Distributions 
Pathology 6: 
Firms fail to prevent 
diversion of claims 
Arises when some residual owners of a firm 
manipulate corporate, bankruptcy, and other laws to 
shift ownership away from other residual owners – 
often by diluting shares held by outside minority 
shareholders. 
Pathology 7: 
Firms fail to prevent 
diversion of assets 
Arises when some residual owners privately 
appropriate assets and opportunities belonging to 
the firm, but leave the firm‘s formal ownership 
structure intact. 
Source: Fox & Heller, (2000) 
Appendix 3: Example of an article containing a corporate dispute 
 
Tuesday, October 27, 1998.  
 
Moscow Court Seizes 330 Rossiisky Kredit Vehicles 
By Boris Aliabyev  
Bailiffs have seized 330 cars and armoured vehicles owned by Bank Rossiisky 
Kredit, acting on a court ruling in favour of a disgruntled bank client.  
Moscow's Golovinsky District Court ordered the seizure of the property last week 
to support a claim by a computer firm called Trekhmernaya Pamyat, or Three-
Dimensional Memory, based in Oryol, a city about 400 kilometres southwest of 
Moscow, bailiff Maria Khrenova said Monday. Moscow's traffic police assisted the 
bailiffs in seizing the cars, she added.  
Trekhmernaya Pamyat won a ruling against Rossiisky Kredit in Moscow City 
Arbitration Court in September, said the firm's lawyer Sergei Yerokhov. The court 
ruled that Rossiisky Kredit had wrongfully refused to transfer 32 million rubles 
($1.9 million at Tuesday's official rate), meant for wages and taxes, out of the 
computer company's account. According to Yerokhov, the seized cars are worth 
$2 million.  
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The Golovinsky Court has jurisdiction over the area in Moscow where Rossiisky 
Kredit is registered. It has recently issued over 40 rulings against the bank, which 
are now being enforced, a court official said.  
Rossiisky Kredit was one of Russia's top banks before the Aug. 17 ruble 
devaluation and debt default. Some of its depositors and clients have since filed a 
suit against the bank to recover their money. Vladimir Zimonenko, a lawyer who 
works for several Rossiisky Kredit depositors, told Reuters last week that he had 
won one of these cases, in which his client demanded $8,000 from the bank.  
Numerous suits are pending against other Russian banking giants also, for 
example, more than 5,000 of them have been filed against SBS-Agro bank in 
another area of Moscow.  
But the Trekhmernaya Pamyat case dates to events that took place before Aug. 
17. The bank says it had refused to transfer Trekhmernaya Pamyat's money 
because the firm's account had been frozen by tax authorities in Oryol last 
summer. Rossiisky Kredit spokeswoman Tatyana Izmailova said the bank would 
appeal the arbitration court ruling.  
The computer company's lawyers said, however, that the tax authorities had no 
problem with their client and the bank was just trying to hang on to the money.  
 
Appendix 4: Interview Guide 
 
Introduction:  
The questions below address the corporate governance environment in Russia. They 
seek to: 
1. Cover corporate disputes and methods of their resolution pertaining to and 
representative of 1998 and 2006.  
2. Invite comments on the rule of law/ (or lack of it) as determined by the dominance 
of both formal and informal institutions. 
3. Address the role of The Moscow Times and press in covering corporate disputes. 
 
Interviewees: Three reporters working for the Moscow Times in 1998169 
 
Questions in relation to late 1990s Russia: 
 
                                                          
169 All published material produced by the reporters was reviewed before the interviews in order to help participants recall particularly 
memorable disputes and be in a better position to probe the questions further. 
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1. Disputes: 
Are there any particular corporate disputes that come to mind?  
Possible answers: 
1.  Managerial (non- maximization of residuals) 
1. Bankruptcy 
2. Ownership 
3. Misinvestment 
4. Misimplementation 
5. Taxes 
6. Control 
2.  Distributions (unfair distribution of residuals) 
7. Diversion of Assets 
8. Diversion of Claims 
3. Other 
 
Probe170: What was the problem? Who were the key parties involved in the disputes?  
 
2.  Enforcement: 
What were the most effective ways of resolving such corporate disputes? 
Possible answers: 
1. Litigation (courts) 
2. Administrative levers of the state (officials exercising influence) 
3. Private enforcement (private enforcement agencies, security firms) 
4. Third-party enforcement (influential organisations) 
5. Self- enforcement (own capabilities) 
6. Shadow of enforcement (threat of resorting to a stronger enforcement 
mechanism) 
7. Relationship-based enforcement (negotiations, mutual agreement, 
compromise) 
8. Other 
Probe: Who was involved in the arbitration process? Which party/stakeholder group 
prevailed and why? How fair was the arbitration process? 
 
3. Institutional Environment and the Rule of Law 
To what extent were the identified methods of dispute resolution determined by the 
existing institutional environment?  
 
Probe: What were the most dominant institutions/mediators at the time? Which institutions 
were stronger at the time? How would you comment on the rule of law at the time? 
 
                                                          
170 Suggested by King, (2004). 
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Interviewees: Two reporters working for the Moscow Times in 2006 
 
 
The same set of questions is then asked in relation to modern day (2006) Russia. 
 
Interviewees: All five reporters working for the Moscow Times 
 
 
Additionally, two questions specifically about the Moscow Times were asked: 
4. The role of the Moscow Times 
 
4. a  How accurate was/is the Moscow Times coverage of corporate disputes?  
Probe: If accurate/inaccurate – why? Any political, economic or other pressures? 
Any sources of possible bias? 
4. b  How much of foreign investor perception was/is determined by the Moscow Times 
coverage of the environment? 
Probe: How does the newspaper coverage of disputes influence actual corporate 
practice? 
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Appendix 5: Informed consent form for research participants 
 
Title of Study 
 
Institutional Change in Russian Corporate 
Governance: An Analysis of Corporate 
Disputes 
Person(s) conducting the research Roman Stepanov 
 Programme of study PhD 
Address of the researcher for 
correspondence 
 
Newcastle Business School 
City Campus East 
Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 8ST 
Telephone +44(0)191 2347660 or +44(0)7949120617 
E-mail roman.stepanov@unn.ac.uk 
Description of the broad nature of the 
research 
 
 
 
Arguably, the two major determinants of 
corporate governance in the Russian context 
are shareholder rights and law enforcement 
practices. Over the years, practical solutions 
employed in relation to these determinants 
deviated from the Western model by far more 
than any other aspect of corporate 
governance. The first stage of the study 
proposes to address the evolutional change 
within these determinants by examining 
corporate disputes and enforcement strategies 
prevailing in 1998 and 2006 in Russia. 
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Description of the involvement 
expected of participants including the 
broad nature of questions to be 
answered or events to be observed or 
activities to be undertaken, and the 
expected time commitment 
 
 
 Participants will be expected to share 
their knowledge/experience of typical 
corporate disputes pertaining to 1998 
and 2006 in Russia. 
 Participants will be asked about 
enforcement strategies used in relation 
to the disputes identified. 
 Participants will be asked to comment 
on the institution change in Russia over 
the period in question 
 Interviews will last approximately half 
an hour and participants will be asked 
whether they consent to the interview 
being recorded. They do not have to do 
so. 
 
 Participants will later be offered the 
chance to read a transcript of the 
interview and amend it if they wish to. 
 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and 
participants can refuse to answer certain 
questions or end the interview at any time. 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly 
confidential (i.e. will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and 
organisations will not be identified unless this is expressly excluded in the details given 
above). 
 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of 
forms and for a variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed 
above. It will not be used for purposes other than those outlined above without your 
permission.  
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above 
information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of the above information. 
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Participant‟s signature             Date: 
 
 
Student’s signature  Roman Stepanov                  Date: 
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
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Appendix 6 a: A Priori Themes 
 
Corporate Disputes 
o Non-Maximization of Residuals (5 Pathologies) 
o Non Pro Rata Distributions (2 Pathologies) 
 
(Fox & Heller, 2000) 
 
Corporate Disputes: Parallel Themes 
o Appraisal of Assets 
o Inaccurate/Incomplete Information 
o Voting 
o General Meetings 
o Share Dilution 
o Insider Dealing 
o Transfer Pricing 
o Asset Stripping 
o Transactions with Self Interest 
 
(Federal Law „On Joint Stock Companies‟ dated 1995, last amended 2006) 
o Other 
 
Enforcement Strategies 
o Litigation (courts) 
o Administrative levers of the state (officials exercising influence) 
o Private enforcement (private enforcement agencies, security firms) 
o Third-party enforcement (influential organisations) 
o Self-enforcement (own capabilities) 
o Shadow of enforcement (threat of resorting to a stronger enforcement mechanism) 
o Relationship- based enforcement (negotiations, mutual agreement, compromise) 
 
 (Hendley et al., 1999) 
o Other 
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Appendix 6 b: Final Themes 
 
Corporate Disputes 
o Bankruptcy     1.1.1 
o Ownership/Structure    1.1.2 
o Misinvestment     1.1.3 
o Misimplementation    1.1.4 
o Tax       1.1.5 
o Control      1.1.6 
o Diversion of Assets    1.2.1 
o Diversion of Claims    1.2.2 
 
(Based on Fox & Heller, 2000) 
 
Corporate Disputes: Parallel Themes 
o State Interference    D1 
o Inadequate Information    D2 
o General Meetings    D3 
o Unclear Rules     D4 
o Transactions with Self-Interest/  D5 
Transfer Pricing/Insider Dealing/ 
Asset Stripping/Appraisal of Assets 
/Share Dilution 
 
(Based on the Federal Law „On Joint Stock Companies‟) 
 
Enforcement Strategies 
o Relationship-Based    ES6 
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o Self-Enforcement    ES7 
o Third-Party Enforcement   ES8 
o Private Enforcement    ES9 
o Administrative Levers of the State  ES10 
o Shadow of Enforcement   ES11 
o Litigation      ES12 
 
(Based on Hendley et al., 1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 a: Companies and Respective Industries, 1998 
 
Industry Ref. Company Notes 
Transport 1. Aeroflot Airline 
Telecommunications 3. MGTS Mobile phone network provider 
  4. VimpelCom Mobile phone network provider 
Automotive 6. AvtoVaz Car manufacturer (Lada) 
 7. Gaz Car manufacturer 
 8. KamAZ Heavy truck manufacturer 
  9. KIA Motors Car manufacturer 
Oil & Gas 10. Rosneft State oil company 
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 11. Gazprom State gas company 
 12. Yukos Private oil company 
 18. Transneft State oil pipeline company 
 19. Surgutneftegaz Private oil company 
 20. Tatneft Private oil company 
 21. Sibneft Private oil company 
 22. Sidanko Private oil company 
  23. Tyumen Oil Co Private oil company 
Energy 24. 
Krasnoyarsk 
Hydro Plant 
Hydro plant 
 25. UES Electricity provider 
  26. Mosenergo Moscow electricity provider 
Manufacturing of 
Generators 
27. Electrosila 
Manufacturer of power 
generators 
Metallurgy 28. Norilsk Nickel Nickel miner 
 29. Novolipetsk Steel mill 
 33. Magnitogorsk Steel mill 
 34. 
Libedinsky Ore 
Mining Plant 
Ore mining plant 
  35. 
Achinsk 
Alumina 
Combine 
Alumina combine 
Construction Materials 36. Knauf Construction materials 
Paper Mill 38. AssiDoman Paper mill 
  39. Vyborg Paper  
Banking 40. SBS - Agro Bank 
 41. 
MFK 
Renaissance 
Investment bank 
 42. Inkombank Private bank 
 43. MOST Bank Private bank 
 44. Pioneer Group Foreign Bank 
 45. EBRD European bank 
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 46. Tokobank Private bank 
  47. 
Rossiisky  
Kredit 
Private bank 
Media 49. Kosmos Cable TV company 
 50. Channel Five St. Petersburg TV channel 
  51. ORT Main Russian TV channel 
Food 52. Subway Fast food 
Porcelain 53. 
Lomonosov 
Porcelain 
Factory 
Porcelain factory 
Coal Mining 54. 
Kuznetsky 
Mine 
Coal Mining 
Real Estate 55. MCCI 
State-owned real estate 
company 
Auto Parts 56. Standart - NMT Auto parts distributor 
Logistics 57. Post Office Post office 
Appendix 7 b: Companies and Respective Industries, 2006 
 
Industry Ref.  Company Notes 
Transport 1. Aeroflot State-owned airline 
Telecommunications 2. Svyazinvest Telephone land line company 
 4. VimpelCom Mobile phone operator 
  5. Megafon Mobile phone operator 
Automotive 6. AvtoVaz Car manufacturer (Lada) 
Oil & Gas 10. Rosneft State oil company 
 11. Gazprom State gas company 
 12. Yukos Former private oil company 
 13. Shell Foreign oil company 
 14 Total Foreign oil company 
 15. ExxonMobil Foreign oil company 
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 16. TNK-BP Foreign oil company 
 17. LUKoil Private oil company 
  18. Transneft State-owned oil pipeline 
Metallurgy 29. Novolipetsk Steel mill 
 30. Severstal Steel mill 
 31. Evraz Steel mill 
  32. RusAl Aluminium producer 
Construction Materials 37. Eurocement Cement 
Retailer 48. IKEA 
Furniture and renting of retail 
space 
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Appendix 8 a: Template of the Coding Profile – Management 
 
First order 
      
 
1.1 1.2 
    
 
Management Diversion 
    
Second order 
      
 
1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.1.5 1.1.6 
 
Bankruptcy Ownership Misinvestment Misimplementation Taxes Control 
Third order 
 
     Disputes/Enforcement 
     D1 State Interference 1.1.1.1 1.1.2.1 1.1.3.1 1.1.4.1 1.1.5.1 1.1.6.1 
D2 Inadequate Information 1.1.1.2 1.1.2.2 1.1.3.2 1.1.4.2 1.1.5.2 1.1.6.2 
D3 General Meeting 1.1.1.3 1.1.2.3 1.1.3.3 1.1.4.3 1.1.5.3 1.1.6.3 
D4 Unclear Rules 1.1.1.4 1.1.2.4 1.1.3.4 1.1.4.4 1.1.5.4 1.1.6.4 
D5 Transactions with Self-Interest 1.1.1.5 1.1.2.5 1.1.3.5 1.1.4.5 1.1.5.5 1.1.6.5 
ES6 Relationship-Based 1.1.1.6 1.1.2.6 1.1.3.6 1.1.4.6 1.1.5.6 1.1.6.6 
ES7 Self-Enforcement 1.1.1.7 1.1.2.7 1.1.3.7 1.1.4.7 1.1.5.7 1.1.6.7 
ES8 Third-Party Enforcement 1.1.1.8 1.1.2.8 1.1.3.8 1.1.4.8 1.1.5.8 1.1.6.8 
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ES9 Private Enforcement 1.1.1.9 1.1.2.9 1.1.3.9 1.1.4.9 1.1.5.9 1.1.6.9 
ES10 Administrative Levers 1.1.1.10 1.1.2.10 1.1.3.10 1.1.4.10 1.1.5.10 1.1.6.10 
ES11 Shadow of Enforcement 1.1.1.11 1.1.2.11 1.1.3.11 1.1.4.11 1.1.5.11 1.1.6.11 
ES12 Litigation 1.1.1.12 1.1.2.12 1.1.3.12 1.1.4.12 1.1.5.12 1.1.6.12 
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Appendix 8 b: Template of the Coding Profile – Diversion 
 
Second order 
  
 
1.2.1 1.2.2 
 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Third order 
  Disputes/Enforcement 
 
D1 State Interference 1.2.1.1 1.2.2.1 
D2 Inadequate Information 1.2.1.2 1.2.2.2 
D3 General Meeting 1.2.1.3 1.2.2.3 
D4 Unclear Rules 1.2.1.4 1.2.2.4 
D5 Transactions with Self-Interest 1.2.1.5 1.2.2.5 
ES6 Relationship-Based 1.2.1.6 1.2.2.6 
ES7 Self-Enforcement 1.2.1.7 1.2.2.7 
ES8 Third-Party Enforcement 1.2.1.8 1.2.2.8 
ES9 Private Enforcement 1.2.1.9 1.2.2.9 
ES10 Administrative Levers 1.2.1.10 1.2.2.10 
ES11 Shadow of Enforcement 1.2.1.11 1.2.2.11 
ES12 Litigation 1.2.1.12 1.2.2.12 
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Appendix 9 a: Templates of Corporate Disputes, 1998 
 
1. Aeroflot: Rao, (1998a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Disputed transactions. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Travel agents were told to pay for tickets in 
advance using the services of a bank 
connected to majority shareholder. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Berezovsky personally benefited from the deal. 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Berezovsky was under investigation for 
siphoning the company‘s assets, but 
ultimately, the charges were dropped as 
Yeltsin intervened.  
1.2.2.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
Travel agents considered legal action. 
 
3. MGTS: Baker-Said, (1998i); Baker-Said, (1998k); Peach, (1998a); Whalen, (1998s) 4 
articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Disputed transactions. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Issue of new shares. 
1.2.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The privatization tender agreement was not 
disclosed in the company‘s reports and 
investment prospectus. 
1.2.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules There was a conflict between the Joint Stock 
Company Law and 1995 investor tender 
agreement (privatization). 
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The majority stake in MGTS was transferred 
from the Moscow Committee of Science and 
Technology, a city owned organisation, to AO 
Sistema, a secretive outfit that had links to 
Yury Luzhkov (the mayor of Moscow). 
MGTS shareholders voted to allow the 
company's board of directors to raise 
authorized capital by 50 percent in preparation 
for a share issue. The Moscow city 
government was expected to scoop up the 
new shares at a highly discounted price under 
the terms of the 1995 privatization of MGTS. 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Svyazinvest and the Moscow City Government 
were expected to reach a compromise further 
to a murky share issue in Moscow City 
Telecom Co. (MGTS). 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
A presidential decree 1210 ruled in Luzhkov‘s 
favour. It was speculated that MGTS‘ available 
cash would be spent on the presidency 
campaign for Yury Luzhkov. 
 
4. VimpelCom: Kenyon, (1998d); Rao, (1998g) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Protection of the business 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control A local criminal community was trying to take 
control of the company. 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
First Deputy Prime Minister Yury Maslyukov 
was accused of helping VimpelCom illegally 
obtain a license to operate GSM900 standard. 
If Yavlinsky‘s allegations were true, there must 
have been some kind of behind the scenes 
agreement involving money. 
1.1.6.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
There were death threats and physical 
assaults on the company‘s employees. The 
attacks were thought to have come from a 
local criminal community which was trying to 
take control of the company. 
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1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
There were allegations that VimpelCom 
obtained the license to operate the 
GSM900 standard illegally by relying on 
the help from First Deputy Prime minister 
Yury Maslyukov (a fierce defence industry 
lobbyist). 
 
6. AvtoVAZ: Whitehouse, (1998a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Disputed transactions 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Distributors charged unusually high margins on 
retail sales. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The company had a highly criminalised 
dealership network which was taking unusually 
high margins on retail sales. 
 
 
1.2.2.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
When Kadannikov (director of AvtoVaz) 
announced a campaign to rework the 
relationship with the dealers, the company's 
deputy commercial director was murdered and 
the director of the spare parts centre was 
severely beaten. 
 
7. Gaz: Boyle, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Efforts to minimize expenditure. 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Promised tax-breaks did not materialise. 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government granted the joint venture a 
series of tax breaks which it was forced to 
withdraw subsequently. 
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1.1.5.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules Yeltsin signed a vaguely worded decree 
granting the auto industry a series of tax 
breaks and financial incentives. But the tax-
breaks fell foul of existing legislation and the 
International Monetary Fund‘s requirements. 
1.1.5.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Russia‘s dependence on the IMF funding 
forced authorities to scale back on the tax- 
breaks promised by the presidential decree. 
 
8. KamAZ: Peach, (1998j); Rao, (1998c) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Dept restructuring 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Issue of convertible bonds on terms 
unfavourable for small shareholders and some 
creditors. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The debt restructuring plan diluted shares of 
some small shareholders. Creditors were 
offered shares based on book value (further to 
a recent re-valuation of assets) of the company 
and not the market value (the truck maker‘s 
stock was highly illiquid at the time). In effect, 
$3 of debt were exchanged for a bond that 
could be subsequently converted into 1 
KamAZ share which was worth a mere $0.10. 
 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Further to the proposed plans of debt 
restructuring, KKR partner Michael Tokarz 
said in a statement that all the sides had 
agreed to discuss rebuilding KamAZ "in a 
way that involves and satisfies everyone." 
KKR has agreed to a dilution of its stake. 
 
9. KIA: (Parallel Coding) Rao, (1998d) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
1.2 
Management 
Diversion 
Competition 
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First Order 
1.1.5 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Taxes 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Disputed seizure of assets further to tax 
allegations. 
1.1.5.8 
1.2.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Allegedly, the tax authorities were in cahoots 
with the local used cars importers. 
1.1.5.10 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The tax police targeted (specifically) the KIA 
venture which cut into the profits of used cars 
importers. 
 
10. Rosneft (3 separate disputes) 
10.1: 'Criminal Investigation Begins Into Purneftegaz Sell-Off Deal', (1998); Peach, 
(1998e); Peach, (1998g); Peach, (1998k); Peach, (1998n); 'Rosneft Gets New Chief', 
(1998); 'Rosneft Unit Stake Sold for Only $10M', (1998); 'Yeltsin on Purneftegaz', (1998) 8 
articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Dealing with creditors 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Dispute over diversion of assets from the state 
by the company‘s creditors. 
1.2.1.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government ordered to reverse the 
transaction which deprived state-controlled 
Rosneft of a stake in its subsidiary 
Purneftegaz. 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The 38 percent stake in Purneftegaz was 
seized by the creditors and sold for just $10 
million. Rosneft claimed the stake was worth 
$400 to $500 million. 
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1.2.1.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The true owner of the four obscure companies 
that had bought the shares was unknown. The 
Moscow Times traced possible links to 
industrial giant LUKoil and Kremlin insider 
Pavel Borodin, while the effective buyer of the 
stake was directly related to the Moscow 
Patriarchiate. 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
President Boris Yeltsin intervened to stop the 
controversial giveaway of the shares in the 
government-controlled oil company and to 
punish those responsible for the transaction. 
Analysts suggested that the court case could 
go either way, although with the president and 
prime minister involved, a decision favouring 
Rosneft and therefore the government was 
expected. 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Analysts suggested that the court case 
could go either way, although with the 
president and prime minister involved, a 
decision favouring Rosneft and therefore 
the government was expected171. 
Furthermore, a Western bank purchased 
the stake and in turn sold it back to a 
Russian entity. It was necessary to bring a 
Western financial institution into the deal 
since Russian law enforcement agencies 
"wouldn't crack down on a Western bank 
as they would on a Russian bank in the 
event of a scandal." 
 
10.2: Peach, (1998l); Whalen, (1998j) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Disputed transactions. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of claims through transfer pricing 
and write – offs of bad debts. 
                                                          
171
 The reason for coding the same bit of text (theme) a number of times is because the general content is 
then captured more fully. Template analysis allows this flexibility, at the expense of the relationship 
between salience and importance (King, 2004). 
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Transfer pricing of crude oil and insider dealing 
in the form of boosting operational expenses 
by means of write – offs of bad debts 
belonging to management controlled 
companies. 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
It is difficult to imagine a transfer-pricing 
scheme between two separate companies 
without a close personal connection between 
the benefiting parties. In this case, it was the 
managers/beneficiaries of Purneftegaz and 
Sibneft. 
 
10.3: Peach, (1998l) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Authority of the board of directors. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control Dispute over the level of control that the 
directors had in relation to large transactions. 
1.1.6.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting At an annual shareholder meeting Rosneft 
pushed through an amendment to the 
company's charter giving the board of directors 
of Purneftegaz authority to conduct 
transactions with up to 50 percent of the 
company's assets. Charter amendments 
require a 75 percent vote, but Rosneft was 
able to eke out a favourable verdict due to the 
fact that only 75 percent of Purneftegaz's 
votes were present at the meeting, thereby 
giving its 51 percent stake a 68 percent 
weighing.  
1.1.6.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement … finding the other 7 percent was a matter of 
bargaining and subtle stealth. It was suspected 
that the whole voting procedure was 
designed/planned by senior management of 
Rosneft. 
 
11. Gazprom (7 separate disputes) 
11.1: Whitehouse, (1998d) 1 article 
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Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Trading of stock 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Gazprom managers barred foreigners from 
buying domestic Gazprom stock, and 
implemented something traders call "the right 
to the first night," under which the company's 
registrar refuses to accept trades unless the 
shares have first been offered to Gazprom.  
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Yeltsin signed a decree limiting foreign 
ownership in Gazprom to 9 percent and 
legalizing the company's ban on direct 
purchases of domestic shares by foreigners 
and foreign-owned companies. 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules Creative foreign investors found ways around 
the rules. Regent Fund Management Limited 
set up a Cayman Islands-based entity called 
Regent GAZ, which announced plans to buy 
$200 million worth of domestic Gazprom 
shares and sell derivatives to foreign investors. 
1.1.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Gazprom director Rem Vyakhirev publicly 
denounced the scheme, and subsequently 
Regent GAZ closed shop.  
 
11.2: 'Duma Gazprom Plea', (1998); Aliabyev, (1998l); Budrys, (1998) 3 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Management of subsidiaries 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Russian tax police seized the assets of two 
Gazprom subsidiaries as part of a campaign 
by newly appointed tax chief Boris Fyodorov to 
increase revenue collection.  
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The State Duma, or lower house of parliament, 
moved against the seizure by adopting a 
resolution which portrayed the action as a 
threat to national security.  
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1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The government and Gazprom were expected 
to reach a compromise in which Gazprom 
would agree to shoulder some of its 
subsidiaries' debts and the government would 
delay enforcing the bankruptcies. 
1.1.5.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
Gazprom responded by saying that the 
seizure assets would cause far-reaching 
economic consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. 3: Whalen, (1998aa) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Reforming gas industry 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Demands to increase transparency by 
reforming the ownership structure of 
Gazprom's pipeline network. 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government had to restructure the gas 
market if it was to receive the loan from the 
World Bank. 
1.1.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
The World Bank sought to enforce the decision 
by stating that the $1.5 billion loan to Russia 
was on condition that the government would 
reform the gas company. 
 
11. 4: 'Gazprom Challenged', (1998) 1 article 
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Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Trust agreement. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership 
 
Russia's independent Federal Audit Chamber 
said that it was seeking to cancel an 
agreement under which the head of gas 
monopoly Gazprom also managed the 35 
percent stake owned by the state. The trust 
agreement between the government and 
Gazprom chief executive Rem Vyakhirev was 
signed in December 1997. The new agreement 
was intended to limit Vyakhirev's power by 
denying Gazprom the right to buy up to 30 
percent of the company's shares at face value, 
an option available under the previous trust 
arrangement. 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Head of Gazprom (Vyakhirev) fell out of favour 
with the government which used the Audit 
Chamber to limit his powers by cancelling the 
trust agreement. The original trust agreement 
delegated management of the state‘s 35 
percent stake to the head of Gazprom i.e. 
Vyakhirev. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The chamber proposed to the Prosecutor 
General's Office to start court proceedings 
aimed at declaring the original agreement 
illegal and therefore null and void. 
 
11.5: Peach, (1998h) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Purchasing decisions 
1.1.3 
Second Order 
Misinvestment Decisions to purchase Inkombank and a 
media outlet were more likely to be motivated 
out of pre-election oligarchic manoeuvring 
rather than prudent business acumen. 
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1.1.3.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Gazprom purchased a 25 percent stake in 
Inkombank, and grew its media portfolio; these 
actions were motivated by pre-election 
oligarchic maneuvering rather than prudent 
business acumen. It has been suggested that 
Gazprom was worried about its oligarchic 
friends first, the government second, 
employees third, and then maybe its 
shareholders.  
 
11. 6: Peach, (1998b) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Privatisation auction. 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Assets 
A large equity stake in a strategic natural-gas 
refining company was sold off to an unknown 
European company for roughly $20 million, a 
price significantly below the company's value. 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
A natural gas refining company was sold for 
very cheap in a privatisation tender to an 
unknown European company. The premium of 
only $11,420 was paid on the extremely low 
starting price of $20 million.  
1.2.1.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
No information about the buyer was made 
available by the privatization officials, although 
fingers in the industry immediately and 
instinctively pointed to Gazprom, which 
possesses other major gas refineries in Russia 
and was likely interested in obtaining more. 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Such a sale was authorised and facilitated by 
the privatisation officials close both to the 
company and government.  
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11.7: Arvedlund, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Barter 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
The problem of theft through barter extended 
to Russia's biggest companies, including 
Gazprom. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The rampant barter economy made it possible 
for Gazprom managers to put together a 
scheme of complex, non-transparent 
transactions which were vulnerable to 
corporate fraud. The problem was that a 
considerable amount of value was lost in the 
meantime. This was indicative of the economy 
as a whole and in relation to the biggest 
companies like Gazprom and UES. 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
This is an example of the rampant barter 
economy as an indicator of the level of 
corporate fraud. Russian companies often 
based on personal relationships would stitch 
together complex transactions between 
companies, their suppliers, the local tax 
authorities and other government agencies to 
pay off debts with goods enterprises produced.  
 
12. Yukos (9 separate disputes) 
12.1: (Parallel Coding) Whalen, (1998e); Whalen, (1998g); Whalen, (1998k); Whalen, 
(1998m); Whalen, (1998p); Whalen, (1998u); Whalen, (1998y); Whalen, (1998ab); 
Whalen, (1998ad); 'No Reviews Underway At Yukos Subsidiaries', (1998) 10 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Large transactions 
Management of subsidiaries 
1.2.2 
 
1.1.6 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Control 
Transfer pricing 
 
Consolidation 
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Second Order 
1.2.2.1 
1.1.6.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The dispute appears to put the federal 
government in the role of minority shareholder, 
battling to maintain the value of its holdings 
against the actions of a powerful financial-
industrial group. 
 
 
1.2.2.5 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Yukos have been accused of transferring value 
out of subsidiaries to the holding company 
through practices such as transfer pricing, 
whereby a holding company buys crude oil 
from its subsidiaries at below-market prices 
and resells it for a hefty profit. Furthermore, 
this value reducing practice negatively affected 
the share price of the subsidiaries making the 
terms of consolidation more favourable for the 
parent company.  
1.2.2.12 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The FSC ordered subsidiaries of Yukos to 
reverse actions that gave their boards of 
directors too much authority with reference to 
large transactions (reliance on Russian Joint 
Stock Company law). 
 
12.2: Daigle, (1998a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Raising capital 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Share issue 
1.2.2.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting Proposal to allow board of directors to issue 
shares was voted down at a shareholders 
meeting. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
It was alleged that the directors were planning 
to issue shares in a private placement and 
take all the shares themselves. 
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1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Minority became suspicious of the proposal 
and voted it down at a shareholders meeting. 
 
12.3: 'Yukos Investor Threatens Lawsuit', (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Financing. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
The loan was not used to benefit Yukos‘ 
subsidiary. 
1.2.2.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting There were allegations that a vote authorizing 
the company to guarantee a $500 million 
foreign loan to Yukos violated Russian joint-
stock company law. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Yukos voted in favour of a loan of $500m that 
was meant for its subsidiary Samaraneftegaz. 
However, minority shareholders argued that it 
was not in the interest of the subsidiary 
because it would end up with the interest 
payments and the loan itself. Possibly, the 
minority were concerned that the money would 
be siphoned off by the parent company. In 
formal terms, Yukos could have been regarded 
as an interested party, yet voted on the 
resolution regardless. 
1.2.2.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
A minority shareholder threatened legal action. 
 
12.4: Aliabyev, (1998o) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Financing. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Unfair debt swap harming subsidiary‘s 
minority.  
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Yukos wanted to write off its debts to 
Tokobank in exchange for a write-off of 
Tokobank‘s debts to two subsidiaries 
(Tomskneft and Eastern Oil) of the oil major. 
Although Yukos held a majority stake in the 
subsidiaries, the move would have violated the 
rights of the minority shareholders of the two 
subsidiaries. On the other hand, the 
subsidiaries had little chance of recovering 
their debts from the bank. 
1.2.2.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
EBRD used the sell option as leverage in 
persuading the management of Yukos to come 
up with a credible restructuring plan. 
 
12.5: 'Amoco, Yukos Attempt to Revive Joint Oil Plan', (1998); Whalen, (1998d)  
2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Unexpected, one-sided termination of 
partnership. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Yukos signed an agreement with Amoco to 
develop a field in 1993 and together won a 
tender to secure development rights. Amoco 
invested more than $100 million in preliminary 
development of the field. But later Yukos said 
that it had no business relationship with Amco. 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear rules One of the cited reasons for the termination of 
the partnership was that Amoco‘s approach to 
the development of the filed was not in 
Russia‘s best interests. 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Yukos made a surprise announcement that it 
had ‗no business relationship‘ with Amoco. 
Later, Yukos had to consider compensating 
Amoco further to Gore – Chernomirdin talks.   
 
12.6: 'Size Won't Make Yuksi World-Class', (1998); Whalen, (1998b) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
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1.1 
First Order 
Management Political differences and ownership disputes as 
an obstacle to joint venture. 
1.1.4 
Second Order 
Misimplementation Failure to set up a joint venture. 
1.1.4.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The joint venture between Yukos and Sibneft 
was threatened due to (in part) political 
differences between Khodorkovsky and 
Berezovsky. The latter irritated the Kremlin 
with his political manoeuvring. 
1.1.4.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
Sibneft and Yukos were among Russia's most 
secretive companies with unclear ownership 
and questionable privatisation history. 
1.1.4.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The joint venture between Sibneft and Yukos 
was on its last legs due to political differences. 
Berzovsky had irritated the Kremlin by his 
political manoeuvring, while Khodorkovsky 
preferred to keep low profile.  
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12.7: Daigle, (1998d); Whalen, (1998t) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Managing relations with local stakeholders 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Tax arrears 
1.1.5.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Thousands of irate workers and citizens in the 
Siberian town of Neftegansk blocked Yukos 
President Sergei Muravlenko and other 
company officials inside a meeting for 12 
hours, demanding local taxes and wages be 
paid172. The incident occurred two months after 
the parent company announced plans to cut 
back on production and costs due to low world 
oil prices.  
1.1.5.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
The town's popular mayor, Vladimir Petukhov, 
was shot dead as he walked to work. The 
unsolved crime occurred one month after 
Petukhov again blamed Yukos for many of the 
town's woes, and led oil workers and municipal 
employees in an angry demonstration on the 
main square to protest months of unpaid 
wages. When first elected, Petukhov made 
real strides to improve the town's infrastructure 
by repaving roads and rebuilding the central 
market, but a shortage of funds finally pushed 
him to complain. He and the Nefteyugansk 
Solidarity union staged a rally outside 
Yuganskneftegaz headquarters that disrupted 
the subsidiary's annual shareholder meeting.  
1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The protests were probably organised by the 
administration of Neftegansk calling on Yukos 
to pay taxes into the local budget. It has also 
been alleged that workers did not get paid at 
Yuganskneftegaz, a claim that was denied by 
                                                          
172
 But according to a Yukos spokesperson, the protest did not include company workers (who had been 
paid), but only civil service employees angry with the local administration for not paying city wages for four 
months. Only after 12 hours did they meet with the mayor and union members, finally agreeing to transfer 
30 million rubles needed by the local government to pay February wages to city workers.  
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Yukos. There were demonstrations and finally 
after a meeting with the unions, mayor and 
Yugansk officials, 30 million rubles were 
transferred to the local budget.  
 
12.8: 'Yukos Unit Prepares for Bankruptcy', (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Failure to meet financial obligations. 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Tomskneft owed 400 million rubles ($21 million 
at Central Bank rate) in taxes to the federal 
budget and another 200 million rubles to the 
local budget and the pension fund. It also 
owed 300 million rubles to its staff in back 
wages. 
1.1.5.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting The Tomsk regional property fund declared 
illegal a decision taken at Eastern's general 
shareholders meeting to transfer executive 
powers to Yukos. 
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation A Yukos spokesman said that the court had 
ignored a Yukos proposal to cover its 
subsidiary's debt without giving reasons. Plus, 
the tax case was awaiting trial at the Tomsk 
arbitration court. 
 
12. 9: Kenyon, (1998b) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Financing 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Share issue to minimise value of collateral. 
 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Menatep defaulted on loan repayment, for 
which it used 30 percent of Yukos shares as 
collateral. Later it was decided to dilute the 
stake of the bank through a share issue. 
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1.2.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Rosprom financial-industrial group headed by 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky (included Menatep and 
Yukos) pushed for a share issue in Yukos 
diluting the western bank‘s stake. However, it 
appears that the bank had an edge over Yukos 
since the latter was in need of external finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Transneft: Aliabyev, (1998e); Peach, (1998c); Peach, (1998d); Peach, (1998p); 
Peach, (1998s); 'Transneft Investigation', (1998); 'Ugly Games At Transneft Must End', 
(1998)     7 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Post privatization 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Management buying shares from employees 
for very cheap. 
1.2.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
Workers were coerced into selling their shares; 
some were threatened and some were lied to - 
‗a mixture of threats and misrepresentations‘. 
The actual sale of shares was conducted 
through murky off shore companies and one 
British company with an untraceable 
ownership.  
1.2.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules The newly appointed chief was using the 
prosecutor general‘s office and the Moscow 
Arbitration Court to reverse the transactions 
that resulted in a large number of shares going 
missing further to a questionable consolidation. 
The contradictory rulings by the same court 
added to the uncertainty and hence opened 
the situation up to various interpretations. 
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transaction with 
Self-Interest 
The former president of Transneft and several 
of his deputies used company funds to buy 
shares from employees and then transferred 
the stock to outside firms that they owned at 
far below market prices. The scheme 
transferred 21 percent of Transneft either into 
a management-owned company or into the 
hands of untraceable offshore entities. 
The appraisal of shares was completely 
flawed. Transneft executives bought nearly 85 
percent of the 1.55 million shares distributed 
among workers for $60 million. A few months 
later, according to stock brokers, the market 
value of this stake reached $1.5 billion. 
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Management used the tactics of intimidation 
i.e. threats of being fired, refusal to issue 
ownership certificate, deprivation of social 
benefits, etc. if the workers refused to sell. In 
geranial, those who were charged with the task 
of retrieving the shares were told to do so by 
all means possible. 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The government turned its attention to the 
case only after hundreds of lawsuits had been 
filed by rank-and-file workers against their 
company. In terms of reversing the 
transactions, it appears that the new 
management relied on the legal infrastructure, 
although it would be logical to conclude, that a 
great deal of political support was at their 
disposal, in this case, evident by the Finance 
Ministry‘s ruling.  
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The newly appointed chief of Transneft (Dmitry 
Savelyev) used the prosecutor general‘s office 
and the Moscow Arbitration Court to reverse 
the transactions that resulted in a large 
number of shares going missing further to a 
questionable consolidation. The Finance 
Ministry ruled in favour of the reversal. 
 
19. Surgutneftegaz: Peach, (1998q); Peach, (1998i) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
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1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Subsidiaries breaking free from the parent 
company. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Share dilution; transfer pricing through a 
questionable leasing contract. 
1.2.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
Rather than continuing a futile legal battle, 
Russia's third-largest oil producer decided to 
sell the subsidiaries. Surgut's remaining 
interest in Ruchi, Nefto-Kombi, and Krasny 
Neftyanik was sold off for an undisclosed sum 
to a group of local ‗investors.‘ 
1.2.2.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting Nefto-Kombi, a company commanding more 
than 110 filling stations in St. Petersburg, 
called an extraordinary shareholders meeting 
at which an additional equity issuance was 
approved and Surgutneftegaz was stricken 
from the charter documents and board of 
directors. A representative from Surgut was 
allowed into the meeting, though he was 
forbidden to participate. The reason: his power 
of attorney letter was sent to the meeting by 
fax, an act deemed in violation of AGM 
procedures devised by Nefto-Kombi officials. 
Surgutneftegaz's stake in the company was 
diminished from 42 percent to 11 percent.  
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Ruchi, a subsidiary of Surgutneftegas, signed 
a lease contract that effectively funnelled all 
profits to the leasee, thereby slowly driving the 
company into bankruptcy. Whoever signed the 
contract had the backing of the local 
administration and criminal underworld and 
took advantage of complete chaos on the 
country‘s political arena. Surgutneftegaz 
eventually decided to sell a number of its 
subsidiaries which employed similar tactics of 
transferring value away from the parent.  
1.2.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Surgut failed to get anywhere with court 
hearings as they kept being postponed on hair-
splitting technicalities. A groups of local 
investors (St. Petersburg) bought Surgut‘s 
remaining interest in three subsidiaries (Ruchi, 
Nefto-Kombi, and Krasny Neftyanik) for an 
undisclosed sum. It is clear that the local 
investors exerted influence over the courts and 
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local administration.  
1.2.2.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
Surgut subsidiaries (a batch of oil storage 
facilities and filling stations as well as an oil 
refinery in Kirishi), had ties with the criminal 
underworld. The criminal group had access to 
the local administration. Surgut‘s stake in the 
subsidiaries was diluted by means of the 
crudest of schemes (bankruptcy, striking 
parent of the charter, etc.). 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Surgutneftegaz failed to keep its subsidiaries 
because it was useless fighting local courts 
without the regulatory or political support. The 
new owners of ex-Surgut subsidiaries on the 
other hand wanted to create a holding 
company that would control the regional petrol 
market: A "Central Fuel Company" for Russia's 
second city. To garner political support, they 
proposed that the city administration of St. 
Petersburg acquire a stake in the new entity; in 
return the city would have the right to store fuel 
supplies for free and city officials could fill their 
tanks at a special rate. One has to wonder 
whether the stake offered to the city of St. 
Petersburg is a bribe for the years of "legal 
assistance" in local courts.  
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The expropriation of Surgut subsidiaries took 
place because the local parties – local criminal 
groups and administration – acted in 
consortium and had the upper hand over 
Surgut Holding on their own turf. The case was 
taken to the St. Petersburg Arbitration Court. 
 
20. Tatneft: Peach, (1998r) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Financing 
1.1.1 
Second Order 
Bankruptcy A failure to meet the debt obligation.  
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1.1.1.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Tatneft and a group of Western creditors were 
engaged in unofficial discussions on debt 
restructuring. 
1.1.1.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
One of the key enforcement mechanisms was 
the ‗cross default clause‘ which meant that a 
failure to meet the debt obligation would result 
in the immediate claim of all other outstanding 
debts. This would have led to bankruptcy and 
deprived Tatneft of an opportunity to access 
much needed foreign capital in the future.  
 
21. Sibneft (3 separate disputes) 
21.1: (Parallel Coding) Latynina, (1998b) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Consolidation 
1.1.6 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Control 
Taxes 
Privatisation, fight for control 
Privatization led to diminishing taxes paid by 
the company. 
1.1.6.1 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The city of Omsk administration attempted to 
increase its dwindling tax revenues and 
imposed a 2 percent city tax. This fact forced 
local companies to re-register outside the city 
including a number of businesses linked to the 
governor of Omsk. Sibneft followed others, but 
the city administration introduced a 35-ruble-
per-ton tax on crude oil processed by the 
refinery.  
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Berezovsky paid only $100 million for the 
company under the loans-for-shares auction. 
In 1998 the company was paying far less into 
the local budget. It was alleged that at that 
time the company was looted by its new 
management. 
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1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Boris Berezovsky was behind the merger of 
the Omsk Oil Refinery and Tyumen's 
Noyabrskneftegaz. This merger led to the 
emergence of Sibneft which caused damage to 
the local budget of Omsk and in general made 
little economic sense. 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Consolidation of Sibneft was driven by 
Berezovsky who enjoyed a great deal of 
political support. In some instances such 
consolidation happened at the expense of local 
budgets but was nevertheless made possibly 
because of the support of regional 
administration. 
1.1.6.12 
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Sibneft registered its refinery outside the city of 
Omsk for tax reasons. The city administration 
responded by introducing a 35 ruble per ton 
tax on oil processed by the refinery. Sidneft 
challenged the tax in courts. 
 
21.2: (Parallel Coding) Koriukin, (1998a); Whalen, (1998n); Whalen, (1998o); Whalen, 
(1998x); 'Yukos Investor Threatens Lawsuit', (1998) 5 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Share price manipulation 
1.2.2 
 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Closed share issue 
 
Sibneft depressed the market price of its 
subsidiaries on the eve of consolidation. 
1.2.2.5 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Sibneft was siphoning off value from its 
subsidiaries Omsk Oil Refinery and 
Noyabrskneftegas (e.g. Sibneft purchased oil 
from Noyabrskneftegas at a below market 
price driving the stock value down). Once the 
value of the subsidiaries was low enough, the 
parent company consolidated the battered 
subsidiaries at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
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1.2.2.12 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Minority filed suits in local courts and relied on 
the ruling of the FSC with regard to what they 
thought were illegal practices of share dilution 
by the parent. 
21.3: Whalen, (1998a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Minority shareholders 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership 
 
U.S. investor Kenneth Dart was investigated 
by the State Antitrust Committee which sought 
to establish whether he colluded with other 
shareholders to control more than 20 percent 
of Sibneft‘s subsidiary Noyabrskneftegaz 
without permission from the committee. Dart 
Management provided a compelling argument 
suggesting why his holding could not have 
been above the allowed limit. 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
Dart Management did not publicly disclose its 
shareholding information. 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The investigation was interpreted as a warning 
to the US investor who became increasingly 
vocal in his criticism of the Russian investment 
climate. 
 
22. Sidanko (5 separate disputes) 
22.1: 'Sidanko Issue Review?' (1998); Whalen, (1998m); Whalen, (1998e); Whalen, 
(1998q); Whalen, (1998s); Whalen, (1998z) 6 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Financing 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Closed bond issue 
1.2.2.2 Inadequate 
Information 
The closed bond issue was not advertised to 
minority when they were buying in. 
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The closed bond issue, if went ahead, 
would have constituted share dilution. 
Also, there appears to be confusion 
because at a certain shareholder meeting, 
a Sidanko‘s representative was minuted as 
saying that all subsidiary companies would 
participate in the bond issue. However, 
Sidanko intended to sell the bonds to 
Uneximbank insiders only at about $1.60 
per share, roughly one-tenth the market 
price of Sidanko stock. 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
The FSC responded by cancelling the bond 
issue saying that it may be reregistered if 
Sidanko was able to form a plan agreeable to 
minority shareholders. Investor-savvy 
Uneximbank was predicted to make peace 
with its shareholders and to ensure that 
investors did not lose money in the bond issue. 
There were private negotiations between 
Uneximbank and investors about solving the 
problem to the satisfaction of both parties.  
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The minority complained about the closed 
bond issue. The parent company had to 
negotiate with the disgruntled shareholders as 
it was seeking to improve its corporate 
governance image. 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Sidanko‘s bond issue which included an 
interested-party transaction was investigated 
by the FSC. The investigation came further to 
a complaint from former Finance Minister Boris 
Fyodorov raising questions about the legality 
of the issue. At the time the regulators and 
politicians were concerned over the country‘s 
investment image.  
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The securities commission headed by Vasiliev 
(further to finance minister Boris Fyodorov‘s 
written complaint), cancelled the bond issue 
that diluted the stake of minority by limiting the 
issue to two parties. The securities 
commission said that it would allow the bond 
issue provided a mutually acceptable solution 
was found.   
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22.2: 'Sidanko Tells State To Rethink Oil Cuts', (1998); 'Sidanko to Honor Tax Debts But 
Complains Bill Is Inflated', (1998); 'Sidanko, Onako Warned on Debts', (1998); 'Sidanko 
Unit Goes Bankrupt', (1998); 4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Financing 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Non-payment of taxes 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government cut Sidanko‘s access to the 
export pipeline by a third because the 
company failed to meet tax payments. At the 
time, the state was having difficulty raising the 
revenues needed to provide basic services 
and to pay millions of state workers on a timely 
basis.  
1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Under a government resolution, the ministry 
could cut access to export pipelines for 
companies that were behind with their tax 
dues. 
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22.3: (Parallel Coding): Whalen, (1998r); Whalen, (1998l) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Non-payment in the local budget. 
1.1.6 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Control 
Taxes 
Regional administration taking control over 
Sidanko‘s subsidiary which failed on tax 
payments. 
1.1.6.1 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The company was fighting local administration 
with regard to back tax claims against its 
subsidiary (the Angarsk refinery). Bankruptcy 
proceedings were initiated by the local court 
taking control of the cash flow of the refinery 
away from Sidanko. In response Sidanko 
stopped shipments of crude oil. The move 
infuriated the local and federal governments. 
1.1.6.10 
1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The Irkutsk regional administration attempted 
to usurp control of a Sidanko‘s subsidiary by 
pushing for bankruptcy for non-payment of 
taxes. There is a contradiction of business and 
political objectives where the priority is on 
keeping a loss making entity in operation for 
continuous employment in the region. 
Sidanko did not fight till the end since it did not 
consider the subsidiary of much value. 
 
 
1.1.6.12 
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Irkutsk regional administration sought to take 
control over the refinery on the back of tax 
allegations by installing external managers 
further to a ruling made by the regional 
arbitration court.  
 
22.4: Kenyon, (1998a); 'Sidanko Unit Goes Bankrupt', (1998) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 Management Management of the subsidiaries. 
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First Order 
1.1.1 
Second Order 
Bankruptcy Bankruptcy was called for by the creditors and 
objected to by the majority shareholder. 
1.1.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Creditors of a Sidanko‘s unit Kondpetroleum 
decided to call for bankruptcy alleging a 
continuous transfer of value from the daughter 
company to the parent. Sidanko opposed the 
local court‘s decision to appoint a special 
(bankruptcy) manager. 
1.1.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The court ruled in favour of the creditors who 
were calling for bankruptcy. 
 
22.5: (Parallel Coding) Aliabyev, (1998f); Whalen, & Korchagina, (1998)              2 
articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Dealing with creditors and competitors. 
1.1.6 
1.1.1 
Second Order 
Control 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy proceedings were used in order to 
gain control of Chernogorneft.  
 
1.1.6.6 
1.1.1.6 
Third Order 
 
Relationship-
Based 
It is unclear why the two creditors who were 
left out from the bankruptcy proceedings did 
not react to the news. It was speculated that a 
behind the scenes agreement had been 
formed. 
1.1.6.8 
1.1.1.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
It is possible that Sidanko‘s competitors (either 
Surgutneftegaz or Tyumen Oil Co.) were 
behind the bankruptcy proceedings of 
Chernogorneft. The idea was to capitalize on a 
perfectly viable company‘s woes. It 
demonstrates the weakness of the legal 
system. Two foreign investors, who reportedly 
held 60 percent of Chernogorneft's $133 
million total debt, were not included on the list 
of creditors who stood to benefit from 
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Chernogorneft's possible bankruptcy.  
1.1.6.12 
1.1.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation It appears that courts were used as the main 
mechanism of enforcement. A number of 
creditors were excluded from the bankruptcy 
proceedings. It is possible that the court 
excluded the creditors on technicalities such 
as an application not being filed in time, or 
register entries not being properly checked. It 
is also possible that Sidanko‘s competitors 
were behind the bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
23. Tyumen Oil Co.: Interfax & MT (1999); Reuters & Itar-Tass (1998); Whalen,  (1998h); 
Whalen, (1998i); Whalen, (1998v); Whalen, (1998w); Whitehouse, (1998e) 7 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Renegade director. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control The renegade director used the support of the 
workers‘ collective of the subsidiary in order to 
maintain his control of Nizhnevartovsk. 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
It was suggested that the terms of the 
privatisation tender were rigged in Alfa‘s 
favour. Alfa won a privatization tender, paying 
only $810 million for the 40 percent share in 
Tyumen. As a result of that, 
Nizhnevartovskneftgaz rebelled and refused to 
hand control over until an out-of-court 
settlement was reached. It is unclear whether 
the renegade director acted on behalf of the 
workers union or in self-interest. 
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1.1.6.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
The fight for control made it difficult for 
Tyumen to raise financing, slowed 
Nizhnevartovskneftegaz's oil exports to a 
trickle and left Tyumen's Ryazan refinery 
without a crude oil supplier. In the end, the two 
parties reached an out-of-court settlement.  
1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Paly allegedly transferred stakes in daughter 
companies to off-shore accounts in order to 
have financial leverage as a means of 
protection from the powerful industrial groups. 
Eventually he gave up or was bought by the 
FIGs i.e. Alfa and Renova. The parties to the 
conflict were interested in a speedy resolution, 
because the parent (Tyumen) and the 
subsidiary (Nizhnevartovskneftegaz) were 
losing money. 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The government intervened with a warning 
urging the renegade director and Alfa to reach 
a compromise.  
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation A Federal Arbitration Court ruled in favour of 
replacing Paly with a Tyumen official if 
bankruptcy was to be avoided. 
 
24. Krasnoyarsk Hydro: (Parallel Coding) Aliabyev, (1998p); Baker-Said, (1998j); 
Daigle, (1998c); 'Hydro Plant Share Issue', (1998) 4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Transaction involving a purchase of a 
significant stake. 
1.2.2 
 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Control 
Fight for control and diversion of claims. 
 
 
 
1.2.2.3 
1.1.6.3 
Third Order 
General meeting It was alleged that Krasnoyarskenergo's chief 
executive, Vladimir Kolmogorov, was not 
allowed to vote the company's 28 percent 
stake in the power plant because he was 
chosen at a shareholders meeting that was 
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declared invalid by a local court. KrAZ denied 
that there had been any irregularities at the 
shareholders meeting.  
1.2.2.5 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Siberian hydroelectric station Krasnoyarsk  
Krasnoyarskenergo, which was controlled by 
UES, sold a 23 percent stake in the 
hydroelectric power station Krasnoyarsk Hydro 
to Tanako, a financial industrial group 
established by Krasnoyarsk Aluminum or 
KrAZ. The sale reduced Krasnoyarskenergo's 
stake in the power plant to 28 percent. It was 
claimed that the stake had been sold at a 
fraction of its real value. 
1.2.2.7 
1.1.6.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement In the end, the UES signed a share 
management deal because it felt that it would 
not be possible for it to regain control of the 
plant.  
1.2.2.8 
1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Krasnoyarskenergo, which was controlled by 
UES sold a 23 percent stake in the 
hydroelectric power station to Tanako, a 
financial industrial group established by 
Krasnoyarsk Aluminum or KrAZ. The sale 
reduced Krasnoyarskenergo's stake in the 
power plant to 28 percent. UES ousted 
Krasnoyarskenergo's general director, Vladimir 
Ivannikov, who oversaw the deal.  
1.2.2.10 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Nemtsov denounced the sale saying that the 
stake was sold for a fraction of its value. This 
battle ran parallel to the highly political battle at 
the top of UES between Dyakov and Brevnov.  
1.2.2.12 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The Tanako FIG exerted pressure on the 
management of Krasnoyarskenergo to sell the 
stake in Krasnoyarsk Hydro for cheap. UES 
mounted a legal challenge in an effort to return 
the stake. Secondly, the increase of authorised 
capital of Krasnoyarsk Hydro was voted by the 
shareholders, but the FSC announced an 
investigation into the rights issue and the 
legitimacy of the shareholder meeting. 
 
25. UES (4 sepaprate disputes) 
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25.1: Aliabyev, (1998c); Baker-Said, (1998a); Baker-Said, (1998b); Baker-Said, (1998e); 
Baker-Said, & Zaks, (1998); 'Challenge To Brevnov Is Senseless', (1998); 'Duma 
Launches Attack on Brevnov', (1998); Latynina, (1998a); Lowe, (1998); Peach, (1998f); 
Whalen, (1998c) 11 Articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Highly political and lacking business rationale. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control Fight for control. 
1.1.6.1 
Third Order 
State Interference A fight between Chernomyrdin (Prime Minister) 
and Nemtsov (Deputy Prime Minister) filtered 
down to a fight between Dykov and Brevnov. 
Both praties relied on varions powerful 
establishments while accusing each other of 
corruption. 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
There were allegations of transactions 
involving the company‘s veksels designed to 
transfer value away from UES for the benefit of 
management. Plus questionable loans, barter 
schemes and extravagant expense claims. 
1.1.6.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Brevnov was Nemtsov‘s friend while Dyakov 
was supported by Chernomyrdin. 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Both clans relied heavily on various institutions 
at their disposal like the Account Chamber and 
State Duma.  
1.1.6.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
Lots of warnings and political rhetoric aimed at 
frightening the sides into surrender. 
 
25.2: Baker-Said, (1998c); 'Chubais Not Right Man For UES Job', (1998); Whalen, 
(1998c); Whitehouse, (1998b) 4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Nominations 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control The question who would head UES was 
decided through political support and crony 
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agreements. 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Allegedly, Chubais received bribes and 
promises of high-ranking positions for 
privatisation favours.  
1.1.6.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Chubais was supported because of his 
contacts with Western banks. Also, the 
privatisation deals required a great deal of 
personal trust. 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Influential politicians relied on power structures 
at their disposal in order to pursue their self-
centred means. 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation A Moscow district court rejected a libel suit he 
filed against a Russian investigative journalist 
and a Moscow radio station that accused 
Chubais of accepting a $90,000 bribe in a fake 
book deal. 
 
25. 3: Berezanskaya, (1998b) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Distribution of residuals. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Promised dividends were not paid 
1.2.2.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
The National Reserve Bank said it was 
preparing legal action against Unified 
Energy Systems for failure to pay promised 
1996 dividends. Bank chairman Alexander 
Lebedev said at a news conference that he 
will wait and see whether new 
management at UES agrees to pay the 
money. 
25. 4: Aliabyev, B. (1998k); Baker-Said, S. (1998c); Baker-Said, S. (1998h); 'Bill on UES 
Saps Russia's Credibility', (1998); 'Duma Vote Likely to Scuttle Plans for Sale of UES 
Stake', (1998); Rao, S. (1998h); 'UES Halts Trading In ADRs', (1998); 'Yeltsin Aide Blasts 
Law On UES', (1998) 8 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
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1.1 
First Order 
Management Ownership restriction. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership The law passed by the Duma, the lower 
chamber of parliament, required the 
government to keep a 51 percent stake in 
UES, which controlled 75 percent of 
Russia's electricity. Foreign ownership was 
limited to 25 percent despite foreigners 
owning more than 28 percent of the 
company.  
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The law was the result of tensions between 
Yeltsin and the Communist-dominated 
Duma over the Cabinet shake-up, and a 
shake-up in the management of UES.  
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules The law limited foreign ownership to 25 
percent despite the fact that foreigners had 
already acquired almost 30 percent. There was 
no plausible mechanism for compensating 
foreigners  
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The law was a part of political bargaining over 
who would be appointed as the prime minister. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The chairman of the UES board of 
directors, Viktor Kudryavy, said that the bill 
infringed on the rights of shareholders and 
would be impossible to enforce. Yeltsin 
was expected to appeal the content of the 
law in the Constitutional Court. 
 
26. Mosenergo: Aliabyev, (1998i) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Share issue. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Because Mosenergo purchased plants from 
‗friendly‘ UES, a damaging insider dealing 
practice was suspected. 
1.2.2.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting The decision on share issue was made at the 
shareholders meeting. Because the decision 
made economic sense, it was approved. 
However, the existing stakes of minority 
shareholders were diluted.  
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Dilution of the foreign investors' stake from 
29 percent to 25.5 percent.  
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The shareholders reached consensus even 
though a certain minority stood to lose out as a 
result of the rights issue.  
 
27. Electrosila: Varoli, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Balancing the interests of shareholders. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control Majority shareholder decided that the existing 
director was no longer suitable for them. It was 
speculated that the director needed to be 
replaced with someone who would be more 
active at recovering a lost stake on behalf of a 
majority shareholder (EMK). Siemens 
protested saying that they were happy with the 
existing director who returned Elektrosila to 
profitability. 
1.1.6.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules EMK, majority shareholder in Elektrosila, 
ignored the decision of the court and installed 
a new director who was working alongside the 
old one. 
1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Most analysts suggested that Siemens will 
lose because EMK is a majority 
shareholder and a powerful corporation. 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation When the existing director was replaced, 
Siemens took the case to court and received a 
ruling in its favour (the decision to replace the 
director was in violation of the company‘s 
charter). EMK, majority shareholder in 
Elektrosila, ignored the decision of the court. 
 
28. Norilsk Nickel (3 separate disputes) 
28.1: 'Duma Asks for Sell-Off Reversal', (1998) (1 article) 
Code Theme Notes 
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1.1 
First Order 
Management Legitimacy of privatisation was questioned 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership The results of high profile privatization deals 
were threatened to be reversed. 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Under the loan-for-shares scheme, the 
government received money from Russian 
banks against stakes in Russia's most 
attractive state-owned companies. The 
loans were never repaid, and the banks 
acquired the stakes for prices far-below 
market value. Norilsk Nickel was privatised 
by means of this arrangement. 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The government was on the verge of 
bankruptcy and was very much dependant on 
financial structures that had all the bargaining 
power on their side. Analysts suggested that 
the review of the loan-for-shares deals was 
unlikely because of the involvement of the 
powerful financial industrial groups. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The fact that Duma voted unanimously in 
favour of the reversal through courts indicated 
a great deal of public dissatisfaction with the 
loan-for-shares deals. 
 
28.2: 'Share Issue Gives Norilsk $400M', (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion 
 
Share Issue 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of claims through exclusion of a 
group of shareholders from a share issue. 
1.2.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The company failed to ensure that all preferred 
stock was transferred into ordinary stock; a 
condition upon which most institutional 
investors had bought into the preferred stock. 
Furthermore, Uneximbank later relented and 
changed the terms of the issue, but investors 
who sold their stock on the false news lost out. 
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Norilsk announced its intention to double 
its charter capital with the issue of a further 
126 million shares. The first plan it drafted 
was scrapped because it was perceived to 
exclude preferred shareholders. 
 
 
 
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The company was forced to change the terms 
of the new share issue because the losing 
party i.e. preferred shareholders; (mainly 
institutional investors) started dumping their 
holdings, thereby driving the preferred share 
price down by some 10 percent. However, the 
new issue was on slightly less favourable 
terms, i.e. the price of the issued stock was 
higher. 
 
28.3: 'Norilsk Nickel Fights State Over Tax-Owing Subsidiary', (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Managing relations with the government. 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Back taxes claim leading to the government 
pressing for bankruptcy proceedings against a 
subsidiary. 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government had to boost tax collection in 
order to close a substantial budget deficit. In 
this particular case the decision was made to 
recover some of the tax debt through 
bankruptcy of a Norilsk Nickel‘s subsidiary.  
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The government, under a great deal of 
pressure from western investors to 
improve tax collection, pressed for 
Severonickel‘s bankruptcy because, 
apparently, the subsidiary had a 
substantial tax debt. Norilsk Nickel 
appealed the decision in an arbitration 
court arguing that the tax debt of $40 
million was calculated incorrectly. 
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29. Novolipetsk (2 separate disputes) 
29.1: Baker-Said, (1998f); Borisova, (1998d); Whitehouse, (1998e); Whitehouse, (1998g) 
4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Board representation. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control Fight for control; 40 percent minority was 
blocked from getting a proportionate board 
representation. 
1.1.6.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting Once a court returned the ruling in favour of 
the minority shareholders, the old 
management attempted to avoid allowing the 
shareholders to vote in their representatives by 
removing voting from the agenda of the 
shareholders meeting.  
1.1.6.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules There were a number of conflicting 
decisions that the Lipetsk arbitration court 
returned, and at some point there was a 
decision to take the case to the Supreme 
Arbitration Court. 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Clearly the minority shareholders relied on 
courts which eventually ruled in their favour. 
 
29.2: (Parallel Coding): Baker-Said, (1998f); Borisova, (1998d); Rao, (1998b)  
3 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Insider dealing 
Squeezing out an unwanted shareholder 
1.2.2 
 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Control 
Diversion of claims through alleged insider 
dealing. 
Forcing an unwanted shareholder to sell their 
stake. 
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1.2.2.5 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Trans-World Group, which had about 35 
percent of stock at the combine, was buying 
metal cheaply at the NLMK to resell it on the 
London commodity market at a profit. This 
made other shareholders unhappy. 
1.2.2.7 
1.1.6.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The new shareholders blocked Trans-
World‘s vote and by doing so, forced the 
company to sell its stake. 
1.2.2.8 
1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
The financial groups behind the new 
shareholders squeezed Trans-World out by 
means of blocking its vote. It appears that the 
interest in Novolipetsk arose as a result of rosy 
forecasts for the industry. 
1.2.2.10 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The State Duma's security committee 
launched an attack against Trans-World, 
alleging its director, Briton David Reuben, was 
a spy. The investigation by the State Duma 
securities commission of the Trans-World 
Director must have been a coordinated effort 
(rather than a coincidence) in driving the 
British company away from the dominant 
position in the industry. 
1.2.2.12 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The British company filed a number of cases in 
European courts with a Dutch court ruling in its 
favour ordering seizure of Novolipetsk‘s metal 
in Roterdam in Trans-World‘s favour.  
 
33. Magnitogorsk: Aliabyev, (1998d); Aliabyev, (1998m); Aliabyev, (1998n) 
3 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Negotiating with external finance providers. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Ownership dispute in which the company that 
managed shares refused to hand in the shares 
that were meant to be used as collateral for a 
loan from the EBRD. The loan was meant to 
modernise the plant, but the collateral would 
have changed the ownership structure. 
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1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The company ousted the renegade director for 
his refusal to hand over the shares. However, 
the shares were hidden in a number of 
transactions involving undisclosed foreign 
companies and individuals. 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear rules The company ousted the renegade director for 
his refusal to hand over the shares. However, 
the shares were hidden in a number of 
transactions involving undisclosed foreign 
companies and individuals. These transactions 
were made possible by the local share 
registrars who approved the transactions after 
the court order had frozen the disputed shares. 
Moreover, there was additional confusion, 
because the two parties to the conflict held 
their own board meetings since a Moscow 
district court returned a ruling reinstating 
Sharipov in his previous position. 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The company that was appointed to 
manage shares of Magnitogorsk may have 
resisted the hand over of shares as 
collateral for the loan because the stake 
represented its main asset. Consequently, 
the shares changed hands in a number of 
transactions involving undisclosed foreign 
companies and individuals. 
1.1.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Sharipov encouraged a number of transactions 
involving foreign partners and the local share 
registrar to hide the shares. He explained his 
actions by suggesting that handing over the 
shares would lead to a redistribution of 
property.  
 
 
1.1.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
The plant depended on the finance from the 
EBRD and possibly was prepared to accept 
less favourable terms. Bearing in mind the 
difficult financial situation in the country, the 
chances of the plant failing on repayment 
terms must have been fairly high. 
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1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The new management acted on the directions 
of the central government that clearly 
supported the loan. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The dismissal was fought in a Moscow district 
court. There were criminal charges against 
Sharipov for his failure to follow an earlier court 
order compelling him to hand over the shares. 
The Federal Securities Commission closed 
down the local registrar that authorised the 
deals with the disputed shares. However, a 
Moscow Court reinstated Sharipov to his 
position further to the sacking. 
 
34. Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant (2 separate disputes) 
34.1: Borisova, (1998a); Todres, (1998) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Privatisation. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Ownership dispute regarding a 10 percent 
stake that had been sold on the back of legal 
confusion, hence in part constituting a 
diversion of claims. 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government attempted to return the 
lost stake through the courts. It failed to 
achieve its task of maximizing revenue 
from the auction of the stake as during the 
time of the dispute a majority shareholder 
emerged that scared off minority investors. 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules The court system produced two 
contradictory rulings complicating the 
situation. Finally, the government 
suggested that although the present stock 
holders obtained the shares legitimately, it 
was not theirs as in the past, i.e. the 
disputed stock was sold improperly. 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Those who attempted to hide the stakes did so 
by selling it to a foreign company which 
possibly was closely affiliated to Russian 
partners. 
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1.1.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
The whole pursuit of shares might have been 
caused by the pressure from the IMF that was 
calling for greater effort to collect money on the 
part of the Russian government. 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
It might have been that the fate of the stakes 
had already been decided (amongst 
government officials or well connected 
insiders) away from the spotlight and the 
government was just keen to demonstrate the 
illusion of the action that was doomed to fail. It 
is entirely possible that the government 
exerted pressure on the legal system to come 
up with the rulings in its favour at the required 
time. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation There was an overall reliance on courts in the 
government‘s pursuit of the lost stake. The 
government clearly wanted to see the stake 
returned (or create an illusion to that effect) 
and eventually, the Moscow court ruled in the 
government‘s favour. 
 
34.2: Borisova, (1998a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Unwanted shareholder. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of claims through illegal increase of 
the company‘s charter capital. 
 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Lebedinsky Ore Mining Plant‘s 
management tried to dilute the stake of 
Rossiisky Kredit by illegally increasing the 
charter capital. Rossiisky Kredit managed 
to hold its ground, but made enemies with 
the local administration and the plant‘s 
management. When Rossiisky Kredit 
incurred liquidity problems brought about 
by the crisis, the bank was forced to sell its 
stake to Nacosta. 
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1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The plant‘s management and local 
administration used vulnerability of Rossiisky 
Kredit (caused by the looming crisis) to 
squeeze out the bank from the list of its 
shareholders. With regard to the charter capital 
increase, the parties used their proximity to 
local courts and other institutions in the 
Belgorod region to fight the bank. 
 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation With regard to the increase of the charter 
capital, there was some reliance on courts that 
helped Rossiisky Kredit hold its ground. 
 
35. Achinsk Alumina Combine: (Parallel Coding) Aliabyev, & Koriukin, (1998)            1 
article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Shortage of finances 
1.1.1 
1.1.3 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Bankruptcy 
Misinvestment 
Control 
The debt laden plant was allegedly protected 
from bankruptcy because the local 
administration was trying to prevent the plant‘s 
collapse due to far reaching social 
implications. There was a fight for control of 
the plant between the local administration and 
creditor. 
1.1.1.4 
1.1.3.4 
1.1.6.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules Every twist of the dispute around the 
combine and possible bankruptcy followed 
a change of Lebed's stand on the issue. I 
was alleged that Lebed withdrew his 
support of Kraz in favour of Alfa and vice 
versa. 
1.1.1.6 
1.1.3.6 
1.1.6.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Had Alfa (Alfa-Eko, a part of Alfa group and a 
major creditor of the combine) sided with 
Lebed, the local governor, the resolution, 
surely, would have been different. KRAZ, on 
the other hand managed to reach some sort of 
a compromise with the local administration 
(probably on a private level). 
1.1.1.8 Third-Party Had Alfa sided with Lebed, the local governor, 
the resolution, surely, would have been 
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1.1.3.8 
1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Enforcement different. KRAZ, on the other hand managed to 
reach some sort of a compromise with the 
local administration. 
1.1.1.10 
1.1.3.10 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The creditors should have had the upper hand, 
but the support of the local administration must 
have been decisive in the rulings of the local 
courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1.12 
1.1.3.12 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation There was an overall reliance on courts in the 
pursuit of control over the debt laden plant. 
However, it appears that the final call on the 
issue was made by the local governor and the 
financial group behind him. It is clear that the 
local administration was critical in ensuring that 
KRAZ maintains control over the debt laden 
plant. From this, it is once again evident that 
the local courts were very much under control 
of the local administration. 
 
36. Knauf (2 separate disputes) 
1. (Parallel Coding): Daigle, (1998b) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management New investor fighting local stakeholders. 
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1.1.6 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Control 
Ownership 
Sergiyenko (appointed director) was 
suspended from office on allegations of theft, 
mismanagement and tax manipulation. His 
response was to hold his own meetings, 
remove Knauf from the company‘s name, and 
issue 64 percent new shares to dilute the 
Germans' stake.  
1.1.6.3 
1.1.2.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting Sergiyenko‘s response was to hold his own 
meetings, remove Knauf from the company 
name, and issue 64 percent new shares to 
dilute the Germans' stake. 
1.1.6.5 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Sergiyenko removed Knauf from the company 
name, and diluted the Germans' stake.  
1.1.6.7 
1.1.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Knauf, as the rightful owner of the Kubansky 
Gyps-Knauf gypsum mine refused to leave the 
office as the renegade director attempted to 
seize control over the company. The Germans 
barricaded themselves in the building believing 
that physical possession was more valuable 
than meaningless court orders. 
1.1.6.9 
1.1.2.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
Sergiyenko used the support of the local 
government and Cossack Army to oust Knauf 
officials, while the German company appealed 
to the federal government for support. 
1.1.6.10 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The local authorities supported the coup 
arguing that the plant should be renationalised 
while the federal government, although 
inactive, was on Knauf‘s side. 
1.1.6.12 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation 30 court decisions were ignored. However, 
eventually, commission for the protection of 
investor rights resolved the dispute in favour of 
Knauf.  
 
36.2: (Parallel Coding) Whalen, (1998f) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 Management Relations with local stakeholders. 
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First Order 
1.1.5 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Taxes 
Control 
Although tax police were formally right as 
Knauf made an accounting mistake, the former 
refused to consider the evidence (receipts) 
supplied by Knauf. 
1.1.5.5 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions With 
Self-Interest 
It appears that an unidentified party was 
using tax authorities to exert pressure on 
the company to either surrender control, or 
simply share profits. 
1.1.5.8 
1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
An unidentified party was behind the 
allegations against Knauf. 
1.1.5.12 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The arbitration courts ruled in favour of the 
decision made by the tax authorities.  
 
38. AssiDoman (2 separate disputes) 
38.1: Aliabyev, (1998b); Aliabyev, (1998j) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Pre foreign investment debts. 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Back taxes and pension arrears. 
1.1.5.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
The company sought to establish personal 
relationships with key individuals in the 
position of power like Chubais and Mostovi. 
Their efforts were cancelled out by the 
reshuffle. The company raised its hopes on a 
new person (Nemtzov) but as a precaution 
ceased production while negotiating with the 
authorities and major shareholders.  
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1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
It appears that Yeltsin‘s comments were not 
taken too seriously, as his pledges to help did 
not sound convincing enough for the company 
to restart capital investments and production. 
Meanwhile, the tax authorities froze the 
company‘s accounts. 
 
 
38.2: Aliabyev, (1998a); Aliabyev, (1998b); Aliabyev, (1998g); Aliabyev, (1998j)  
'AssiDoman Pulls Out', (1998); Schwartz, (1998e); 6 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Legitimacy of the purchased assets. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership The legitimacy of the ownership stake was 
thrown into question because of unclear rules 
of the game, while minority shareholders with 
powerful backing sought to capitalise on the 
situation. 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules AssiDoman purchased a stake in a paper mill. 
It is possible that the legality of this purchase 
was questioned because someone else 
became interested in the stake. The courts 
were used to challenge the legitimacy of the 
stake. Subsequently, AssiDoman expressed a 
wish to sell its stake saying that it had 
underestimated problems with Russian 
bureaucracy. 
1.1.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
It is unclear why AssiDoman‘s stake was 
questioned by the courts. The only reasonable 
explanation would be an effort from either a 
minority shareholder or a Third-Party to win 
over control and ownership of the paper mill. 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Despite pledges from high ranking officials, 
including Boris Yeltsin, the government 
refused to offer the $60m guarantee without 
the backing of the Karelian government and 
the all clear from the courts. That fact 
prevented a sustained inflow of cash from 
AssiDoman. There were worthless pledges of 
support from the central government which 
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was clearly incapable of enforcing decisions on 
the minority shareholders which enjoyed the 
support of the local administration. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The State Anti Trust Committee‘s decision to 
allow the transfer of the stake to AssiDoman 
was declared illegal by the Moscow Arbitration 
Court. AssiDoman issued a statement in which 
it confessed that the problems with partners 
and bureaucracy had been underestimated. 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Vyborg Paper: (Parallel Coding) Lagnado, (1998a); Digges, (1998); Lagnado, 
(1998b) 3 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Maintaining relationships with stakeholder, i.e. 
employees. 
1.1.2 
 
1.1.4 
Second Order 
Ownership/ 
Misimplementation 
Fight for control and ownership which resulted 
in a failure to implement what otherwise would 
have been a viable project 
1.1.2.7 
1.1.4.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The trade unions, encouraged by national 
attention and political support, organised 
strikes, seizure of the mil, and blockage of the 
motorway. In the end the government decided 
to re-nationalise the property and thus 
supported employees in their efforts to return 
the paper mill. 
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1.1.2.10 
1.1.4.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
A promise to settle taxes and not lay off 
employees was broken by Nimonor (a 
company that was registered three weeks 
prior to the sale of the mill). The company 
tried to win control over the paper mill by 
registering an off-shore company, and 
allegedly by being in cahoots with the local 
authorities. In the end, the government 
decided to re-nationalise the property and 
supported employees in their efforts to return 
the paper mill. 
1.1.2.12 
1.1.4.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Nimonor failed to honour the agreement to 
settle wage and tax arrears provoking 
overreaction from the unions. There was 
some reliance on the St. Petersburg 
Arbitration Court in the resolution of this 
dispute. Also, the parliament responded to the 
pledges from the workers who received official 
support from the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40. SBS Agro (3 separate disputes) 
40.1: '2 Banks Attack Lehman Brothers', (1998); Bershidsky, (1998a); 'SBS-Agro Assets 
Frozen', (1998); 'Western Banks Drop Bond Lawsuit', (1998) 4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
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1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Financing 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Default on payment to foreign investors 
 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
SBS Agro complained to the Russian 
government and insisted on exclusion of 
Lehman Brothers‘ from participating in the 
debt-restructuring process. 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Further to the London court decision (a case 
initiated by Lehman Brothers), the accounts of 
SBS Agro were frozen. Also, Russian courts 
made a precedent setting decision on 
Tokobank which suggested that recovering 
investments in the banking sector on Russian 
soil would be very difficult. As far as freezing 
foreign accounts of Russian banks by foreign 
courts was concerned, there was a clear lack 
of enforcement powers over the Russian 
banks as their deposits in overseas accounts 
were smaller than their debt. 
 
40.2: Korchagina, (1998); 'No SBS-Agro Payments', (1998); Peach, (1998o); Rao, 
(1998f); 'Sberbank to Release SBS Savings Friday', (1998); 5 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Lack of money. 
1.1.1 
Second Order 
Bankruptcy Possible bankruptcy proceedings further to a 
failure to pay depositors. 
1.1.1.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rues Although the Central Bank had said SBS-Agro 
depositors could have access to their funds, it 
later retracted that pledge. 
At some point due to lack of cash, the bank 
decided to pay depositors on the basis of their 
needs. This was an arbitrary approach open to 
abuse. 
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1.1.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Simultaneously, questions were raised as to 
the legitimacy of the privatization of the bank 
which was seen as an insider deal involving 
government officials. 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation There was a danger of bankruptcy 
proceedings further to the bank‘s failure to pay 
depositors. A Russian court taking a formal 
stance on the issue froze accounts of the 
bank. Further bankruptcy proceedings were 
possible if the bank failed to demonstrate that 
the money was coming in. Although every 
precaution not to bankrupt the bank was 
evident, it had been proposed by the courts 
that bankrupting might lead to a higher chance 
of depositors being repaid. In any case, it had 
also been suggested that depositors with a 
court order, if not guaranteed, had a better 
chance of recovering their money than those 
without. 
 
40.3: Borisova, (1998f) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Importance of political connections 
1.1.3 
Second Order 
Misinvestment Political connections leading to bailing out of 
some banks and not others. It is misinvestment 
because the decision was not linked to 
operational efficiency. 
1.1.3.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Based on political connections, some banks 
received support form the government, but not 
other. The decision was based on affiliations 
and connection with powerful structure groups. 
1.1.3.6 Relationship-
Based 
Political connections and personal 
relationships influenced the government‘s 
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Third Order decision which banks to support. 
1.1.3.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Banks which had strong government support 
because of personal relationships and maybe 
access to media received preferential 
treatment following default of 1998. 
 
41. MFK Renaissance: Baker-Said, (1998g) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Appointments 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control A prominent investor was denied an 
opportunity to stand for the CEO. 
1.1.3.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Arbitrary application of law, where the 
candidate was refused the position on a 
technicality, which it could be argued did not 
apply in the context of that particular 
circumstance. Allowing a foreigner to be in 
charge of an investment vehicle could have 
made the Russian government vulnerable. 
Jordan attempted to tackle the dispute by 
negotiating with the chairman of the Central 
Bank of Russia. 
 
42. Inkombank: Borisova, (1998c) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Board representation. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control Fight for control.  
1.1.6.3 
Third Order 
General meeting It appears that Uneximbank-MFK prevented 
representatives from Inkombank from voting 
on dismantling the board due to an error on the 
part of the board. Inkombank representatives 
did not receive ballots for the vote.  
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1.1.6.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Two banking empires were locked in a battle 
for control of Severnaya Verf. The courts took 
a stance and made their decision. It appears 
that the parties to the conflict were of the same 
clout and therefore a fairer resolution was 
more likely.  
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Inkombank successfully petitioned the St. 
Petersburg Arbitration Court for an injunction 
on the meeting. Even though initially the ruling 
was ignored, the decision of the court was 
complied with upon the delivery of the 
documents. The meeting was rescheduled 
until a later date. Previously, the courts were 
relied upon when the dispute over the control 
of a 33 percent stake was being resolved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. MOST Bank: (Parallel Coding) Berezanskaya, (1998a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
1.2 
First Order 
Management 
Diversion 
Terminated joint venture. 
1.1.4 
1.2.2 
 
Second Order 
Misimplementation 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Failure to implement a viable joint venture 
project because the other party was allegedly 
engaging in serious business misconduct. 
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1.1.4.5 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
MOST Bank terminated a joint venture (United 
Card Service) with Uneximbank alleging 
serious misconduct on the part of 
Uneximbank‘s officials. The misconduct was 
likely to have been of benefit to some insiders. 
1.1.4.7 
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Most-Bank pulled out of the venture citing 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for the 
gross misconduct on the part of the joint 
venture partner. 
1.1.4.11 
1.2.2.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
Most-Bank pulled out of the venture citing 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for the 
gross misconduct on the part of the joint 
venture partner. The bank said in a statement 
that it intended to ask government regulators 
to investigate the "doubtful actions of a few 
officials at United Card Service and 
Uneximbank." 
 
44. Pioneer Group: 'Misdeeds at Bank in Moscow Revealed', (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Unauthorised transactions. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversions of claims through unauthorised 
financial transactions. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Pioneer Group Inc. disclosed unauthorised 
financial transactions at Pioneer Bank in 
Moscow which it owned 60 percent of. The 
asset management company felt it was not in 
the position to prevent such practice in the 
future. The unexpectedly high loss for the 
quarter was attributed to that fact. 
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement Pioneer group decided to withdraw from the 
Moscow Banking business altogether following 
the discovery of unauthorised transactions. 
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45. EBRD: Gordeyev, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Bankruptcy proceedings. 
1.1.1 
Second Order 
Bankruptcy The EBRD was unable to recover its stake in a 
bankrupt bank and wrote off its investment. 
1.1.1.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules The put option design under the British law 
which would have allowed the EBRD and sell 
back the stake was not recognised by the 
Russian law (equal treatment of all 
shareholders) in the face of bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
1.1.1.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The EBRD was unable to recover its stake in a 
bankrupt bank despite the put option and wrote 
off its investment. 
 
46. Tokobank: Bershidsky, (1998a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Failure to enforce a contract. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Tokobank used a loophole in the law to avoid 
settling futures contracts which became highly 
unprofitable as a result of rouble devaluation. 
1.2.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules Tokobank used a loophole in the law to avoid 
settling futures contracts which became highly 
unprofitable as a result of the devaluation of 
ruble. 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The court ruled against investors because 
according to the Russian Civil Code futures 
contracts were regarded as wagers in the 
absence of coercion or deceit. Wagers could 
not be settled by courts.  
 
47. Rossiisky Kredit: Aliabyev, (1998h) 1 article 
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Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
Fist order 
Diversion   Disputed transaction. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Refusal to transfer money to a customer 
1.2.2.4 
Third Order 
 
Unclear Rules 
   
 
The bank appealed the decision of the court 
claiming that the client‘s account had been 
frozen by tax authorities. 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation  
 
Court ruling was enforced by bailiffs who 
seized property of the bank. 
 
49. Kosmos TV: Smith, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Dismissal of a director. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control A renegade director took shareholders to court 
over his wrongful dismissal. The cable TV 
station ended up with two headquarters. 
1.1.6.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules The court ruled in favour of the renegade 
director because it relied on the Labour Code, 
rather than the Joint Stock Company Law, 
which was a higher order law and would have 
protected the shareholders more adequately. 
The Russian courts, at the time, were much 
more familiar with the Labour Code than the 
JSC Law and used the former much more 
readily. The decision raised concerns since it 
proved impossible for companies to sack their 
directors on even legitimate grounds. 
1.1.6.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Lapshin left after an out-of-court settlement 
was reached. 
1.1.6.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Foreign investors and the Russian partners 
respected decision of the court and reinstated 
the director. 
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50. Channel Five: Whitemore, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Contracting. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of funds through unprofitable 
advertising contracts and questionable fiscal 
practices. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
A Finance Ministry audit of St. Petersburg 
Channel 5 television station revealed a series 
of unprofitable advertising contracts and 
questionable fiscal practices that cost the 
station at least $7 million in lost revenues over 
the two year period. The TV channel signed 
contracts with advertising companies 
connected to Lisovsky (close ally of 
Berezovsky). The fees in the contracts were 
subsequently lowered for no apparent reason 
and the advertising companies failed to fully 
repay their debts to the channel. 
 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Personal relationships played an important role 
at the initial stage of questionable contracting. 
Lisovsky was allowed to transfer value from 
Channel 5 to his advertising agencies for the 
successful re-election campaign. Also, with 
regard to an unpaid debt of LISS (one of 
Lisovsky‘s advertising agencies) to Channel 5, 
an out of court settlement was reached where 
only one fourth of the debt was paid despite 
the case being taken to court.  
1.2.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
Third-party enforcement in the form of 
Berezovsky‘s support. 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
 
Yeltsin‘s apathy might have been the reward 
that Lisovsky received for running the 
successful re-election campaign.  
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Finance Ministry produced an audit report 
about financial irregularities to do with 
advertising contracts. The report led to the 
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investigation by the General Prosecutor‘s 
Office. Also, the case of non payment by LISS 
was taken to court.  
 
51. ORT (2 separate disputes) 
51.1: 'Yeltsin Denies TV Share Trade', (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Transfer of shares. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of claims through non transparent 
schemes involving leading politicians and 
businessmen. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
There were alleged transfers of more than one 
quarter of ORT‘s shares from Berezovsky to 
Yeltsin through Korzhakov. Yeltsin‘s 
spokesman denied the transaction. 
Berezovsky, however said that the transfer 
was ordered by Korzhakov. 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
This case demonstrates the extent of 
Berezovsky‘s proximity to Yeltsin and the 
government.  
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The transfer of shares in ORT allegedly took 
place because Berezovsky wanted to bribe 
Yeltsin. The presidential administration denied 
the allegation. Although the actual transaction 
did take place; high ranking officials kept 
accusing each other. 
 
51.2: Zolotov, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Failure to pay creditors. 
1.1.1 
Second Order 
Bankruptcy Bankruptcy proceedings following ORT‘s 
failure to pay creditors. The government 
repeatedly stepped in to bail out the company. 
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1.1.1.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
The company was protected by the 
government, not only because it represented 
an important asset, but perhaps due to the fact 
the Yeltsin and other high ranking officials 
allegedly held shares in ORT. 
1.1.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The courts sent marshals to seize the property 
of ORT following the company‘s failure to pay 
the creditors. The government however, 
extended the credit given to ORT by issuing a 
presidential decree to that effect.  
1.1.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation There were bankruptcy proceedings following 
ORT‘s failure to pay creditors. The government 
repeatedly stepped in to bail out the company. 
Courts ruled against ORT sending marshals to 
seize the property in lieu of the debts. The 
Moscow city bankruptcy committee also filed a 
case in the Moscow Arbitration Court. 
 
52. Subway: (Parallel Coding) Borisova, (1998e); Borisova, & Whitemore, (1998); 
Schwartz, (1998a); Schwartz, (1998b); Schwartz, (1998d); Schwartz, & Digges, (1998); 
'Subway Shop Neglected at St. Pete's Peril', (1998) 7 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2 
First Order 
Management 
 
Diversion 
Joint Venture 
1.1.6 
1.1.2 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Control 
Ownership/ 
Diversion of 
Assets 
A Russian joint venture partner illegally ousted 
American partners, renamed the entity, and 
assumed control and ownership of the 
business thereby diverting assets and claims. 
1.1.6.5 
1.1.2.5 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
A Russian joint venture partner (Bordug) 
illegally ousted American partners (East West 
Invest), renamed the entity, and assumed 
control and ownership thereby depriving East 
West Invest of their initial investment for over 2 
years. 
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1.1.6.9 
1.1.2.9 
1.2.1.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
When the bailiffs showed up (with all the 
necessary papers) the management of 
Minutka did not quietly acquiesce in the 
process. It was suggested that the Submarine 
business is quite separate from Minutka.  
A document dated March 2, 1998, was 
produced according to which all the assets of 
Minutka had been transferred to the new 
corporate entity. An assistant, who identified 
himself only as Vyacheslav, refused to let a 
reporter examine the document. Vyacheslav, a 
thickly built man with close-cropped hair who 
refused to say what his position in the 
business was, repeatedly challenged the 
bailiffs as they tried to fulfil their duties.  
1.1.6.10 
1.1.2.10 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The governor (Vladimir Yakovlev) did not 
assist the process and used an example of 
another dispute as a justification for the 
injustice. However, he (the governor) was 
under a lot of pressure from foreign community 
to demonstrate the rule of law and adequate 
protection. It appears that the local 
administration was not in the position to solve 
the case categorically. 
1.1.6.12 
1.1.2.12 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The case of expropriation was taken to the 
Stockholm International Arbitration Court which 
ruled in favour of the American partners. 
Russian Common and Supreme Courts 
endorsed the decision. However, the bailiffs 
appointed by the local court struggled to 
recover the debts. They were not qualified to 
evaluate the property; their efforts were 
hindered by the formal change of ownership of 
Minutka and private security involvement. 
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53. Lomonosov Porcelain Factory: Koriukin, (1998b) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Buying stock through brokerages. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership/Control Managers of Lomonosov Porcelain Factory 
denied foreign investors access to the factory 
and its books on the grounds that the 
brokerages that sold the stakes had originally 
purchased them illegally. 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
Foreign investors claimed that they had 
determined that the St. Petersburg brokerages 
had the right to sell the shares, although they 
did not know the details of how the brokers 
had acquired the shares. A financial 
consultant to the factory, however, said the 
investors did not exercise due diligence when 
dealing with the brokerages, which were 
reported to have been involved in 
questionable stock transactions in the past. 
Lomonosov was a closed joint-stock company, 
which meant a shareholder could not sell his 
shares to a third-party without other 
shareholders' approval. The shares were sold 
through a scheme by which a factory 
employee gave one of his shares as a gift to 
an intermediary company, which thus became 
a shareholder and could buy any number of 
shares. 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The brokerages picked August for their 
takeover plan, knowing that the factory had 
been shut down for a month and a half in June 
and July and unable to pay its workers. The 
shares were bought up for half their face value 
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of 50 rubles ($8 at the August exchange rate). 
1.1.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The factory‘s management tried to protect 
themselves from the new investors by denying 
them access to their property while turning to 
courts in an effort to reveal illegal practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
It was alleged that the brokerages were 
connected with criminal circles which 
employed practices like physical harassment, 
(a project manager with Vanguard was brutally 
beaten with iron rods by unknown men just as 
he was in the middle of negotiations with KKR 
and the investment fund managers. St. 
Petersburg mafia, which profited from the 
stock deal and was trying to prevent a fair 
agreement between the factory and foreign 
investors, was blamed) threats, etc, to 
persuade employees to sell their stakes 
cheaply. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Managers of Lomonosov Porcelain Factory 
denied foreign investors access to the factory 
and its books on the grounds that the 
brokerages that sold the stakes had originally 
purchased them illegally. The factory took the 
case to a St. Petersburg court which agreed to 
look into the situation suspecting illegal action. 
 
54. Kuznetsky Mine (Parallel Coding): Rao, (1998e) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Stakeholder relations (local authorities). 
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1.1.2 
1.1.4 
Second Order 
Ownership/ 
Misimplementation 
Local authorities tried to win control from 
foreign investors over a potentially profitable 
venture. 
1.1.2.1 
1.1.4.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Local authorities were trying to renationalize 
assets belonging to a foreign investor – 
Prosystem GmbH. The plant (Kuznetsky Mine) 
had a potential; the local administration 
realised that and decided to get their hands on 
the property. They started ignoring previous 
agreements and began legal action against 
the foreign investor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2.4 
1.1.4.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules Kuznetsky was the first Russian mine to be 
privatized. Prosystem obtained a 40 percent 
stake in 1991, while another 20 percent went 
to a Liechtenstein-based company, Tradico. 
Another 40 percent was held by workers and 
managers. Some have deemed the 
privatization unfair given the relatively cheap 
conditions under which Prosystem bought its 
stake -$800,000 and a promise to invest 
another $1 million. But Hofer said this was a 
fair price at the time, given the mine's 
condition. A Kemerovo arbitration court ruled 
the privatization of the mine illegal, but an 
appeals court later invalidated the ruling.  
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1.1.2.5 
1.1.4.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Allegedly, local authorities, attracted by the 
newly installed modern infrastructure at the 
mine, attempted to renationalize it. Soon after, 
a devastating fire broke out in the mine. 
Moreover, a coal monopoly Rosugol refused to 
pay its $2.9m debt despite written pledges.  
1.1.2.7 
1.1.4.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The Austrian investors (Prosystem GmbH) 
considered simply leaving the project provided 
they were reimbursed for their expenses and 
the 40 percent stake in the mine.  
1.1.2.9 
1.1.4.9 
Third Order 
Private 
Enforcement 
Local power structures including administration 
and federal agencies used a variety of 
techniques aimed at pressurising foreign 
investors. There might have been a connection 
between the events to do with the mine and 
the fire, beating up of employees, raids of the 
offices, and murders.  
1.1.2.12 
1.1.4.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The Austrian investor did turn to courts in 
order to defend the legitimacy of the privatized 
stake and make a ruling on the outstanding 
debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55. MCCI (Parallel Coding): Kenyon, (1998c) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 Management Lease agreement. 
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1.2 
First Order 
Diversion 
1.1.6 
1.1.2 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Control 
Ownership/ 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Russian state-owned entity took control over a 
viable project from which a foreign investor 
was forced to withdraw due to concerns over 
the lease agreement. 
1.1.6.1 
1.1.2.1 
1.2.1.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The state company used its influence to 
renegotiate terms of the lease agreement in its 
favour. The agreement was previously called 
into question. An arbitration court in 
Stockholm, Sweden, ruled that GlavUpDK had 
reneged on its part of the contract with MCCI 
by not turning over the lease on the property to 
the joint venture. Uncertainty drove foreign 
inventors out at which point GlavUpDK 
continued with the project.  
1.1.6.5 
1.1.2.5 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The state-owned company (GlavUpDK) used 
its powers to negotiate the lease agreement in 
its favour depriving the foreign investor 
(California-incorporated Moscow Country Club 
Inc., or MCCI) of any guarantees thus driving 
the foreign investor out of the project. 
1.1.6.10 
1.1.2.10 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The state-owned company used its power to 
negotiate the lease agreement in its favour 
depriving the foreign investor of any 
guarantees. 
1.1.6.12 
1.1.2.12 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Stockholm arbitration court and a U.S. federal 
court ruled in favour of the US investor. 
Without the stamp of a Russian court, the 
foreign partner could seize foreign assets of 
the state-owned company (there were 
insufficient assets to cover the claim), or prove 
its (GlavUpDK) links with the government and 
seize the property of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry. 
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56. Standart NMT: Schwartz, (1998c) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Increased price of service. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
The police department was providing security 
service to a business client and possibly 
forcing him to pay more money using gangster 
tactics. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The police department in St. Petersburg 
decided to increase the price of security 
service it offered businesses and forced 
owners like Igor Rudyenkov of Standart-NMT, 
(an auto parts store in Kirishi) to pay more. 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The police department did not hesitate to 
enforce its decision (increase the price of 
security service) by means of such tactics as 
denying the owner access to the shop, drawing 
on the economic crimes department to press 
questionable charges accusing the 
businessman of selling fake oil (despite the 
demonstration of the required licences); and 
traffic police stopping and detaining the 
businessman for no apparent reason. 
 
57. Post Office: Solovyova, (1998) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 Diversion Non payment to a service provider. 
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First Order 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
The Railway refused to carry the mail when the 
Post Office failed to settle its debt. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
 
The Post Office was accused of allowing the 
bureaucrats to pocket revenues and thus 
forcing the service to accumulate a massive 
debt. In theory, the Post Office should be a 
profitable entity because it collects money 
upfront at rates established by the 
Communications Ministry well above those 
necessary to cover its transportation 
expenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The Railways Ministry decided to stop carriage 
of post due to non payment. The ministry did 
not refer to courts. The decision was made at 
the ministerial level. On the other hand, the 
stoppage of shipments could be interpreted as 
a way to win back commercial carriage 
contracts and bring them under the auspices of 
the Railways Ministry.  
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Appendix 9 b: Templates of Corporate Disputes, 2006 
 
1. Aeroflot: Humphries, (2006) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Purchasing strategy. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of claims through the purchasing 
strategy that was not shareholder-centred. 
1.2.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government had a different agenda in 
terms of the purchasing strategy which sought 
to recreate the national industry and build 
political allies.  
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Major shareholders are more profit driven, but 
failed to get anywhere with pushing their case. 
 
2. Svyazinvest: 'Svyazinvest Sale Delayed', (2006) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Sale of a stake. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Uncertainty concerning the sale of a 75 
percent stake in the company. 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The government kept delaying the promised 
sale of the 75 percent stake in Svyazinvest.  
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The government broke its promise to sell a 75 
percent stake in Svyazinvest to strategic 
investors because it was looking for a 
politically acceptable partner. 
 
4. VimpelCom: Levitov, (2006a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
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1.1 
First Order 
Management Acquisition strategy. 
1.1.3 
Second Order 
Misinvestment Misinvestment by misleading shareholders at 
an extraordinary shareholders meeting. 
1.1.3.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The original decision regarding a controversial 
purchase of Ukrainian Radiosystems was 
made at an extraordinary shareholders 
meeting based on misleading information. 
 
 
 
 
1.1.3.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting Both shareholders of VimpelCom have a 
blocking stake. One of them was interested in 
a purchase of a competitor of the other. The 
Russian shareholder provided misleading 
information at the disputed extra-ordinary 
shareholders meeting and got the vote its way. 
1.1.3.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
Telenor threatened to take the case to an 
American court.   
1.1.3.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Telenor disputed the decision in Russian 
courts. 
 
5. MagaFon: (Parallel Coding) Belton & Levitov, (2006a); Belton & Levitov, (2006b) 2 
articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Minister as ultimate beneficiary. 
1.2.2 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Ownership 
Diversions of claims through dilution by a 
government minister who denied his status as 
the ultimate beneficiary. 
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1.2.2.2 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
IT and Communications Ministry spokesman 
denied that Reiman was among the fund's 
owners. It has been claimed that ‘Reiman was 
neither a beneficiary nor a shareholder of the 
companies described‘. However, the Zurich 
court found that Reiman was the ultimate 
beneficial owner of IPOC. 
1.2.2.5 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The minister diluted the states interest in 
MegaFon using his powers as the IT and 
Communications Minister.  
1.2.2.10 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The minister diluted the state‘s interest in 
MegaFon using his powers as the IT and 
Communications Minister. 
1.2.2.12 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The Zurich arbitration tribunal ruled that the IT 
and Communications Minister Leonid Reiman 
was the ultimate beneficiary of the IPOC fund. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. AvtoVaz: (Parallel Coding) 'AvtoVAZ Investigation Closed', (2006); 
Smolchenko, (2006b) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion Government seeking greater control. 
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1.1.6 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Control 
Taxes 
The government was seeking to re-establish 
control over the car manufacturer by opening 
and closing criminal investigations (including 
probes into the non-payment of taxes) and 
bringing in a symbolic suit against the joint 
venture partner GM. 
1.1.6.1 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government was seeking to re-establish 
control over the car manufacturer by opening 
and closing criminal investigations and 
bringing in a symbolic suit against GM, the 
joint venture partner. 
1.1.6.4 
1.1.5.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules The Russian Court system bounced the 
criminal charges from court to court, but 
eventually returned the cases to the 
prosecutor‘s office which decided to cancel the 
investigation. No explanation was given as to 
why. 
1.1.6.10 
1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The Russian government‘s technique was 
based on intimidating power groups within 
AvtoVaz with overly serious (in this case 
probably not unfounded) and symbolic 
charges. Subsequently, the charges were 
dropped because the influential parties agreed 
to co-operate with the government. The suit 
against the joint venture was used in order to 
redress the balance between the joint venture 
partners in favour of the Russian side.  
1.1.6.12 
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The Russian Court system bounced the 
criminal charges from court to court, but 
eventually returned the cases to the 
prosecutor‘s office which decided to cancel the 
investigation. No explanation was given as to 
why. Also, the government friendly 
management sued its joint venture partner GM 
for a symbolic sum of $60. 
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10. Rosneft (5 separate disputes) 
10.1: Belton, (2006m); 'Rosneft Consolidates Yugansk Stake', (2006) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Asset transfers. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversions of shares through a non transparent 
company. 
1.2.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
An unknown (possibly shell) firm, Baikal 
Finance Group, received assets of Yukos, held 
on to them and later transferred those to 
Rosneft. A similar scheme used Rosneftegaz 
as an intermediary. The schemes lacked 
transparency and it is possible that a 
substantial amount of money changed hands.  
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Officials acting in their self-interest devised 
these non-transparent schemes because of 
which (possibly) a substantial amount of 
money changed hands.  
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Officials acting in their self-interest devised 
a scheme whereby the company‘s assets 
were transferred by means of non 
transparent schemes. One of the schemes 
also protected Rosneft from legal risks 
arising from the much disputed auction of 
Yugansk. 
 
10.2: Belton, (2006r); Belton, (2006s); Humber, (2006h) 3 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Consolidation. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Undervaluation of shareholders‘ stakes in 
Rosneft subsidiaries. 
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Some minority shareholders felt that the terms 
of consolidation were ten times below what 
they should have been. An analyst however 
suggested that the price of the subsidiary‘s 
shares was inflated by speculative purchases 
from investors who counted on better 
consolidation terms ahead of the IPO. 
1.2.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules It is difficult to see how the minority can protect 
its interests since by law the company is 
allowed to pick a method of valuation. Clearly, 
management would use the most favourable 
one and with the legal profession lacking 
expertise, accountants have a greater freedom 
when it comes to ‗massaging‘ the figures. 
1.2.2.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
Minority shareholders threatened to sue 
Rosneft. 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The fund‘s director felt that the interests of 
minority were trampled with and filed a 
complaint with a regional court. 
 
10.3: (Parallel Coding) Belton, (2006s) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Parent - Subsidiary 
1.2.2 
 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Transfer pricing and asset stripping of the 
subsidiaries. 
1.2.2.5 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Alleged asset stripping and transfer pricing 
took place at Rosneft‘s subsidiaries. The 
subsidiaries complained to the government. 
1.2.2.10 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
Rosneft acknowledged transfer pricing and 
asset stripping saying that the former was 
common practice within oil industry and the 
latter was the result of Rosneft‘s major 
investment in the subsidiary.  
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10.4: 'Protests Grow Over Barinov's Arrest', (2006) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Stakeholder management. 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Alleged non-payment of taxes by a Rosneft‘s 
subsidiary. 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government detained Barinov on 
suspicion of fraud and embezzlement allegedly 
after/because he campaigned against 
Rosneft‘s subsidiary which did not pay taxes 
and broke ecological standards. Rosneft‘s 
spokesman said that the company was acting 
in accordance with all signed agreements and 
had nothing to do with the detention of the 
governor. 
Page 436 
 
1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
It is possible that Rosneft relied on 
administrative support and ordered formal 
institutions to detain Barinov. From the report it 
is impossible to determine whether Barinov 
was actually guilty. It is however clear that the 
state and state companies would not hesitate 
to revive charges against their opponents (both 
political and economic) and use those to 
protect their interest. 
 
10.5: (Parallel Coding) Belton, (2006k); Belton, (2006l); Belton, (2006m); Belton, 
(2006n); Belton, (2006r); 'Rosneft to Sell More IPO Shares in Russia', (2006)        6 
articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Legitimacy 
1.2.2 
 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Claims 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Legitimisation of Rosneft‘s acquisition of 
Yukos‘ assets. 
1.2.2.5 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The government and Rosneft‘s officials used 
IPO in London as an instrument for legitimising 
the status of the acquired assets (previously 
belonging to Yukos). 
1.2.2.6 
1.2.1.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-
Based 
Foreign companies like BP and Petronas were 
keen to support Rosneft‘s IPO in order to 
please the Russian government. The 
government made it clear that such support 
will be critical when it comes to decisions to do 
with licensing and access to resources. 
1.2.2.10 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The IPO in London and the fact that Rosneft 
was fully backed by the government meant 
that it was immune from the rulings of foreign 
courts.  
1.2.2.12 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Although the company was being sued in 
various locations by minority shareholders, the 
rulings of international courts had to be upheld 
by a Russian court in order to compel Rosneft 
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to pay. 
 
11. Gazprom (5 separate disputes) 
11.1: Korchagina, (2006d) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Previous agreements. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Ownership of a 40 percent stake in a gas field 
is disputed. 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference An agreement that a significant ownership 
stake would go to Moncrief was broken 
probably because BASF received a much 
stronger political support. 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules An agreement was not honoured by Gazprom 
possibly because the government found a 
more acceptable (politically) partner to develop 
the field. 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The initial agreement specified that all disputes 
should be settled in Russian courts hence it 
was probably possible for Gazprom to 
disregard the agreement completely.  
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The initial agreement specified that all disputes 
should be settled in Russian courts hence it 
was probably possible for Gazprom to 
disregard it completely.  
 
11.2: (Parallel Coding) Belton, (2006h) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Transfer of assets. 
1.2.1 
 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Diversion of 
Diversion of assets and claims from Gazprom 
to Itera through crony deals valued at as much 
as $4 billion a year and then back to Gazprom 
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1.2.2 
Second Order 
Claims through a politically backed consolidation. 
 
1.2.1.5 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Backed by Putin‘s administration, the state 
company Gazprom transferred assets from the 
largest independent gas producer Itera in order 
to redress the balance in its favour. Previously 
Itera siphoned off a great deal of Gazprom‘s 
assets by means of crony deals. 
1.2.1.10 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The former managers of Gazprom were 
replaced by those completely loyal to Putin. 
Hence, Putin‘s administration made it possible 
for Gazprom to regain some of the key assets 
that had been previously transferred to Itera. 
 
11.3: (Parallel Coding) Belton, (2006i); Elder, (2006e); Kim, (2006b); Zhdannikov, 
(2006a) 4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Competition. 
1.2.1 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of 
Assets 
Ownership 
Diversion of assets in favour of Gazprom by 
means of threats to revoke licenses from major 
companies using environmental allegations as 
an excuse. 
1.2.1.1 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Threats by the Natural Resources Ministry to 
revoke operating licenses from Shell and TNK-
BP have been interpreted as a means of 
putting government pressure on foreign oil 
majors to accept Gazprom's entry into their 
projects. 
1.2.1.4 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules The government decided to consolidate control 
over the oil and gas sector (Gazprom was the 
main beneficiary of such action), yet delayed 
the law on strategic assets.  
1.2.1.10 
1.1.2.10 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
The government and Gazprom put pressure on 
foreign led projects using environmental non-
compliance as a negotiating tool in order to 
secure favourable terms for Gazprom‘s (or 
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Third Order Rosneft) entry.  
1.2.1.12 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The development of the law on strategic 
assets which would have clarified the legal 
side of things in these sorts of disputes was 
delayed several times. 
 
 
 
 
11.4: Elder, (2006c) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Appointments 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control A Gazprom official accumulated too much 
power and, allegedly, because of that was 
replaced by a Putin‘s loyalist. 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the 
State 
It has been suggested that Ryazanov became 
so powerful that perhaps started to represent a 
threat to some other high ranking officials 
within Gazprom and the government. 
Ryazanov was replaced with an ex KGB agent 
from St. Petersburg who worked at the mayor‘s 
office at the same time as Putin.  
 
11.5: (Parallel Coding) Belton, (2006g); Belton, (2006j); Boykewich, (2006a); 'Ukraine 
Deal Answers Only One Question', (2006) 4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Contracts. 
1.2.2 
1.1.2 
Diversion of Claims/ 
Ownership 
Gazprom cut supplies to Ukraine and 
Belarus in order to renegotiate terms of the 
existing contracts and arrangements. The 
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Second Order  new agreement features a middle man with 
an un- disclosed ownership structure. 
1.2.2.1 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Despite the formal agreement between 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Gazprom cut 
supplies in order to increase the price of gas 
and extend its grip over the export pipeline to 
Europe. Gazprom and the Russian 
government felt that they were not getting a 
good deal and perhaps argued legitimacy of 
their actions in those terms. 
1.2.2.2 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
In the instance of the agreement with 
Ukraine, a company with an undisclosed 
ownership structure (Rosukrenergo) was 
nominated as a trader. As a result of that, 
billions of dollars went unaccounted for.  
1.2.2.4 
1.1.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear rules Gazprom suddenly moved to breach a five-
year contract signed with Ukraine in August 
2004 that set the gas price at $50.  
1.2.2.5 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
There was a vast disparity in the two sides' 
assessment of Beltransgas‘ worth: Belarus 
put it at $5 billion, while Gazprom's 
assessment of it was a mere $600,000173. 
Additionally, because of the undisclosed 
ownership structure of Rosukrenergo, billions 
of dollars went unaccounted for. 
1.2.2.9 
1.1.2.9 
Third Order 
Private Enforcement The gas export agreement between Russia 
and Ukraine involved a middleman 
(RosUkrEnergo) with a murky ownership 
structure. Some suggested it was linked to 
the criminal underworld. The company‘s 
auditor KPMG resigned because of its 
concerns over possible damage to 
reputation. 
1.2.2.10 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
Gazprom cut gas supplies breaking existing 
contracts and agreements. The company 
used its monopoly power to renegotiate the 
terms of the contracts. In the instance of the 
                                                          
173
 Clearly the Belarusian side was playing the political card. It is probably understood that Gazprom would 
pay a premium on the company’s assets for the sake of extending its monopoly powers. The question is 
how much Gazprom would be willing to part with.  
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agreement with Ukraine, a company with an 
undisclosed ownership structure 
(Rosukrenergo), but possibly connected to 
the government, was nominated as a trader.  
 
12. Yukos (7 separate disputes) 
1. (Parallel Coding): Abdullaev, (2006); Belton, (2006a); Belton, (2006b); Belton, (2006f); 
Belton, (2006o); Belton, (2006q); Belton, (2006s); Belton, (2006x); Belton, (2006y); 
Boykewich, (2006b); 'Date Set for Yukos Case, Shares Plunge', (2006); 'Gazprombank 
Tapped in Yukos Sell-Off', (2006); Korchagina, (2006a); Korchagina, (2006f); 'Lawyer's 
Jail Time Cut to 6 1/2 Years', (2006); Mauldin, (2006b); Medetsky, (2006a); Medetsky, 
(2006c); Schreck, (2006); Smolchenko, (2006c); 'These Signals Are Less Than 
Transparent ', (2006); 'Yukos Exec Could Get 9 Years', (2006); 'Yukos Pegs Hopes on 
Lower Debt, More Oil', (2006)          23 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Re-nationalization, stakeholder 
management. 
1.1.2 
1.1.6 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Ownership/ 
Control 
Taxes 
 
Re-nationalization of the company through 
questionable tax allegations. 
1.1.2.1 
1.1.6.1 
1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government, possibly arbitrary, imposed 
back tax bills on the company in an effort to 
seize control over its main assets. The 
decision was likely to be linked to 
Khodorkovsky‘s support of political 
opposition. 
1.1.2.5 
1.1.6.5 
1.1.5.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
A Moscow court sanctioned the arrest of 
Yukos' executive vice president, a day after 
he was charged with embezzlement and 
money laundering. Aleksanyan was detained 
by the Prosecutor General's Office just days 
after his appointment as Yukos vice 
president. He was charged with stealing 8 
billion rubles ($290.3 million) in property and 
3.6 billion rubles in shares belonging to 
companies tied to Eastern Oil Company. This 
case was part of the government‘s onslaught 
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on Yukos. 
1.1.2.9 
1.1.6.9 
1.1.5.9 
Third Order 
Private Enforcement Campaign of intimidation in the form of 
beating, jailing etc. was used in order to 
silence Khodorkovsky‘s Russian lawyers. 
International lawyers were refused visas or 
expelled from the country. 
1.1.2.10 
1.1.6.10 
1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
The government used tax authorities in order 
to seize control of Yukos. Khodorkovsky was 
sentenced on fraud and tax evasion charges. 
International lawyers were refused visas or 
expelled from the country. The prosecutor‘s 
office and tax authorities were instrumental in 
the enforcement of the government‘s 
objectives. It has been alleged that a state-
owned company such as Gazprom or 
Rosneft could buy a controlling stake in 
Yukos for $3 billion to $4 billion and then use 
their leverage to lift its tax debts.  
1.1.2.12 
1.1.6.12 
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The case was disputed in local and 
international courts including the US court 
case when high profile government officials 
were ‗legally served‘. The government‘s 
onslaught was eventually legitimised by the 
international community when a British judge 
cleared the way for Rosneft‘s listing on the 
LSE. 
 
 
 
 
 
12.2: Belton, (2006b); Belton, (2006f) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Questionable transactions. 
1.2.2 Diversion of Claims There were numerous accusations of money 
laundering on the part of former Yukos 
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Second Order  executives.  
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
It has been alleged that Golubovich had 
conducted transactions worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars every year through various 
firms between 1996 and 2000. It has been 
claimed that Golubovich had forged 
signatures in several asset transactions. 
Moreover, the Prosecutor General's Office 
accused Theede and Osborne of siphoning 
off more than $10 billion of assets out of 
Yukos into foreign holdings. Former Yukos 
CFO Bruce Misamore and Yukos lawyer 
David Godfrey, the managers of a Dutch-
based Yukos subsidiary, were also under 
investigation. Aleksanyan was detained by 
the Prosecutor General's Office just days 
after his appointment as Yukos vice 
president. He was charged with stealing 8 
billion rubles ($290.3 million) in property and 
3.6 billion rubles in shares belonging to 
companies tied to Eastern Oil Company. 
1.2.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based Former Federal Security Service General 
Andrei Lych co-ran Russkiye Produkty, 
which is a major supplier of coffee, tea 
and other foodstuffs. Former colleagues 
of Golubovich's have suggested that his 
connections with a former high-ranking 
Federal Security Service (FSB) officer 
might have staved off arrest attempts 
against him. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2.9 
Third Order 
Private Enforcement The Kremlin was seeking former 
Khodorkovsky partner Leonid Nevzlin's 
extradition from Israel on charges that he 
had ordered a string of murders and 
attempted murder. Nevzlin denies the 
charges. Also, the Russian prosecutors 
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drafted a request for Golubovich's extradition 
on charges of participating in an "organized 
criminal group" that committed large-scale 
fraud174. Golubovich in turn, claimed that two 
unsuccessful attacks on his family appeared 
to be "acts of intimidation" aimed at scaring 
him out of Russia as the legal attack against 
Yukos mounted in 2003. Also cases involving 
Aleksanyan, Bakhmina and other 
Khodorkovsky‘s former colleagues cannot be 
disregarded as unconnected to private 
enforcement.  
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Legislation The government put significant pressure on 
courts and other formal institutions in order to 
make sure that those act in line with the 
politically imposed will and with the required 
level of efficiency. E.g. Luxembourg-based 
Yukos Capital sued (Moscow Arbitration 
Court) its bankrupt parent company Yukos 
for $4.8 billion in debts, which could make it 
the third-largest creditor. It has been 
suggested that Yukos Capital could win the 
case only if it had an agreement with 
Gazprom to sell the debt once the court rules 
in its favour. 
 
12.3: Mauldin, (2006b) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Inside information. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims 
 
It has been alleged that Gazprombank 
executives used inside information when 
they sold Yukos shares short one day before 
a Russian court upheld a back tax bill of $3.5 
billion against the company. Gazprombank 
may have profited by as much as $500,000. 
                                                          
174
 Former colleagues said they feared Russian law enforcement agencies were trying to trap Golubovich 
into testifying against his partners in return for a light sentence as the Kremlin prepared to finish off its 
assault on Khodorkovsky and his Menatep empire.  
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1.2.2.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules Insider trading was not a crime under the 
Russian law at the time, but the markets 
service were preparing legislation that would 
criminalize such trades. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
A lawyer representing U.S. shareholders of 
Yukos claimed that Gazprombank executives 
used inside information when they sold 
Yukos shares short one day before a 
Russian court upheld a back tax bill of $3.5 
billion against the company. Gazprombank 
may have profited by as much as $500,000.  
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
It is entirely possible that Gazprom officials 
relied on insider information when they sold 
Yukos shares one day before a court 
decision.  
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation A lawyer representing U.S. shareholders of 
Yukos claimed that Gazprombank executives 
used inside information when they sold 
Yukos shares short one day before a 
Russian court upheld a back tax bill of $3.5 
billion against the company. 
 
12.4: Belton, (2006c); Belton, (2006u); Belton, (2006w); Belton, (2006x); 'Date Set for 
Yukos Case, Shares Plunge', (2006); 'Gazprombank Tapped in Yukos Sell-Off', (2006); 
Schreck, (2006); Skarzinskaite (2006) 8 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Sale of assets. 
1.1.1 
Second Order 
Bankruptcy 
 
Politically motivated bankruptcy proceedings. 
1.1.1.1 
Third Order 
State Interference In order to make sure that Yukos did not find 
a way to avoid bankruptcy, the government 
initiated a set of new charges (may be 
legitimate) and used the Prosecutor 
General‘s Office and the Russian courts to 
prevent the sale of the Mazeikiu refinery. 
1.1.1.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The biggest problem was a lack of 
information in the West about Yukos and 
GML assets, which, according to different 
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estimates, totalled between $5 billion and 
$20 billion. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1.5 
Third Order 
Transaction with 
Self-Interest 
There were new money laundering charges 
brought against Khadarkovsky and Lebedev 
as part of a centralised effort to dismantle 
Yukos. All of the allegations refer to value 
reducing schemes set up in the 90s early 
00s. 
These allegations could be interpreted as a 
way (for the Russian government) not to 
compensate foreign shareholders for the 
residual value of the company. 
1.1.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
In order to make sure that Yukos did not find 
a way to avoid bankruptcy, the government 
initiated a set of new charges (may be 
legitimate) and used the Prosecutor 
General‘s Office and the Russian courts to 
prevent the sale of the Mazeikiu refinery.  
1.1.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation Eventually, the rulings were supported by a 
US court. Initially, Yukos International UK 
refused to comply with the rulings of the 
Russian court. But when the US court made 
its ruling, the international unit accepted it. 
 
12.5: 'Rebgun Fires Yukos Dutch Unit Chiefs', (2006) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Appointments. 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Diversion of Assets 
 
Hiding assets using a complex web of 
transactions. 
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1.2.1.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting A shareholder meeting which was 
acknowledged by a Dutch court as legitimate 
authorised the decision of the Yukos receiver 
to fire managers accused of hiding assets in 
a complex web of transaction. 
1.2.1.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The decision to get rid of the two Yukos 
managers was made by the court appointed 
Yukos receiver and enforced by means of an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting that was 
ruled to be legitimate by a Dutch court. The 
two managers were accused of trying to hide 
the company‘s assets. 
 
 
 
 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The decision to get rid of the two Yukos 
managers was made by the court appointed 
Yukos receiver and enforced by means of an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting that was 
ruled to be legitimate by a Dutch court. The 
two managers were accused of trying to hide 
the company‘s assets. 
 
12.6: Belton, (2006c); Belton, (2006d); Belton, (2006v); Belton, (2006x); Belton, (2006y); 
Korchagina, (2006b) 6 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Valuation. 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Diversion of Assets 
 
Undervalued assets to the benefit of Rosneft. 
1.2.1.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Valuations of Yukos assets were carried out 
in such a way as to suit Rosneft. A number of 
alternative (more independent), valuations 
including that by UBS, produced substantially 
higher figures. 
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1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
The state dictated the terms of valuations. 
Even though Yukos managers asked for 
alternative valuations, they were completely 
disregarded. It is probable that reputable 
audit firms did not want to protest too loudly 
because if they did, they risked getting on the 
wrong side of the Russian government. 
 
12.7: Belton, (2006w); Belton, (2006x) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Appointment. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control 
 
A subordinate refused to follow the orders of 
the superior who represented the interests of 
the sole shareholder in the unit. Instead of 
the proposed appointment, the person who 
was fired got promotion. 
1.1.6.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Allegedly, there were discounted sales to 
unnamed third parties from the Yukos‘ 
Trading House leading to a short fall of 
between $50m. and $100m.  
 
1.1.6.7 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based Mr. Nazarov managed to get promoted 
because of the compromise that he had 
reached with the government.  
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
It is unlikely that such an act of 
insubordination could have been possible 
without the pre agreed support of the 
government and/or high ranking officials from 
Rosneft. Clearly the government used its 
administrative resource to deflect Mr 
Nazarov to their side.175 
 
13. Shell (Parallel Coding): '$10Bln Behind Oil Difficulties', (2006); Elder, (2006a); Elder, 
(2006b); Elder, (2006d); Elder, (2006f); Elder, (2006g); Elder, (2006h); Elder, (2006i); 
Elder, (2006j); Elder, (2006k); Elder, (2006l); Elder, (2006m); Elder, (2006n); Elder, 
                                                          
175
 There were more instances that could have been included in the coding. Those can be found in the 
explanatory notes and code summaries. 
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(2006q); 'Hurting the Future of Energy Deals', (2006); Kim, (2006a); Korchagina, (2006e); 
Miles, (2006); 'Mitvol Takes His Crusade to Sakhalin', (2006);  Putin Hopes for Sakhalin-2 
Deal With Shell', (2006); 'Shell Says Pressure May Delay Project', (2006); 'Shell, Exxon 
Under Fire on Sakhalin', (2006); Zhdannikov, (2006b) ; Zhdannikov, (2006c); Zhdannikov, 
& Miles, (2006) 25 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
1.2 
First Order 
Management 
Diversion 
Renegotiation of contractual terms, 
competition, stakeholder management. 
1.1.4 
1.1.2 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Misimplementation 
Ownership 
Diversion of Assets 
Renegotiation of the ownership structure - 
Shell was forced to accepts new terms or 
face serious environmental allegations. 
1.1.4.1 
1.1.2.1 
1.2.1.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government helped Gazprom enter the 
Sakhalin 2 project by accusing Shell of 
environmental violations. The environmental 
allegations were used as a bargaining tool to 
ensure favourable terms of Gazprom‘s entry. 
Shell‘s investment was protected by the PSA 
which required consent from all parties to the 
contract before any changes were made. 
Eventually, Shell gave up when they realised 
that it was impossible to fight the allegations 
in the Russian courts which were under strict 
instructions to make rulings consistent with 
the government‘s agenda. The Natural 
Resources Ministry with its powers to revoke 
licenses was used as a key instrument in the 
negotiation process.  
1.1.4.10 
1.1.2.10 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers 
The government used the Natural Resources 
Ministry and a number of mid ranking officials 
in order to force Sakhalin Energy accept 
Gazprom‘s entry on favourable terms. 
Previously, the Russian government was 
angered by Shell when the company 
increased its cost estimate of the project. 
Under the PSA agreement, that would have 
meant that the government would have to 
wait longer before it received any money 
from the project. Because of the new cost 
estimate and high price of oil and gas, the 
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government decided to renegotiate terms of 
the contract which admittedly were not in 
Russia‘s best interests. 
1.1.4.11 
1.1.2.11 
1.2.1.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
Selective application of law becomes visible 
in the context of Gazprom‘s desire to enter 
the project. The threat of license withdrawal 
based on environmental violations 
subsided/evaporated once Gazprom 
pushed/bullied its way into the project as a 
majority shareholder. 
1.1.4.12 
1.1.2.12 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The government used the Natural Resources 
Ministry and a number of mid ranking officials 
in order to force Sakhalin Energy accept 
Gazprom‘s entry in to the Sakhalin project on 
favourable terms. The Natural Resources 
Ministry withdrew a number of operational 
licenses further to purported environmental 
violations176. The Ministry was also prepared 
to argue the case in an international 
arbitration court in Stockholm. Also, some 
consideration was given to the terms of the 
PSA. Finally, strategic reciprocity was 
featured in the government rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Total: (Parallel Coding) Clark & Humber, (2006); Elder & Wall, (2006)            2 
articles 
Code Theme Notes 
                                                          
176
 It is extremely difficult not to violate environmental rules in the process of oil and gas extraction, 
particularly if you are forced to use subcontractors which you have little control over. Clearly, based on the 
technical point of law, the government had the right to revoke licenses and some violations probably did 
take place (this made it possible for the government to attack the PSA which offered a great deal of 
protection to foreign partners). However, selective application of law becomes visible in the context of 
Gazprom’s desire to enter the project. 
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1.1 
1.2 
First Order 
Management 
Diversion 
Competition, managing stakeholder, 
renegotiating contracts. 
1.1.2 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Control 
Diversion of Claims 
The government was seeking to re-establish 
control over the country‘s oil and gas 
industry. The government used reviews by 
the subsoil resource agency (acting on its 
behalf) in order to force international 
companies like Total to renegotiate terms of 
the PSA agreements. 
1.1.2.1 
1.2.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The Russian government used its usual 
tactics of bulling foreign companies into 
compliance (approve amendments to the 
PSA) by bringing allegations against oil 
majors. In the instance of Total it was the 
subsoil resources agency that blamed Total 
for breaking the license terms (inflating costs 
and producing too little oil).  
1.1.2.10 
1.2.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
Total, on the other hand, had the protection 
offered by the PSA agreement which 
stipulated the necessity of bilateral consent if 
amendments to the existing terms were to be 
made. The government clearly had an edge 
over the legal protection at the disposal of 
Total. 
1.1.2.12 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The Russian government felt it was not in the 
interests of the country to allow foreign led 
projects to continue to operate under the 
original PSA terms. The decision was based 
on the fact that macro economic conditions 
i.e. sharp increases in oil prices rendered the 
PSA agreements highly unprofitable for the 
Russian side. The decision to re-establish 
the ownership structure came from the 
government and was contrary to the 
agreements and promises made in the past. 
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15. ExxonMobil: Elder & Wall, (2006); Elder, (2006i) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Competition, managing stakeholder, 
renegotiating contracts. 
1.1.6 
Second Order 
Control The government was seeking to re-establish 
control over the country‘s oil and gas 
industry. The government used the Federal 
Service for Ecological, Technological and 
Atomic Inspection to force international 
companies like ExxonMobil to renegotiate 
terms of the PSA agreements. 
1.1.6.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The Russian government felt it was not in the 
interests of the country to allow foreign led 
projects to continue to operate under the 
original PSA terms. The decision was based 
on the fact that macro economic conditions 
i.e. sharp increases in oil prices rendered the 
PSA agreements highly unprofitable for the 
Russian side. The decision to re-establish 
the balance comes from the government and 
in all probability was contrary to the 
agreements and promises made in the past. 
1.1.6.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
 
 
The Russian government used its usual 
tactics of bulling foreign companies into 
compliance by bringing allegations against oil 
majors. In the instance of ExxonMobil it was 
the Federal Service for Ecological, 
Technological and Atomic Inspection that 
blamed ExxonMobil for violations in the area 
of industrial and environmental safety.  
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16. TNK-BP (2 separate disputes) 
16.1: Belton, (2006e); Belton, (2006t); Belton, (2006p); Elder, (2006o); Elder, (2006h); 
Elder, (2006q); Elder, & Korchagina, (2006); Kim, (2006b); Medetsky, (2006b); Miles, 
(2006); Simpson, (2006); 'These Signals Are Less Than Transparent', (2006); 
Zhdannikov, (2006a); 'Trutnev Agrees to TNK-BP Well Plan', (2006); Levitov, & Elder, 
(2006)             
15 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
1.2 
First Order 
Management 
Diversion of Claims 
Competition, managing stakeholder, 
renegotiating contracts. 
1.1.6 
1.1.2 
1.2.1 
Second Order 
Control 
Ownership/ 
Diversion of Assets 
The government used environmental 
violations and non-compliance with the 
license agreement to force TNK-BP to accept 
‗Gazprom tailored‘ terms of restructuring. 
1.1.6.1 
1.1.2.1 
1.2.1.1 
Third Order 
State Interference There was formal non-compliance with the 
license terms because Gazprom denied 
TNK-BP access to the export pipeline on the 
grounds of its monopoly status. TNK-BP 
were required to produce more gas for the 
local market which did not exist. The 
government felt it was necessary to 
renegotiate the terms of oil and gas contracts 
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relating to major foreign led projects. 
1.1.6.6 
1.1.2.6 
1.2.1.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based TNK-BP agreed to form a joint venture with 
Gazprom as it sought better government 
relations amid a crackdown on foreign 
energy companies. Criminal allegations of 
purported license violations were used to 
force TNK-BP to co-operate with Gazprom. 
TNK-BP agreed to invite Gazprom into its 
projects and by doing so, probably did not 
lose as much as others. Moreover, BP 
participated in Rosneft‘s IPO in London as a 
relationship building exercise with the 
Russian government.  
1.1.6.9 
1.1.2.9 
1.2.1.9 
Third Order 
Private Enforcement It is possible that the murder of the TNK-BP 
official was a contract hit connected to the 
company‘s operations in the country. It is 
unlikely to have been ordered by the federal 
government and probably was planned on 
the local level. 
 
 
1.1.6.10 
1.1.2.10 
1.2.1.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
The government used the Prosecutor 
General‘s Office and the Ministry for Natural 
Resources in order to pressurise the 
company into acceptance of the restructuring 
plan which involved Gazprom‘s participation. 
The preference of this solution lies in the fact 
that companies in this industry inevitably 
violate environmental law and license 
agreements.  
1.1.6.11 
1.1.2.11 
1.2.1.11 
Third Order 
Shadow of 
Enforcement 
The government used environmental 
violations and non-compliance with the 
license agreement to force TNK-BP to accept 
‗Gazprom tailored‘ terms of 
restructuring177.The mounting campaign 
against foreign oil projects prompted 
warnings from foreign diplomats and analysts 
that Moscow must clarify its intentions if it 
                                                          
177
 Similar pressure was faced by Total, ExxonMobil, LUKoil and Yukos.  
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hopes to continue attracting foreign 
investment. 
1.1.6.12 
1.1.2.12 
1.2.1.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The government used the Prosecutor 
General‘s Office and the Ministry for Natural 
Resources in order to pressurise the 
company into acceptance of the restructuring 
plan which involved Gazprom‘s participation. 
There was formal non-compliance with the 
license terms because Gazprom denied 
access to the export pipeline on the grounds 
of its monopoly status178. TNK-BP were 
required to produce more gas for the local 
market which did not exist. In addition, the 
prosecutor general‘s office opened an 
investigation into TNK-BP for acquiring state 
secrets from top government officials179. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.2: Elder, (2006p) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Managing stakeholders 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Undisputed back taxes. 
                                                          
178
 The preference of this solution lies in the fact that companies in this industry inevitably violate 
environmental law and license agreements to some degree, particularly if compliance is made impossible.  
 
179
 The investigation came at a time when the government sought to increase pressure on the oil operator 
in order to negotiate better terms for Gazprom’s entry. 
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1.1.5.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Allegations of unpaid taxes came at a time 
when the government increased pressure on 
oil companies in Russia in order to ensure 
favourable terms for Gazprom‘s entry into a 
number of major oil projects as a majority 
shareholder. 
1.1.5.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based 
 
TNK-BP probably learnt from the Yukos 
experience and did not want to challenge the 
back taxes claim too aggressively in courts. 
The fact that the company did pay back 
taxes may have been viewed as another 
relationship building opportunity with the 
Russian government. 
1.1.5.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
TNK-BP agreed to pay the back taxes 
charges which were by many seen as related 
to the company‘s vows. 
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation TNK-BP probably learnt from the Yukos‘ 
experience and did not challenge the back 
taxes claim too aggressively in courts. 
Interestingly, because the claims related to 
the pre merger period, it was the Russian 
shareholders who paid the money.  
 
17. LUKoil (2 separate disputes) 
17.1: Elder, & Wall, (2006); Elder, (2006i) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Competition, managing stakeholder, 
renegotiating contracts.  
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership The government was seeking to re-establish 
control over the country‘s oil and gas 
industry.  
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government used the Natural Resources 
Ministry's environmental regulator to force 
private companies like LUKoil into sharing 
licenses and prevent aggressive bidding. 
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
In the instance of LUKoil it was the Natural 
Resources Ministry's environmental regulator 
that blamed LUKoil for environmental 
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violations and development delays.  
17.2: Elder, & Wall, (2006); Elder, (2006i) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Consolidation 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims Diversion of claims through questionable 
consolidation practise involving low valuation 
of target companies. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
LUKoil was seeking to consolidate its assets 
and employed aggressive valuation policies. 
Minority shareholders of targeted 
subsidiaries felt the valuation was 
inadequate. 
1.2.2.3 
Third Order 
General Meeting 
 
LUKoil being a large company with a 
significant clout was predicted by analysts as 
a potential winner in the conflict. However, a 
minority shareholder (Prosperity Capital 
Management) sought to boost its stake in the 
subsidiary to 25 percent in order to be in the 
position to block the merger at an upcoming 
general meeting.  
1.2.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement LUKoil being a large company with a 
significant clout was predicted by analysts as 
a potential winner in the conflict. However, 
the minority shareholder (Prosperity Capital 
Management) sought to boost its stake in the 
subsidiary to 25 percent in order to be in the 
position to block the merger at the upcoming 
general meeting.  
 
18. Transneft: Korchagina, (2006c); Levitov, (2006b) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Managing stakeholders, investigation into 
abuses by former managers. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership Trading in preferred shares was cancelled 
because of an ongoing investigation into 
alleged abuses by former managers. The 
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prosecutor general‘s office asked a number 
of brokerages to disclose the beneficiaries of 
Transneft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference The government, being a majority 
shareholder in Transneft, began an 
investigation into abuses of power by 
previous managers during privatisation of the 
company. The investigation might have 
stemmed from a conflict of a political nature. 
As part of the investigation, brokerages were 
asked to disclose information about the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the preferred 
shareholders. 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
Detailed information about the owners of 
Transneft's preferred shares had to be 
disclosed because of an ongoing criminal 
investigation into abuses by former Transneft 
managers during the company's 
privatization. Deutsche UFG said that asking 
brokerages to disclose beneficiary owners of 
a company's shares "is an unprecedented 
case for the Russian stock market, which will 
likely further worsen sentiment surrounding 
Transneft shares. 
1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The General Prosecutor‘s Office contacted 
the brokerages with a demand to disclose 
the identity of beneficiaries as a part of an 
ongoing criminal investigation. It is difficult to 
tell whether the investigation was a genuine 
effort to fight corrupt privatisation from years 
ago, or a way of punishing an influential 
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investor who dared disagreeing with the 
state180.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. Novolipetsk (Parallel Coding) Humber, (2006j) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Management of subsidiaries. 
1.2.2 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims/ 
Ownership 
The market forced Novolipetsk chairman to 
sell raw material suppliers to the parent 
group in order to avoid accusations of 
transfer pricing. 
1.2.2.5 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The chairman of Novolipetsk sold raw 
materials suppliers that he owned to the 
group in order to address concerns of 
transfer pricing from the shareholders.  
                                                          
180
 The most interesting point however was the fact that disclosing who beneficiaries were, was predicted 
to would have worsened the sentiment on the stock market because of the constantly questioned 
legitimacy of privatisation. 
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1.2.2.7 
1.1.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The move to consolidate the raw materials 
suppliers was determined by the market 
pressures to increase transparency. 
 
30. Severstal (2 separate disputes) 
30.1: (Parallel Coding) Humber, (2006i); Humber, (2006j) 2 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Management of subsidiaries. 
1.2.2 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims 
Ownership 
The market forced Severstal owner 
Mordoshov to sell raw material suppliers to 
the parent group in order to avoid 
accusations of transfer pricing. 
1.2.2.5 
1.1.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Mordoshov sold raw materials suppliers that 
he owned to the group in order to address 
concerns about the group‘s transparency. 
Previously, these types of assets were 
acquired by Kremlin insiders involving a 
series of transfer pricing schemes. 
1.2.2.7 
1.1.2.7 
Third Order 
Self-Enforcement The move to consolidate the raw materials 
suppliers was determined by the market 
pressures to increase transparency as the 
company was preparing for either an 
acquisition or floatation. 
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30.2: Humber, (2006b); Humber, (2006g); Humber, (2006f); Humber, (2006e)       4 
articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Merger, management of stakeholders. 
1.1.4 
Second Order 
Misimplementation Severstal lost a bid to merge with Arcelor. 
Despite support from the board, Arcelor‘s 
shareholders turned down the offer. 
1.1.4.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The European shareholders did not welcome 
Mordoshov‘s bid because they suspected 
foul play on the part of the unknown Russian 
businessman. Also, it was very easy for the 
competitors for Arcelor‘s assets (Mittal) to 
play the corruption card, i.e. a rich Russian 
who was not doing a great deal to introduce 
himself to shareholders, was a bit of a dark 
horse, and therefore was very likely to 
be/have been connected to the criminal 
world. 
1.1.4.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based 
 
Arcelor‘s shareholders voted down 
Mordoshov‘s offer despite recommendations 
from the board. Mordoshov may have had an 
informal agreement with the board of Acelor 
promising their support in return for 
compensation. According to an official, 
Arcelor's board picked Mordashov over 
several other candidates, including rival 
Russian steel magnate Vladimir Lisin, due to 
"a record of close cooperation in several joint 
ventures and established trust. Mordashov's 
example could prove the key to long-
expected consolidation in the Russian steel 
industry. "The sector is very closed right 
now" due to personal differences between 
leading steel companies' majority 
shareholders. 
1.1.4.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
The government supported Mordoshov‘s bid 
for Arcelor. Mordoshov himself was very 
close to Kremlin and the president Putin. It 
could be assumed that the initial support of 
the Arcelor board was encouraged by the top 
Russian politicians even though Mordoshov 
himself denied that fact saying that 
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Serverstal is a private entity.   
 
31. Evraz (2 separate disputes) 
31.1: Humber, (2006j) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Taxes 
1.1.5 
Second Order 
Taxes Evraz avoided taxes by using off shore 
traders to export domestic steel. 
1.1.5.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Accusations of transfer pricing have dogged 
Russian metals producers as they seek to 
bring their business practices in line with 
Western standards. Last week, the Audit 
Chamber decided that the country's largest 
steelmaker, Evraz Group, used offshore 
traders to export domestic steel at below-
market value, hence avoiding higher 
taxation. 
1.1.5.12 
Third Order 
Litigation 
 
Evraz avoided taxes by using off shore 
traders to export domestic steel. The Audit 
Chamber felt that Evraz was in the wrong 
and ruled against it.  
 
31.2: Smolchenko, (2006a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Takeover. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership The US authorities wished to scrutinize links 
between Abramovich and the Russian 
Government in relation to Evraz‘s bid for 
Oregon Steel. 
1.1.2.1 
Third Order 
State Interference Because the relationship between business 
and politics is so intertwined in Russia, the 
American authorities could use the 
investigation of that relationship as a tool to 
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block the bid on political grounds. Equally so, 
the American authorities need to know what 
motivated the actions of the investor. It is 
suspected that Abramovich is linked to the 
Russian government, but the latter seeks to 
stop that news from spreading. If the national 
security is successfully passed, Evraz gets 
the green light for its $2.3 billion purchase of 
Oregon Steel. The decision could be 
politically motivated and depends on the 
nature of the relationship between the 
businessman and the Kremlin. 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
 
U.S. authorities were to examine Roman 
Abramovich's ties to the Kremlin before 
deciding whether to approve the sale of 
Oregon Steel to steelmaker Evraz Group, 
which the billionaire co-owns. The U.S. 
Treasury's Committee on Foreign Investment 
scrutinized Abramovich's ties to the Russian 
government as part of a national security 
review before clearing his $2.3 billion bid for 
Oregon Steel. The report did not say when 
the review would take place. Abramovich, 
who also owns the Chelsea football club, is 
the governor of Chukotka. Governors are 
appointed by the Kremlin. 
 
32. RusAl (4 separate disputes) 
32.1: Mauldin, (2006a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Consolidation, treatment of minority 
shareholders. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims Allegations that RusAl and SUAL have 
bought out minority shareholders at below 
market prices. 
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1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
Valuation of minority stake is a central 
corporate governance issue. In this instance 
the companies have been accused of 
undervaluation despite their ambitions to go 
public on a foreign stock exchange. In 
protecting their interests, minority 
shareholders could play the IPO card which 
makes the management vulnerable to bad 
publicity. 
 
32.2: 'RusAl Named in $2.8Bln Suit', (2006) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Merger, bidding process. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims RusAl allegedly conspired with the Nigerian 
president to tip the balance in favour of its 
less attractive bid for Alscon in comparison 
with what BFI Group Devino was offering. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
RusAl allegedly conspired with the Nigerian 
president to tip the balance in favour of its 
less attractive bid for Alscon in comparison 
with what BFI Group Devino was offering. 
1.2.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based 
 
The Russian company could conspire with 
the Nigerian president using Relationship-
Based arrangements (probably non 
transparent) to secure support for its lower 
bid. 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation BFI Group Devino took the case to a US 
court as it apparently offered more for 
Alscon. The Russian company argued that 
the US court lacked jurisdiction in this case. 
 
32.3: 'RusAl Appoints 2 Outside Directors', (2006); Humber, (2006d); Humber, (2006a)         
3 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Financing. 
Page 465 
 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership RusAl disclosed its ultimate beneficiary 
because of a condition for a loan received 
from the EBRD and IFC. This in turn 
triggered a suit from a former business 
partner which had an impact on investor 
confidence. 
1.1.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The EBRD and IFC used the loan as a 
means of pressurising the company to 
disclose its ownership structure. Also, 
possible foreign flotation and the issuance of 
the Eurobonds may have contributed to the 
decision. Additionally, the former business 
partner of Derepaska went for litigation to 
extract more money that he felt RusAl owed 
him. To address these concerns the 
company recruited two high profile non 
executive directors. 
1.1.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based 
 
Other former partners, brothers Simon and 
Peter Reuben, have settled claims against 
Derepaska out of court over the last year. 
This happened as Deripaska was seeking to 
improve corporate governance standards 
and transparency of RusAl and Basic 
Element.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
The EBRD and IFC (the International 
Financial Corporation) used the $150 million 
loan as a means to pressurise the company 
to disclose its ownership structure. Also, a 
possible foreign flotation and the issuance of 
the Eurobonds may have contributed to the 
decision to improve transparency of the 
company and its parent Basic Element. To 
address some of the corporate governance 
concerns the company recruited two high 
profile non executive directors. 
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1.1.2.12 
Third Order 
 
Litigation The EBRD and IFC used the loan as a 
means of pressurising the company to 
disclose its ownership structure. It turned out 
that Derepaska was the sole shareholder of 
the group. This disclosure led to a former 
partner‘s legal complaint because he felt a 
debt to him had not been settled. He sued 
the company for $3b in compensation. 
 
32.4: Humber, (2006a) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
1.1 
First Order 
Management Industry consolidation. 
1.1.2 
Second Order 
Ownership A possibility of a merger between two 
previously competing oligarchs.  
1.1.2.6 
Third Order 
Relationship-Based Derepaska and Vekselberg appeared to be 
burying the hatchet when they considered a 
possibility of a merger between their 
aluminium assets after years of bitter rivalry.  
1.1.2.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
 
It has been suggested that the chances for a 
merger between Rusal and SUAL would be 
strengthened further should the new 
company allow the state to take a stake in 
the business. It was predicted that the 
Kremlin's support would bolster the merged 
company against possible legal claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37. Eurocement: Humber, (2006c) 1 article 
Code Theme Notes 
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1.2 
First Order 
Diversion Minority claims. 
1.2.2 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims Allegedly, majority owners of Eurocement 
Group created the company with the aim of 
diverting profits away from the investment 
fund Russia Partners. 
1.2.2.2 
Third Order 
Inadequate 
Information 
The American registered fund upset the 
majority owners of the Eurocement group by 
blocking new share issue. The majority 
owners responded by refusal to send 
financial information to the fund. 
Subsequently, the majority set up the group 
and used internal pricing arrangements to 
divert the profits from the factories thus 
diverting profits away from the minority. The 
group was also under the investigation of the 
Federal Anti Monopoly Service for severe 
price hikes the previous year. 
1.2.2.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
The American registered fund upset the 
majority owners of the Eurocement group by 
blocking new share issue. The majority 
owners responded with a refusal to send 
financial information to the fund. 
Subsequently, the majority set up a group 
and used internal pricing arrangements to 
divert profits away from the factories and the 
minority. The group was also under the 
investigation of the Federal Anti Monopoly 
Service for severe price hikes the previous 
year. 
1.2.2.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
 
The American fund recruited the services of 
A1 [a unit of Afla Group] to help it fight the 
case of expropriation on a particularly large 
scale in Russian courts namely the Moscow 
Arbitration Court. 
1.2.2.12 
Third Order 
Litigation The American fund recruited the services of 
A1 [a unit of Afla Group] to help it fight the 
case of expropriation on a particularly large 
scale in Russian courts namely the Moscow 
Arbitration Court. 
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48. IKEA: (Parallel Coding) Henry, (2006); 'Irregularities in the State of Regulations', 
(2006); Shuster, (2006); 'Mega Mall Tenants May Seek Damages', (2006) 4 articles 
Code Theme Notes 
1.2 
1.1 
First Order 
Diversion 
Management 
Corporate raid. 
1.2.2 
1.1.4 
Second Order 
Diversion of Claims 
Misimplementation 
It appears that the mall was closed by the 
local court for fire violations. The closure 
coincided with the busy Christmas period 
and may have been linked to an unidentified 
business group that allegedly benefited from 
the closure. If that was the case, this was a 
classic case of a corporate raid. Similarly, 
another IKEA mall was closed for safety 
concerns and reopened again after the 
company invested in local infrastructure. 
1.2.2.4 
1.1.4.4 
Third Order 
Unclear Rules IKEA mall was closed for safety concerns 
and reopened again after the company 
invested in local infrastructure181. The 
regulations (in this case the fire code) are 
very vague and open to different 
interpretations. In other words if you are 
looking hard enough, you will find all sorts of 
violations - the very thing that makes 
corporate raids possible.  
1.2.2.5 
1.1.4.5 
Third Order 
Transactions with 
Self-Interest 
 
It appears that the mall was closed by the 
local court for fire violations. The closure 
coincided with the busy Christmas period 
and may have been linked to an unidentified 
business group that allegedly benefited from 
the closure. If that is the case, this is a 
classic case of a corporate raid. Similarly, 
another IKEA mall was closed because of 
safety concerns and reopened again after 
                                                          
181
 The company invested in the local infrastructure, after which the governor intervened and ordered 
reopening. 
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the company invested in local infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2.8 
1.1.4.8 
Third Order 
Third-Party 
Enforcement 
It is very possible that a well connected local 
business group used the fire violation to put 
the competitor (IKEA) at a disadvantage. It is 
also very possible that the business group 
had more fundamental plans to do with the 
permanent closure of the mall. In these 
circumstances, based on the previous 
experience where the company invested in 
the infrastructure, IKEA had no choice but to 
negotiate a common solution with the 
stakeholders involved. The courts here were 
clearly used as an instrument at the disposal 
of the interested parties. 
1.2.2.10 
1.1.4.10 
Third Order 
Administrative 
Levers of the State 
It is very possible that a well connected local 
business group used the fire violation to put 
the competitor (i.e. IKEA) at a disadvantage. 
The business group had more fundamental 
plans to do with the permanent closure of the 
mall. In these circumstances, based on the 
previous experience where the company was 
forced to invest in the local infrastructure, 
IKEA had no choice but to negotiate a 
common solution with the stakeholders 
involved. The courts were clearly used as an 
instrument at the disposal of the well 
connected interested parties. 
1.2.2.12 
1.1.4.12 
Litigation The fire inspection came up with 887 fire 
code violations further to an unrelated 
accident killing a 5 year old boy. Local 
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Third Order politicians made populist claims promising to 
close the mall. The 30 day closure was 
ordered by the local court182. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10:  Major Russian Oligarchs  
 
Name Estimated 
wealth 
Narrative 
Roman 
Abramovich 
$28.7 billion Abramovich made accumulated his wealth 
in the 1990s, when much of Russia's 
industry was purchased by government 
connected elite for a fraction of real value. 
The oligarch targeted major oil and 
aluminium assets. In 2005 he sold the 
Sibneft oil company to the Kremlin-
controlled Gazprom for $20.6 billion, 
allegedly, the biggest transaction in 
Russian corporate history.  
 
                                                          
182
 It is very possible that a well connected local business group used the fire violation to put the competitor 
(i.e. IKEA) at a disadvantage. 
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Name Estimated 
wealth 
Narrative 
Vagit Alekperov 
 
 
$20 billion 
 
 
 
Alekperov amassed his fortune by building 
up a huge stake in Russia's largest oil firm, 
LUKoil. The oligarch comes from oil-rich 
Azerbaijan, and towards the final days of 
the USSR was appointed First Deputy 
Minister of Fuel and Energy, a position he 
used to lobby for the merger of three major 
Russian oil producers. That firm became 
LUKoil and Alekperov assumed its 
presidency. 
 
Vladimir Lisin $17.7 billion Lisin sold a 7 per cent stake in his steel 
giant Novolipetsk to investors on the 
London Stock Exchange in 2005. The sale 
raised more than $960 million and he still 
has an 83 per cent remaining. He has 
never meddled with politics and worked 
his way up from the shop floor. In 1993 he 
became involved with Novolipetsk. 
 
Mikhail Fridman $16.5 billion Fridmans‘ success is based on the 
banking-to-telecoms consortium Alfa 
Group, which he founded. He is one of the 
company's majority shareholders. Fridman 
has traditionally enjoyed good relations 
with the Kremlin but suffered a setback 
earlier this year when his country house 
was seized by the Government. 
 
 
Viktor 
Vekselberg 
$16 billion In 2004 Vekselberg spent an estimated 
$148 million to acquire the second-largest 
collection of Russian Faberge Easter eggs 
in the world. His stated aim was to bring 
them back to the motherland so that 
ordinary Russians could admire their own 
cultural legacy. However, critics suggested 
that he might have been simply re-
affirming his loyalty to the Kremlin. 
Vekselberg has a reputation for avoiding 
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Name Estimated 
wealth 
Narrative 
political debates. He began his business 
career in 1988 trading computers before 
going into business with a former 
classmate who had immigrated to the US. 
Oil is the main source of his wealth. 
 
Oleg Deripaska 
 
 
 
 
$14 billion 
 
 
 
 
 
Derepaska‘s competitors allege that he 
uses strong-arm tactics in hostile 
corporate takeovers. In 2001 he married 
Polina Yumasheva, former President Boris 
Yeltsin's granddaughter, and has long 
enjoyed close relations with Russia's 
political elite. He began his career in 1993 
as a commodities trader. 
 
Aleksei 
Mordashov 
$13.3 billion Mordoshov owns a large stake in steel 
giant Severstal, which was privatised in 
1993. He was finance director of the 
Cherepovets steel mill north of Moscow 
and in the 1990s was asked by the serving 
director to purchase the company's shares 
to prevent outsiders from buying into 
Severstal. Mordashov bought a large 
number of highly discounted shares for 
himself as well. He later turned Severstal 
into a powerful conglomerate, buying a 
car-maker, coal mines, railway companies 
and port facilities.  
Vladimir 
Evtushenkov 
$12 billion The source of Evtushenkov‘s wealth is the 
telecoms to real estate conglomerate that 
he controls called Sistema. In 1993 he 
helped set up the company which includes 
some of the most profitable assets that 
once belonged to the state in Moscow: the 
Russian capital's fixed-line telephone 
network, its principal mobile phone 
operator MTS (which is now Eastern 
Europe's biggest), the well known 
Children's World department store, and a 
large insurance company. Evtushenkov is 
widely regarded as one of the most erudite 
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oligarchs, and has a doctorate in 
economics. 
Vladimir Potanin $11.8 billion Potanin won control of Norilsk Nickel in the 
1990s from the mine's communist-era 
directors. In 1995 he helped devise a 
controversial loan-for-shares scheme 
whereby the Government sold off state 
enterprises at highly discounted prices in 
return for much needed bank loans. 
Potanin, a well established insider, 
benefited from the sales. In 1996 he 
became the country's first Deputy Prime 
Minister under Yeltsin, the highest office 
ever held by an oligarch.  
German Khan $10.6 billion Khan is regarded as one of the most 
reclusive, low-profile oligarchs. An 
allegedly close friend and business partner 
of fellow oligarchs Mikhail Fridman and 
Viktor Vekselberg, he owns a major stake 
in telecoms and banking consortium Alfa 
Group. Similarly to his associates and 
business partners Khan‘s speciality is oil. 
In the 1980s he met Fridman and several 
other future oligarchs while studying at 
Moscow's Institute of Steel and Alloys. 
 
Viktor 
Rashnikov 
$8.5 billion Rashnikov and a group of managers are 
believed to control 99 per cent of the 
shares in the iron and steel works in 
Magnitogorsk, Siberia, Russia's largest 
steel producer. Little is known about 
Rashnikov except that he was born and 
bred in Magnitogorsk and still lives there. It 
has been suggested that he worked his 
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way up from the workshop floor to become 
the plant's general director in 1997. 
 
Boris Ivanishvili $7.4 billion Forbes' description of the secret of 
Ivanishvili‘s success could apply to many 
of other Russian oligarchs. In the 1990s 
"he bought firms for tens of millions of 
dollars and [later] sold them for billions of 
dollars." He has subsequently largely sold 
up and his money is primarily in 
investment funds.  
Alisher 
Usmanov 
$5 billion Usmanov, controls his corporate affairs 
through a holding company called 
Metalloinvest and has admitted to being 
totally enthusiastic about buying and 
selling shares. 
 
Elena Baturina $3.8 billion Baturina‘s wealth comes from a Moscow 
construction company called Inteko, which 
she owns. Her critics allege that she has 
been able to cash in on Moscow's 
construction boom because of the 
patronage of Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of 
Moscow and her husband. 
 
Rustam Tariko $2.9 billion The source of Tariko‘s wealth is Russian 
Standard, a vodka-to-banking empire that 
has rapidly become one of Russia's most 
successful companies. Tariko appeared in 
the headlines when he was outed as the 
buyer of Pablo Picasso's Dora Maar with 
Cat. He paid more than $150 million for 
the canvas. He was in London for the 
Russian Economic Forum in 2006, when 
he spoke on the theme of luxury as a 
Russian national idea. 
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Boris 
Berezovsky 
$1.6 billion Berezovsky made his money in the 1990s 
by capitalising on his close contacts with 
then President Boris Yeltsin. His 
connections made possible for him acquire 
lucrative stakes in the Russian oil, car, 
airline and media industries, many of 
which he has since sold at substantial 
profit. Afraid of being jailed by the Kremlin, 
Berezovsky won political sanctuary in 
Britain where he now resides. 
 
Igor Yakovlev $1.5 billion Yakovlev, who appears to have built up 
a business rather than "inherited" it, is 
the owner of Russia's largest 
electronics retailer, Eldorado. Yakovlev 
built up his wealth by capitalising on 
Russians' growing demand for 
consumer durables. He founded the 
business with his brother Oleg in 1994 
and has created an empire which has 
around 1000 stores in 600 Russian 
towns, as well as 85 stores in 
neighbouring Ukraine. 
 
Shalva 
Chigirinsky 
$1.5 billion Chigirinsky is one of Moscow‘s most 
successful property developers. He is also 
paying British architect Sir Norman Foster 
to design what will be Europe's tallest 
tower, to redevelop an entire island district 
in St Petersburg, and to create a huge 
entertainment complex in southern 
Moscow. Chigirinsky makes no secret of 
his dislike for Roman Abramovich, whom 
he accuses of having stolen half an 
oilfield. Abramovich denies the accusation.  
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Valery Oif $1.5 billion There is very little information on Oif, apart 
from his age and marital status. This is 
surprising given that he is a senator 
representing a Siberian constituency in 
Russia's Federation Council. The source 
of his wealth is oil, and he was among 
those who established a company with 
Abramovich making plastic toys. He 
appears to have been one of his most 
important Abramovich‘s lieutenants ever 
since. 
 
Mikhail 
Zingarevich 
$1 billion Little is known about one of the directors 
of Russia's biggest forestry enterprise, the 
St. Petersburg-based Ilim Pulp. 
Zingarevich and his brother founded Ilim 
Pulp in 1992 with one other partner after 
working their way up through the hierarchy 
of various pulp mills. Today Ilim is one of 
the world's biggest timber firms, and the 
brothers comprise half of the company's 
board. 
 
Boris Jordan 
and Stephen 
Jennings183 
$886 million and 
$2.3 billion 
respectively 
Jordan is an American investment banker 
of Russian origin while Jennings is a New 
Zealander. When the duo realised how 
cheaply Russia was going to sell off its 
major assets, Jordan and Jennings 
decided in favour of trying to benefit from 
the sales even though there were 
substantial risks attached. The two 
investors made a fortune. 
 
                                                          
183
 This is a rare case of foreign nationals fully exposing themselves to the risks and consequently large 
returns offered by opportunities of the early stage transition. For this reason the two investors are regards 
as adopted Russian oligarchs even though they are nationals of other countries. 
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Nikolai 
Smolensky 
$148 million Smolensky is the controversial young 
figure known as "baby oligarch". 
Aleksander Smolensky, his father, is an 
oligarch of 1990s who is no less 
controversial. The bank he once 
controlled, SBS-Agro, collapsed during 
Russia's financial crisis in 1998, leaving 
thousands of ordinary people without their 
life savings. While many Russian lives 
were ruined by the 1998 crash, 
Aleksander Smolensky somehow 
managed to prosper and created a new 
bank that his son briefly chaired before it 
was sold for $325 million. 
 
Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky 
Dwindling When Forbes published its first Russian 
rich list in 2004, Khodorkovsky headed it 
with an estimated $23.6 billion. The 
original source of his wealth was oil, via 
the Yukos company that he built up during 
the 1990s. He is serving his eight-year 
sentence in a Siberian penal colony. His 
supporters contend that he was 
imprisoned because of his growing interest 
in politics, and his opposition to President 
Putin. 
 
Vladimir 
Gusinsky 
Dwindling Gusinsky‘s case, similarly shows how 
dependent oligarchs are on the Kremlin's 
suport. Gusinsky flourished under 
President Boris Yeltsin but subsequently 
his empire collapsed when president 
Vladimir Putin came to power. In the 
1990s Gusinsky founded Media Most, a 
company that included the Segodnya 
newspaper, independent TV station NTV, 
and a banking and property empire. NTV 
became the Kremlin's target because of its 
highly critical coverage of the war in 
Chechnya. As a consequence, in 2000 
Gusinsky was accused of embezzlement 
and money laundering and was forced into 
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exile. He now lives in Israel. 
 
Leonid Nevzlin Dwindling  Nevzlin must be one of the few billionaires 
who is also wanted for murder. Like 
Khodorkovsky, he lost Kremlin's suport but 
instead a prison now lives in Israel. He 
contends that the fraud and murder 
charges against him are completely 
fabricated for political reasons. He became 
a computer programmer working with 
Khodorkovsky in the late 1980s and 
remained the famous oligarch's right-hand 
man until 2001. 
 
Paul Klebnikov -  An American of Russian origin, Klebnikov 
was the editor of the Russian edition of 
Forbes, and it was he who in May 2004 
published the country's first authoritative 
rich list. Less than two months after the list 
appeared in the public domain, Klebnikov 
was shot dead in a contract killing. His 
killers have never been found and some 
believe that he may have been killed 
because of his exposure of the famously 
secretive oligarchs. 
 
Source: Edited from Osborn (2006). 
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